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SUMMARY 
 
The thesis investigates the extent to which cross-border taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters in relation to Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and 
Uganda is allowed. Such evidence-taking is not only governed by the domestic law of the state 
seeking evidence abroad and that of the state where the relevant means of proof are located, but 
also by public international law, and more specifically by the concept of sovereignty. The ad-
missibility of the cross-border taking of evidence under public international law depends on 
whether or not evidence-gathering in civil litigation is regarded as a judicial act, which violates 
sovereignty when performed on foreign territory, or as a purely private act. In the first case, the 
evidentiary material has to be obtained through channels of international judicial assistance. 
Such assistance can either be rendered based on the basis of an international treaty, or through 
courtoisie internationale. No international judicial assistance is necessary in cases of a so-
called “transfer of foreign evidence”, provided no compulsion is applied which infringes the 
sovereignty of the foreign state. 
The thesis analyses the taking of evidence abroad based on the Hague Evidence Convention, 
and the Hague Procedure Convention. It further expounds how evidence located in Switzer-
land, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda can be obtained for the benefit of civil proceed-
ings pending abroad in the absence of any relevant international treaty. The thesis also exam-
ines under what conditions a litigant in civil proceedings in the aforementioned countries may 
request evidence to be taken on foreign soil. The position of cross-border taking of evidence in 
civil and commercial matters in the said countries is assessed, and suggestions are made on 
how such status quo may be improved. The thesis makes an attempt to establish the basic prin-
ciples for a convention on evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters between South Af-
rica, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. The development of such principles, however, 
is only possible once the similarities and differences in the procedure for the taking of evidence 
and the means of proof in the relevant laws of the aforesaid countries have been identified. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Context of Thesis 
In the course of worldwide globalisation and the facilitation of the transfer of goods, services, 
and persons across national borders, civil and commercial interaction between individuals or 
entities domiciled in different countries has gained in significance over the last few decades. 
The growth of cross-border relations has inevitably resulted in an increase in both international 
civil disputes and litigation. In the majority of such legal proceedings, courts and parties are 
faced with evidence located outside the state in which the lawsuit is pending.  
In practice, experience in civil proceedings often demonstrates that to be right and to be proven 
to be right are sometimes two different things. The result of any court case depends largely on 
the extent to which the litigant bearing the onus of proof, normally the plaintiff, is able to prove 
the facts in dispute. Thus, the lawsuit of a plaintiff can succeed only where the evidence neces-
sary to establish the claim is accessible to the plaintiff, even if that requires the support of the 
trial court. Where the relevant means of proof are located in the state of the trial court, obtain-
ing evidence will be a purely domestic matter and generally will not cause major problems for 
the plaintiff. The situation is different, however, with regard to evidence situated in a foreign 
state. Here, the taking of evidence not only affects the jurisdiction of the trial court, but it also 
involves another state. In other words, the obtaining of evidence is no longer just a national af-
fair, but it has an international impact. The following example illustrates the problems which 
typically arise from the cross-border taking of evidence: 
A motor vehicle accident occurred in Switzerland between A, a Swiss national domiciled in 
Switzerland, and B, a South African residing in South Africa. A sues B in Switzerland claim-
ing damages. B rejects A’s claim alleging that the accident was A’s fault. To support his alle-
gation, B calls C, a South African national domiciled in Namibia, who was a passenger in B’s 
car at the time of the accident, as witness. Against this background, the following questions 
arise: can the Swiss court examine B and C who live in South Africa and Namibia, respective-
ly? Is the Swiss judge entitled to travel to South Africa and Namibia to question B and C? Are 
B and C under an obligation to cooperate with the Swiss court, in particular to attend court in 
Switzerland? Does the Swiss court require the involvement of any South African and Namibian 
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authority in order to obtain the testimony of B and C? What law governs the examination of B 
and C? 
Given the aforesaid international impact, the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters is not only subject to the domestic rules of the state of the trial court and the 
foreign state where the relevant evidence is located, but also to public international law which 
governs the relation between states. One of the cornerstones of public international law is the 
sovereignty of states which includes the right of a state to exercise functions of a state within 
its borders to the exclusion of other states. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the concept of sov-
ereignty is closely intertwined with the cross-border taking of evidence and determines to what 
extent the latter is admissible under public international law.  
In the light of the above, the trial court seeking evidence abroad does not only have to take into 
account its own interests, but also those of the foreign state where the relevant means of proof 
are located. As a result, the cross-border taking of evidence is often faced with a dilemma: on 
the one hand, the need of the trial court to obtain the evidence necessary to establish all the rel-
evant facts to make a correct court ruling; on the other, the wish of the foreign state to safe-
guard its sovereignty, and to protect the interests of its residents against interference from the 
state where the trial court is situated. 
II. Scope of Thesis 
The thesis focuses on the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. It 
does not deal with the taking of evidence in criminal, fiscal, or administrative matters. In addi-
tion, questions related to the recognition and enforcement of judgments are excluded. The ser-
vice of judicial documents abroad is, in the sense of an excursus, marginally discussed in the 
context of the so-called “transfer of foreign evidence”. The thesis is moreover limited to the 
taking of evidence in pending civil proceedings. It therefore does not address the preservation 
of evidence that may take place before proceedings are initiated. The thesis deals with the pro-
cedure for the taking of evidence, as well as the means of proof; however, it excludes questions 
regarding the admissibility and weight of evidence, as well as the burden of proof.  
The thesis is confined to the cross-border-taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters in 
Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Based on the fact that the 
thesis is submitted at the University of South Africa and the author is a Swiss qualified attor-
ney at law, the choice of South Africa and Switzerland stands to reason. Moreover, Switzerland 
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is a good example of a civil-law country while, at least with regard to its rules on civil proce-
dure, South Africa
1
 follows the common-law tradition. The choice of Botswana, Namibia, Ni-
geria, and Uganda was necessitated by the lack of research material for other African countries. 
From a practical point of view, it would have made more sense to focus on countries of the so-
called “Southern African Development Community” (“SADC”)2 would have made more sense. 
However, the scarcity of sources dealing with the legal systems of some of the SADC countries 
compelled the author to let her gaze wander beyond the boundaries of the SADC and to include 
Nigeria and Uganda within the scope of the thesis. 
Where reference is made to civil proceedings pending in Switzerland, the focus lies on the so-
called “ordinary proceedings” (“ordentliches Verfahren”) before the District Court or the 
Commercial Court. As the name suggests, this type of proceedings usually applies in civil and 
commercial matters with a value in dispute higher than 30,000 Swiss Francs.
3
 With regard to 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, reference is made to action proceed-
ings pending before the High Court of the particular country. This type of proceedings is most 
comparable to the aforesaid ordinary proceedings under Swiss law. 
III. Research Methodology  
Chapter 2 analyses the relation between the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters and the public international law concept of sovereignty. The term “cross-
border taking of evidence” forms the point of departure in this Chapter. It also explains the no-
tion and the different elements of sovereignty. The Chapter proceeds to examine whether the 
taking of evidence constitutes a judicial act which may infringe the sovereignty of the foreign 
state where the evidence to be obtained is located. Since this question depends on whether it is 
the trial court that is, or the parties that are, in control of evidence-taking in civil proceedings, 
civil litigation in the common-law and civil-law traditions is outlined, and the major differ-
ences between the two systems are identified. Chapter 2 also addresses international judicial 
assistance in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters. The legal basis and applicable 
                                                     
1
 As well as Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. 
2
 Apart from South Africa, the SADC includes not only South Africa’s immediate neighbours, namely Botswa-
na, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, but also Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia. For more information on the 
SADC, cf. http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/ (date of use: 26 June 2013). 
3
 Cf. Article 219 read in conjunction with Article 243(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code of 19 December 
2008, SR 272. For the (unofficial) English translation of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, see 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/210.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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law relating to international judicial assistance, as well as the different forms of such assistance 
are expounded.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the transfer of foreign evidence from abroad to the jurisdiction of the trial 
court as an alternative for such court to obtain foreign evidence compared to international judi-
cial assistance. The main differences between these two forms of evidence-taking are analysed. 
The Chapter also examines whether and, if so, to what extent, a transfer of foreign evidence is 
limited by the sovereignty of the foreign state. It investigates whether litigants and third parties 
are under an obligation to cooperate with the trial court in obtaining foreign evidence, and 
whether the former may apply coercive measures against recalcitrant witnesses. Chapter 3 pro-
ceeds to analyse the different forms of a transfer of foreign evidence, as well as the service 
abroad of a respective request of the trial court. 
In Chapter 4, the rules that govern cross-border taking of evidence in relation to Switzerland, 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are addressed. The discussion not only 
includes the domestic rules of the said countries, but also the Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of 18 March 1970, and the Convention on Civil 
Procedure of 1 March 1954. The status quo of cross-border taking of evidence in the aforemen-
tioned countries is assessed, and suggestions are made as to how the situation can be improved 
in these countries. 
Chapter 5 deals with the means of proof and the procedure for the taking of evidence in civil 
proceedings pending in Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda.  
In Chapter 6, an attempt is made to generate the basic principles for a proposed convention on 
the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters between South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. The most preferable method for judicial assistance 
in evidence-taking between the foregoing countries is identified. Suggestions are also made 
with regard to the main points to be considered in such a convention. 
Chapter 7 summarises the major conclusions reached in the thesis. 
The method of research followed with regard to chapters 1-6 is based on the study of statutes, 
reported case law, governmental and inter-governmental legal opinions and records, text books, 
law journals, monographs, and internet resources. With regard to Nigeria, it has to be men-
tioned that case law is reported in more than 40 different law reports, published by both official 
and unofficial publishers. The publication of many series of law reports, however, be they from 
 5 
 
official or unofficial publishers, were discontinued, and in the case of some of the series after 
the publication of only a few volumes. As a result, access to law reports from outside Nigeria 
has proved difficult. Although a considerable number of series of law reports were accessible 
in libraries in South Africa, Botswana, and Germany, not all the different series could be re-
viewed. The same holds true with regard to the law reports from Uganda. Although, compared 
to Nigeria, the number of series of law reports published in Uganda is more limited, access 
from outside Uganda is restricted. In spite of these limitations and constraints, it has been pos-
sible to undertake in-depth research of the legal systems of the African countries dealt with in 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CROSS-BORDER TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
I. Introduction and Terminology 
The extent to which the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters is ad-
missible under public international law is intimately connected with the sovereignty of states. 
Thus, this chapter focuses on the relationship between the concept of sovereignty in public in-
ternational law and the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. The 
notion of “cross-border taking of evidence” forms the point of departure for this chapter. Sub-
sequently, the concept of sovereignty is explained, and the restrictions, which result from this 
concept when obtaining evidence abroad, are analysed. In this context, whether the taking of 
evidence constitutes an act of state that interferes with the sovereignty of the foreign state 
where the evidentiary material is situated is examined. Finally, the chapter deals with interna-
tional judicial assistance as a means to overcome the said restrictions in respect to the cross-
border taking of evidence. 
In the course of this thesis, the notion “trial court” is used for the court where the lawsuit, for 
which evidence located abroad is sought, is pending. The country, where the said evidence is 
situated, is referred to as “foreign state”. The term “foreign court” or “foreign authority” relates 
to the judicial or any other governmental body in the foreign state involved in the cross-border 
taking of evidence. “Foreign litigant”, “foreign third party” or “foreign witness” refers to a liti-
gant, a third party or a witness
1
 who is domiciled in the foreign state. Finally, “foreign evi-
dence” describes evidentiary material that is located in a foreign state, or is in possession or 
under the control of a foreign litigant or foreign third party. 
II. Cross-border Taking of Evidence 
Cross-border taking of evidence is necessary where a litigant in civil proceedings pending be-
fore the trial court wishes to obtain evidence that is located in a foreign state. It goes without 
saying that cross-border taking of evidence occurs where the testimony of a foreign litigant or 
third party, or evidence that involves an immovable property or location situated in a different 
                                                     
1
 For the differentiation between “third parties” and “witnesses”, see fn. 51 below. 
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state than that of the trial court, is sought. However, what if the relevant evidence includes 
documents or movable property? Here, depending on where the litigant or third party control-
ling the documents or property is domiciled, two configurations can be distinguished: on the 
one hand, the case where the litigant or third party is situated in the state of the trial court, but 
the evidence administered by him is located abroad. On the other hand, the litigant or third par-
ty may be domiciled in a foreign state while the relevant evidence is situated either within or 
outside the state of the trial court.
2
 
It is submitted that cross-border taking of evidence only occurs in the second case, that is, 
where the litigant or the third party controlling the evidence and the trial court are located in 
different states. This holds particularly true for documents, but it also applies to movable prop-
erty. In many cases, the location of documents is purely accidental and can, moreover, easily 
be changed.
3
 In contrast, a change of legal residence of the litigant or third party administering 
the documents from one country to another is entirely more troublesome. More importantly, 
however, is the fact that a court order for production of documents has to be issued towards the 
person who is in possession or, at least, in control of the relevant documents. In other words, 
such an order is not aimed at the documents, but at the individual administering the documents. 
The emphasis thus clearly lies on the domicile of the respective person and not the location of 
the documents.
4
 Having said this, the situation mentioned above in which the litigant or third 
party, domiciled in the state of the trial court, and controlling documents which are located 
abroad, is therefore regarded not as a cross-border matter, but as a purely domestic issue. 
III. Sovereignty 
A. Concept of Sovereignty 
The sovereignty of states
5
 is a core concept under public international law and is closely con-
nected with the fundamental doctrine of the equality of states. According to the latter, each 
                                                     
2
 Cf. also Küttler A Das Erlangen von Beweisen in den USA zur Verwertung im deutschen Zivilprozeß 2007 
128. 
3
 A plaintiff, for instance, keeps the relevant documents in his holiday home abroad and not at his permanent 
legal residence. 
4
 Cf. also Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaffung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen 
der Beweisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internationalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 134; Meier AL Die Anwendung 
des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für 
U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 60 et seq. 
5
 See in this regard Steinberger H ʻSovereigntyʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
Volume IV 2000 500, who emphasises that “sovereignty is the most glittering and controversial notion in the 
history, doctrine and practice of public international law” and that the meaning of sovereignty “has oscillated 
throughout the history of law and of the State since medieval times”. 
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state is independent and not subject to the power of any other state.
6
 As a result, a state has, to 
the exclusion of any other state, the monopoly on the exercise within its borders of the func-
tions of a state over its affairs and subjects.
7
 Sovereignty, however, not only includes a positive 
right, the competence to exercise power, but also a negative or defence right against any inter-
ference from other states.
8
 Hence, it also contains the obligation of states to respect the inde-
pendence of other states.
 
As a result, sovereignty is not an absolute concept, but it is of a rela-
tive nature, as it is restricted by the sovereignty of other states. It can thus only be exercised to 
an extent which does not interfere with the sovereignty of another state.
 
Consequently, the sov-
ereignty merely exists within the confines of public international law or, put differently, the 
degree of sovereignty is restricted by the principles laid down in public international law.
9
 In 
the so-called Island of Palmas-case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that the: 
“(...) sovereignty (...) involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a 
State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the 
territory the rights of other States (...).”
10
 
B. Elements of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty as a general concept includes three elements, namely, territorial sovereignty, per-
sonal sovereignty, and so-called “facultas jurisdictionis”. 
                                                     
6
 Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 
233, 236; Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/3 2002 783 et seqq.; Ipsen K Völkerrecht 
2004 367 n. 7; Geiger R Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht: mit Europarecht: die Bezüge des Staatsrechts zum Völ-
kerrecht und Europarecht 2010 281; Anand RP ʻSovereign Equality of States in International Lawʼ in 
Académie de Droit International (ed) Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law 1986 II 1987 22; Steinberger H ʻSovereigntyʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law Volume IV 2000 515; Castro-Rial JM ʻStates, Sovereign Equalityʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclope-
dia of Public International Law Volume IV 2000 682 et seq.; Kingsbury B ʻSovereignty and Inequalityʼ 1998 
European Journal of International Law 600, 603 et seq.; Shearer IA Starke’s Introduction to International 
Law 1994 99 et seq. See also Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations of 26 June 1945 stating that the 
United Nations is based on the “sovereign equality” of states. For the text of the said Charter, cf. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
7
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective 2011 146; Lookofsky JM and Hertz K Transnational 
Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, European, and International Law 2004 467. 
8
 Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen 
staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 64; Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R 
Völkerrecht Band I/3 2002 784; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 46 n. 119; Leipold D Lex 
fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 34. 
9
 Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 
213 et seq., 215; Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/3 2002 783; Schabenberger A Der 
Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 22; Oeter S ʻSouveränität – ein überholtes Konzept?ʼ in 
Cremer H-J et al (eds) Tradition und Weltoffenheit des Rechts: Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger 2002 276. 
10
 Island of Palmas-case 1928 2 RIIA 829 at 839. See also Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others [2004] 2 All SA 37 (T) at 48; Abdi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Oth-
ers [2011] 3 All SA 117 (SCA) at 128. 
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1. Territorial Sovereignty 
Territorial sovereignty
11
 means the sole power of a state over its own territory. As a conse-
quence, a state may, for instance, without interference of any other state cede a part of its terri-
tory to a third state.
12
 Territorial authority is regarded as part of territorial sovereignty and 
stands for the state’s competence to perform acts of state within its borders to the exclusion of 
other states. Such competence extends to all property and subjects located on the state’s territo-
ry, regardless of the subjects’ nationality or the reasons for their stay in that particular state 
(domicile or temporary residence).
13
 Conversely, the exclusivity of territorial authority pre-
cludes a state from performing acts of state on the territory of a foreign state, unless the latter 
gives its permission.
14
 In the so-called Lotus-case, the Permanent Court of International 
 
                                                     
11
 This terminology follows the German doctrine which has greatly influenced the discussion on sovereignty in 
continental Europe and beyond Europe’s borders. This doctrine divides the so-called “territoriale 
Hoheitsgewalt” (territorial supremacy) into “territoriale Souveränität” (territorial sovereignty) and “Ge-
bietshoheit” (territorial authority). The legal literature, however, does often not clearly distinguish between 
“territoriale Souveränität” and “Gebietshoheit”, but also uses the former when referring to “Gebietshoheit”. 
See Verdross 1949 Ius gentium 248, 252, who was the first legal scholar to introduce such distinction in Ger-
many. See also Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völker-
rechtssubjekte 1989 318; Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 25; Siegrist 
D Hoheitsakte auf fremdem Staatsgebiet 1987 9; Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen 
des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 39 fn. 70; Verdross A, Simma B and Geiger R ʻTerritoriale Souve-
ränität und Gebietshoheitʼ in 1980 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 223; Gei-
ger R Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht: mit Europarecht: die Bezüge des Staatsrechts zum Völkerrecht und Euro-
parecht 2010 233. 
12
 Siegrist D Hoheitsakte auf fremdem Staatsgebiet 1987 9; Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grund-
fragen des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 39 fn. 70; Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaffung im 
deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Beweisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internationalen 
Rechtshilfeweges 2000 20; Shaw MN International Law 2008 487 et seq. See also Dugard J International 
Law: A South African Perspective 2011 125 fn. 3 with reference to the Island of Palmas-case 1928 2 RIIA 
829-871. 
13
 Verdross A, Simma B and Geiger R ʻTerritoriale Souveränität und Gebietshoheitʼ in 1980 Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 225, 240, 243; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 
2009 46 n. 119; Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaffung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen der Beweisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internationalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 20; Dahm G, Delbrück 
J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/3 2002 319, 793; Dixon M Textbook on International Law 2007 143, 
146; Anand RP ʻSovereign Equality of States in International Lawʼ in Académie de Droit International (ed) 
Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1986 II 1987 27 et seq.; 
Meng W ʻExtraterritorial Effects of Administrative Judicial and Legislative Actsʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Ency-
clopedia of Public International Law Volume II 1995 340; Torres Bernárdez S ʻTerritorial Sovereigntyʼ in 
Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume IV 2000 826; Shearer IA Starke’s Intro-
duction to International Law 1994 144. See also Commissioner of Taxes, Federation of Rhodesia v McFarland 
[1965] 1 All SA 389 (W) at 393 et seq. 
14
 Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/3 2002 792; Anand RP ʻSovereign Equality of States 
in International Lawʼ in Académie de Droit International (ed) Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law 1986 II 1987 28; Steinberger H ʻSovereigntyʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume IV 2000 516; Shaw MN International Law 2008 490; 
Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaffung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Be-
weisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internationalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 20; Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im 
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Justice described territorial sovereignty as follows:15  
“Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may 
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this 
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State out-
side its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from interna-
tional custom or from a convention.”16 
In the context of cross-border taking of evidence, the question arises whether the taking of evi-
dence for the benefit of proceedings pending before the trial court is an act of state which can-
not be performed in a foreign state, unless the latter gives its permission.
17
 
2. Personal Sovereignty 
As explained earlier,
18
 territorial sovereignty encompasses all subjects located in a particular 
state, irrespective of their nationality. In contrast, personal sovereignty focuses on individuals 
of a specific nationality who stay, permanently or temporarily, in a foreign state. Based on per-
sonal sovereignty, a state has governmental power over those of its nationals who reside 
abroad.
19
 In the case of individuals with dual nationality, that is, the nationality of the country 
where they were born and the nationality of the foreign state in which they reside, it is submit-
ted that the nationality of that state with which the person is more closely associated will pre-
vail. This is normally the country of residence where the individual has his family and social 
ties.
20
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 26; Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des In-
ternationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 39; Trittmann RA ʻExtraterritoriale Beweisaufnahmen und Souveräni-
tätsverletzungen im deutsch-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehrʼ 1989 Archiv des Völkerrechts 195; Müller A 
Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme im Europäischen Justizraum 2004 22; VPB 65 (2001) no. 71 2; VPB 
59 (1995) no. 156 consideration I; BGE 133 I 239 consideration 2.5.1. 
15
 S.S. Lotus 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) no. 10 19 et seq. 
16
 See also the Island of Palmas-case in 1928 2 RIIA 838, where the Permanent Court of International Justice 
held the following: “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in re-
gard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusivity of an other States, the functions 
of a State.” 
17
 Cf. para. IV.A below. 
18
 See para. III.B.1 above. 
19
 Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 
216; Anand RP ʻSovereign Equality of States in International Lawʼ in Académie de Droit International (ed) 
Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1986 II 1987 29; Meng W 
ʻExtraterritorial Effects of Administrative Judicial and Legislative Actsʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law Volume II 1995 340; Stadler A Der Schutz des Unternehmensgeheimnisses im deut-
schen und US-amerikanischen Zivilprozess und im Rechtshilfeverfahren 1989 271 et seq.; Schabenberger A 
Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 33; Torres Bernárdez S ʻTerritorial Sovereigntyʼ in 
Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume IV 2000 829. 
20
 Cf. also Stein T and von Buttlar C Völkerrecht 2012 204 n. 570 who use the term of “effektive Staatsangehö-
rigkeit”, which translates literally as “effective nationality”. 
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In cases where an individual is domiciled outside his state of origin, the latter’s personal sover-
eignty may come into conflict with the territorial authority of his state of residence, as the per-
son is subject to both the personal sovereignty of his state of origin and the territorial authority 
of his state of residence. In the context of the cross-border taking of evidence, such conflict 
may, for instance, occur if an individual residing in a different country than his state of origin 
is requested to testify in proceedings pending in the latter state. Here, the question arises as to 
whether the state of origin can order its nationals domiciled abroad to give evidence in the said 
proceedings.
21
 The answer to this question depends on the relation between personal and terri-
torial sovereignty. In other words, whether personal sovereignty prevails over territorial author-
ity and vice versa. 
3. Facultas Jurisdictionis 
It follows from the concept of sovereignty that each state has so-called “facultas jurisdic-
tionis” which includes the jurisdiction to prescribe, the jurisdiction to enforce, and the jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate.
22
 The jurisdiction to prescribe refers to the power of a state to enact laws and 
issue rules, in other words, the state’s competence to make its law applicable to a particular 
event. In this regard, the question arises as to whether a state can extend its laws to persons, 
property and acts outside its territory, or whether such extension interferes with the sovereignty 
of other states. The jurisdiction to enforce relates to the territorial extent to which a state is al-
lowed to enforce its laws and to sanction their disregard,
23
 while the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
describes the power of a state to render a decision that takes effect abroad.
24
 Both the jurisdic-
tion to prescribe and the jurisdiction to enforce are relevant in the context of cross-border tak-
                                                     
21
 Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 33. See further on this subject Chap-
ter 3. 
22
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective 2011 146; Kaczorowska A Public International Law 
2010 309; Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 36 et seq.; Stadler A Der 
Schutz des Unternehmensgeheimnisses im deutschen und US-amerikanischen Zivilprozess und im Rechtshilfe-
verfahren 1989 271; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 182 n. 371 et seqq.; Dahm G, Delbrück 
J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 319; Schlosser P 
ʻExtraterritoriale Rechtsdurchsetzung im Zivilprozessʼ in Pfister B and Will MR (eds) Festschrift für Werner 
Lorenz zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 1991 505; Shaw MN International Law 2008 649. Unlike Schabenberger 
and Stadler, Schlosser, Dahm, Delbrück and Wolfrum do not consider the facultas jurisdictionis as an inde-
pendent element of sovereignty, but as a part of territorial authority. The question of whether or not the fac-
ultas jurisdictionis is regarded as a third element of sovereignty, is from a practical point of view of small im-
portance as the facultas jurisdictionis is covered by sovereignty in any case. 
23
 Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 37; Geimer E Internationale Beweis-
aufnahme 1998 21 et seq.; Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die 
Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 319 with reference to the Lotus-case; Shaw MN International Law 2008 649, 650 et 
seq. 
24
 Geimer E Internationale Beweisaufnahme 1998 22; Kokott J, Doehring K and Buergenthal T Grundzüge des 
Völkerrechts 2003 148; Thallinger G Grundrechte und extraterritoriale Hoheitsrechte 2008 11 et seq.; Shaw 
MN International Law 2008 651. 
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ing of evidence, as they determine whether a state may include rules on the taking of foreign 
evidence in its domestic law and whether such rules can be enforced and sanctioned abroad. 
The same holds true for the jurisdiction to adjudicate which refers to the question of whether, 
and if so to what extent, a trial court can issue an order regarding evidence located abroad.
25
 
IV. Sovereignty-based Restrictions on the Cross-border Taking of Evidence  
As has been noted above,
26
 the sovereignty of a state is not absolute, but limited by the sover-
eignty of other states.
 
As a result, a state is not allowed to perform any acts of state on the terri-
tory of a foreign state, since such acts interfere with the latter’s sovereignty. The following two 
subchapters deal first with acts of state in general and then investigate whether the taking of 
evidence constitutes such an act.  
A. Act of State 
An act of state is an act performed by a governmental organ in exercise of its official authority. 
This includes, inter alia, acts performed by a police authority or a judicial body. A typical ex-
ample of an act of state is the arrest of a suspect by a police officer or the holding of a court 
hearing by a judge. 
The performance of acts of state is usually reserved to authorities. In practice, however, such 
acts cannot only be carried out by public officials, but also by private individuals, be it based 
upon the authority of a statute or of a public official, or without such permission. In this con-
text, the question arises as to whether such acts of private individuals are to be qualified as acts 
of state. The answer depends on whether the said acts can be imputed to the state. There is no 
doubt that such acts are to be regarded as acts of state where the laws of the state allow private 
individuals to perform such acts,
27
 or where an authority requests them to execute such acts.
28
 
The same must be true for cases where the state did not explicitly instruct private individuals, 
                                                     
25
 See below Chapter 3. 
26
 Cf. para. III.A. 
27
 See in this regard, for instance, Section 42 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which, in 
certain circumstances, allows a private individual to execute an arrest (a so-called “citizen’s arrest”).  
28
 Siegrist D Hoheitsakte auf fremdem Staatsgebiet 1987 79; Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine 
Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Ver-
fahrensrecht 1998 89. See the example in Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der 
aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 
89 where a German customs officer at the German-Austrian border prompted six tourists to follow a car to 
Austria in order to stop the car and bring its driver back to Germany. The tourists detained the driver in Austria 
and handed the latter over to the German authorities. The Austrian government successfully claimed a viola-
tion of Austrian sovereignty. 
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but was aware of the acts to be performed and did not restrain them from doing so. Conse-
quently, the acts were tolerated by the state and can thus be imputed to the latter. In cases, 
however, where the state was not aware of the relevant acts, they should not be regarded as acts 
of state. Here, the private individuals acted on their own authority and their actions should not 
be attributed to the state.
29
 
As has been mentioned earlier,
30
 the sovereignty of a state is closely connected with its territo-
ry, and acts of state performed on foreign soil thus violate the sovereignty of the foreign state. 
The arrest of a suspect by a police officer of state A on the territory of state B therefore in-
fringes the sovereignty of state B. However, what about situations where an act of state is car-
ried out in state A, but has an impact on the territory of state B? This may, for instance, be the 
case where the said police officer fires a gun in state A at a suspect located in state B. Here, not 
only the performance of the act of state as such (the shot by the police officer), but also its re-
sult have to be taken into account. The fact that the outcome of an act of state occurred in a 
foreign state should suffice to qualify the act as an act of state that was performed on foreign 
territory.
31
 What, however, if the aforesaid police officer located in state A interrogates a sus-
pect who resides in state B by telephone? Unlike the example of the shot across a national bor-
der, the result of the act of state (the questioning by the police officer) does not materialise in 
state B, but only in state A; the responses given by the suspect are used in the investigation tak-
ing place in state A. Moreover, the answering of the questions by the suspect in state B does 
not constitute an act of state imputable to state A. In other words, the addressee of an act of 
state does not act in a sovereign manner when complying with such an act.
32
 As a result, the 
telephonic questioning by the police officer does not interfere with the sovereignty of the state 
where the suspect is located. 
An act of state does not require the use or threat of coercive measures. For determining wheth-
er an act qualifies as an act of state, it is thus irrelevant whether a state uses coercive measures 
or not.
33
 As a result, the consent of the addressee of a particular act is immaterial for the quali-
                                                     
29
 Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen 
staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 90; Siegrist D Hoheitsakte auf fremdem 
Staatsgebiet 1987 79.  
30
 See Chapter 1 para. I. 
31
 Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen 
staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 80, 87. 
32
 Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen 
staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 87 et seq., 92 et seq. 
33
 Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 40; 
Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableitbaren Grenzen 
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fication of an act of state, as only states, but not private individuals, can waive their sovereign-
ty.
34
 
B. Taking of Evidence as an Act of State? 
This subchapter first investigates whether there is a general rule on whether evidence-taking in 
civil litigation is to be qualified as an act of state or not. Once the absence of such a rule has 
been established, the nature of taking evidence in civil-law countries, on the one hand, and in 
countries sharing the common-law tradition, on the other, is analysed. In order to fully under-
stand the different approach taken by the civil- and common-law countries in this regard, it is 
necessary to outline the civil procedure in the civil- and common-law systems, and to highlight 
the fundamental differences between these two legal models in terms of gathering evidence in 
civil litigation. Finally, the subchapter deals with Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
which protects the sovereignty of Switzerland by prohibiting activities for the benefit of a for-
eign state on Swiss soil. 
1. Absence of a General Rule 
There is no consensus, let alone an international rule on whether or not the taking of evidence 
in civil litigation can be classified as an act of state or a judicial act, respectively. Rather, it is 
each state that decides whether and, if so, to what extent the collection of evidence within its 
territory is tantamount to a judicial act. In the context of cross-border taking of evidence, it is 
the foreign state, where the evidence to be obtained is located, that determines whether or not 
the procurement of evidence is an exercise of sovereignty. In other words, it is irrelevant 
whether the state, where the trial court seeking foreign evidence is situated, considers the col-
lection of evidence as a private act.
35
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 84; VPB 59 (1995) no. 156 consideration I; 
VPB 65 (2001) no. 71 consideration 3. See also VPB 51 (1987) no. 5 consideration 2.e. 
34
 Siegrist D Hoheitsakte auf fremdem Staatsgebiet 1987 12; Meng W ʻExtraterritorial Effects of Administrative 
Judicial and Legislative Actsʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume II 1995 
339; Müller A Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme im Europäischen Justizraum 2004 23; Stadler A Der 
Schutz des Unternehmensgeheimnisses im deutschen und US-amerikanischen Zivilprozess und im Rechtshilfe-
verfahren 1989 278; Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des Internationalen Zivilpro-
zeßrechts 1989 41, 45; Bertele J Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Eine Untersuchung der aus dem Völker-
recht ableitbaren Grenzen staatlicher extraterritorialer Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht 1998 86 et seq.; 
Geimer E Internationale Beweisaufnahme 1998 15 et seq.; VPB 59 (1995) no. 156 consideration I; VPB 65 
(2001) no. 71 consideration 8. 
35
 Müller A Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme im Europäischen Justizraum 2004 22; Siegrist D Hoheitsak-
te auf fremdem Staatsgebiet 1987 147. 
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In terms of the qualification of evidence-taking, the legal world can be divided into two groups, 
namely the civil-law countries on the one hand, qualifying the taking of evidence as an exercise 
of sovereignty and, on the other, the common-law jurisdiction that regards the collection of ev-
idence as a non-judicial act.
36
 
2. Civil Litigation in the Civil- and Common-law Systems 
a) General Remarks 
Over the years, both the civil-law and the common-law systems have developed with regard to 
civil litigation, and neither of the two legal traditions exists in its pure form, but each is a hy-
brid of the two legal models.
37
 This development not only affected the relation between the civ-
il-law and common-law systems and resulted in a convergence between these two traditions, 
but also the correlation within the civil- and common-law systems. Within both traditions, 
there are many gradations, which make it difficult to portray an archetype of a civil- or com-
mon-law civil procedure that meets all nuances within the civil- and common-law systems, re-
spectively.  
The subsequent description of the general principles underlying civil litigation in the civil-law 
tradition is based on the legal system of Switzerland. Switzerland is a civil-law country whose 
civil litigation procedure is generally similar to that of other countries sharing the civil-law tra-
dition. With regard to civil procedure in the common-law system, the focus lies on South Afri-
ca. South Africa does not, unlike Nigeria, and Uganda, fall into the category of common-law 
jurisdictions, but follows a hybrid system consisting of Roman-Dutch and English law.
38
 The 
                                                     
36
 Müller A Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme im Europäischen Justizraum 2004 22; Lookofsky JM and 
Hertz K Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, European, and In-
ternational Law 2004 468 et seq.; McClean D International Judicial Assistance 1992 57; Oxman BH ʻThe 
Choice between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague 
Conventionʼ 1982-1983 University of Miami Law Review 761 et seq.; Bishop RD ʻInternational Litigation in 
Texas; Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Countriesʼ 1982 Houston Law Review 364 et seq. 
37
 Australian Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 20: Review of the Federal Civil Justice System: Rethinking 
the Federal Civil Litigation System (Closing Date: 8 August 1997) 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/20/02advers.html para. 2.5 (date of use: 31 January 
2013); Australian Law Reform Commission Report 89: Managing Justice – A Review of the Federal Civil Jus-
tice System (2000) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/ch1.html#Heading15 para. 
1.126 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
38
 De Vos WL ʻDevelopments in South African Civil Procedural Law Over the Last Fifty Yearsʼ 2000 Stellen-
bosch Law Review 344; Du Bois F ‘Introduction: History, System and Sources’ in Van der Merwe CG and Du 
Plessis JE (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa 2004 9 et seqq. Cf. also Edwards AB ‘Sources of 
South African Law’ in Hosten WJ et al (eds) Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 1995 382 et 
seqq.; De Bruin J and Barratt A ʻHistory and development of South African lawʼ in Meintjes-Van der Walt et 
al Introduction to South African Law: Fresh Perspectives 2011 18; De Vos WL ʻSouth African civil procedur-
al law in historical and social contextʼ 2002 Stellenbosch Law Review 238 et seqq.; Du Plessis J ʻThe promises 
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rules on civil procedure in South Africa, however, are derived from the English law
39
 and can 
thus serve as an example of common-law civil procedure.
40
 The same holds true for civil litiga-
tion procedure in Botswana and Namibia.
41
 
b) Civil Litigation in the Civil-law System 
In Switzerland, civil litigation procedure is divided into three stages, namely, the pleading 
stage, the trial stage, and the judgment stage. In the course of the pleading stage, the litigants 
exchange their statement of claim and statement of defence which, amongst others, include the 
presentation of the key facts underlying the claims, as well as the prayers for relief.
42
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                        
and pitfalls of mixed legal systems: the South African and Scottish experiencesʼ 1998 Stellenbosch Law Re-
view 340 et seq.; Barrat A, Snyman P, and Kapindu E Researching South African Law (2010 update) 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa1.htm (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
39
 Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 2010 6; Malan FR et al ʻTransnational Litiga-
tion in South African Lawʼ 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 108; De Vos WL ʻDevelopments in 
South African Civil Procedural Law Over the Last Fifty Yearsʼ 2000 Stellenbosch Law Review 344. Cf. also 
Du Bois F ‘Introduction: History, System and Sources’ in Van der Merwe CG and Du Plessis JE (eds) Intro-
duction to the Law of South Africa 2004 11; De Vos WL ʻSouth African civil procedural law in historical and 
social contextʼ 2002 Stellenbosch Law Review 241 et seqq.; Erasmus HJ ʻLaw of Civil Procedureʼ in van der 
Merwe CG and Du Plessis JE (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa 2004 432 et seqq. Civil litigation 
in the United States differs substantially from the Anglo-Saxon civil procedure. This is true, in particular, with 
regard to the extent of discovery and the fact that in the United States, juries are still involved in civil cases. 
Regarding the differences between discovery in England and the United States, see, for instance, Junker A 
Discovery im deutsch-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehr 1987 60 et seq.; McClean D International Judicial Assis-
tance 1992 60 et seq.; Bishop RD ʻInternational Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Countriesʼ 
1982 Houston Law Review 365. For a brief outline of civil-law and common-law civil litigation, see Volken P 
Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 115 n. 161 et seqq.; Swiss Federal Council Botschaft be-
treffend Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Han-
delssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1274; Stürner R ʻParteiherrschaft versus Richtermacht: Materiel-
le Prozessleitung und Sachverhaltsaufklärung zwischen Verhandlungsmaxime und Effizienzʼ 2010 Zeitschrift 
für Zivilprozess 149 et seqq.; Ingenhoven T Grenzüberschreitender Rechtsschutz durch englische Gerichte: 
Prozessuale Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten für ausländische Unternehmen im Forum London 2001 30 et seqq.; 
Stiefel E and Petzinger WF ʻDeutsche Parallelprozesse zur Abwehr amerikanischer Beweiserhebungsverfah-
ren?ʼ 1983 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 244. See also Murray PL ʻEin rechtsvergleichendes Experi-
mentʼ 1999 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 291 et seqq.  
40
 Throughout the thesis, South Africa will thus be treated as a common-law country in relation to the conduct of 
civil proceedings, including the taking of evidence. 
41
 Prior to their independence in 1966 and 1990, respectively, Botswana and Namibia were administered by 
South Africa. As a consequence, the then South African common law, being a mixture of Roman-Dutch law 
and English law, was extended to the said countries. For more in this regard, cf. Fombad CM and Booi L Bot-
swana’s Legal System and Legal Research (May/June 2011 update) 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Botswana1.htm (date of use: 31 January 2013); Geraldo M, Skeffers 
Nowases I, and Nandago H Researching Namibian Law and the Namibian Legal System (January 2013 up-
date) http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Namibia1.htm (date of use: 31 January 2013); Pain JH ʻThe re-
ception of English and Roman-Dutch law in Africa with reference to Botswana, Lesotho and Swazilandʼ 1978 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 163 et seq. See also Kakuli GM ‘The histori-
cal sources and development of civil procedure and practice in the High Court of Botswana’ 1995 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 185 who points out that “the procedural law of Botswana is basically that of South Africa”. Hav-
ing said this, also Botswana and Namibia will be treated as common-law contries in relation to the conduct of 
civil proceedings. 
42
 Article 221(1)(b) and (d) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
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pleadings must also indicate the evidence offered for the allegations of fact.
43
 If available at the 
time, the documentary evidence has to be enclosed with the pleadings.
44
  
Once the parties have concluded their pleadings, the judge reviews the latter together with the 
documentary evidence submitted, and makes himself familiar with the case. Thereafter, he 
schedules a hearing for the litigants and their counsel.
45
 Prior to such hearing, the court issues 
the so-called ”Beweisverfügung”, where the judge decides what the relevant issues in dispute 
are and what evidence proffered by the parties in their pleadings is admitted.
46
 The judge fur-
thermore decides whether or not it is necessary to obtain an expert opinion. In the former case, 
he not only determines whom to appoint as an expert, but he also instructs the latter as to which 
aspect requires an expert opinion.
47
 
The trial phase consists of one or several oral hearings.
48
 In the course of such hearings, the 
court may discuss the case with the parties and their counsel, sometimes revealing its provi-
sional views on the probable outcome of the lawsuit. The court may also make an attempt to 
persuade the parties to settle the case amicably.
49
 The core element of the trial stage, however, 
is the hearing of evidence.
50
 The examination of the litigants, non-party witnesses,
51
 and ex-
perts is conducted by the judge.
52
 Once the court has concluded its interrogation of witnesses 
and experts, the litigants or their counsel may pose via the judge additional questions.
53
 At the 
conclusion of the hearing of evidence, the parties have the opportunity to comment on the out-
                                                     
43
 Article 221(1)(e) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
44
 Article 221(2)(c) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
45
 Articles 226 and 228 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
46
 Article 154 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
47
 Articles 183(1) and 185(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Under Swiss law, experts are not regarded as 
ordinary third party witnesses. For more in this regard, see Chapter 5 para. B.1. 
48
 Articles 226, 228, 231, and 232 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Cf. also Langbein JH ʻThe German Ad-
vantage in Civil Procedureʼ 1985 University of Chicago Law Review 826 et seq. 
49
 Article 226(1)-(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See also Langbein JH ʻThe German Advantage in Civil 
Procedureʼ 1985 University of Chicago Law Review 828, 832. 
50
 In Switzerland, the so-called “Beweisabnahme”. Cf. Article 231 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.  
51
 Unlike common-law countries, civil-law jurisdictions distinguish between the testimony by “parties” and by 
“witnesses”. As a result, a party cannot be a witness and vice versa. See Article 169 of the Swiss Civil Proce-
dure Code. Cf. also Gerber DJ ʻExtraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany 
and the United Statesʼ 1986 American Journal of Comparative Law 758. For more on this distinction, see 
Chapter 5 para. B.1. To avoid any misunderstandings in this regard, the following terminology will be used 
throughout the thesis: “party witnesses” for litigants, “non-party witnesses” for individuals other than litigants 
and experts, and “witnesses” for party witnesses, non-party witnesses, and experts.  
52
 Articles 172, 187, and 191(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
53
 Article 173 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
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come of the hearing.
54
 Once the matter is due for a court ruling, that is, after developing the 
key facts and hearing the litigants’ arguments, the judge decides the case.55 
c) Civil Litigation in the Common-law System 
In South Africa, civil litigation can be broken down into four sections, namely pleadings, pre-
trial procedures, trial, and judgment.
56
 The first stage of civil procedure under South African 
law parallels the pleading stage in civil litigation in Switzerland. In the pleadings, the litigants 
give, inter alia, details of their respective claims and state the material facts of the case upon 
which the judge is called to adjudicate.
57
 Unlike under Swiss law, pleadings do not indicate any 
means of proof, and as a result, no documentary evidence has to be appended to the plead-
ings.
58
 The fact that evidence has not to be pleaded was described by Judge Kotze as follows:
59
 
“It is a trite rule of pleading that a defendant is entitled to know what the case 
is which he has to meet. He is not entitled to know the evidence, but he may 
demand to know what are the grounds upon which the claim is based.” 
The pleading stage is followed by the pre-trial phase in which the litigants prepare for trial. The 
object of pre-trial procedures is to ensure a smooth and speedy trial, and to persuade the parties 
to settle the lawsuit amicably prior to, or at least at the beginning of, the trial.
60
 The key ele-
ment of the pre-trial stage is the so-called “discovery” which can be described as the:  
“process by which the parties to a civil cause (...) are enabled to obtain, with-
in certain defined limits, full information of the existence and the contents of 
all relevant documents (...) relating to any matter in question between them 
                                                     
54
 Article 232(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
55
 Article 236(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For more on the procedure for the taking of evidence under 
Swiss law, see Chapter 5 paras. II.B.4 and II.C.3.  
56
 Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 154. 
57
 Rule 18(4) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local Divi-
sions of the High Court of South Africa. These Rules are also known as “Uniform Rules of Court” or “High 
Court Rules”. It is the latter term that will be used throughout this thesis. For more on the object of pleadings, 
see, inter alia, Palmer v Guadagni [1906] 2 Ch 494 at 497; Benson and Simpson v Robinson 1917 WLD 126 at 
130; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corp [1956] AC 218 at 238, 239; Thorp v Holdsworth [1876] 3 Ch D 
637 at 639; HT Group (Pty) Ltd v Hazelhurst [2003] 2 All SA 262 (C) at 265 with further references. See also 
Daniels H Beck’s Theory and Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions 2002 43 et seq.  
58
 Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa Volume 1 2009 565; Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 165; Daniels H Beck’s 
Theory and Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions 2002 45, 47. 
59
 Durr v South African Railways and Harbours 1917 CPD 284 at 287. See also Benson and Simpson v Robinson 
1917 WLD 126 at 129. 
60
 Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 246; Harms LTC Civil Procedure in the Superior 
Courts, Students’ Edition 2003 226. See also De Vos WL ʻDevelopments in South African Civil Procedural 
Law Over the Last Fifty Yearsʼ 2000 Stellenbosch Law Review 345. 
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and which, are, or have been, in their possession, custody or power or in the 
possession of (...) persons on their behalf.”61 
The function of discovery is to inform the litigants prior to the trial stage of all relevant docu-
ments of the opponent in order to assist them in identifying the adversary’s position and assess 
the weakness and strength of their respective cases.
62
 In this sense, discovery serves the so-
called “prozessuale Waffengleichheit”, literally “procedural equality of weapons” or, in this 
instance, the equal fighting chances of the parties.
63
 Each litigant shall be aware of all relevant 
documents so that at the trial, no party can be taken by surprise in relation to documentary evi-
dence. Moreover, discovery serves the purpose of finding out the truth and to guarantee a 
transparent civil litigation.
64 
 
In this context, Sir John Donaldson stated the following:65  
“In plain language litigation is conducted ‘cards face up on the table’. Some 
people from other lands regard this as incomprehensible. ‘Why’ they ask 
‘should I be expected to provide my opponent with the means of defeating 
me?’ The answer, of course, is that litigation is not a war or even a game. It is 
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 Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa Volume 1 2009 777. Cf. Rule 35 of the South African High Court Rules. See also Petė S et al Civ-
il Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 248 et seq.; Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court 
of Botswana 2005 132; Eschenfelder ED Beweiserhebung im Ausland und ihre Verwertung im inländischen 
Zivilprozess: Zur Bedeutung des US-amerikanischen discovery-Verfahrens für das deutsche Erkenntnisverfah-
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 See, amongst others, Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of 
the Supreme Court of South Africa Volume 1 2009 777; Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 
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ʻDiscovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictionʼ 1997-1998 Notre Dame Law Review 1021; 
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so Pelidis v Ndhlamuti 1969 (3) SA 563 (R) at 563F which states that the “rules relating to discovery are de-
signed for the benefit of the parties to an action”. 
63
 For the notion of “Waffengleichheit”, see amongst others, Baumgärtel G ʻAusprägung der prozessualen 
Grundprinzipien der Waffengleichheit und der fairen Prozeßführung im zivilprozessualen Beweisrechtʼ in Bal-
lon OJ and Hagen JJ (eds) Verfahrensgarantien im nationalen und internationalen Prozeßrecht: Festschrift 
Franz Matscher zum 65. Geburtstag 1993 31. 
64
 See, amongst others, Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of 
the Supreme Court of South Africa Volume 1 2009 777; Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 
248 et seq.; Lowenfeld AF ʻDiscovery-Verfahren und internationale Rechtshilfeʼ 1984 Praxis des Internatio-
nalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 52; Junker A Discovery im deutsch-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehr 1987 
82, 108 et seq.; Niehr P Die zivilprozessuale Dokumentenvorlage im deutsch-englischen Rechtshilfeverkehr 
nach der deutschen und der englischen Prozessrechtsreform 2004 59, 100; Meier AL Die Anwendung des 
Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufnahme für 
U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 34; Honegger PC Amerikanische Offenlegungspflichten in Konflikt mit 
schweizerischen Geheimhaltungspflichten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtshilfe bei Steuerhinter-
ziehungen und Insidergeschäften 1986 108; Timmerbeil S Witness Coaching and Adversary System: Der Ein-
fluss der Parteien und ihrer Prozessbevollmächtigten auf Zeugen und Sachverständige im deutschen und U.S.-
amerikanischen Zivilprozess 2004 7 et seq. See also Durbach v Fairway Hotel Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1081 (SR) at 
1093.  
65
 Davies v Eli Lilly & Co and Others [1987] 1 WLR 428 at 431. 
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designed to do real justice between opposing parties and, if the court does not 
have all the relevant information, it cannot achieve this object.”  
Or in the words of the United States Supreme Court where discovery is meant to make a trial 
“less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues 
and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”66  
The discovery process is entirely under the control of the parties. The court is not involved, un-
less a party refuses to comply with the opponent’s request for discovery.67  
Pre-trial procedures, however, not only include discovery, that is, the revealing of documents 
and other recorded material,
68
 but also arrangements for further evidence, such as medical ex-
aminations, inspections of objects or expert evidence, as well as the steps to obtain statements 
of witnesses and to ensure their appearance at the trial.
69
 As in the case of discovery, the reve-
lation of such further evidence is usually conducted by the parties without the involvement of 
the court. This is in particular true with regard to experts who are appointed and instructed by 
the parties.
70
  
The pre-trial stage is concluded with the so-called “pre-trial conference” where the parties, 
usually without the involvement of the court, try to curtail the proceedings by narrowing down 
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 United States v Procter & Gamble Co, 356 U.S. 677 (1958) 682 et seq. See also Frei L ʻDiscovery, Secrecy 
and International Mutual Assistance in Civil Mattersʼ in Zäch R (ed) Litigation of Business Matters in the 
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und ihrer Prozessbevollmächtigten auf Zeugen und Sachverständige im deutschen und U.S.-amerikanischen 
Zivilprozess 2004 8; Stürner R ʻU.S.-amerikanisches und europäisches Verfahrensverständnisʼ in Lutter M et 
al (eds) Festschrift für Ernst C. Stiefel zum 80. Geburtstag 1987 767 et seqq.; Maxeiner J ‘Die Gefahr der 
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len Wirtschaft 443. For a comparison of discovery with the taking of evidence in civil litigation under Swiss 
law, see BGE 132 III 295 consideration 2.1. 
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 For instance, tape recordings, cf. Rule 35(1) of the South African High Court Rules. 
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 Rules 36(1), (6) and (9), as well as 38(1) of the South African High Court Rules; Section 30(1) of the South 
African Supreme Court Act.  
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 For more on expert evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, see Chapter 5 paras. 
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the matters in dispute, settle as many issues as possible and agree how to proceed at the trial.
71
 
The pre-trial phase is followed by the trial, a single continuous event which, as a general prin-
ciple, cannot be interrupted.
72
 
In the course of the trial, the litigants present their evidence gathered during the pre-trial pro-
ceedings. The key element of the trial is the questioning of witnesses which remains the prima-
ry responsibility of the parties. The counsel of the party sustaining the burden of proof, usually 
the plaintiff, first questions each of his witnesses (the so-called “examination in chief”). Fol-
lowing such examination, the witnesses are interrogated by the opponent’s counsel (in the 
“cross-examination”). The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit facts favourable to the 
cross-examiner’s case and to challenge the truth or accuracy of the witness’ version of the dis-
puted events in the examination-in-chief.
73
 Adah describes cross-examination as: 
“the most lethal weapon in the armoury of the advocate. In the hands of an in-
genious advocate, cross-examination is the probing search light which roams 
the dark and unexplored abyss of falsehood, deception and deliberate exag-
geration”74  
and labels cross-examination as: 
“a duel between the advocate and the witness. The cross-examiner either de-
stroys the witness or the witness destroys him”.75 
The counsel, who originally called the witnesses, may then pose additional questions (“re-
examination”). The purpose of re-examination is to:  
“repair any damage that may have been done by the cross-examination and to 
give the witness the opportunity of reconciling any inconsistency or ambigui-
ties”.76 
Once all witnesses of the plaintiff have been examined, the same procedure applies with regard 
to the witnesses called by the defendant; they are examined in chief by the defendant’s counsel, 
                                                     
71
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cross-examined by the plaintiff’s lawyer and re-examined by the counsel for the defendant.77 
The judge is usually not actively involved in the questioning of witnesses, but merely supervis-
es the presentation of evidence by the parties to ensure a fair trial and the observance of the re-
spective rules by the litigants.
78
 Once the parties have presented all their evidence, their legal 
counsel have the opportunity to comment on the results of such presentation.
79
 Following the 
parties’ closing addresses, the trial stage concludes, and the court decides the case based on the 
evidence presented to it and the law.
80
 
d) Fundamental Differences between Civil-law and Common-law Civil Litigation 
In the light of the above, the considerable divergences between civil litigation in countries 
sharing the civil-law tradition and those following the common-law model are evident. This is 
in particular true with regard to the gathering of evidence in civil proceedings. Schlosser de-
scribes this difference as follows:81  
“There is no field where civil law and common law procedural systems are 
more divergent than in the context of obtaining information needed for the 
resolution of a lawsuit”. 
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The key differences in the collection of evidence in civil litigation are, on the one hand, the dis-
tinct role of parties and judges, and, on the other, the clear division in pre-trial and trial in 
common-law civil procedure.
82
 
In the context of the contrasting role of parties and judges in civil-law and common-law civil 
litigation, one often refers to the so-called “adversarial system” as opposed to the “non-
adversarial system” or “inquisitorial system”.83 The adversarial system is the system of civil 
procedure prevailing in countries following the common-law tradition. According to Hurter, 
the adversarial system is based on three assumptions: (i) disputes are private, and (ii) the par-
ties know how best to prepare and present their case (iii) without the involvement of the 
judge.
84
 Or in the words of Sir Jacob:
85
 
“Under the adversary system, the basic assumptions are that civil disputes are 
a matter of private concern for the parties involved, and may even be regarded 
as their private property, although their determination by the courts may have 
wider, more far-reaching, even public repercussions, and that the parties are 
themselves the best judges of how to pursue and serve their own interests in 
the conduct and control of their respective cases, free from the directions of or 
intervention by the court.” 
Under the adversarial system, the parties, and not the judge, thus take the main responsibility 
for “defining the issues in dispute and for investigating and advancing the dispute.”86 Or in the 
words of Hurter:
87
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“under the adversarial system, it is the parties who dictate at all stages the 
form, content and pace of proceedings.” 
Given the above, it is not surprising that in common-law civil litigation, there is no court order 
equivalent to the aforementioned “Beweisverfügung” under Swiss law.88 
In common law, it is the prevailing view that in civil litigation, truth is best found by counsel 
who enquire and present the facts to the court from a partisan perspective.
89
 To put it different-
ly, the “clash of adversaries is a powerful means for hammering out the truth”.90 The cross-
examination of witnesses by the parties’ counsel91 thereby plays an important role and is, 
among other things, portrayed as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth”.92  
In contrast to the common-law counsel, dominant and active in the collection and examination 
of evidence, the common-law judge is not involved in this regard so as not to create any im-
pression of partiality. Rather, the judge is confined to a passive and receptive role of a mere 
umpire or referee who “is first a spectator and subsequently an arbiter of a duel between two 
lawyers”93 and “holds the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part 
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in their disputations”94. Lord Denning described the position of the common-law judge as fol-
lows:
95
 
“In the system of trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to 
hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investi-
gation or examination, as happens, we believe in some foreign countries (...). 
Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-
speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.” 
In the same context, Lord Greene stated:
96
  
“a judge who himself conducts the examination (...) descends into the arena 
and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict.”97 
In clear contrast with all this, is the inquisitorial system which refers to the civil-law model of 
conducting civil proceedings.
98
 Here, the conduct of every aspect of civil proceedings is under 
the control of the court which is, amongst others, responsible for the development of evi-
dence.
99
 The judge decides which witnesses, as indicated by the parties in their pleadings, to 
summon to testify in court. It is also the judge who questions the witnesses, and there is thus no 
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room for cross-examination through the parties’ counsel. Having said this, civil-law judges are 
the ”powerful centrepiece” of civil proceedings, while the role of the parties is limited to fur-
nishing the court with the facts underlying the respective lawsuit and the means of proof.
100
 
The active role of the civil-law judge requires that he is, unlike his common-law counterpart, 
familiar with the case once the trial stage begins in order to efficiently administer the examina-
tion of witnesses.
101
 Kaplan, Van Mehren and Schaefer summarise, from a common-law per-
spective, the role of the civil-law judge as follows:
102
  
“(...) one can see in the (...) judge a common image of the paterfamilias (...) 
having a large measure of power and considerable willingness to exercise it, 
the (...) judge sits high and exalted over the parties, dominating the courtroom 
scene; at the same time he is constantly descending to the level of the litigants, 
as an examiner, patient and hectoring, as counsellor, adviser and insistent 
promoter of settlements.” 
Notwithstanding the above divergences, one also has to bear in mind the similarities of the civ-
il- and common-law civil procedure. In both legal traditions, the so-called “principle of party 
presentation”103 usually prevails in civil litigation. According to this principle, it is the parties 
who initiate the proceedings, determine the matters to be adjudicated by the court and select 
witnesses as well as other means of proof. Moreover, the judge does not investigate facts that 
were not presented to him by the parties.
104
 Apart from the process of how the means of proof 
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are introduced into civil proceedings and the examination of evidence at the trial, civil proce-
dure in civil-law countries is thus as adversarial as civil litigation in common-law countries.
105
 
In this regard, the use of the term “inquisitorial system” as opposed to that of “adversarial sys-
tem” can be misleading, as the former could imply a connection to the so-called “principle of 
inquisitorial procedure”.106 Under this principle, the judge of his own accord seeks out facts 
and means of proof, and is not limited to the evidence proffered by the parties.
107
 Such connec-
tion, however, does not exist, as in countries following the inquisitorialsystem, the judge does 
usually not investigate the facts.
108
 
In recent years, the extent of procedural intervention by judges in civil litigation in some of the 
common-law countries such as England, Australia, South Africa, or Nigeria, has been in-
creased in order to expedite the trial proceedings.
109
 In addition to the aforementioned blend of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 378 n. 9 et seqq.; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 
706 n. 2271. 
105
 Langbein JH ʻThe German Advantage in Civil Procedureʼ 1985 University of Chicago Law Review 841 et 
seq.; Hurter E ʻSeeking truth or seeking justice: Reflections on the changing face of the adversarial process in 
civil litigationʼ 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 252; Junker A ʻDie Informationsbeschaffung für den 
Zivilprozeß: Informationsbeschaffung durch Beweispersonenʼ in Schlosser P (ed) Die Informationsbeschaf-
fung für den Zivilprozeß: die verfahrensmäßige Behandlung von Nachlässen, ausländisches Recht und Inter-
nationales Zivilprozessrecht 1996 121 et seq. 
106
 In Switzerland called “Untersuchungsmaxime” or “Untersuchungsgrundsatz”. 
107
 See, amongst others, Gerber DJ ʻExtraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany 
and the United Statesʼ 1986 American Journal of Comparative Law 754 fn. 42; Steck D ʻArt. 296ʼ in Spühler 
K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1412 n. 7; 
Sutter-Somm T and von Arx G ʻArt. 55ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kom-
mentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 388 n. 60 et seqq.  
108
 With regard to Switzerland, see Article 55(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, which stipulates that the par-
ties are responsible for pleading the facts on which they base their claims and for offering evidence, cf. the 
(unofficial) English translation of Article 55 by Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 542. For exceptions to 
Article 55(1), see Articles 247(2), 255, 272, 277(2), 296(1), and 306 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See 
also Kötz H ʻThe role of the judge in the court-room [sic]: The common law and civil law comparedʼ 1987 
Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 36 et seq., who notes that the label “inquisitorial system” is “unfortunate 
and misleading” insofar as the former term is used to refer to the “bureaucratic omnipotence” of the judge. In 
this context, see also Stürner R ʻParteiherrschaft versus Richtermacht: Materielle Prozessleitung und Sachver-
haltsaufklärung zwischen Verhandlungsmaxime und Effizienzʼ 2010 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 154 et seq. 
109
 Australian Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 20: Review of the Federal Civil Justice System: Rethinking 
the Federal Civil Litigation System (Closing Date: 8 August 1997) 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/20/02advers.html paras. 2.29 et seq. and 5.1 et seqq. 
(date of use: 31 January 2013); Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 62: Review of the Fed-
eral Civil Justice System (19 July 1999) 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/62/ch2.html#Heading6 para. 2.27 (date of use: 31 Jan-
uary 2013); Australian Law Reform Commission Report 89: Managing Justice – A Review of the Federal Civil 
Justice System (2000) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/ch1.html#Heading15 pa-
ra. 1.127 et seqq. (date of use: 31 January 2013); De Vos WL ʻInternational Aspects of Civil Procedural Lawʼ 
1996 Stellenbosch Law Review 349; Kötz H ʻThe role of the judge in the court-room [sic]: The common law 
and civil law comparedʼ 1987 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 42; Hurter E ʻSeeking truth or seeking jus-
tice: Reflections on the changing face of the adversarial process in civil litigationʼ 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse Reg 256 et seqq.; De Vos WL ʻDevelopments in South African Civil Procedural Law Over the Last 
Fifty Yearsʼ 2000 Stellenbosch Law Review 349 et seq.; Müller A Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme im 
Europäischen Justizraum 2004 27; Bamford D ʻThe Continuing Revolution: Experts and Evidence in Com-
 28 
 
adversarial and inquisitorial elements in civil- and common-law civil litigation, this so-called 
“managerial judging” results in a further convergence in civil procedural matters in both legal 
models. It is to be expected that such rapprochement will further increase in the future in order 
to combine the advantages of civil procedure in both legal systems.
110 The dichotomy between 
the adversarial and the inquisitorial model, however, will remain due to the long-standing ex-
istence of both traditions. 
The second key difference in the collection of evidence in civil and common law, namely the 
breakdown of common-law civil procedure in the pre-trial and trial stage, has its roots in the 
jury system. The common-law jury trial has been described as “single continuous drama”, as a 
jury cannot be “assembled, dismissed and reconvened from time to time over an extended peri-
od.”111 To put it differently, the temporary availability of the jury requires the trial to be a con-
tinuous event. Once commenced, a trial cannot be interrupted for the collection of additional 
evidence. In order to present all evidentiary material to the jury at the trial, it is therefore essen-
tial that it is gathered prior to the trial stage. This also gives litigants the time that is required to 
preview the opponent’s evidence and to develop a strategy on how to counter such evidence 
before the jury.
112
 Hence, the time for gathering evidence is necessarily before the trial. Evi-
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dentiary material that is not collected prior to the beginning of the trial cannot be presented to 
the jury and, thus, cannot be taken into consideration when deciding the case.
113
 Having said 
this, there is usually no second opportunity for the litigants to collect evidence following the 
pre-trial procedure.
114
 
Although in many common-law countries, such as England, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, 
Nigeria or Uganda, there are no longer juries in civil litigation,
115
 the separation of civil proce-
dure into the pre-trial and trial stage remained, and the aforementioned principles designed for 
jury trials still apply.
116
 
By contrast, in civil-law civil procedure, there is no need for a distinction between pre-trial and 
trial, as it is not based on a jury system. The judge is, unlike a jury, permanently available to 
hear evidence. As a result, civil litigation in civil-law jurisdictions  does not require a pre-trial 
stage, let alone discovery.
117
 The collection of evidence has thus not to be concluded prior to 
the trial stage, but can, if necessary, also take place during the latter. Moreover, the trial may 
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consist of a sequence of hearings and may be interrupted.
118
 In this context, it should also be 
recalled that in civil proceedings in civil-law countries, the judge is actively involved in the 
collection of evidence, and, since he is in charge of the trial, can gather evidence at any stage 
of the proceedings. 
3. Evidence-taking in Civil-law and Common-law Civil Litigation 
Based on the fact that in civil litigation in civil-law jurisdictions, the judge is responsible for 
gathering the evidence, the taking of evidence is regarded as a judicial act that is entrusted ex-
clusively to the judicial authorities of the state in whose jurisdiction the evidentiary material is 
located. The evidence-taking by a trial court without the involvement of the competent authori-
ties of the foreign state is therefore seen as trespassing on the domain of the foreign courts.
119
 
From the perspective of a civil-law country, members of a court located abroad are thus pre-
cluded from travelling to the said country in order to, for instance, question witnesses or in-
spect a location.
120
 In this context, one has to recall that it is irrelevant whether the court domi-
ciled abroad applies any compulsory measures in the said state or not. Also, the collection of 
evidence in a civil-law country by a private individual
121
 for the benefit of foreign civil pro-
ceedings is regarded as a judicial act.
122
 From a civil-law viewpoint, the individual acts as an 
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extended arm of the court located abroad, as the evidentiary material obtained by the individual 
is ultimately used in a foreign civil litigation. 
By contrast, common-law countries consider the taking of evidence in civil proceedings as a 
non-judicial act, provided no measures of compulsion are applied.
123
 This is a corollary of the 
adversarial system which places upon the parties the duty of securing and presenting evidence 
at the trial. The gathering of evidence is thus regarded as a purely private matter in which the 
judicial authorities, in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located, usually have no interest and 
no wish to participate.
124
 The questioning, for instance, of a willing third party in a common-
law country by a counsel for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings is, therefore, not consid-
ered as a judicial act and does not violate the sovereignty of the said country.
125
 
4. Evidence-taking in Civil and Commercial Matters in Switzerland and Article 271 
of the Swiss Criminal Code 
a) Evidence-taking as a Criminal Offence 
Like other civil-law countries, Switzerland regards the taking of evidence as a judicial act re-
served to judicial authorities.
126
 Compared to other civil-law countries, however, Switzerland 
went a step further by inserting in the 1930s’ Article 271 in its Criminal Code.127 This provi-
sion prohibits acts on Swiss territory for the benefit of a foreign government in order to 
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protect the sovereignty of Switzerland.
128
 Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as 
follows:
129
 
“Any person who carries out activities on behalf of a foreign state on Swiss 
territory without lawful authority, where such activities are the responsibility 
of a public authority or public official, (...), any person who encourages such 
activities shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to 
a monetary penalty, or in serious cases to a custodial sentence of not less than 
one year.” 
The notion of “activities on behalf of a foreign state” is quite broad. It is not only activities 
carried out by an authority or a public official that fall within this notion, but also the activities 
of a private individual. Under Swiss law, the acts of authorities, public officials and private in-
dividuals constitute activities in the sense of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code if they 
can first be characterised as activities of state in view of their nature or function, and, second, if 
the activities benefit a foreign governmental, judiciary or legislative body.
130 A typical activity 
under Article 271(1) is the taking of evidence, such as questioning witnesses or inspecting 
documents located in Switzerland, as such an act is, from a Swiss perspective, entrusted to 
public officials. Cross-border taking of evidence furthermore assists the trial court outside 
Switzerland for whose benefit the evidence is taken on Swiss soil. In this context, the Swiss 
Federal Court held that any activities performed in the interest of a foreign state or its authori-
ties are considered, under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, as activities that benefit 
foreign states. This, according to the said court, is particularly true with regard to the enforce-
ment of law by court judgments which, in every state, is regarded as one of the major duties of 
                                                     
128
 Federal Office of Justice Bericht des Bundesamtes für Justiz zu Rechtsfragen im Zusammenhang mit der Zu-
sammenarbeit mit ausländischen Behörden (Amtshilfe, Rechtshilfe, Souveränitätsschutz) (14 March 2011) 
http://www.bj.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/rechtshilfe/ber-auslandszusammenarbeit-d.pdf 20 (date of 
use: 31 January 2013); decision of the Swiss Federal Court 6B_402/2008 of 6.11.2008 consideration 2.3.2. 
129
 For the (unofficial) English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
130
 BGE 114 IV 130 consideration 2.a; BGE 65 I 43 consideration 2; decision of the Swiss Federal Court 
6B_402/2008 of 6.11.2008 consideration 2.3.2; VPB 66 (2002) no. 128 consideration 6; VPB 61 (1997) no. 82 
consideration III.1; Schramm D ʻEntwicklungen bei der Strafbarkeit von privaten Zeugenbefragungen in der 
Schweiz durch Anwälte für ausländische Verfahrenʼ 2006 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 491 et seq.; Hopf T ʻArt. 
271ʼ in Niggli MA and Wiprächtiger H (eds) Basler Kommentar Strafrecht II Art. 111-392 StGB 2007 1916 n. 
7. For criticism regarding BGE 114 IV 130, see Schramm D ʻEntwicklungen bei der Strafbarkeit von privaten 
Zeugenbefragungen in der Schweiz durch Anwälte für ausländische Verfahrenʼ 2006 Aktuelle Juristische Pra-
xis 494 et seq.; Schultz H ʻDie strafrechtliche Rechtsprechung des Bger 1988ʼ 1990 Zeitschrift des Bernischen 
Juristenvereins 25 et seq.; Delnon V and Rüdi B ʻStrafbare Beweisführungʼ 1998 Schweizerische Zeitschrift 
für Strafrecht 330; ZR 104 (2005) no. 62. 
 33 
 
state. The gathering of evidence ultimately serves such enforcement, as it forms an essential 
part of the adjudicative process.
131
 
Under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, it is not only irrelevant whether the evi-
dence-taking is conducted by an authority or by a private individual, but also whether the latter 
was requested to obtain evidence on Swiss territory by a court abroad or a litigant in civil pro-
ceedings before such court.
132
 A counsel who, for instance, questions a non-party witness in 
Switzerland on behalf of his client for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings, violates Article 
271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. In other words, it is immaterial whether in the state where 
the said proceedings are pending, the evidence-gathering is considered as a purely private mat-
ter.
133
 Article 271(1) also applies, irrespective of whether the testimony of the witness exam-
ined on Swiss soil will directly (by submitting the transcript of the witness examination to the 
court outside Switzerland) or indirectly (by a testimony of the person who questioned the wit-
ness in Switzerland) be introduced into the foreign proceedings.
134
 Moreover, it is also irrele-
vant under Article 271(1) whether the authority or the private individual taking the evidence 
uses measures of compulsion or not.
135
 
Activities of a litigant or his counsel, that merely serve to assess the chances of success of a 
lawsuit or to prepare the latter, do not constitute “activities on behalf of a foreign state” and 
thus do not fall under Article 271(1), provided the respective information will later on not be 
used as evidence in the foreign civil proceedings. Having said this, private research or informal 
investigations, such as conversations with potential non-party witnesses, do not, as a general 
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principle, infringe Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code.
136
 In practice, to distinguish 
whether an activity falls under the said provision or merely constitutes a preparatory measure 
exempt from punishment can be challenging and has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
137
 
In order to avoid any risk of criminal prosecution under Article 271(1), counsel and parties in 
proceedings pending outside Switzerland are advised to refrain from taking any evidence on 
Swiss soil or, at least, to consult a Swiss lawyer before taking action in Switzerland to ensure 
that the intended activity does not infringe the said provision. 
The voluntary presentation of documents to a court located abroad by a litigant domiciled in 
Switzerland does not constitute a violation of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. Such 
transmission is not regarded as an act reserved to an authority, but as a matter for the parties.
138
 
Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code requires that the activity on behalf of a foreign state 
is performed on Swiss soil. It is, however, not necessary that the entire act be conducted in 
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Switzerland, but it suffices that it partly take place on Swiss territory.
139
 It goes without saying 
that in cases where the questioning of a witness or the inspection of documents occurs entirely 
outside Switzerland, Article 271(1) does not apply. Counsel or parties in proceedings before a 
court located abroad may thus, for instance, agree with a non-party witness domiciled in Swit-
zerland to question the latter outside of Switzerland, that is, in the nearest country that allows 
the examination of witnesses by a counsel or litigant
140
 and so avoid criminal prosecution un-
der Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. The same holds true for an inspection of docu-
ments, provided the latter are reviewed outside Switzerland.
141
 
b) Authorisation under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code 
Courts or private individuals wishing to perform acts falling under Article 271(1) of the Swiss 
Criminal Code require a waiver from the competent Swiss authority.
142
 Permission from the 
individual affected by the act does not suffice, as only states can relinquish their sovereignty.
143
 
Where a waiver is not granted, the said courts or private individuals are not allowed to perform 
the relevant acts on Swiss territory, but have to seek international judicial assistance.
144
  
Permissions under Article 271(1) are only given in exceptional cases. A waiver may be granted 
where international judicial assistance is theoretically feasible, that is, where there are no 
grounds for refusal, and where it appears practically impossible, or even absurd, to request the 
relevant Swiss authority for judicial assistance.
145
 When determining whether permission under 
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 It is, for instance, sufficient, if the examination of the witness took place in Switzerland, while the signing of 
the transcript by the witness, however, occurred abroad, Hopf T ʻArt. 271ʼ in Niggli MA and Wiprächtiger H 
(eds) Basler Kommentar Strafrecht II Art. 111-392 StGB 2007 1924 n. 17: Honegger PC Amerikanische Offen-
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unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtshilfe bei Steuerhinterziehungen und Insidergeschäften 1986 138. 
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 See Article 31(1) of the Government and Administrative Ordinance of 25 November 1998 (“Regierungs- und 
Verwaltungsverordnung”, SR 172.010.1), http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/1999/1258.pdf (date of use: 31 Janu-
ary 2013). Authorisations are granted by one of the seven Federal Departments and the Federal Chancellery. 
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 For international judicial assistance, see para. V. below. 
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 The latter is, for instance, the case where a court located abroad requests an on-site inspection in Switzerland. 
See Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last 
updated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 35 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). These guidelines are the official guide on international judicial assistance in 
civil matters drafted by the Federal Office of Justice, that is, the federal authority responsible for international 
judicial assistance in Switzerland. Currently, the Federal Office of Justice is busy revising the guidelines. Un-
fortunately, at the time this thesis was printed (14 February 2013), the newly updated version was not yet 
available. See furthermore also VPB 61 (1997) no. 82 consideration III.2, III.3; Frei L ʻDiscovery, Secrecy and 
International Mutual Assistance in Civil Mattersʼ in Zäch R (ed) Litigation of Business Matters in the United 
States and International Mutual Assistance 1984 192; Zulauf U ʻKorruption mit dem Ausland: Verrat an der 
Schweiz? Gedanken zu den Schweizer Verbotsgesetzen (“Blocking Statutes”) von Art. 271 und 273 StGB und 
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Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code shall be granted or not, the competent authorities 
have to balance the various interests involved, namely the protection of Swiss sovereignty, the 
cooperation with the relevant authorities outside Switzerland, and the interests of individuals 
affected by the permission.
146
 
c) Protection of Foreign Sovereignty under Article 299(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code 
Under Swiss law, not only the encroachment on Swiss sovereignty constitutes a criminal of-
fence, but also that of a foreign state. Article 299(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code states the fol-
lowing: 
“Any person who violates the territorial sovereignty of a foreign state, in par-
ticular by conducting official activities without authorisation on foreign terri-
tory (...), shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to 
a monetary penalty.”147 
This provision penalises Swiss public officials who perform official acts for the benefit of 
Switzerland on foreign territory. The scholarly doctrine in Switzerland is ambiguous on wheth-
er Article 299(1) merely punishes acts performed by authorities or public officials, or also 
those carried out by private individuals. To date, the Swiss Federal Court has not yet dealt, at 
least not in a published decision, with this issue. In any event, there is no doubt that, for in-
stance, the questioning of witnesses or the inspection of documents by a Swiss judge abroad 
infringe Article 299(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, provided the foreign state regards such ac-
tivities as judicial acts.
148
 
V. International Judicial Assistance in Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 
This subchapter deals with international judicial assistance as a means to vanquish the afore-
mentioned restrictions resulting from the concept of sovereignty. First, the practical signifi-
cance of international judicial assistance in the context of cross-border taking of evidence in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Art. 47 BankGʼ in Waldburger R et al (eds) Wirtschaftsrecht zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für 
Peter Nobel zum 60. Geburtstag 2005 1085. 
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 Federal Office of Justice Bericht des Bundesamtes für Justiz zu Rechtsfragen im Zusammenhang mit der Zu-
sammenarbeit mit ausländischen Behörden (Amtshilfe, Rechtshilfe, Souveränitätsschutz) (14 March 2011) 
http://www.bj.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/rechtshilfe/ber-auslandszusammenarbeit-d.pdf 51 (date of 
use: 31 January 2013). 
147
 For the (unofficial) English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
148
 Omlin E ʻArt. 299ʼ in Niggli MA and Wiprächtiger H (eds) Basler Kommentar Strafrecht II Art. 111-392 
StGB 2007 2137 n. 5, 2138 n. 12. In practice, Article 299(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code is of little importance. 
See in this regard Omlin E ʻArt. 299ʼ in Niggli MA and Wiprächtiger H (eds) Basler Kommentar Strafrecht II 
Art. 111-392 StGB 2007 2137 n. 1. 
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civil and commercial matters is highlighted. Subsequently, the notion of “international judicial 
assistance”, the legal basis of judicial assistance as well as the applicable law are explained. 
The subchapter also outlines the different forms of international judicial assistance in evidence-
taking in civil and commercial matters, and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. Fi-
nally, the subchapter addresses the question of how a trial court seeking evidence abroad may 
proceed in cases where the foreign state does not render judicial assistance. 
A. Terminology and Practical Significance of International Judicial Assistance 
As explained earlier,
149
 a state is not allowed, due to the concept of sovereignty, to perform ju-
dicial acts on the territory of a foreign state, as such acts would infringe the latter’s sovereign-
ty. This is particularly true for the taking of evidence in a foreign state, provided the latter re-
gards the gathering of evidence as a judicial act.  
International judicial assistance constitutes an instrument to overcome the hurdles imposed by 
the sovereignty of states by, amongst other things, facilitating the production of evidence situ-
ated abroad. It means the support of an activity of a state by another state and consists in the 
execution of an official activity in one state in response to a request from an authority in anoth-
er state with the objective of assisting a pending matter in the latter state.
150
 
International judicial cooperation is critical for a lawsuit not to fail on the grounds that evi-
dence is located in a foreign state. In other words, evidence should not merely be excluded in 
the proceedings pending before a trial court, because it is located abroad. It is thus of utmost 
importance that states grant each other judicial assistance in the taking of evidence to the great-
est possible extent and abstain from refusing cooperation without any good cause. This is all 
the more important as the world grows “smaller” which entails, inter alia, a growth of cross-
border relations that result in an increase in both international civil disputes and litigation. 
Moreover, it has to be borne in mind, that a state, which rejects a request for judicial assistance 
without good cause, penalises the litigant proffering the relevant evidence, and not the state 
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 Cf. paras. III.A and IV.A above. 
150
 This definition refers to the so-called “active judicial assistance”. For more on the different forms of interna-
tional judicial assistance, see the paragraph below. Cf. also Jones HL ʻInternational Judicial Assistance: Proce-
dural Chaos and a Program for Reformʼ 1953 Yale Law Journal 515; Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe 
in Zivilsachen 1996 2 n. 5; Geiger R ʻLegal Assistance between States in Civil Mattersʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume III 1997 194; Nobel P ʻDie Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen im 
Lichte der Ratifikation der Haager Konvention von 1970 über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und 
Handelssachenʼ in 1995 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 75; Hauser R and 
Schweri E GVG, Kommentar zum zürcherischen Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz vom 13. Juni 1976 mit den seithe-
rigen Änderungen 2002 409 n. 1; ZR 97 (1998) no. 116 consideration 2; ZR 88 (1989) no. 95 consideration 3. 
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requesting judicial assistance. It is the said litigant who ultimately bears the respective negative 
consequences, and he is in no position to exert influence on the mutual assistance procedure. In 
addition, the refusal of a request for judicial assistance may result in an incorrect court judg-
ment, as the trial court may have to decide the case without having all relevant facts before 
it.
151  
Due to the worldwide globalisation, the need for an intensification of international judicial co-
operation in civil and commercial matters has been increased in recent years. As a conse-
quence, more and more states have strengthened their judicial cooperation, in particular with 
regard to the cross-border taking of evidence, by entering into treaties or joining conventions 
that facilitate and regularise the procedure for obtaining evidence abroad. It is to be hoped that 
this trend will continue, as international judicial assistance is the most viable vehicle for over-
coming the difficulties arising from the cross-border taking of evidence and creating legal cer-
tainty in cases where a litigant wishes to obtain foreign evidence. 
In the context of international judicial assistance, one has to distinguish between the “request-
ing state”, the state that requests another state to grant judicial assistance, and the “requested 
state”, the state that is asked to render judicial assistance by the requesting state. Where inter-
national judicial assistance is requested to obtain foreign evidence in civil and commercial mat-
ters, the proceedings in which the evidence is sought are pending in the requesting state, while 
the relevant means of proof is located in the requested state. The latter thus provides assistance 
in support of civil proceedings pending in the requesting state. International judicial assistance 
must thus be considered from two angles, namely that of the requesting and the requested state. 
International judicial assistance can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, there is 
the so-called “active judicial assistance” where the requested state conducts the official activity 
on its own territory and passes the outcome of such performance on to the requesting state. On 
the other, there is the so-called “passive judicial assistance” where the requested state permits 
the requesting state to perform the official act on its territory.
152  
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 Guldener M Das internationale und interkantonale Zivilprozeßrecht der Schweiz 1951 21; Schabenberger A 
Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 60; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 
49 n. 124b. 
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 De Vos WL ʻInternational Aspects of Civil Procedural Lawʼ 1996 Stellenbosch Law Review 173; Layton A 
and Mercer H (eds) European Civil Practice Volume 1 2004 177 n. 7.022; Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweis-
beschaffung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Beweisbeschaffung ausserhalb des in-
ternationalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 22; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 852 n. 2426; Gei-
mer E Internationale Beweisaufnahme 1998 5; Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens 
in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufnahme für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 
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B. Legal Basis of International Judicial Assistance 
Due to its sovereignty,
153
 each state determines whether, and if so to what extent, it renders in-
ternational judicial assistance to other states. This particularly includes the state’s decision as to 
whether it enters into any bilateral treaties or becomes a member of any multilateral convention 
on transborder judicial cooperation.
154
 
1. International Judicial Assistance Based on Courtoisie Internationale 
In absence of any relevant treaty or convention, states are not obliged under public internation-
al law to render judicial assistance.
155
 As a result, each state can at its own discretion and on a 
case-by-case basis determine whether or not it grants judicial assistance.
156
 Most states, how-
ever, render judicial assistance to states with which they have diplomatic relations in expecta-
tion that the latter will reciprocate and grant assistance.
157
 They do this based on the so-called 
“courtoisie internationale”, that is, the mutual courtesy and respect states usually show for one 
another.
158
 Having said this, a state requesting assistance from another state, that is neither par-
ty to a relevant international treaty, is at the mercy of the requested state, as it can never be sure 
whether in a particular case, the requested state will render judicial assistance or not.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
1999 3 et seq.; Hess B Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht 2010 463 n. 33 et seq.; ZR 88 (1989) no. 95. See, how-
ever, Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 50 et seq., who opines that mere 
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2012 1254 n. 10. 
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 See in this regard the so-called S.S. Wimbledon-case 1923 PCIJ (ser. A) no. 1 15 where the following was stat-
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Anand RP ʻSovereign Equality of States in International Lawʼ in Académie de Droit International (ed) Recueil 
des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1986 II 1987 29; Stein T and von 
Buttlar C Völkerrecht 2012 182 n. 516 et seq. 
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 Cf., inter alia, Stadler A ʻ§ 363ʼ in Musielak H-J (ed) Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung mit Gerichtsverfas-
sungsgesetz 2012 1252 n. 3; Schack H Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht 2010 73 n. 198. See also 1998 Die 
Praxis des Bundesgerichts no. 12 consideration 4.c)bb). 
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 Based on their domestic law, however, states may be under an obligation to render international judicial assis-
tance. 
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 Kreindler RH Transnational Litigation: A Basic Primer 1998 125; Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaf-
fung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Beweisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internatio-
nalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 26 et seq. 
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 Daoudi J Extraterritoriale Beweisbeschaffung im deutschen Zivilprozeß: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Be-
weisbeschaffung ausserhalb des internationalen Rechtshilfeweges 2000 27; Schack H Internationales Zivilver-
fahrensrecht 2010 73 n. 198; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 61 n. 157, 76 n. 192b; Geiger R 
ʻLegal Assistance between States in Civil Mattersʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law Volume III 1997 194; Geimer E Internationale Beweisaufnahme 1998 52; Nagel H and Gottwald P Inter-
nationales Zivilprozessrecht 2007 338 n. 15, 343 n. 34; Dahm G, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R Völkerrecht 
Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 74, 484; Schabenberger A Der Zeuge im Ausland 
im deutschen Zivilprozess 1996 57; Geimer R ‘Betrachtungen zur internationalen (aktiven und passiven) 
Rechtshilfe und zum grenzüberschreitenden Rechtsverkehrʼ in Bernreuther J et al (eds) Festschrift für Ulrich 
Spellenberg 2010 407; ZR 97 (1998) no. 116 consideration 3.  
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States, that do not render judicial assistance based on courtoisie internationale, do not violate 
public international law. Other states, however, may interpret the refusal to grant judicial assis-
tance as an unfriendly act which may entail retribution by the requesting state towards the re-
quested state. The requesting state may, for instance, reject future requests for judicial assis-
tance emanating from the requested state.
159
  
2. International Judicial Assistance Based on International Treaties 
In case of a treaty or convention on mutual cooperation, contracting states undertake an inter-
national obligation to render judicial assistance in accordance with the rules laid down in the 
agreement.
160
 By entering into such agreement, a state partially waives its sovereignty, as it is 
no longer free to decide whether it renders judicial assistance or not. A state, that refuses to ex-
ecute a request for judicial assistance without good cause, that is, for reasons not provided for 
in the relevant treaty or convention, violates public international law. 
International judicial assistance is regarded as an intergovernmental matter. As a result, only a 
contracting state may demand judicial assistance from another state based on the relevant treaty 
or convention. Litigants domiciled in the requesting state cannot claim judicial assistance from 
the requested state. The same holds true for the trial court; it is powerless towards a requested 
state that refuses judicial assistance. Based on the national law of the requesting state, litigants 
may, however, be able to demand from the requesting state to seek international judicial assis-
tance.
161
 
As has been mentioned earlier,
162
 the number of treaties and conventions on the cross-border 
taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters has increased in the last few decades. In this 
regard, the most important multilateral conventions are the Convention of 18 March 1970 on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Conven-
tion”)163 and the Convention of 1 March 1954 on Civil Procedure (“Hague Procedure Conven-
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 See para. V.A. 
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 Initiated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. For the text of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, cf. http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt20en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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tion”).164 Mention must also be made of the European Council Regulation of 28 May 2001 on 
Cooperation between the Courts of the Member States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (“European Evidence Regulation”),165 the Inter-American Convention on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad of 30 January 1975 between several Central and South Ameri-
can countries (“Inter-American Evidence Convention”)166 and the Mercosur Protocol on Coop-
eration and Jurisdictional Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labour and Administrative Matters 
of 27 June 1992 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (“Mercosur 
Protocol”).167 Countries, that are not party to any multilateral convention on taking evidence 
abroad, may sign relevant bilateral treaties.
168
 A multilateral convention may also allow con-
tracting states to enter into bilateral agreements with other member states in order to supple-
ment or alter the regulations of the convention in relation to a particular state.
169
  
C. International Judicial Assistance and Applicable Law 
As a general principle, requested states apply their own law when rendering active judicial as-
sistance. This is true in particular for executed requests that are based on courtoisie internatio-
nale. In absence of any international rules on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters, the domestic law of the requested state determines, inter alia, the methods 
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tion, see http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt02en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
165
 For the text of the European Evidence Regulation, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:174:0001:0024:EN:PDF (date of use: 31 January 
2013). 
166
 For the text of the Inter-American Evidence Convention, cf. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-
37.html (date of use: 31 January 2013). With regard to the list of member states of the said Convention, see 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-37.html (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
167
 “Mercosur” stands for “Mercado Común del Sur” (English: Southern Common Market). The original title of 
the Protocol in Spanish is “Protocolo de Cooperacion y Asistencia Jurisdiccional en Materia Civil, Commer-
cial, Laboral y Administrativa”. For the text of the Mercosur Protocol, see 
http://www.mercosur.int/t_ligaenmarco.jsp?contentid=4823&site=1&channel=secretaria (Dec. No. 05/92) 
(date of use: 31 January 2013).  
168
 See, for instance, the Agreement on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters and Co-operation in 
Arbitration between the Kingdom of Thailand and Australia of 2 October 1997, 
http://www.coj.go.th/jla/userfiles/file/Thai-Australia%20agreement%20(english).pdf (date of use: 31 January 
2013), or the Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters between Australia and the Repub-
lic of Korea of 17 September 1999.  
169
 See, for example, Article 28 of the Hague Evidence Convention. Cf. also the “Erklärung vom 1./13. Dezember 
1878 zwischen der Schweiz und dem Deutschen Reiche betreffend den unmittelbaren Geschäftsverkehr zwi-
schen den beiderseitigen Gerichtsbehörden” (Treaty on Direct Communication between Courts between 
Switzerland and Germany of 1/13 December 1878), http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/i2/0.274.181.361.de.pdf 
(date of use: 31 January 2013), or “Vertrag vom 26. August 1968 zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossen-
schaft und der Republik Österreich zur Ergänzung des Haager Übereinkommens vom 1. März 1954 betreffend 
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and procedures for the taking of evidence, the means of proof that are available, the privileges 
of witnesses, and the measures of compulsion towards recalcitrant witnesses.
170
 
The above also holds true for the rendering of judicial assistance based on a treaty or conven-
tion. The latter do not provide for an autonomous set of rules on the taking of evidence. Rather, 
they stipulate the conditions under which a requested state is obliged to render judicial assis-
tance, as well as the forms of such assistance.
171
 The methods and procedures to be followed 
when taking evidence in response to a request for judicial assistance are thus not governed by 
treaties or conventions, but by the domestic law of the requested state or, as an exception, by 
that of the requesting state.
172
 To put it differently, conventions and treaties do not supersede 
the relevant domestic rules of the requested state by creating uniform rules on the procedure for 
the taking of evidence, means of proof, privileges of witnesses, or the measures of compulsion. 
The absence of such homogeneous rules is one of the reasons that, in practice, international 
judicial assistance may not always fully succeed, even when fully granted by the requested 
state. Differences in the approach of evidence-taking in the states involved may compromise 
the use of evidence obtained in the requested state in the civil proceedings pending in the re-
questing state.
173
 
The foregoing comments also apply with regard to passive judicial assistance. Here, however, 
the evidence-taking is not governed by the domestic law of the requested state, but by the rele-
vant rules of the requesting state. It goes without saying that compared to active judicial assis-
tance, the potential for conflict between the domestic law of the requesting state and that of the 
requested state is reduced in the case of passive judicial assistance.
174
 
In the light of the above, it is evident that both active and passive international judicial assis-
tance have a dual nature, as public international law as well as the domestic law of the request-
ed and requesting state determine the preconditions and constraints for granting judicial assis-
tance.
175
 While the public international law specifies the restrictions resulting from the concept 
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of sovereignty, the domestic law determines, amongst others, whether witnesses are cross-
examined or not. 
D. Forms of International Judicial Assistance for the Taking of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 
The three classical methods for obtaining foreign evidence in civil and commercial matters by 
means of international judicial assistance are the taking of evidence (i) by means of a so-called 
“letter of request”,176 (ii) through commissioners, and (iii) by diplomatic officers or consular 
agents.  
1. Taking of Evidence by Letter of Request 
In the case of a letter of request, the requesting state asks the requested state to take evidence 
that is located in the latter’s jurisdiction. It is the requested state that executes the letter of re-
quest by, for instance, questioning the foreign witness, and then transmits the results of such 
examination to the requesting state. The authority of the requested state, which takes the evi-
dence, thus acts as the eyes, ears and mouth of the trial court.
177
 Having said this, it is evident 
that international judicial assistance via a letter of request constitutes active judicial assistance, 
as the evidence is taken by the authorities of the requested state. As explained above,
178
 the re-
quested state usually applies its own law with regard to the procedures and methods to be fol-
lowed for the procurement of evidence, and can, in particular, use coercive measures towards 
recalcitrant witnesses as provided in its domestic law.
179
 
2. Taking of Evidence through Commissioners 
Where the requesting state asks the requested state to obtain foreign evidence through a com-
missioner, it is not the requested state that takes the evidence on its territory, but a commis-
sioner. The latter is usually appointed by the trial court and applies the law of the requesting 
state. The commissioner, however, is not allowed to apply any coercive measures in the re-
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quested state, as such compulsion would interfere with the latter’s sovereignty.180 Contrary to 
judicial assistance via a letter of request, obtaining evidence through a commissioner consti-
tutes passive judicial assistance. 
3. Taking of Evidence through Diplomatic Officers and Consular Agents 
Judicial assistance through diplomatic officers and consular agents is similar to that conducted 
by commissioners. The former, who represent the requesting state in the requested state, take 
the evidence in accordance with the rules of the requesting state. Like commissioners, diplo-
matic officers and consular agents are not allowed to use any coercive measures in the request-
ed state. It goes without saying that the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or consular 
agents is regarded as passive judicial assistance. 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Different Forms of International Judicial 
Assistance 
Obtaining evidence by means of a letter of request does not usually interfere with the sover-
eignty of the requested state, as it is the latter that takes the evidence on its territory.
181
 Conse-
quently, this form of international judicial assistance is the traditional method of obtaining evi-
dence abroad and applies, irrespective of whether the requesting and requested state are party 
to a relevant international treaty. In other words, international judicial assistance via a letter of 
request usually applies in those cases where the states involved have not joined a treaty or con-
vention on cross-border taking of evidence, that is, where the requested state renders judicial 
assistance based on courtoisie internationale. In contrast, judicial assistance through a com-
missioner, diplomatic officer, or consular agent implicates the sovereignty issue,
182
 at least if 
the requested state follows the civil-law tradition. These forms of judicial assistance are there-
fore often only permitted, if there is a treaty or convention allowing such methods, or if such 
practices are authorised by the requested state, common, or at least tolerated by the latter.
183
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From the point of view of the trial court and the litigant seeking evidentiary material abroad, 
the taking of evidence through a commissioner is the preferable method. Since the commis-
sioner acts on the authority of the trial court, the evidence-taking is conducted by an agent of 
the requesting state. Moreover, the commissioner applies the law of the requesting state when 
procuring evidence in the requested state. Consequently, the evidence taken in the jurisdiction 
of the requested state is governed by the same rules as the evidentiary material located in the 
requesting state. The fact that the taking of evidence is governed by uniform rules, irrespective 
of where the evidence is located, in the requesting or requested state, overcomes most of the 
divergences resulting from the different approach the respective states may adopt regarding 
evidence-taking.
184
 This holds particularly true for cases where the requested state shares the 
common-law tradition while the requesting state follows the civil-law model and vice versa. 
Here, the differences between the two legal systems may result in a limited probative value or 
even inadmissibility of foreign evidence in the proceedings of the trial court. The departure 
from the law of the requested state governing the taking of foreign evidence eliminates such 
risk. 
In comparison with a letter of request, however, international judicial assistance through com-
missioners has a considerable drawback. A commissioner is usually not allowed to use any 
compulsion when taking evidence in the requested state.
185
 Where the commissioner cannot 
apply to the requested state for appropriate assistance to obtain the evidence by compulsion,
186
 
judicial assistance via a commissioner is only successful if the witness in the requested state 
voluntarily cooperates. Before issuing a request for taking evidence by a commissioner, the 
trial court or the litigant wishing to obtain evidence abroad should make sure that the foreign 
witness is willing to collaborate. If the latter is reluctant to do so, the trial court has no choice 
but to seek judicial assistance by means of a letter of request. This is particularly true where a 
witness who at first voluntarily agreed to cooperate, then changes his mind when confronted by 
the commissioner. The fact that a request for taking evidence by a commissioner was unsuc-
cessful should not preclude the trial court from resorting to a letter of request at a later stage.
187
 
What has been said with regard to judicial assistance by a commissioner applies mutatis mu-
tandis to assistance by a diplomatic officer or consular agent of the requesting state. Compared 
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to the evidence-taking by commissioners, however, judicial assistance by diplomatic officers or 
consular agents may, if permitted at all, be limited to witnesses who have the nationality of the 
state which the diplomatic officer or consular agent represents, and may thus exclude nationals 
of the requested state or any third state.
188
  
In the light of the above, the advantages and disadvantages of a letter of request are evident. 
The requested state may use measures of compulsion if the evidence is not obtainable on a vol-
untary basis. In such cases, the evidence can usually only be obtained by means of a letter of 
request. The requested state, however, applies its own law when executing the request for judi-
cial assistance which may, particularly in cases where judicial assistance among civil- and 
common-law countries is requested, result in the aforementioned limited probative value or 
inadmissibility of the foreign evidence in the proceedings before the trial court. 
E. International Judicial Assistance in the Civil- and Common-law Systems 
Due to the principle of judicial control over the procurement of evidence and the qualification 
of evidence-taking as a judicial act, civil-law jurisdictions usually favour the active interna-
tional judicial assistance where the evidence is gathered by a judicial authority of the requested 
state. As a consequence, the taking of foreign evidence by way of a letter of request is the 
method most preferred by countries sharing the civil-law tradition.
189 
 
In contrast, party control dominates the evidence-taking in common-law countries that regard 
the procurement of evidence as a purely private matter. It is therefore not surprising that these 
countries prefer those forms of international judicial assistance where the foreign courts are not 
actively involved in obtaining evidentiary material. As a result, passive judicial assistance, and 
in particular the procurement of evidence through commissioners, prevails in common-law 
countries.
190 
 
In practice, difficulties may arise where a common-law judge is confronted with a letter of re-
quest emanating from a civil-law country wherein the former is expected to take evidence like 
a civil-law judge in the inquisitorial system. Here, the common-law judge is faced with a pro-
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cedure he is usually unfamiliar with, as he is not accustomed to play an active role in evidence-
taking.
191
 This may result in uncertainties on the side of the common-law judge as to how to 
execute the request for judicial assistance. Such uncertainties may ultimately culminate in a 
limited probative value or even inadmissibility of the foreign evidence in the proceedings 
pending before the civil-law court. How to best deal with such situations depends on the par-
ticularities of the individual case. One option may be the appointment of a person by the com-
mon-law judge who is familiar with the procurement of evidence as requested in the letter of 
request.
192
 If, however, it is reasonably foreseeable for the civil-law court that the evidence ob-
tained by the common-law judge will most likely be of only limited probative value or even 
inadmissible, the former should refrain from pursuing the execution of the letter of request and 
instead consider alternatives, such as evidence-taking by a commissioner, provided evidence 
obtained by such a method is admissible under the laws of the requesting state.  
Similar problems may occur where a civil-law judge is faced with a request emanating from a 
common-law country to obtain evidence based on the relevant rules of the requesting state 
which, for instance, include the cross-examination of witnesses. A civil-law judge, who is not 
in a position to execute such a request, may, for example, appoint a sole commissioner who 
chairs the witness examination or may nominate the counsel of the parties as commissioners.
193
  
F. Failure of Requested State to Grant International Judicial Assistance 
In a perfect legal world, a requested state renders international judicial assistance, provided 
there are no valid grounds to refuse the execution of the relevant request
194
 and, in the case of 
an international agreement, provided the request is in accordance with the relevant convention 
or treaty.
195
 In practice, however, requests for international judicial assistance often remain un-
answered, be it that the requested state does not react to a request at all, or explicitly refuses to 
execute it. The reasons for such non-execution are manifold and may, inter alia, include con-
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gestion or lack of competent authorities for the execution of requests, retaliation for the past 
non-execution of requests by the requested state submitted to the requesting state, the invoca-
tion of an ordre public by the requested state, the latter’s political isolation, or the protection of 
information whose furnishing is restricted by the requested state.
196
  
Against this background, the question arises for the trial court as to how to pursue the pending 
proceedings, if the requested state does not execute the former’s request for judicial assistance. 
As has been explained earlier,
197
 the trial court cannot claim judicial assistance from the re-
quested state. It goes without saying that the proceedings before the trial court have to be con-
cluded, even though the foreign evidence cannot be obtained from the requested state. Where 
the latter informs the requesting state that it will not execute the request, and there are no others 
means to obtain the foreign evidence,
198
 the trial court should proceed in the same way as in the 
case where a litigant bearing the burden of proof fails to adduce evidence.
199
 This may be 
deemed as not entirely fair, as the litigants have no influence on whether judicial assistance is 
granted by the requested state or not. As mentioned above, the proceedings before the trial 
court must continue which requires that an assumption has to be made regarding the facts for 
which evidence was sought abroad. To presume that the relevant facts cannot be proven and 
thus impose the risk of lack of evidence to the party bearing the onus is the only feasible solu-
tion.
200
 
How, therefore, should the trial court proceed in cases where the requested state does not ex-
plicitly refuse to execute a request for judicial assistance, and yet does not react to the request 
at all? In a case before the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich, a request for the exami-
nation of two non-party witnesses was sent to the relevant authorities in Canada. After the Ca-
nadian authorities did not respond to the request for more than a year, the Swiss authorities 
asked the former to inform them about the progress of the execution of the request. Again, the 
Canadian authorities did not respond. The Commercial Court held that in cases where a request 
for judicial assistance has not been executed for two years despite sending a reminder to the 
relevant foreign authorities, it can be assumed that the testimony sought abroad is unobtaina-
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ble, and the proceedings should continue as if the domicile of the particular non-party witness 
is unknown or the latter has died.
201
 Although this decision makes sense, the period of two 
years should not be regarded as absolute, but it should depend on the particular state to which 
the request for judicial assistance was addressed, especially on the experience gained from re-
quests sent to such state in the past.
202
 
VI. Conclusion 
Based on the public international law concept of sovereignty, each state has, to the exclusion of 
any other state, the competence to exercise governmental power on its own territory. At the 
same time, however, a state must also refrain from conducting acts of state on the territory of a 
foreign state. The sovereignty of a state is thus limited by the sovereignty of other states or, to 
put it differently, the exercise of power by one state on the territory of another state infringes 
the latter’s sovereignty and violates public international law. The extent to which a trial court, 
litigants or their counsel are, if at all, allowed to gather evidence abroad under public interna-
tional law depends on whether the foreign state, where the evidentiary material is located, re-
gards the evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters as an act of state whose performance 
is reserved to its own authorities; in other words, whether the foreign state considers the evi-
dence-taking on its territory by a trial court, litigant, his counsel, or any other individual as an 
intrusion upon its sovereignty. 
In absence of any international rule on whether evidence-taking constitutes an act of state or 
not, the legal world can be divided into two groups, namely on the one hand, the countries 
sharing the civil-law tradition, and, on the other, those adopting the common-law system. In 
Switzerland, a civil-law country, the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters is seen 
as a judicial act, irrespective of whether it is performed by members of the trial court or a pri-
vate individual. It is also irrelevant whether the trial court applies any measures of compulsion 
on Swiss soil, or whether the witness located in Switzerland voluntarily collaborates or not. 
This is in sharp contrast with the approach taken by common-law countries, such as South Af-
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rica,
203
 Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, where the collection of evidence is regarded 
as a non-judicial act, provided no compulsion is applied. This distinct approach in civil and 
common law rests on the peculiarities of civil procedure in the two legal traditions, in particu-
lar the question of who is in control of gathering the evidence, that is, the court or the parties. 
In the civil-law tradition, civil proceedings are under the control of the court. This holds true in 
particular for the development of evidence, as the judge decides what evidence proffered by the 
litigants is taken for proof. It is also the judge who conducts the examination of witnesses. The 
parties and their counsel are confined to posing additional questions to witnesses once the court 
has concluded its interrogation. This principle of judicial control over the procurement of evi-
dence is often referred to as the “inquisitorial system”. In clear contrast to this system is the so-
called “adversarial system” that prevails in common-law countries. Here, the litigants, or rather 
their counsel, dominate the process of evidence-taking. The litigants collect the evidence with-
out the involvement of the court, unless a party does not comply with a relevant request from 
his opponent. This holds true for the pre-trial discovery of documents where the litigants in-
form each other of all relevant documents relating to the matter in dispute. The litigants fur-
thermore control the examination of the witnesses who are subject to examination-in-chief, 
cross-examination, and re-examination by the parties’ counsel. In contrast to civil-law coun-
tries, the common-law judge plays a passive and receptive role and, as a mere umpire or refer-
ee, supervises the proceedings in order to guarantee a fair trial and ensure the litigants’ compli-
ance with the relevant procedural rules. Based on the above, it is evident that the divergent 
qualification of evidence-taking in civil and common law is ultimately a corollary of the in-
quisitorial and adversarial systems. Under the former, the procurement of evidence is entrusted 
to judicial authorities and is thus seen as a judicial act. In contrast, by leaving the collection of 
evidence to the parties, the adversarial system qualifies the evidence-taking as a purely private 
act.  
In Switzerland, the taking of evidence on Swiss territory for the benefit of civil proceedings 
pending abroad without the authorisation of the competent Swiss authorities is not only seen as 
a violation of public international law, but also as a criminal offence under Article 271(1) of 
the Swiss Criminal Code. As a result, a member of a trial court or a litigant in foreign civil pro-
ceedings who, for instance, questions a non-party witness in Switzerland without the permis-
sion of the relevant Swiss authorities, violates the said provision. Exempt from punishment un-
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der Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code are, however, activities of private individuals 
that merely serve to evaluate the chances of a lawsuit or to prepare the latter, as such activities 
are not regarded as acts reserved to Swiss authorities, but as a matter for the parties. 
Whenever a state intends to perform an act that interferes with the sovereignty of another state, 
it must request international judicial assistance from the latter. In this context, international ju-
dicial assistance can be seen as a vehicle to overcome the restrictions imposed by the concept 
of sovereignty. In the context of the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial 
matters, it prevents the exclusion of evidence in civil proceedings pending before a trial court 
because a particular means of proof is located in a foreign state. International judicial assis-
tance in evidence-taking is thus crucial for a lawsuit not to fail merely on the grounds that evi-
dence is situated in a foreign state. International judicial assistance includes, on the one hand, 
the so-called “active judicial assistance” where the requested state performs the requested acts 
on its territory and transmits the relevant outcome to the requesting state or, on the other hand, 
the so-called “passive judicial assistance” where the requested state authorises the requesting 
state to perform the relevant acts on its territory. Due to the principle of judicial control over 
the procurement of evidence, civil-law countries prefer active judicial assistance, as the evi-
dence is taken by the courts of the requested state. In contrast, in common-law countries, where 
the development of evidence is in the hands of the parties, passive judicial assistance prevails. 
Requested states either render judicial assistance based on an international treaty of mutual le-
gal cooperation or, in the absence of the latter, on the so-called “courtoisie internationale”. In 
the former case, the requested state is under a public international law obligation to grant judi-
cial assistance, provided the request from the requesting state complies with the treaty or con-
vention, and there are no valid grounds to refuse the execution of the request. By contrast, in 
the case of “courtoisie internationale”, the requested state is not obliged to render judicial as-
sistance under public international law, but usually does so in expectation that the requesting 
state will reciprocate. 
When rendering active judicial assistance in cross-border taking of evidence, the requested 
state usually applies its domestic rules on the form and procedure of taking evidence. In cases 
of passive judicial assistance, however, the requesting state takes evidence in the requested 
state based on its own law. Trial courts seeking evidence abroad usually favour passive judicial 
assistance, as in this case, the taking of evidence is, irrespective of whether the evidentiary ma-
terial is located in the requesting or requested state, governed by the same rules, namely those 
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of the requesting state. This minimises the risk that evidence obtained in the requested state is 
merely of limited probative value or even inadmissible in the proceedings before the trial court 
due to any discrepancies in the rules on evidence-taking in the requesting and requested state.  
The three classical methods for obtaining foreign evidence in civil and commercial matters by 
means of international judicial assistance are the taking of evidence by way of letter of request, 
through commissioners, and by diplomatic officers or consular agents. In the first case, the re-
quested state is asked to take the foreign evidence for the benefit of civil proceedings pending 
before a trial court on its territory. Evidence-taking by means of letter of request thus consti-
tutes active judicial assistance, and the requested state usually applies its own law when exe-
cuting the request. In contrast, the taking of evidence through commissioners, diplomatic offic-
ers, or consular agents is seen as passive judicial assistance. Here, it is the commissioner, 
usually appointed by the trial court, the diplomatic officer or the consular agent of the request-
ing state who obtains the evidence on the territory of the requested state in accordance with the 
relevant rules of the requesting state. Due to the aforesaid preference of passive judicial assis-
tance by trial courts and the fact that evidence-taking by a diplomatic officer and consular 
agent may be confined to nationals of the requesting state, trial courts usually favour evidence-
taking through a commissioner. Compared to a letter of request, however, this form of judicial 
assistance, as well as evidence-taking by a diplomatic officer or consular agent has a consider-
able drawback: a commissioner, a diplomatic officer and a consular agent cannot apply any 
compulsion on the territory of the requested state. A letter of request is thus the vehicle to ob-
tain evidence from individuals who do not voluntarily cooperate with a commissioner, diplo-
matic officer or consular agent, as the courts of the requested state may use measures of com-
pulsion provided for in their domestic law. 
In practice, a trial court sometimes faces a situation where its request for judicial assistance 
remains unanswered by the requested state. It goes without saying that the trial court has to 
pursue the pending proceedings and to adjudicate even though foreign evidence cannot be ob-
tained by means of international judicial assistance. In case the requested state expressly refus-
es to execute the request for judicial assistance, the trial court should proceed in the same man-
ner as if the litigant bearing the burden of proof fails to adduce evidence. Where there is no 
formal rejection of the request by the foreign state, the trial court should be able to continue the 
proceedings on the assumption that the evidence sought abroad is not obtainable, provided a 
reminder was sent to the requested state and remained unanswered for a reasonable period of 
time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFER OF FOREIGN EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 
 
I. Introduction 
In a lawsuit pending in South Africa, the plaintiff calls A, a Swiss national residing in Switzer-
land, as a witness. As the members of the South African court or the parties’ counsel are not 
allowed to travel to Switzerland to interrogate A without the permission of the competent 
Swiss authorities, the South African court may request international judicial assistance from 
Switzerland.
1
 Since obtaining foreign evidence through channels of international judicial assis-
tance is often a time-consuming and cumbersome process,
2
 the South African court may try to 
obtain A’s testimony without the involvement of the Swiss authorities, namely by summoning 
A to appear in court in South Africa, by examining him by videolink or telephone, or by re-
questing A to answer the relevant questions in writing. Furthermore, the South African court 
may try to obtain A’s testimony through the party who called A as witness, namely by ordering 
such party to submit the written testimony of A. By so doing, the South African court attempts 
to transfer the evidence, which is originally located in Switzerland, to its own jurisdiction. This 
so-called “transfer of foreign evidence”3 means that the evidence is no longer examined in 
Switzerland, but in South Africa.
4
 
This Chapter focuses on the transfer of evidence from abroad to the trial court’s jurisdiction as 
an alternative method to obtain foreign means of proof. It first explains the nature of such 
transfer, analyses its advantages and disadvantages in comparison with the procurement of evi-
dence through means of international judicial assistance and examines whether the latter pre-
vails over a transfer of foreign evidence under public international law. The Chapter then in-
vestigates whether or not, and, if so, to what extent, a transfer of foreign evidence is limited by 
the concept of sovereignty. In this context, it is examined whether foreign litigants and third 
parties are under an obligation to cooperate with the trial court regarding a transfer of foreign 
evidence and whether the court may apply measures of compulsion towards recalcitrant wit-
nesses. Once the relationship between a transfer of foreign evidence and the sovereignty of the 
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state, where the evidence is originally located, is highlighted, the Chapter analyses the different 
forms of transfer of foreign evidence. Finally, the transmission of a request for transfer of for-
eign evidence from the trial court to the foreign witness is briefly discussed. 
II. Nature of a Transfer of Foreign Evidence 
A trial court has two options when faced with evidence located abroad: either to obtain the evi-
dentiary material through means of international judicial assistance, or via a transfer of foreign 
evidence.
5
 In the first case, the evidence-taking occurs outside the trial court’s jurisdiction on 
the territory of the foreign state where the evidentiary material is located. The foreign court, for 
instance, interrogates the foreign witness and subsequently sends the transcript of the hearing 
to the state of the trial court. From the latter’s perspective, such evidence-taking is of an extra-
territorial nature.  
By comparison, a transfer of foreign evidence constitutes, again from the viewpoint of the trial 
court, a purely domestic taking of evidence. The evidence originally situated in a foreign state 
is transferred to the jurisdiction of the trial court where it is examined by the latter. The trial 
court, for example, will order a foreign litigant to attend court in order to testify before it.
6
 As a 
result, the evidence is no longer taken in the foreign state, but in the jurisdiction of the trial 
court. By means of a transfer of foreign evidence, the evidence-taking thus mutates into a pure-
ly domestic process which is under the exclusive control of the trial court.
7
 In other words, the 
trial court takes the evidence directly from the foreign witness and does not, as in the case of 
international judicial assistance, ask a foreign authority to obtain the evidence from the relevant 
witness. 
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III. Transfer of Foreign Evidence versus International Judicial Assistance in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Transfer of Foreign Evidence 
Based on the foregoing comments,
8
 the fundamental differences between international judicial 
assistance and a transfer of foreign evidence are evident. While in the case of international ju-
dicial assistance, the evidence is obtained in the foreign state where it is originally located, the 
evidence-taking by means of a transfer of foreign evidence occurs in the state where the law-
suit is pending. In the first case, it is the foreign court, a commissioner, a diplomatic officer or 
consular agent acting on foreign territory, who will examine the evidence. The trial court is 
usually not involved in the actual examination, but merely receives a written report on the evi-
dence-taking abroad.
9
 In the case of a transfer of foreign evidence, however, the transferred 
evidence is examined by the trial court in its jurisdiction. As a result, the foreign state, from 
whose territory the evidentiary material was transferred, is not involved in the taking of evi-
dence. Consequently, there is no need for the trial court to seek international judicial assistance 
from the foreign state. Unlike in the course of active judicial assistance where the evidence-
taking is usually governed by the law of the requested state,
10
 the trial court applies its own 
rules with regard to transferred evidence.
11
 
The collection of foreign evidence through channels of international judicial assistance can be 
a time-consuming and cumbersome process. In the worst case scenario, requests for interna-
tional judicial assistance remain unanswered, and the evidence located abroad cannot be ob-
tained through the authorities of the foreign state. This is particularly true with regard to for-
eign states that are not party to an international agreement on evidence-taking in civil and 
commercial matters and are thus under no public international law obligation to render judicial 
assistance.
12
 Here, the trial court is at the mercy of the foreign state, as it cannot be sure wheth-
er in a pending lawsuit, the latter will render judicial assistance or not. Also in cases where the 
foreign state is, based on a convention or treaty, in principle obliged to grant judicial assis-
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10
 With regard to active judicial assistance, see Chapter 2 para. V.B. 
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tance, it may refuse the execution of a request for judicial assistance for reasons stipulated in 
the relevant agreement.
13
 Even though a foreign state is willing to grant assistance, the execu-
tion of a request may take several months and considerably delay the course of procedure be-
fore the trial court.
14
 Moreover, the distinct difference of approach in evidence-taking in civil 
and commercial matters in civil- and common-law countries,
15
 as well as the divergences in the 
procedure for the taking of evidence and in the means of proof in the laws of the requesting and 
requested state may cause difficulties.
16
 These differences may, in the last resort, result in a 
limited probative value or even in the inadmissibility of foreign evidence in the proceedings 
before the trial court.
17
  
To overcome these hurdles, trial courts often tend to avoid international judicial assistance and 
instead try to transfer evidence from abroad to their jurisdiction. Such transfer not only pre-
vents delay in the proceedings before the trial court, but it offers, at least from the latter’s per-
spective, additional benefits. The evidence is taken in the presence of the judge who ultimately 
decides the case and who is thus in a position to observe the witness’ demeanour with his own 
eyes.
18
 This results in a better assessment of the witness’ credibility rather than relying purely 
on a written witness report prepared by the foreign court, a commissioner, diplomatic officer or 
consular agent that questioned the witness abroad.
19
 Moreover, the examination of a witness by 
the trial court often leads to a better establishment of the facts, as such court is, at least in civil-
law jurisdictions, more familiar with the case than the foreign court, a commissioner, diplomat-
ic officer or consular agent.
20
 Accordingly, the trial court is in a better position to identify any 
ambiguity or omission in a witness’ testimony and can, if necessary, change the flow of ques-
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tions in the light of the responses of the witness.
21
 The fact, that a foreign witness is interrogat-
ed by an authority of the requested state or one of the aforesaid individuals and not by the trial 
court that ultimately decides the case, may furthermore reduce the witness’ threshold of self-
restraint to tell the truth.
22
  
In case of a transfer of foreign evidence, the evidence-taking is, as mentioned earlier, no longer 
governed by the laws of the state where the evidence was originally located, but by the rules of 
the trial court.
23
 The departure from foreign law eliminates the aforesaid risk that evidence tak-
en in the course of active judicial assistance may be inadmissible, or of merely limited proba-
tive value due to discrepancies in the procedural laws of the foreign state and the state of the 
trial court.  
In the light of the above, it is evident that, compared to evidence-taking through international 
judicial assistance, a transfer of foreign evidence has, at least from the perspective of the trial 
court and the plaintiff who both are interested in speedy proceedings, many advantages. The 
downside of such transfer, however, is the limited use of coercive measures by the trial court 
towards uncooperative foreign witnesses, as the use of compulsion may interfere with the sov-
ereignty of the foreign state. Where the trial court is not allowed to apply compulsion, a trans-
fer of foreign evidence only succeeds if the foreign witness voluntarily collaborates.
24
 In the 
absence of the voluntary cooperation of the witness, international judicial assistance is the only 
means to obtain foreign evidence. 
From the perspective of a foreign defendant or third party, however, a transfer of foreign evi-
dence may be disadvantageous. Compared to an examination by way of international judicial 
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assistance where the witness is questioned at his foreign domicile based on the rules of his state 
of residence,
25
 he may have to travel abroad and/or may be confronted with a legal system he is 
not familiar with and court proceedings that are conducted in a foreign language.
26
  
B. Primacy of International Judicial Assistance over a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
As has been explained earlier,
27
 trial courts often prefer to obtain foreign means of proof via a 
transfer of foreign evidence than through means of international judicial assistance. When 
choosing between these two procedures, the trial court must take into consideration the follow-
ing points: first, whether there is a convention or treaty governing the particular taking of evi-
dence and, if so, second, whether such international treaty contains any rules on transfer of for-
eign evidence. In case the latter is excluded by an international convention or treaty, the trial 
court violates public international law when procuring evidence from abroad without the in-
volvement of the foreign state.
28
 Where the international agreement allows for a transfer of for-
eign evidence, or where there is no such agreement between the state of the trial court and the 
foreign state, the transfer of foreign evidence is solely subject to the rules of the trial court. One 
must, however, bear in mind that the trial court always has, in particular in the absence of any 
international treaty, to take into consideration the sovereignty of another state when deciding to 
obtain evidence via a transfer of foreign evidence. 
IV. Transfer of Foreign Evidence and Sovereignty 
A. General Remarks 
In the course of a transfer of foreign evidence, neither a member of the trial court nor any other 
public official of the state of the trial court travels to the foreign state to take evidence on the 
latter’s territory. Nevertheless, the order of the trial court for a transfer of foreign evidence has 
an impact beyond the area of its national jurisdiction on the territory of the foreign state where 
the evidence is originally located.
29
 The question therefore arises whether such a court order 
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infringes foreign sovereignty. Since in the civil-law tradition, the gathering of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters is usually entrusted to the courts,
30
 the said question has been repeat-
edly discussed with regard to the transfer of foreign evidence situated in civil-law jurisdictions 
. 
When assessing the admissibility of a transfer of foreign evidence under public international 
law, one has to distinguish between two issues. The first question that arises is whether a state 
is allowed to extend the application of its domestic rules on evidence-taking to means of proof 
located abroad. Provided such an extension is allowed, it has to be examined whether the order 
of the trial court for a transfer of foreign evidence interferes with foreign sovereignty.
31
 
It is well established that under public international law, a state may apply its own law on facts 
that materialise abroad, provided there is a genuine link between such facts and the respective 
state. Such a connection exists particularly where civil court proceedings involve means of 
proof that are located in a foreign state.
 
Accordingly, the trial court does not infringe public 
international law when extending the application of its rules on evidence situated on foreign 
territory.
32
 In this context, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated the following in 
the Lotus-case:
33
 
“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exer-
cising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts 
which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive 
rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law 
contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws 
and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their ter-
ritory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do 
so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international 
law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the ef-
fect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
rechts 1989 50; Rechberger WH and McGuire M-R ʻDie Umsetzung der EuBewVO im österreichischen Zivil-
prozessrecht: Der Vorrang der traditionellen Rechtshilfe im Spannungsverhältnis mit dem Unmittelbarkeits-
grundsatzʼ 2005 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 114 et seq. 
30
 See Chapter 2 para. IV.B.3 above. 
31
 Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 49 et 
seq.  
32
 Steinberger H ʻSovereigntyʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume IV 2000 
516; Leipold D Lex fori, Souveränität, Discovery: Grundfragen des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts 1989 49 
et seq.; Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 184 n. 374; Dahm R, Delbrück J, and Wolfrum R 
Völkerrecht Band I/1: Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte 1989 483; Ipsen K Völkerrecht 2004 320 n. 
88 et seq. Cf. also the comments on the jurisdiction to prescribe in Chapter 2 para. III.B.3. For more on the ge-
nuine link, see, amongst others, Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 63 n. 166 et seq., 184 n. 374; 
Seidl-Hohenveldern and Stein T Völkerrecht 2000 249 n. 1366 et seq.; Ipsen K Völkerrecht 2004 321 n. 90 et 
seqq.; Adolphsen J ʻDas Territorialitätsprinzip im europäischen Patentrechtʼ in 2006 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß 
International 139; VPB 45.47 253 et seqq.  
33
 S.S. Lotus 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) no. 10 19 et seq. 
 60 
 
this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.” 
It is also generally recognised that not every court order with extraterritorial effect interferes 
with public international law. By way of example, a court decision wherein the losing party is 
ordered to perform a particular action on foreign territory is compatible with public interna-
tional law. Such a decision does not impair the sovereignty of the foreign state, as the latter is 
free to recognise and enforce the decision in its jurisdiction.
34
 Similarly, the order of a trial 
court regarding a transfer of foreign evidence is not per se regarded as encroachment on for-
eign sovereignty.
35
 The admissibility of such a court order under public international law rather 
depends on two factors, namely the addressee of the court order, litigants or third parties, and 
whether the order includes any measures of compulsion towards its addressees.
36
 In this con-
text, the question arises to what extent, if at all, foreign witnesses are under a public interna-
tional law obligation to collaborate with the trial court. Provided such obligation exists, it has 
to be examined whether and, if so, to what extent the trial court is allowed to compel foreign 
witnesses to cooperate.  
B. Obligation of Foreign Witnesses to Cooperate with the Trial Court 
The outcome of a transfer of foreign evidence largely depends on the extent to which a foreign 
witness is under an obligation to collaborate with the trial court.
37
 In the absence of such an 
obligation, a transfer of foreign evidence is only successful with regard to litigants and third 
parties who voluntarily cooperate, but is ineffective with recalcitrant witnesses. 
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Since a court order for a transfer of foreign evidence either aims at foreign litigants or third 
parties. Thus the following addresses first the obligation of foreign litigants to cooperate and, 
secondly, deals with the respective obligation of foreign non-party witnesses.
38
  
1. Obligation of Foreign Litigants to Cooperate 
It is well established that under public international law, foreign litigants are under an obliga-
tion to cooperate with the trial court. The reasons given for this obligation, however, vary.
39
 
Leipold’s arguments are based on the so-called “lex-fori principle”. According to this principle, 
court proceedings are governed by the rules of the court where the lawsuit is pending, the so-
called “lex fori”.40 In the opinion of Leipold, the lex-fori principle is of an international nature 
and is an expression of the sovereignty of states. This follows, according to Leipold, from the 
fact that each state recognises the right of another state to apply its own law in court proceed-
ings pending in its jurisdiction. Accordingly, Leipold maintains that orders of a trial court to-
wards foreign litigants are justified by the lex-fori principle which establishes, inter alia, a spe-
cial procedural relation between the trial court and foreign litigants.
41
 He concludes that parties 
domiciled abroad have the same duties as domestic litigants.
42
  
Schlosser maintains that, based on what he calls the “Annexzuständigkeit”, literally “annex ju-
risdiction”, foreign litigants have the same duties as domestic parties, provided the trial court is 
competent to decide the relevant case under public international law. In this context, he points 
to the fact that there is no international rule that prevents a trial court from ordering the losing 
party to perform a particular action in a foreign state. Schlosser furthermore emphasises that a 
different treatment of foreign and domestic litigants is not justified and would impair the 
“prozessuale Waffengleichheit”, that is, the equal fighting chances of plaintiffs and defend-
ants.
43
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Mössle refers to the so-called “internationale Beweiszuständigkeit”, literally “international ju-
risdiction over evidence”, which includes the trial court’s power to request means of proof lo-
cated abroad via a transfer of foreign evidence without having to resort to international judicial 
assistance.
44
 In comparison with Schlosser’s “Annexzuständigkeit”, Mössle considers the “in-
ternationale Beweiszuständigkeit” as a “separate phenomenon”. He maintains that merely by 
virtue of the “Annexzuständigkeit”, the trial court is not allowed to request a transfer of foreign 
evidence. When defining the prerequisites for the “internationale Beweiszuständigkeit”, 
Mössle follows the relevant doctrine in the United States which includes three requirements, 
namely the personal jurisdiction, the control, and the comity. The first requirement describes 
the trial court’s international jurisdiction over the addressee of the request for a transfer of for-
eign evidence. In other words, the trial court must have the power to order a respective transfer 
towards a foreign litigant. The second requirement, the control, refers to the power of the ad-
dressee to deal with the foreign evidence. The comity serves the purpose to define the limits of 
a transfer of foreign evidence and includes two elements. Firstly, a transfer is, as claimed by 
Mössle, only permitted if there is a close link between the foreign evidence and the state of the 
trial court. According to Mössle, such a link exists where the activities, to which the foreign 
evidence refers, have a domestic nexus which justifies that they are covered by the state of the 
trial court. The second element includes the public international law obligation of states to 
show consideration for each other, which particularly applies to a transfer of foreign evi-
dence.
45
 
From a practical viewpoint, it is irrelevant which of the foregoing theories prevails, as they all 
advocate the obligation of foreign litigants to cooperate with the trial court. The prevailing 
view in Germany, however, which is shared by the author, bases this obligation on the said 
“Annexzuständigkeit”.46 With regard to the abovementioned lex-fori principle, it is criticised 
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that, according to Leipold, the concept should only apply to foreign litigants, but not to foreign 
third parties.
47
 Based on Leipold’s assumption that each state recognises the right of another 
state to apply its lex fori in court proceedings, the differentiation between foreign litigants and 
foreign third parties is not deemed justified; there is no reason why states should recognise the 
lex-fori principle with respect to foreign litigants, but not regarding foreign third parties.
48
 The 
predominant view furthermore rejects the approach taken by Mössle, as it does not see the need 
to introduce the “internationale Beweiszuständigkeit” as a separate element to the “An-
nexzuständigkeit”. Such an element is, according to the prevailing view, not necessary, because 
in the opinion of Mössle, the trial court has “internationale Beweiszuständigkeit” whenever 
there is personal jurisdiction over the foreign litigant. It is therefore argued that if the personal 
jurisdiction, being the first requirement in the approach of Mössle, already results in the “in-
ternationale Beweiszuständigkeit”, the further prerequisites of control and comity are superflu-
ous.
49
 
2. Obligation of Foreign Third Parties to Cooperate  
While under public international law, the obligation of foreign litigants to cooperate with the 
trial court in the course of a transfer of foreign evidence is recognised,
50
 there is no consensus 
as to what extent foreign third parties have to collaborate.
51
 Leipold argues that unlike in the 
case of foreign litigants, the lex-fori principle does not apply to foreign third parties.
52
 He 
maintains that in contrast to litigants, the lis pendens of a lawsuit does not per se establish a 
relation between the trial court and foreign third parties, but that a respective connection only 
exists once the trial court has ordered a third party to cooperate. According to Leipold, such an 
order infringes the sovereignty of the foreign state, irrespective of the nationality of the third 
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party and whether the trial court uses any compulsion or not.
 
As a result, Leipold rejects any 
obligation of foreign non-party witnesses to collaborate with the trial court in the course of a 
transfer of foreign evidence.
53
 
By contrast, Schlosser holds that, based on the aforementioned “Annexzuständigkeit”,54 third 
parties have the same obligation to cooperate as litigants, provided the trial court is competent 
to decide the relevant case. The mere fact that a foreign non-party witness has information, 
which is relevant for the proceedings pending before the trial court, however, does, according 
to Schlosser, not suffice to establish a respective obligation to cooperate. Rather, there must be 
a genuine link that justifies the involvement of the foreign third party into the domestic pro-
ceedings. While Schlosser rejects such connection in the case of a transient tourist, he, for in-
stance, advocates an obligation to cooperate for a foreign third party who possesses property 
items in a lawsuit involving the estate of a deceased person who was domiciled in the trial 
court’s jurisdiction.55 
Mössle, whose argument is based on the aforesaid “internationale Beweiszuständigkeit”,56 on-
ly distinguishes between foreign litigants and third parties when examining the third require-
ment of comity. He maintains that, as a general principle, a foreign non-party witness is, like a 
foreign litigant, under an obligation to cooperate with the trial court, provided there is a close 
link between the third party and the state of the trial court which justifies the latter having per-
sonal jurisdiction over the non-party witness. Compared to a foreign litigant, however, Mössle 
emphasises that a foreign third party must be better protected, because his interests are more 
affected by the trial court’s order for a transfer of foreign evidence, as he is not a party to the 
lawsuit.
57
  
According to Geimer and Schack, the question of whether a foreign third party is under an ob-
ligation to collaborate with the trial court depends on his nationality. They argue that based on 
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the personal sovereignty,
58
 foreign third parties, who have the same nationality as the state of 
the trial court, are under an obligation to cooperate.
59
 Geimer emphasises that this obligation 
may be limited by virtue of the rule of reasonableness,
60
 and that the trial court therefore has to 
consider on a case-by-case basis whether the non-party witness is exempt from appearing in 
court due to a too long distance between his domicile and the location of the trial court, or due 
to other good causes. If such a cause exists, the trial court has, according to Geimer, to con-
template less incisive means than ordering the non-party witness to attend court, such as a writ-
ten testimony, or an examination via international judicial assistance.
61
 With regard to foreign 
third parties having a different nationality than that of the state of the trial court, Geimer and 
Schack reject an obligation to cooperate, as the said court is not in a position to invoke person-
al sovereignty over foreign nationals.
62
 
Müller maintains that an obligation of foreign third parties to cooperate requires a sufficient 
relation between the state of the trial court and the non-party witness. In the opinion of Müller, 
such relation exists if the third party has the same nationality as the state of the trial court. Spe-
cific connecting factors, however, are, as claimed by Müller, necessary in cases where the third 
party has a different nationality to that of the trial court. According to Müller, such factors 
may, for instance, exist where the third party has a right to the subject of the dispute or carries 
out business activities in the state of the trial court.
63
 
Finally, Daoudi applies, unlike Leipold, the lex-fori principle to foreign third parties. He main-
tains that, based on the personal sovereignty of the state of the trial court, this principle serves 
as a basis for the said court to order a transfer of foreign evidence towards non-party witnesses 
who are of the same nationality as the state of the trial court.
64
 With regard to non-party wit-
nesses who have a different nationality, Daoudi argues that, in the absence of the personal sov-
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ereignty of the trial court, the admissibility of a court order for a transfer of foreign evidence 
depends on the content of the court order without, however, specifying such content.
65
 
Leipold’s approach, which rejects any obligation to cooperate, irrespective of the nationality of 
the foreign third party, has been rejected by the majority of the German legal scholars. The 
same applies to the position taken by Mössle. Based on the personal sovereignty of the state of 
the trial court over its nationals, the prevailing view advocates an obligation of foreign third 
parties to collaborate, provided the latter have the same nationality as the said court.
66
 In other 
words, in the case of a transfer of foreign evidence aiming at a third party with the same na-
tionality as the state of the trial court, the latter’s personal sovereignty prevails over the territo-
rial sovereignty of the state where the witness is domiciled.
67
 With regard to foreign third par-
ties having another nationality than the state of the trial court, the latter, however, cannot 
invoke personal sovereignty. Consequently, the predominant view rejects an obligation of the 
said third parties to cooperate with the trial court.
68
 This view is shared by the author. 
C. Measures of Compulsion by the Trial Court towards Foreign Witnesses 
1. General Remarks 
In cases where a foreign witness has an obligation to cooperate with the trial court in the course 
of a transfer of foreign evidence,
69
 the question arises as to whether the said court can use 
measures of compulsion if the witness refuses to collaborate. Whether and, if so, to what extent 
such coercive measures are allowed under public international law depends on two factors: the 
addressee of the measure, foreign litigant or foreign third party, and the content of the measure. 
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This question is of great practical importance, as the obligation of a foreign witness to cooper-
ate holds good to the extent that the trial court is in a position to enforce that obligation upon 
the recalcitrant witness.
70
 This is all the more true as, in practice, foreign witnesses, in particu-
lar defendants and third parties, are often reluctant to cooperate with the trial court. If the latter, 
however, is not able to compel the collaboration of a recalcitrant foreign witness, the transfer 
of the respective evidence is not possible. In this event, the trial court has no other option, but 
to try to obtain the evidence through channels of international judicial assistance. Needless to 
say, the question as to the admissibility of compulsion becomes obsolete in cases where the 
foreign witness is under no obligation to cooperate with the trial court. 
This subchapter deals first with the different types of coercive measures as well as their im-
pacts on foreign territory. It then examines their admissibility under public international law, in 
other words, their relation to the sovereignty of the foreign state, and investigates to what ex-
tent, if at all, a trial court may compel foreign witnesses to collaborate.
71
 
2. Types and Impacts of Measures of Compulsion 
With regard to coercive measures, one distinguishes between direct and indirect compulsion. 
Direct compulsion includes measures that are aimed either at the assets of the recalcitrant for-
eign witness, by imposition of a fine, or at the witness himself, for example, by means of con-
finement for contempt of court. By contrast, indirect compulsion can be equated with conse-
quences of a merely procedural nature.
72
 Here, an uncooperative litigant may, for instance, be 
sanctioned with the dismissal of his claim.
73
  
The impacts of coercive measures are either limited to the jurisdiction of the trial court, or they 
extend to foreign states. The effects of measures of indirect compulsion are confined to the 
state of the trial court. By contrast, direct compulsion may take effect either in the jurisdiction 
of the trial court,
74
 or in a foreign state.
75
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3. Measures of Compulsion and Sovereignty 
It is well established that under public international law, a state is not allowed to apply direct 
compulsion on foreign territory. This holds true not only for cases where a trial court performs 
a judicial act in a foreign state, but also with regard to a transfer of foreign evidence, that is, 
where the said court does not become physically active on foreign territory. Consequently, for-
eign sovereignty is infringed where the trial court uses direct compulsion which takes effect 
abroad.
76
 
With regard to direct compulsion of which the impact is limited to the jurisdiction of the trial 
court, it is the prevailing view that a trial court is allowed to use such measures.
77 
 In contrast, 
Leipold argues that the mere threat of direct compulsion puts pressure on the foreign witness 
and that such pressure takes effect in the foreign state. Accordingly, Leipold considers the use 
of direct compulsion by the trial court, be it limited to the state of the trial court or not, as vio-
lation of foreign sovereignty.
78 Stadler maintains that the sovereignty of a state not only in-
cludes its territorial integrity, but also the protection of the state’s nationals against acts of other 
states. In this context, she holds that in case of indirect compulsion, the foreign litigant bears 
the normal risk of losing a case and can decide freely, that is, without the pressure of the trial 
court, whether he procures the evidence, or whether he accepts the possible procedural conse-
quences when not complying with an order for a transfer of foreign evidence. Accordingly, 
Stadler qualifies the use of indirect compulsion as not being a violation of foreign sovereignty 
as the trial court does not apply any pressure or compulsion towards the foreign litigant. Where 
the trial court, however, uses direct compulsion, the foreign witness has, in the opinion of 
Stadler, no real choice between giving in to the court order and, if not doing so, accepting the 
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respective coercive measure. In this regard, Stadler argues that the trial court compels the for-
eign witness to perform actions on foreign territory which such court could not have taken 
without violating foreign sovereignty. According to Stadler, however, not all direct coercive 
measures interfere with public international law, but only those which, from the perspective of 
the trial court, aim at penalising the foreign witness for not complying with the court order. In 
contrast, measures that serve the purpose of concluding the proceedings and not as punishment 
or enforcement of procedural duties, do, according to Stadler, not infringe foreign sovereign-
ty.
79
 
Neither Leipold’s or Stadler’s position is fully convincing. With regard to the former, one has 
to keep in mind that the use of direct compulsion limited to the trial court’s jurisdiction is of a 
purely domestic nature. The threat of compulsion occurs in the state of the trial court. The same 
holds true for the execution of the respective court order which can only be enforced within 
that court’s jurisdiction. Following Leipold’s approach would furthermore impair the equal 
fighting chances between domestic and foreign litigants, as only the former could be compelled 
to collaborate with the trial court. Such unequal treatment, however, should be avoided.
80
 
Stadler’s differentiation regarding direct coercive measures appears to be rather artificial, as a 
respective court order always includes the court’s intention to enforce the procedural duties of 
the foreign witness in case he fails to comply with the court’s request.  
Measures of indirect compulsion do not interfere with the sovereignty of the state where the 
foreign litigant is domiciled and are thus compatible with public international law.
81
 As has 
been noted above, the impacts of such measures are limited to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Moreover, such measures result from the procedural relation between the trial court and the 
foreign litigant, in other words, from a relation that is of a purely domestic nature.  
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4. Measures of Compulsion towards Foreign Litigants 
In the light of the above, it becomes evident that under public international law, the measures 
of compulsion that a trial court may apply towards foreign litigants are twofold: measures of 
direct compulsion, provided they do not take effect outside the state of the trial court, and 
measures of indirect compulsion.
82
 Since the use of these measures is based on the procedural 
link between the trial court and the foreign litigant, they can be applied with regard to a foreign 
litigant having the same nationality as the state of the trial court as well as a party having a dif-
ferent nationality. The admissibility of such measures of compulsion, be they direct or indirect, 
ultimately serve the purpose of guaranteeing the equal fighting chances between domestic and 
foreign litigants.
83
  
From a practical point of view, the use of direct compulsion limited to the state of the trial 
court only makes sense if the foreign witness has assets in such state that can be seized once he 
fails to collaborate with the trial court. 
5. Measures of Compulsion towards Foreign Third Parties 
As has been explained earlier,
84
 the use of direct compulsion taking effect outside the state of 
the trial court interferes with the sovereignty of the foreign state. This also holds true with re-
gard to foreign third parties. Compared to a foreign litigant, the coercive measures the trial 
court may apply towards a foreign third party are more restricted. This follows from the fact 
that the latter is not party to the proceedings. Consequently, there is no procedural relation be-
tween the trial court and the foreign third party. The impacts of this are twofold: first, the trial 
court cannot apply any indirect compulsion towards foreign non-party witnesses, as such com-
pulsion requires a procedural relation. Second, the use of direct compulsion limited to the state 
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of the trial court cannot be founded on a procedural link. Instead, the criterion to be considered 
is the personal sovereignty of the state where the trial court is situated. As the personal sover-
eignty only extends to individuals having the same nationality as the state of the trial court, 
there are differences in approach regarding the use of direct compulsion (taking effect in the 
trial court’s jurisdiction) depending on the nationality of the foreign third party. While a trial 
court may apply direct measures towards non-party witnesses having the same nationality as 
the trial court, the use of such compulsion regarding third parties with another nationality is not 
compatible with public international law.
85
  
The preceding conclusion is consistent with the aforementioned obligations of foreign third 
parties to collaborate with the trial court in the course of a transfer of foreign evidence, as the 
use of compulsion requires a respective obligation to cooperate. In other words, where there is 
no respective obligation of the foreign non-party witness, the trial court cannot compel him to 
collaborate. As in the case of foreign litigants,
86
 the use of indirect compulsion towards third 
parties makes sense only if the latter have assets in the trial court’s jurisdiction. 
6. Summary 
In the light of the above, the following picture emerges regarding the admissibility of an order 
of the trial court for a transfer of foreign evidence under public international law: with respect 
to foreign litigants, such court order is allowed, provided indirect compulsion or direct compul-
sion limited to the state of trial court is applied. Moreover, the trial court may issue an order 
towards foreign third parties having the same nationality as the state where the trial court is lo-
cated, provided it merely uses direct compulsion taking effect in its jurisdiction. By contrast, a 
court order for a transfer of foreign evidence, which includes direct coercive measures taking 
effect abroad, interferes with foreign sovereignty, irrespective of whether it aims at foreign liti-
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gants or foreign third parties. The same holds true for any measures of compulsion towards 
foreign non-party witnesses having a nationality different from that of the state of the trial 
court. 
D. Request of the Trial Court for Voluntary Cooperation of Foreign Witnesses 
In cases where a trial court cannot compel a foreign witness to collaborate, the question arises 
whether the former is allowed to ask the witness for his voluntary cooperation. In other words, 
can the trial court solicit evidence from a foreign witness without the involvement of the for-
eign state, provided no compulsion is involved? Or does such a request already interfere with 
foreign sovereignty so that the trial court has no other choice than seeking international judicial 
assistance?  
In practice, a trial court will hardly request foreign litigants for their voluntary cooperation, as 
it has sufficient means to compel them to collaborate. This particularly holds true for cases 
where a litigant does not have any assets in the state of the trial court, as the latter can still ap-
ply indirect compulsion. The prospect of such compulsion usually suffices to ensure the liti-
gant’s cooperation. In contrast, the voluntary cooperation of foreign third parties plays a more 
important role, as the extent to which a trial court is allowed to use compulsion is more lim-
ited.
87
 Accordingly, a voluntary cooperation of a non-party witness becomes relevant whenever 
the latter has a nationality different from that of the state of the trial court. The same holds true 
with regard to third parties who have the same nationality as the trial court, but do not have any 
assets in the court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that even in cases 
where the trial court could theoretically apply coercive measures, a request for voluntary coop-
eration may be the more promising strategy to obtain foreign evidence. In practice, foreign 
third parties are often more motivated to cooperate with a trial court when requested for their 
voluntary cooperation than when ordered by a court decision to procure evidence. Having said 
this, the following comments focus on the voluntary cooperation of third party witnesses. 
The question of whether the trial court is allowed to request the voluntary cooperation of third 
parties without the involvement of the foreign state has been controversially discussed.
88
 Ac-
cording to one school of thought, such request interferes with foreign sovereignty and is thus 
incompatible with public international law. In this context, Leipold maintains that by soliciting 
a voluntary transfer of foreign evidence, the trial court performs a judicial act taking effect on 
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foreign territory, as it aims at a third party located abroad.
 
 He opines that, although the trial 
court neither acts on foreign soil nor uses any measures of compulsion, the request nevertheless 
interferes with foreign sovereignty because it ultimately aims at bypassing international judi-
cial assistance.
89
 Geiger points out that, in this context, the fact that the foreign third party vol-
untarily cooperates is irrelevant, as the latter cannot waive the sovereignty of the foreign 
state.
90
 
The prevailing view, however, regards the request for voluntary cooperation as compatible 
with public international law, albeit based on different arguments. Schack notes that such a re-
quest does not constitute a judicial act of the trial court on foreign territory and therefore does 
not interfere with foreign sovereignty.
91
 Mann maintains that by issuing the said request, the 
trial court merely informs the foreign third party about the pending lawsuit and that it is at the 
discretion of the third party whether to collaborate or not.
92
 Schabenberger qualifies the request 
for voluntary cooperation as a judicial act, as it is issued by a court in support of court proceed-
ings. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Schabenberger opines that the request does not infringe 
foreign sovereignty, because the third party is free to decide whether he wants to cooperate or 
not. In this context, Schabenberger compares the request with a notification issued by a court 
where a foreign third party is informed about measures that were already taken in the respec-
tive court’s jurisdiction and which he considers as allowed under public international law. In 
this regard, Schabenberger points out that like notifications, requests for voluntary cooperation 
do not entail any legal consequences, as they do not include any compulsion.
93
 
Following the prevailing view, it is submitted that the trial court’s request for voluntary coop-
eration does not interfere with the sovereignty of the foreign state. As has been explained earli-
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er,
94
 the use of compulsion by a trial court towards foreign third parties is permitted under cer-
tain circumstances. A request for voluntary cooperation should therefore be allowed at least to 
the same extent. In addition, one has to bear in mind that, unlike in the case where direct com-
pulsion is used, such a request does not entail any detrimental legal consequences for the for-
eign third party, but merely informs the latter that a lawsuit is pending before the trial court and 
that his cooperation may benefit these proceedings. Consequently, a request for voluntary co-
operation should not only be allowed towards non-party witnesses having the same nationality 
as the trial court, but also regarding third parties with a different nationality. For the avoidance 
of doubt, the request should clearly point out that the foreign third party is under no obligation 
to collaborate with the trial court and that the disregard of the request is not accompanied by 
any kind of coercive measures or any other negative consequences.
95
 
V. Different Forms of a Transfer of Foreign Evidence 
A. General Remarks 
This subchapter deals with the different options a trial court has when trying to obtain the evi-
dence of foreign witnesses directly, that is, without the involvement of the foreign state. The 
focus is on the oral and written testimony of litigants and third parties, as well as documents 
and movable property that are under their control.
96
 Having said this, a trial court may order a 
foreign witness to appear in court, to testify via videolink or telephone, to give evidence in 
writing or to submit documents or movable property. Where the opinion of an expert is neces-
sary and has to be based on foreign evidence, the trial court may furthermore appoint a domes-
tic expert who collects the evidence abroad.  
The following outlines the nature of each of the aforementioned options, including their ad-
vantages and disadvantages compared to the evidence-taking through international judicial as-
sistance as well as in comparison with each other. With regard to most of the said methods, it is 
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controversial whether they qualify as a transfer of foreign evidence,
97
 or rather whether they 
constitute a judicial act of the trial court on foreign territory. This qualification is, as has been 
mentioned before, essential, as in the latter case, the evidence-taking without authorisation of 
the relevant foreign authority is per se impermissible under public international law, irrespec-
tive of whether the trial court applies compulsion or not. In contrast, a transfer of foreign evi-
dence, with the exception of third parties having a different nationality to the state of the trial 
court, does not interfere with public international law, unless the trial court applies compulsion 
that infringes foreign sovereignty.
98
 Finally, it is investigated whether the said methods contra-
vene Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code.  
In connection with a request for a transfer of foreign evidence, it is not only the question of 
whether that transfer interferes with foreign sovereignty that arises, but also how a respective 
request is to be served upon foreign witnesses under public international law.
99
 Having said 
this, the conclusion that public international law allows the aforesaid forms of evidence-taking 
does not imply that the service of the relevant request abroad does not require the assistance of 
the foreign authorities.
100
 
There is no doubt that under public international law, the trial court is allowed to order a liti-
gant or third party residing in its jurisdiction to submit documents or movable property located 
in a foreign state that are under the witnesses’ control. As has been explained earlier,101 cross-
border taking of evidence only occurs where the witness administering the evidence to be ob-
tained is located in a different state than the trial court. Since in the constellation at hand, the 
witnesses controlling the evidence are located in the state of the trial court, there is no cross-
border taking of evidence, let alone a transfer of foreign evidence.
102
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B. Summons of a Foreign Witness to Appear before the Trial Court 
1. Nature of a Summons to Appear before the Trial Court 
This subchapter deals with the situation where a trial court requests a foreign witness to appear 
and testify before it. Based on the said summons, the witness travels to the state of the trial 
court and testifies before the competent judge in the presence of the litigants and their counsel. 
The advantages and disadvantages of an examination of a foreign witness through the trial 
court without the involvement of the foreign state in comparison with questioning by means of 
international judicial assistance have already been outlined:
103
 the time-consuming and burden-
some process of international judicial assistance can be avoided, the trial court is able to see 
and hear the witness, the examination is governed by the law of the trial court, and the use of 
compulsion by the trial court is limited. 
2. Summons to Appear before the Trial Court as a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
There is no doubt that the summons of a foreign witness to testify before the trial court consti-
tutes a transfer of foreign evidence. The examination of the foreign witness occurs fully in the 
state of the trial court, as both the questioning of the witness by the trial court, the litigants or 
their counsel and the answering of these questions by the witness happen in the jurisdiction of 
the trial court. As a consequence, the summons by the trial court does not interfere with the 
sovereignty of the foreign state and does therefore not require a request for international judi-
cial assistance.
104
 
3. Summons to Appear before the Trial Court and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal 
Code 
An examination of a witness residing in Switzerland that is conducted in the foreign state 
where the civil proceedings are pending does not involve a violation of Article 271(1) of the 
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Swiss Criminal Code.
105
 As the questioning of the witness does not take place on Swiss soil, it 
does not fall under the aforesaid provision. 
C. Examination of a Foreign Witness by the Trial Court by Videolink 
1. Nature of an Examination by Videolink 
The development of new technologies has created novel forms of communication which may 
considerably enhance the taking of evidence across national frontiers. This is particularly true 
with regard to the use of videolink technology that enables the trial court to communicate with 
litigants, their counsel and non-party witnesses residing abroad instantaneously with real-time 
audio and visual display.
106 
 In other words, videoconferencing allows foreign witnesses to tes-
tify “live” during a trial.107  
Depending on where the participants of such examination are located, one can distinguish dif-
ferent situations. The classical case is where the non-party witness to be questioned is domi-
ciled in a state other than that where the lawsuit is pending while the members of the trial 
court, the litigants and their counsel are located in the state of the said court. It is, however, al-
so conceivable that the litigants and their counsel attend the witness examination by videolink 
outside the state of the trial court, that is, either in the state where the foreign non-party witness 
is domiciled, or in a third country. Where a foreign litigant is to be examined via videolink, the 
above applies accordingly. While he is located outside the state of the trial court, the judge, the 
opponent and the latter’s counsel are situated in the state where the lawsuit is pending. With 
regard to the location of the counsel of the litigant to be questioned, one has to keep in mind 
that in practice, foreign litigants usually engage attorneys who practise in the trial court’s juris-
diction and are thus not only familiar with the procedural laws of such court, but also how such 
laws are applied by the said court. It is advisable for the respective counsel to be located at the 
same venue as the foreign litigant during the latter’s examination. This is the only way that suf-
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ficient consultation between the litigant and his attorney can be ensured throughout the interro-
gation.
108
 
The following focuses on the case where a foreign third party is questioned by videolink, and 
the judge, the litigants and their counsel are located in the state of the trial court. In practice, 
this is the most common situation, as in most cases, a trial court can compel foreign litigants to 
attend court to give testimony and thus it is only in exceptional cases that the court allows them 
to testify by videolink.
109
 
The advantages and disadvantages of a witness examination conducted by the trial court with-
out the involvement of the foreign state in comparison to questioning through channels of in-
ternational judicial assistance have already been outlined.
110
 Compared to the foregoing sum-
mons of a foreign witness to appear before the trial court,
111
 the interrogation via videolink has 
the advantage that the witness does not have to travel to the state of the trial court. Rather, he 
can “appear” before the trial court from any place in the world where suitable audio- and vid-
eo-equipment as well as networks to transmit information are available. This not only reduces 
costs and difficulty usually associated with bringing evidence from one country to another, but 
it may also motivate foreign non-party witnesses, in particular those who are under no obliga-
tion to cooperate with the trial court, to voluntarily collaborate.
112
 It may also expedite the pro-
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ceedings pending before the trial court, as foreign third parties no longer have to dovetail court 
appearances in a remote country with their schedules.
113
  
From a practical viewpoint, no major logistical problems should arise, provided the aforesaid 
equipment and networks are available at the location of the foreign non-party witness and that 
of the trial court, and any time difference issues between these venues can be solved. The same 
applies with regard to the verification of the identity of the foreign third party. The fact that the 
witness and the judge are not in the same room does not usually cause any problems, as a visu-
al verification of the witness’ identity is nevertheless possible. Where the identity of the wit-
ness cannot be verified by videolink,
114
 it can be arranged for a suitable individual
115
 to identify 
the witness at the latter’s location prior to the beginning of the examination. Such a person may 
also ensure that the foreign third party is not influenced by any other person during the ques-
tioning, or uses documents or any other aids that are not visible to the trial court.
116
 Where the 
foreign third party requires an interpreter, the latter can either be located in the courtroom or at 
the venue of the non-party witness.  
In connection with evidence given by videolink, the question arises whether the fact that the 
examination does not take place in a courtroom has any detrimental consequences for the wit-
ness’ testimony; this is because the transmission from commercial videoconferencing centres 
or offices lacks the traditional judicial surroundings thought to convey the seriousness of court 
testimony.
117
 It has furthermore to be kept in mind that the examination by videolink may in-
fluence the trial court’s perception of the witness, in particular with regard to the latter’s non-
verbal demeanour.
118
 In some cases, the summons of a foreign third party to appear before the 
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trial court may thus be the better option than an examination by videolink, in particular where 
several witnesses are likely to give a divergent testimony on the same issue.
119
 
2. Examination by Videolink as a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
Compared to the preceding case where a foreign witness is summoned to appear before the trial 
court,
120
 the situation regarding an examination via videolink is different. The foreign witness 
does not travel to the state of the trial court, but is located abroad when giving evidence. In 
other words, it is not the witness who travels to the state of the trial court, rather it is the wit-
ness’ testimony that is brought to the trial court by videolink. Having said this, the question 
arises as to whether an examination by videolink does nevertheless qualify as a transfer of for-
eign evidence.
121
 It appears that, thus far, this question has not been widely discussed.
122
 
According to Stadler, the examination of foreign third parties by the trial court via videolink 
interferes with foreign sovereignty. She maintains that the fact that the trial court conducts the 
questioning in its own jurisdiction is irrelevant, as the trial court becomes virtually active 
across national borders.
123
  
Schack also holds that an examination by videolink has to be performed by means of interna-
tional judicial assistance. In this context, he refers to Articles 10(4) and 17(4)(3) of the Europe-
an Evidence Regulation where it is mentioned that the requested state may use videoconferenc-
ing when rendering active judicial assistance and that, in case of passive judicial assistance, the 
requested state shall encourage the use of videolink technologies.
124
 This view is shared by 
Schulze and Hess who note that the fact that the European Evidence Regulation includes the 
examination via videolink shows that the European legislator considers such questioning not as 
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a transfer of foreign evidence, but as evidence-taking on foreign territory which requires inter-
national judicial assistance.
125
 
Markus compares the examination by videolink with the written reply a foreign witness sub-
mits to the trial court in response to a questionnaire issued by the latter
126
 and considers such 
reply as a transfer of foreign evidence. He argues that if one merely takes into account the an-
swers given by the foreign witness by videolink, such responses would not constitute a judicial 
act on foreign territory. Markus, however, emphasises that the examination by videolink is, un-
like the written reply to a questionnaire, an interactive process between the witness and the trial 
court which includes an element of immediacy.
127
 The answers given by the witness via video-
link can, according to Markus, not be considered in isolation, but have to be seen as part of the 
witness examination which is a homogenous process that includes both the questions put to the 
witness and the answers given by him. Against this background, Markus argues that the domi-
ciles of all respective participants have to be taken into account and regards the examination by 
videolink as evidence-taking on foreign territory.
128
  
A similar view is shared by Küttler who maintains that in the context of an examination by 
videolink, the location where the evidence is taken extends from the domicile of the trial court 
to the state where the witness to be questioned is domiciled.
129
 
In contrast, Geimer and Berger consider the said examination not as interference with foreign 
sovereignty without, however, giving any reasons for his position.
130
  
It is submitted that the approach taken by Markus is not fully convincing. It is correct that the 
witness is located in the foreign state when answering the questions put to him by videolink. 
However, it should also be noted that the trial court is situated outside the foreign state when 
asking the questions and receiving the witness’ answers. A considerable part of the witness ex-
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amination thus occurs in the jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, the differentiation be-
tween the written reply of a witness to a questionnaire issued by the trial court and a respective 
oral testimony in the course of an examination by videolink, as outlined by Markus, seems ra-
ther artificial. The way the questions by the trial court and the answers of the witness are 
transmitted, that is, usually by physical mail in case of a testimony based on a questionnaire or 
via videolink, should not be the crucial point. Rather, regard should be had to the question 
whether and, if so, to what extent these two forms of evidence-taking impair foreign sovereign-
ty. It is submitted that a testimony based on a questionnaire and an examination by videolink 
may affect foreign sovereignty to the same extent, as in both cases, a witness answers questions 
by a trial court located in a different state. The interference with foreign sovereignty is, if at all, 
only marginal, as the trial court does not become physically active on foreign territory. Moreo-
ver, one can argue that the witness examination is only concluded once the trial court has taken 
notice of the testimony, and that such notice takes place in the trial court’s jurisdiction and not 
at the foreign domicile of the witness.
131
 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the examination by videolink constitutes a transfer 
of foreign evidence.
132
 The testimony by videoconference should be treated the same way as 
evidence based on a questionnaire.
133
 In this context, one has to bear in mind that the qualifica-
tion of an examination by videolink as a transfer of foreign evidence does not give the trial 
court unconditional and unrestricted access to witnesses residing abroad. Rather, such access is 
limited by the fact that certain foreign witnesses are under no obligation to cooperate with the 
trial court and that, with regard to those witnesses who are obliged to collaborate, the compul-
sion a trial court may use is restricted.
134
 These limitations take sufficient account of the sover-
eign interests of the foreign state and, at the same time, contribute to the much needed facilita-
tion of cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. This is all the more 
true, as the examination by videolink is best suited to serve as an alternative to those cases 
where a foreign witness cannot be interrogated in the jurisdiction of the trial court. Finally, one 
has to keep in mind that the hostile stance civil-law countries generally take towards a request 
of a trial court for a transfer of foreign evidence is often not rooted in concerns of the respec-
tive states about their sovereignty, but rather with an eye to protect their nationals and/or resi-
dents from getting involved with foreign procedural laws with which the latter are unfamil-
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iar.
135
 The foregoing comments not only apply to the examination of foreign witnesses by 
videolink, but to all other forms of transfer of foreign evidence.
136
 
3. Examination by Videolink and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
It appears that to date, the question of whether an examination of a witness residing in Switzer-
land by a trial court abroad via videolink infringes Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code 
has neither been addressed by the Swiss Federal Court nor any of the Swiss authorities compe-
tent for granting a waiver under the respective provision, at least not in a decision that was 
made public.
137
 Hopf maintains that the examination via videolink is a violation of Article 
271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, as it ultimately aims at the circumvention of international 
judicial assistance.
138
 
The view of Hopf is shared by this author. Given the restrictive interpretation of Article 271(1) 
of the Swiss Criminal Code by the Swiss Federal Court and the aforesaid other Swiss authori-
ties,
139
 it is very likely that an examination by videolink is considered a violation of Swiss sov-
ereignty. As explained earlier,
140
 it is sufficient under the said provision that the “activities on 
behalf of a foreign state” partly take place in Switzerland. This is the case with a witness dom-
iciled in Switzerland when interrogated by a trial court abroad via videolink. This is in conflict 
with the approach the author has taken earlier with regard to the qualification of an examina-
tion by videolink as a transfer of foreign evidence.
141
 Such contradiction results from the afore-
said narrow interpretation of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code by the relevant Swiss 
authorities which aims at the most extensive protection of Swiss sovereignty. 
D. Examination of a Foreign Witness by the Trial Court by Telephone 
1. Nature of an Examination by Telephone 
This subchapter deals with the situation where a witness located abroad gives testimony to the 
trial court via telephone. Like in the case of videoconferencing,
142
 the examination by tele-
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phone allows the trial court, the litigants and their counsel to communicate instantaneously 
with the foreign third party. In contrast to questioning by videolink, however, there is no visual 
display, but only real-time audio when examining witnesses via telephone. 
As in the case of an examination by videolink, one can distinguish different configurations, de-
pending on where the participants of the telephone conference are located. Where the foreign 
witness to be questioned is a third party, all participants, apart from the non-party witness, may 
be located in the state of the trial court. It is, however, also possible that one or both litigants 
are situated outside the state of the trial court, be it in the same country as the foreign third par-
ty or in a third country. Where a litigant gives evidence via telephone, he and his counsel are 
located in the foreign state while the judge, the opponent and his counsel attend the telephone 
conference in the state of the trial court.
143
 Since in most cases, the trial court can compel for-
eign litigants to attend court to testify, the following comments focus on the examination of a 
foreign third party by telephone.
144
 
The advantages and disadvantages of a witness examination conducted by the trial court with-
out the involvement of the foreign state in comparison with a questioning by means of interna-
tional judicial assistance have already been outlined.
145
 Furthermore, the abovementioned ad-
vantages and disadvantages of an examination by videolink apply mutatis mutandis to the 
questioning via telephone.
146
 It has, however, to be kept in mind that, unlike cases in which a 
foreign witness is summoned
147
 or examined via videolink, a court is not in a position to ob-
serve the witness’ demeanour with its own eyes during a telephonic interrogation, but is limited 
to what it hears over the telephone. The absence of visual perception by the trial court also 
hampers the verification of the witness’ identity. Consequently, special measures have to be 
taken, for instance by arranging a suitable person
148
 to be present at the location of the foreign 
third party in order to verify the latter’s identity.149 The presence of such individual may also 
make sense in order to ensure that the foreign non-party witness is not influenced by any other 
person while testifying. The same holds true with regard to the use of documents or other aids 
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by the third party during the course of his examination and of which the trial court is not 
aware.
150
 Moreover, the aforementioned concerns regarding the absence of a formal hearing in 
a courtroom
151
 become even more acute in a questioning by telephone than in the case of an 
examination by videolink.
152
 However, compared to videoconferencing, the witness examina-
tion by telephone offers one substantial advantage. No technical equipment other than a tele-
phone and telephone line at the venue of the third party and the trial court are required. This 
allows a testimony by telephone in cases where the equipment for videoconferencing is not 
available at the aforesaid locations. 
Given the aforementioned drawbacks of a witness examination by telephone, the latter should 
not be the norm for questioning foreign witnesses. It may, however, be suitable for information 
provided by a member of a foreign authority in official matters, as the accuracy of such state-
ments can usually be assumed. The testimony of private individuals, in particular those who 
may have an interest in the outcome of the particular lawsuit, should be taken by other means 
than via telephone. The aforesaid fact that the examination is not conducted in the courtroom of 
the trial court and the latter is not in a position to see the witness may reduce the latter’s 
threshold of self-restraint to tell the truth. 
2. Examination by Telephone as a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
The questioning of a foreign witness by telephone is, apart from the fact that there is no visual 
contact between the witness and the trial court, very similar to the examination via videolink. 
Hence, the same question arises as in the case of an interrogation by videoconference, namely 
whether the examination of a foreign witness by telephone constitutes a transfer of foreign evi-
dence.
153
 To date, this question has hardly been discussed.
154
 Geimer regards the said interroga-
tion as compatible with public international law without, however, giving any reasons for his 
position.
155
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Having regard to the parallels between an examination by telephone and that via videolink,
156
 
the two forms of questioning a foreign witness should be treated in the same way when deter-
mining their qualification as a transfer of foreign evidence. Based on what has been said earlier 
with respect to a testimony by videoconference,
157
 it is submitted that the examination of a for-
eign witness by telephone constitutes a transfer of foreign evidence.
158
 
3. Examination by Telephone and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
It appears that neither the Swiss Federal Court nor any other relevant Swiss authority
159
 has 
dealt with the question whether an examination of a witness domiciled in Switzerland by a trial 
court abroad by telephone contravenes Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. Hopf and 
Honegger consider such questioning as violation of the said provision, as it aims at bypassing 
the general rules on international judicial assistance.
160
 
Based on the aforesaid narrow interpretation of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code by 
the relevant Swiss authorities,
161
 it is again highly probable that the latter regard the examina-
tion by telephone without the assistance of the competent Swiss officials as contravention of 
the said provision. As in the case of an examination by videolink, this contrasts with the fore-
going qualification of an interrogation by telephone as a transfer of foreign evidence.
162
 Such 
contradiction, however, is the consequence of the said restricted interpretation of Article 271(1) 
of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
E. Examination of a Foreign Witness by Questionnaire Issued by the Trial Court 
1. Nature of an Examination by Questionnaire 
This subchapter deals with the configuration where the trial court sends a questionnaire pre-
pared by the court and/or the litigants to a foreign witness. The latter answers the questions in 
writing at his foreign domicile and then returns the completed questionnaire to the trial court.  
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The examination of a foreign witness by way of questionnaire or as a result of a letter of re-
quest in the course of active judicial assistance reveal certain analogies. In the latter case, the 
competent authority of the requested state usually interrogates the witness based on a list of 
questions drafted by the trial court and the litigants.
163
 In contrast to the aforesaid question-
naire, which the foreign witness completes by himself, it is, however, the authority of the re-
quested state that records the witness’ answers which are then transmitted in the form of a tran-
script to the trial court. The fact that such a transcript is drafted by the foreign authority may 
have an impact on the content of the reply of the foreign witness that is forwarded to the trial 
court. This particularly applies where the law of the requested state generally governing the 
execution of the letter of request does not provide for a verbatim, but only a summary tran-
script.
164
 In the latter case, a member of the foreign authority usually dictates for each question 
of the list provided by the trial court a summary of the relevant answer given by the foreign 
witness.
165
 By contrast, where the answers of the witness are recorded in a verbatim transcript, 
the witness’ reply is unfiltered. The same holds true for the answers of a witness in response to 
a questionnaire.
166
 
The content of the answers of a foreign witness may furthermore be influenced by the modus 
operandi of his examination. Where a witness completes a questionnaire, he does so in sur-
roundings familiar to him and without time constraint. The latter allows him to revisit his an-
swers and, if necessary, complete or rectify them before he transmits the completed question-
naire to the trial court. One, however, has to bear in mind that an interrogation based on a 
questionnaire lacks the surprise effect which makes it easier for a witness to “doctor” his testi-
mony.
167
 On the other hand, in cases where the witness testifies before the competent authority 
of the requested state based on a letter of request, usually a court, there is often only limited 
time available for the questioning. This may result in incomplete answers, in particular in those 
cases where prior to his examination, the witness is not informed about the subject of the hear-
ing of evidence. The witness is, however, hardly able to amend any incomplete replies once his 
examination before the foreign authority is concluded. On the other hand, the said authority 
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may clarify incomplete or ambiguous answers of the foreign witness by posing additional ques-
tions. Here, however, one has to keep in mind that the foreign authority has only a limited 
knowledge about the facts underlying the case pending before the trial court. In most cases, it is 
thus difficult for the said authority to detect inconsistencies in the testimony of the foreign wit-
ness, unless there are obvious contradictions in the latter’s statements.168 Finally, a witness 
who testifies before a foreign court does so in a courtroom, that is, in unfamiliar surroundings 
which intimidate most witnesses, at least if they appear in court for the first time. This may 
have a negative impact on the quality of the witness’ answers.169 On the other hand, the gravi-
tas of a testimony in a courtroom may encourage a witness to respond more carefully to the 
questions put to him, an aspect that lacks in the case of the completion of a questionnaire by 
the witness.
170
  
The above shows that both the witness examination by means of a letter of request and by 
questionnaire have their advantages and disadvantages.
171
 Considering the time-consuming 
process of international judicial assistance and the fact that the examination of a witness based 
on a letter of request is usually governed by the law of the requested state, the trial court usual-
ly prefers the interrogation of the foreign witness based on a questionnaire, unless the assis-
tance of the requested state for measures of compulsion is required. In any event, one has to 
keep in mind that the testimony of a witness is only as good as the questions with which the 
foreign authority or the witness is provided. In case of an examination based on a letter of re-
quest, it is furthermore important to give the foreign authority the facts of the case to which the 
questions refer. This enables the said authority to better assess the answers given by the foreign 
witness and clarify any ambiguities or contradictions in the witness’ testimony. 
The trial court’s decision whether the testimony of a foreign witness is to be obtained by means 
of a questionnaire, based on a summons to appear before the court, or via videoconference
172
 
should largely depend on the extent of the contribution the witness is expected to make. The 
more crucial the testimony of the witness and the more complex the subject of the hearing of 
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evidence is, the more important is it for the trial court to consider whether an examination by 
questionnaire is the best method to secure the witness’ evidence. In addition, the trial court has 
not only to consider the subject of the hearing of evidence, but also the respective witness. In 
other words, the court must take into account the witness’ intellectual abilities as well as his 
capacity of expressing himself in writing. It goes without saying that in the absence of the re-
spective capabilities, a trial court should refrain from interrogating a witness by way of ques-
tionnaire. Moreover, the said court has to take into consideration any relationship between the 
witness and the litigants. The closer such a relationship is, the more important it is for the trial 
court to get a personal impression of the witness by questioning him via videolink or, even bet-
ter, summoning him to attend court.
173
 A trial court should furthermore show restraint with 
questionnaires if the subject of the hearing of evidence is strongly contested, and the testimony 
of the foreign witness is expected to be challenged.
174
 Here also, a videoconference examina-
tion or a summons for the witness to appear before the trial court is better suited. In both cases, 
the examination is conducted in the presence of the trial court and is interactive, that is, the trial 
court, the litigants or their counsel may immediately clarify any issues that arise in the course 
of the questioning without having to send back and forth further questionnaires to elucidate any 
obscurities in the witness’ testimony. Finally, one has to bear in mind that there is no guarantee 
that the witness completes a questionnaire without the assistance of other persons, or using 
documents or other aids.
175
 Such support is problematic if it is not disclosed by the foreign wit-
ness.  
2. Examination by Questionnaire as a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
As in the case of a witness examination by videolink or telephone, it is only the testimony of 
the foreign witness that is transferred to the trial court while throughout the entire examination, 
the witness remains at his foreign domicile. Again, the question is therefore whether the exam-
ination of a foreign witness by questionnaire is to be regarded as a transfer of foreign evidence 
or not.
176
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The prevailing view considers the examination of a foreign witness by questionnaire as a trans-
fer of foreign evidence which is allowed under public international law, provided the respective 
rules on the use of compulsion are followed.
177
 In this context, Daoudi emphasises that it is not 
the completion of the questionnaire by the witness at his foreign domicile that is to be regarded 
as evidence-taking, but rather the acknowledgement of the witness’ answers by the trial court. 
Daoudi moreover points out that it is the trial court, and not any foreign authority, that hears 
the evidence. This shows, according to Daoudi, that the testimony of the foreign witness is 
transferred from the latter’s domicile to the trial court’s jurisdiction.178  
A similar view is shared by Schabenberger who points out that the examination of a witness is 
only concluded once the court has taken note of the witness’ testimony. According to 
Schabenberger, this particularly applies to cases where a witness completes the questionnaire 
abroad and then forwards his reply to the trial court. Consequently, Schabenberger maintains 
that the testimony of a witness based on a questionnaire takes place in the jurisdiction of the 
trial court.
179
 
In contrast, Leipold argues that the question where the decisive act of the witness examination 
takes place, at the witness’ domicile or in the trial court’s jurisdiction, is not the crucial point. 
Rather it is, according to Leipold, the “Sollensanordnung”, that is, the fact that the trial court 
orders a foreign witness to do something, that must be taken into account when considering 
whether foreign sovereignty is infringed or not.
180
 
The aforesaid prevailing view, which qualifies the testimony by a questionnaire as a transfer of 
foreign evidence, is shared by the author. Since the testimony by a questionnaire should be 
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treated in the same way as an examination via videoconference, reference can be made to the 
comments in this regard.
181
 
3. Examination by Questionnaire and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
The gathering of information through a trial court located outside Switzerland by way of ques-
tionnaire is regarded as an infringement of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, provid-
ed such collection serves procedural purposes and may entail procedural consequences for the 
witness domiciled in Switzerland. Needless to say, the trial court is not allowed to apply any 
measures of compulsion towards the said witness.
182
 The above contradicts the position the au-
thor has taken with regard to the qualification of the examination by questionnaire as a transfer 
of foreign evidence.
183
 Again, this conflict results from the aforesaid restrictive interpretation 
of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code.
184
 
F. Order of the Trial Court to Produce Evidence Controlled by a Foreign Witness 
1. Nature of a Court Order to Produce Evidence  
This subchapter deals with the configuration where a trial court orders a foreign litigant or third 
party to produce documents or movable property that are under the foreign witness’ control.185 
The litigant or third party does not appear in person before the trial court in order to present the 
evidence, but merely transmits it to the trial court by postal mail, courier, or other similar 
means.
186
 
Compared to a production of documents through channels of international judicial assistance, 
the submission without the involvement of any foreign authority has, from the perspective of 
the trial court, two advantages, namely the saving of time and the application of its own rules 
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on the production of evidence. The disadvantage of such a procedure without the assistance of 
the relevant foreign state is, however, the limited use of coercive measures by the trial court.
187
 
It has been explained above, that the fact, that a foreign witness is questioned through channels 
of international judicial assistance, may influence the content of the witness’ testimony.188 
Where, however, the trial court obtains documents controlled by a foreign witness, be it with or 
without the involvement of the foreign state, the result is the same, as the fact that a foreign 
state is involved in the procurement of the said evidence does not have any influence on its 
content. 
2. Court Order to Produce Evidence as a Transfer of Foreign Evidence? 
Where a trial court orders a witness located in a foreign state to produce documents, the wit-
ness collects the relevant evidence and forwards it to the trial court. The question therefore 
arises as to whether such evidence-taking is to be qualified as a judicial act performed on for-
eign territory or as a transfer of foreign evidence.
189
 
In the context of the so-called “Justizkonflikt” between the United States and several civil-law 
countries regarding the mandatory character of the Hague Evidence Convention,
190
 the German 
government maintained that the request of a trial court located abroad to produce documents 
located in Germany is to be regarded as a judicial act and, as such, interferes with German sov-
ereignty. It emphasised that the said court seizes evidence that is subject to foreign sovereignty 
and that the collection of the documents on foreign soil is the crucial act.
191
  
In contrast, Daoudi considers the respective request as a transfer of foreign evidence which 
does not violate foreign sovereignty. He maintains that the decisive act is not performed on 
foreign territory, as it is not the collection of the documents that is crucial, but the hearing of 
evidence which only begins once the trial court reviews the evidence. According to Daoudi, the 
gathering of documents by the litigant merely constitutes a preparatory measure which is a 
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purely private matter, as the litigants, and not the trial court, are responsible for collecting the 
documents. Daoudi emphasises that the order of the trial court does not aim at the documents 
to be submitted, but at the person controlling the documents.
192
 A similar opinion is voiced by 
Küttler who maintains that the collection of documents is a preparatory measure which is not 
taken by the trial court, but by the person who gathers the documents and who forwards them 
to the said court.
193
 Stadler emphasises that the collection of documents by an individual resid-
ing in a state other than that of the trial court merely constitutes a preparatory measure while 
the actual taking of evidence ultimately occurs in the jurisdiction of the trial court.
194
  
The aforesaid view, which regards a request for the production of documents from foreign wit-
nesses, as a transfer of foreign evidence is shared by the author. As in the aforementioned cases 
of testimony given by videolink, telephone or in response to a questionnaire, the examination 
of evidence is only concluded once the trial court has reviewed the documents,
195
 while the 
gathering by the individual residing abroad merely constitutes a preparatory measure. Such an 
approach overcomes the outdated perceptions that some civil-law countries have in cases 
where the trial court does not become active on foreign territory. One has furthermore to keep 
in mind that the position against a transfer of foreign evidence is more deeply rooted in the 
concern of the said countries to protect their nationals and/or residents and less so in their con-
cern to safeguard their sovereignty. 
3. Court Order to Produce Evidence and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
To date, the Swiss Federal Court has not yet decided, at least not in a published case, whether a 
witness located in Switzerland violates Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code when trans-
mitting documents abroad in response to a respective request of a court located in a foreign 
country. In a decision of 1988, however, the Swiss Federal Court insinuated that in contrast to 
examining witnesses, filing documents is a party measure and not an “activity on behalf of a 
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foreign state” in the sense of Article 271(1) of the said Code.196 In contrast, in 1997, the Swiss 
Federal Council opined in a case where two defendants domiciled in Switzerland were ordered 
by a court in the United States to submit certain documents that such transmission is about as-
sisting a foreign court in the taking of evidence and thus infringes Article 271(1) of the Swiss 
Criminal Code.
197
 This view is shared by Hopf.
198
 In this context, one has to keep in mind that 
the decision of the Swiss Federal Council is not binding on any judicial authority in Switzer-
land, as it merely reflects the view of the executive. Given the absence of a published decision 
of the Swiss Federal Court which expressly deals with the aforesaid transmission of documents 
to a court abroad, it is unclear whether the witness’ activities in question are regarded as viola-
tion of Article 271(1). In order to avoid any risk of prosecution under the said provision, liti-
gants and third parties domiciled in Switzerland should refrain from handing over documents 
to a court abroad. 
G. Collection of Information Abroad by a Domestic Expert 
1. Nature of a Collection of Information Abroad by a Domestic Expert 
In cases where a trial court lacks the expertise necessary to determine the material facts of a 
lawsuit, the specialised knowledge of an expert is required.
199
 In international litigation, the 
trial court and parties are often faced with the situation where information, which is essential 
for the expert to prepare his opinion, is located in a foreign state. This may, for instance, be the 
case where immovable property involved in the dispute is situated outside of the state of the 
trial court. In such cases, it is often necessary for an expert to make investigations in the for-
eign state.  
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In civil proceedings, as will be explained in more detail below, Switzerland and other countries 
sharing the civil-law tradition distinguish between court- and party-appointed experts.
200
 
Whenever a civil-law court requires expertise to assess the material facts of the case, it ap-
points a suitable expert. In other words, once the trial court lacks the respective special 
knowledge, the appointment of an expert by the court is the rule.
201
 By contrast, in civil pro-
ceedings pending in common-law countries, experts are appointed by the parties.
202
  
When appointing an expert for making investigations abroad, a civil-law court has two options, 
namely either nominating an expert who is located in the trial court’s jurisdiction, but gathers 
information abroad,
203
 or an expert domiciled in the foreign state where the required infor-
mation is located.
204
 In the majority of the cases, the judge prefers to appoint a domestic expert. 
From the perspective of the civil-law court, such an appointment is, unlike in the case of a for-
eign expert, a purely national matter, as the expert is located in the state of the trial court. 
Moreover, for the said court, it is easier to locate a suitable domestic expert than it is a foreign 
expert, particularly as, in Switzerland for instance, many trial courts have a list of domestic ex-
perts and naturally prefer to appoint an expert with whom they have worked in the past and 
whom they trust. An expert opinion may also not only require investigations abroad, but also in 
the jurisdiction of the trial court.
205
 It may moreover be necessary for the expert to elucidate on 
his opinion at a hearing before the trial court. In exceptional cases, however, a trial court may 
appoint an expert located abroad, for instance in cases where only a foreign expert has the re-
quired special knowledge, or where, compared to the value being litigated, the travel expenses 
of a domestic expert are not justified.
206
 Given the fact that in the vast majority of cases, civil-
law courts will appoint a domestic expert to gather information abroad, the following remarks 
focus on the activities of a domestic expert. 
It goes without saying that an expert opinion can be obtained through channels of international 
judicial assistance. In this case, the trial court in the civil-law country requests the competent 
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foreign authority for the appointment of a foreign expert. The said authority appoints the expert 
who furnishes his opinion to such authority, which then forwards it to the trial court. Consider-
ing the fact that in civil proceedings in common-law countries, experts are not appointed by the 
court, but by the parties, a civil-law court should think twice about issuing a respective request 
for judicial assistance to a common-law country. Compared to the appointment of an expert by 
the trial court, the disadvantages of obtaining an expert opinion through international judicial 
assistance are evident. Such a procedure is not only time-consuming, but the appointment of 
the expert and his activities are usually governed by the laws of the requested state. Moreover, 
there is no direct communication between the trial court and the foreign expert, in other words, 
the said court only liaises with the expert via the foreign authority. This not only prolongs the 
procedure, but also complicates it, particularly in cases where instructions are given to the ex-
pert by the trial court
207
 or the expert opinion needs clarification. The obtaining of an expert 
opinion by means of international judicial assistance has, however, one significant advantage: 
the foreign authority may apply compulsion in its territory if a foreign litigant or third party 
refuses to cooperate with the expert. In contrast, neither the trial court nor the expert appointed 
by it is allowed to use coercive measures on foreign territory.
208
 
2. Collection of Information Abroad by a Domestic Expert as a Transfer of Evi-
dence? 
Where an expert, whether appointed by a trial court or a party, collects evidence abroad, the 
question arises as to whether the expert’s activities infringe foreign sovereignty. The response 
to this question depends on the nature of the activity of the expert, namely whether he acts in a 
private manner or in a judicial function. The qualification of the expert’s activities largely 
hinges on who appoints the expert under the relevant national rules, the trial court or the liti-
gants. The following thus briefly outlines by whom experts are appointed in civil litigation in 
common- and civil-law countries.  
As indicated above,
209
 the common- and civil-law traditions take a distinct approach with re-
gard to the appointment of experts in civil litigation. In common-law countries, experts are 
generally appointed by the litigants and are regarded as ordinary non-party witnesses. Accord-
ingly, from a common-law perspective, the activities of such experts are considered as purely a 
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private matter which does not interfere with the sovereignty of the foreign state when per-
formed abroad. By contrast, in most countries following the civil-law model, experts are se-
lected and appointed by the court and are thus not regarded as ordinary non-party witnesses. In 
Switzerland, experts are considered as so-called “verlängerter Arm des Gerichts”, literally 
“extended arm of the court”, or, in this instance, aide of the court.210 By contrast, experts who 
are not appointed by the court, but by the litigants are not regarded as experts in the aforesaid 
sense, but as mere non-party witnesses. Based on the close relationship between a party-
appointed expert and the litigant calling him, the probative value of the evidence given by the 
former is, compared to a court-appointed expert, more limited.
211
 Irrespective of the fact that 
civil-law experts are appointed by the court, different approaches can be taken regarding the 
nature of the activities of such experts performed abroad. While one school of thought believes 
that such activities are compatible with public international law, another regards them as a vio-
lation of foreign sovereignty.
212
 
According to Daoudi, the activities of a domestic expert abroad do not constitute a judicial act 
and thus do not violate foreign sovereignty. He maintains that while making investigations in a 
foreign state, the expert acts as a private individual. Daoudi argues that the expert neither acts 
for the trial court, nor has any judicial power which is, as claimed by Daoudi, particularly 
shown by the fact that the expert is not authorised to use any measures of compulsion. In this 
context, Daoudi points out that the mere fact that the expert acts by order of the trial court does 
not mutate the expert’s activity into a judicial act. He moreover maintains that the collection of 
information through an expert cannot be regarded as the actual taking of evidence. Finally, 
Daoudi emphasises that the expert merely informs himself abroad and that he must remain free 
to determine how to gain the information that is necessary for the preparation of his opinion, 
even if such information is located on foreign territory.
213
 Daoudi’s view is shared by other le-
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gal scholars. Schack, for instance, points out that no governmental authority is vested in the 
expert and that it is not the expert who ultimately takes the evidence.
214
 
According to Wussow, the evidence-taking based on an expert opinion includes two steps: on 
the one hand, the order wherein the trial court appoints the expert to make investigations 
abroad and, on the other, the investigations of the expert on foreign territory. With respect to 
the first step, Wussow argues that the respective court order constitutes a judicial act which, 
however, has no legal effect on the foreign state, as it only affects the litigants and the expert. 
Regarding the second step, Wussow opines that although the expert acts as an aide of the trial 
court, he does not exercise any governmental authority. He furthermore argues that the said 
two steps considered together do not interfere with foreign sovereignty. Wussow maintains that 
the trial court does not become active on foreign territory, as the expert merely gathers infor-
mation abroad which he needs in order to prepare his opinion. In this context, Wussow points 
out that if the expert’s activities were qualified as a violation of foreign sovereignty, the expert 
would not be allowed to collect any information located abroad which is, in Wussow’s opinion, 
an unacceptable result.
215
 
Musielak argues that it is not the relation between the trial court and the expert that is crucial, 
but that between the expert and the witnesses. With regard to the latter, the expert does not act, 
according to Musielak, in an official function, but as a private individual who merely presents 
information collected on foreign territory to the trial court. In this context, Musielak emphasis-
es that there is no difference between the gathering of information located abroad through an 
ordinary non-party witness and that by an expert, as in both cases, such information is present-
ed to the trial court which ultimately weighs the evidence.
216
 
By contrast, Leipold regards the activities of an expert abroad as a violation of foreign sover-
eignty. Leipold acknowledges that the expert does not perform a judicial act on foreign territo-
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ry, but at the same time points out that the relation between the trial court and the expert falls 
within the scope of public international law and that the expert thus acts as “verlängerter Arm 
des Gerichts”. As a result, the expert is, according to Leipold, only allowed to gather infor-
mation in a foreign state with the latter’s permission. Leipold finally argues that taking the op-
posite view may motivate trial courts to appoint experts for the sole purpose of by-passing in-
ternational judicial assistance.
217
 
Like Leipold, Ahrens maintains that an expert is only allowed to gather information abroad 
once authorised to do so by the foreign state. According to Ahrens, this holds particularly true 
for the inspection of immovable property located outside the state of the trial court, as the ex-
pert does not act as a mere tourist when examining such property. Rather, there is, as claimed 
by Ahrens, some interaction between the expert and the litigants who are, for instance, entitled 
to be present at the inspection and whose cooperation may be necessary where the property is 
under their control. Ahrens furthermore emphasises that litigants, who refuse to collaborate 
with the expert, may face negative procedural consequences.
218
  
Stadler also considers the activity of an expert abroad as incompatible with the sovereignty of 
the foreign state, unless the latter gives its permission. She argues that although the information 
gathered by the expert is examined in the jurisdiction of the trial court, the expert’s activities 
cannot be seen as a purely private matter. Even though Stadler concedes that the expert does 
not exercise any governmental authority, she emphasises that the expert not only acts by order 
of the trial court, but also substitutes for the latter when collecting information on foreign terri-
tory.
219
  
It is submitted that the activities of a court-appointed expert abroad do not interfere with for-
eign sovereignty. In accordance with the arguments put forward by Daoudi, Wussow and 
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Musielak, one has to keep in mind that the trial court does not perform any judicial act on for-
eign soil, neither by itself nor via the expert. The collection of information abroad by the expert 
merely constitutes a preparatory measure while the evidence-taking ultimately occurs in the 
jurisdiction of the trial court once the latter reviews the written expert opinion and/or hears the 
expert’s oral testimony. Also, it has to be borne in mind that the expert’s main task is not the 
gathering of information, but the assessment of the relevant facts which culminates in the prep-
aration of his opinion. In relation to litigants or third parties whose cooperation is necessary 
when collecting information abroad, the expert does not have any governmental authority and 
is, in particular, not allowed to use any compulsion. Having said this, it is difficult to compre-
hend how foreign sovereignty can be infringed, if no judicial act is performed abroad by the 
trial court or the expert.
220
 Moreover, the fact, that foreign litigants may face indirect compul-
sion when refusing to collaborate with the expert, does not prevent the expert’s activities on 
foreign soil from qualifying as a transfer of foreign evidence. As has been explained earlier,
221
 
a trial court may apply indirect compulsion towards foreign litigants when issuing a court order 
for a transfer of foreign evidence. Finally, Leipold’s argument, that if the expert’s activities 
abroad are not regarded as a violation of foreign sovereignty, trial courts may be tempted to 
appoint experts for the sole purpose of circumventing international judicial assistance, is not 
entirely convincing. It is the trial court’s discretion as to whether or not to appoint an expert, 
but this discretion is not absolute. The trial court is not allowed to appoint an expert with re-
spect to any material facts, but only to those facts regarding which it lacks the necessary exper-
tise to decide the case.
222
 The risk of an abuse by trial courts is thus limited, if it exists at all.  
The above holds true not only for court-appointed experts, but also with regard to experts se-
lected by the parties. In other words, where the activities of court-appointed experts abroad are 
not regarded as a violation of foreign sovereignty, this is all the more true in relation to party-
appointed experts. 
3. Collection of Information Abroad by a Domestic Expert and Article 271 of the 
Swiss Criminal Code 
Where an expert appointed by a court located outside Switzerland collects information on 
Swiss soil, the question arises of whether such activity violates Article 271(1) of the Swiss 
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Criminal Code. To date, this question has not been addressed either by the Swiss Federal Court 
or any of the Swiss authorities competent for granting a waiver under the said provision,
223
 at 
least not in a published case.  
Given the narrow interpretation of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code by the Swiss 
Federal Court and the other aforementioned Swiss authorities, it can be assumed that the activi-
ties of a court-appointed expert in Switzerland are regarded as a violation of the said provision. 
As has been explained earlier,
224
 private individuals are not allowed to interrogate witnesses, or 
to inspect documents, movable and immovable property on Swiss soil, if the information is 
used as evidence in proceedings pending outside Switzerland later on. Without the permission 
of the relevant Swiss authorities, such activities are only allowed in cases where they merely 
serve to assess the chances of success of a lawsuit or to prepare a case. It goes without saying 
that this is not the case where a court-appointed expert collects information on Swiss soil, as 
such information is used as evidence in the foreign proceedings. When deciding the case, the 
court abroad takes into consideration the expert opinion which is based on facts the expert col-
lected in Switzerland. It is irrelevant if the expert prepares his opinion in or outside Switzerland 
as it suffices that some of the information, on which the expert opinion is based, is gathered on 
Swiss territory.
225
 It is submitted that the above also holds true with regard to an expert ap-
pointed by litigants in civil proceedings pending outside Switzerland. The above contradicts 
the approach that was taken earlier when discussing the nature of activities by an expert 
abroad.
226
 Again, the difference results from the narrow definition the Swiss authorities have 
attributed to the notion of “activities on behalf of a foreign state” in Article 271(1) of the 
Swiss Criminal Code. 
                                                     
223
 For the relevant Swiss authorities, see Chapter 2 para. IV.B.4.b).  
224
 Cf. Chapter 2 para. IV.B.4.a).  
225
 See Chapter 2 para. IV.B.4.a). See, however, Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens 
in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 
1999 72 who maintains that the preparation of an expert opinion by private individuals does not infringe Artic-
le 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
226
 Cf. para. V.G.2. 
 102 
 
H. Obtaining of Evidence from a Third Party via a Litigant based on an Order of the 
Trial Court 
1. Nature of Obtaining of Evidence from a Third Party via a Litigant  
The aforementioned forms of transfer of foreign evidence
227
 focused on the configuration 
where a trial court directly contacts foreign third parties and requests them to cooperate in the 
taking of evidence.
228
 Instead of such direct dealing with foreign non-party witnesses, a trial 
court may order a litigant to procure the written testimony of a foreign third party or other evi-
dence that is controlled by the latter. By doing so, the trial court shifts the responsibility for 
obtaining evidence located abroad onto the litigant who proffered the relevant means of proof. 
Accordingly, the litigant tries to obtain a written statement, specific documents or movable 
property from the third party which he then hands over to the trial court.
229
 As a result, it is the 
litigant, and not the trial court, who communicates with the foreign third party in order to ob-
tain the relevant evidence. 
Given the above, the question arises as to whether the fact that, in relation to the foreign third 
party, evidence is procured without the direct involvement of a court has any detrimental con-
sequences for the evidence obtained from the non-party witness. As has been mentioned earli-
er, the fact that a witness examination is formally conducted by a court may encourage the 
third party to testify more carefully and ensure a more truthful and unbiased testimony.
230
 The 
same holds true where a trial court orders a foreign third party to give evidence by means of 
questionnaire.
231
 Where, however, a litigant asks a foreign non-party witness to provide a writ-
ten statement, the latter lacks the seriousness of court testimony which may increase the risk of 
a false testimony, or at least of the third party being influenced by the litigant. 
With regard to the oral testimony of a foreign third party, the trial court usually prefers to deal 
directly with such a witness and tries to obtain his testimony by summoning him to attend court 
or examining him via videolink. This allows the court to observe the demeanour of the witness 
during his examination. Where the said forms of transfer of foreign evidence are not possible, 
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the trial court may attempt to obtain the third party’s testimony by means of questionnaire. 
From the perspective of the trial court, the obtaining of a witness statement from a foreign third 
party through a litigant thus makes sense only where the said court is not able to secure the ev-
idence directly from the third party. This particularly holds true where the non-party witness 
refuses to cooperate with the trial court, and the latter is not allowed to use any measures of 
compulsion.
232
 In this context, one has to bear in mind that a foreign third party may be more 
willing to testify when contacted by a litigant whom he normally knows than when approached 
by a court located abroad.  
Where the trial court is not able to secure the testimony directly from the foreign third party by 
means of a transfer of foreign evidence, it has the option to either obtain the evidence via the 
litigant or through international judicial assistance. With regard to the latter, the said court has 
not only to take into account the expected time period for the execution of a request for interna-
tional judicial assistance, but also the fact that the examination of the foreign third party is 
conducted in a formal hearing. This not only holds true where the witness is questioned by a 
judicial authority of the requested state, but also where the examination is conducted by a 
commissioner. This may, as has been explained above, increase the chances of the trial court to 
obtain a more truthful testimony. Moreover, the said court should also take into consideration 
the subject of the hearing of evidence, as well as the relation between the foreign third party 
and the litigant who called the former as witness. The more complex and contentious such a 
subject is and the closer the relationship between the aforesaid individuals, the less suitable it is 
to obtain the written testimony of a foreign third party through a litigant.
233
  
Compared to the testimony of a foreign third party, the content of documents and movable 
property controlled by such party witness is less affected by the manner in which the trial court 
obtains the relevant evidence. In other words, the content of a document, for instance, is the 
same, irrespective of whether the latter is obtained from a non-party witness, be it directly, via 
international judicial assistance, or through a foreign litigant. 
With respect to the use of compulsion, one has to bear in mind that the trial court may apply 
indirect compulsion towards litigants, be they domiciled within or outside the state of the said 
court, and that the use of such compulsion usually suffices to ensure the litigants’ cooperation 
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to obtain evidence from the third party.
234
 In relation to the non-party witness, however, the 
trial court cannot apply any coercive measures, as there is no relation whatsoever between the 
third party and the trial court. In other words, where the non-party witness refuses to provide 
the litigant with the relevant evidence, the trial court may merely use compulsion towards the 
litigant. Needless to say, the litigant is not allowed to apply any compulsion towards the for-
eign third party. Where, however, the trial court decides to obtain the evidence directly from 
the non-party witness, the use of compulsion towards the latter is, to a limited extent, possible. 
2. Obtaining of Evidence from a Third Party via a Litigant as a Transfer of Foreign 
Evidence? 
Where a trial court requests a litigant to secure evidence from a foreign third party, the ques-
tion arises whether such a court order interferes with foreign sovereignty. In this context, two 
schools of thought exist: while one considers such a request as a violation of the sovereignty of 
the foreign state where the third party is domiciled, the other regards such a court order as 
compatible with public international law.
235
  
According to Leipold, a request wherein a trial court orders a litigant to procure evidence from 
a foreign third party constitutes a circumvention of international judicial assistance. Leipold 
maintains that without such assistance, the trial court is not able to obtain the evidence directly 
from the third party and thus tries to get the very same evidence via the litigant.
236
 This view is 
shared by Schabenberger who argues that, based on the trial court’s order, the litigant performs 
a judicial act on foreign territory which the said court itself is not allowed to carry out due to 
the public international law restriction on taking evidence abroad.
237
 
In contrast, Daoudi regards a respective request of a trial court as compatible with public inter-
national law and refers to the obligation of a litigant to cooperate with the trial court.
238
 It ap-
pears that a similar view is taken by Eschenfelder who maintains that the said court order to-
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wards a litigant merely constitutes a preparatory measure that only takes effect in the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court.
239
 
It is submitted that an order wherein a trial court requests a litigant to obtain evidence from a 
non-party witness located abroad does not interfere with foreign sovereignty. Neither the trial 
court, nor the litigant or the foreign third party performs a judicial act in the foreign state. Since 
the respective court order is issued to the litigant, there is no relation between the trial court 
and the non-party witness. The litigant does not take any evidence on foreign territory, as he 
merely asks the third party for his voluntary cooperation. The same holds true for the foreign 
non-party witness who simply prepares a witness statement, or collects documents or movable 
property and forwards such evidence to the litigant. The latter may then submit the evidence to 
the trial court for its review. The evidence-taking thus ultimately occurs in the trial court’s ju-
risdiction and not in the state where the third party is domiciled. One has furthermore to keep 
in mind that a trial court is, without the involvement of any foreign authority, allowed to inter-
rogate a foreign non-party witness based on a questionnaire or to order him to hand over doc-
uments or movable property.
240
 The same holds true for a request wherein the said court asks a 
foreign third party for his voluntary cooperation.
241
 Given the fact that under public interna-
tional law, a trial court is allowed to request evidence directly from a foreign third party, the 
said court must also be able to obtain evidence from a third party via a litigant.
242
 
3. Obtaining of Evidence from a Third Party via a Litigant and Article 271 of the 
Swiss Criminal Code 
Where a litigant residing in Switzerland forwards evidence obtained from a third party to a 
court abroad based on a respective order issued by the said court, the question arises whether 
such activity falls under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. To this day, there is no 
published opinion of the Swiss Federal Court or any other competent Swiss authority
243
 ad-
dressing this issue. 
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As has been noted earlier,
244
 the Swiss Federal Court insinuated that in contrast to hearing wit-
nesses, filing documents is a party measure and thus not an “activity on behalf of a foreign 
state” in the sense of Article 271(1) of the said Code.245 In this context, reference was also 
made to a decision of the Swiss Federal Council wherein the latter opined that the submission 
of documents by litigants residing in Switzerland based on a request of a court abroad contra-
venes the aforesaid provision.
246
 Given the absence of a published decision of the Swiss Feder-
al Court, which explicitly deals with the question at hand, litigants domiciled in Switzerland 
should refrain from forwarding evidence obtained by a third party to a court abroad. 
By contrast, it is submitted that a third party located in Switzerland does not violate Article 
271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code when forwarding evidence to a litigant in response to a re-
quest of the latter, even if the litigant submits such evidence to a court abroad later on. The 
third party does not act based on an order of a court located outside Switzerland, but on a mere 
request of the litigant. 
I. Summary 
From the above it follows that the request wherein a trial court orders a foreign witness to ap-
pear in court, to testify via videolink or telephone, to give evidence based on a questionnaire, 
or to produce documents is to be regarded as a transfer of foreign evidence. The same holds 
true where a trial court appoints an expert residing in its jurisdiction to make investigations 
abroad, or orders a litigant to procure evidence from a foreign non-party witness.  
In all the aforesaid cases, no request for international judicial assistance in evidence-taking is 
necessary, if the trial court asks the foreign witness for his mere voluntary cooperation. The 
same holds true where the trial court uses indirect compulsion towards a foreign litigant,
247
 as 
well as direct coercive measures limited to its jurisdiction towards a foreign third party having 
the same nationality as the state of the said court and towards a foreign litigant.
248
 No transfer 
of foreign evidence, however, is allowed, and the competent authorities of the foreign state 
have to be involved where the trial court wishes direct compulsion taking effect on foreign ter-
ritory to be applied, irrespective of whether they aim at litigants or third parties. The same ap-
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plies to the use of direct compulsion limited to the jurisdiction of the trial court in relation to 
foreign third parties who have a different nationality than the state of the trial court. 
J. Voluntary Production of Evidence by a Foreign Witness  
1. Nature of a Voluntary Production of Evidence  
In the preceding cases,
249 the transfer of foreign evidence is initiated by the trial court. A for-
eign witness, however, may also furnish evidence to the trial court on his own initiative, that is, 
without having been requested by the trial court. Litigants, in particular plaintiffs, are usually 
eager to come forward with evidence supporting their claims and are thus willing to hand over 
the relevant means of proof of their own accord. A third party not being a party to a suit may 
produce evidence once he becomes aware of the pending proceedings, that is, usually when 
having been asked by one of the litigants to come forward with the relevant information.
250
 In 
practice, it is usually not the foreign third party who, for instance, submits the documents re-
quested by the litigant to the trial court. Rather, it is the litigant, in whose favour the evidence 
of the third party will be, who volunteers the means of proof obtained by the non-party witness 
and submits them to the trial court. 
2. Voluntary Production of Evidence and Sovereignty 
There is no doubt that the voluntary production of evidence by a foreign party in civil proceed-
ings pending before a trial court is allowed under public international law.
251
 No judicial act is 
performed on foreign territory, neither by the trial court nor the foreign litigant. Rather, the 
voluntary furnishing of evidence by the party is a purely private act which cannot be imputed 
to the trial court.
252
 The same holds true where a litigant asks a foreign third party for his vol-
untary cooperation.
253
 Schabenberger, for instance, compares such a request with preparatory 
measures that are taken before the lis pendens of the claim and which do not interfere with for-
eign sovereignty.
254
 In this context, it should also be recalled that a request by the trial court for 
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voluntary cooperation of foreign witnesses is compatible with public international law. This is 
particularly true for the case at hand where the voluntary production of evidence is not based 
on a request of the trial court. 
3. Voluntary Production of Evidence and Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
Where a witness domiciled in Switzerland volunteers the production of evidence for the benefit 
of civil proceedings pending abroad, Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code is not violated. 
The witness does not carry out “activities on behalf of a foreign state” in the sense of the said 
provision.
255
 With regard to the voluntary submission of documents by a litigant, Hopf empha-
sises that it constitutes an act of a party which is not reserved to authorities and therefore does 
not require the involvement of any Swiss authority. The litigant must thus, according to Hopf, 
be allowed to voluntarily produce evidence supporting his claim, provided such evidence does 
not include means of proof controlled by a third party which can only be obtained through in-
ternational judicial assistance.
256
 
K. Excursus on the Service of Process to Foreign Witnesses 
1. General Remarks 
In connection with a transfer of foreign evidence, two questions arise, namely whether such 
transfer is compatible with foreign sovereignty,
257
 and how a request of a trial court is to be 
served upon foreign witnesses under public international law. In other words, once the admis-
sibility of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence under public international law is estab-
lished, the method of service out of the trial court’s jurisdiction has to be determined, that is, 
whether the trial court may send the request by postal channels directly to the foreign wit-
ness,
258
 or whether such transmission is only possible by means of international judicial assis-
tance.
259
 Due service of process is essential, as it serves the purpose of guaranteeing the foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                        
flikt mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika – The Jurisdiction Conflict with the United States of America 
1986 23. 
255
 See in this regard Chapter 2 para. IV.B.4.a).  
256
 Hopf T ʻArt. 271ʼ in Niggli MA and Wiprächtiger H (eds) Basler Kommentar Strafrecht II Art. 111-392 StGB 
2007 1922 n. 15 in fine. 
257
 See in this regard paras. V.B-V.H. 
258
 From the perspective of the trial court, judicial documents should be sent by registered mail, as there is proof 
that the foreign witness has received the documents. Accordingly, the following comments on the direct 
transmission by postal channels focus on the forwarding by registered mail. 
259
 Cf., amongst others, Geimer R Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 2009 209 n. 424; Schabenberger A Der Zeuge 
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witness the opportunity of being heard and thus ultimately ensures a fair trial. In other words, 
in order to produce legal effects on litigants and third parties, judicial documents must be 
properly served.
260
  
A detailed discussion of the service of process in international civil litigation goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The following thus only outlines briefly the major issues associated with 
the transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence abroad. The focus lies thereby 
on civil-law jurisdictions which regard the service of judicial documents as a judicial act.
261  
2. Service of Process in Civil-law Countries 
a) Service of Process as a Judicial Act 
As has already been explained in detail,
262
 in countries sharing the civil-law tradition, it is the 
court that controls the conduct of civil proceedings. Such control, amongst others, not only in-
cludes the taking of evidence, but also the service of judicial documents that are related to the 
civil proceedings. Consequently, it is the court, and not the parties, that is responsible for serv-
ing documents on litigants, third parties, and experts. As a result, civil-law jurisdictions  regard 
the service of process as a judicial act which is reserved to the competent authority of the state 
where the addressee of the judicial document is domiciled.
263
 By contrast, in countries applying 
the common-law system, it is often the litigants who are responsible for serving judicial docu-
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ments on their opponents and third parties, including experts. In these countries, the service of 
process is thus generally considered as a purely private act, provided no compulsion is ap-
plied.
264
 
The qualification of service of process as a judicial act by the foreign state means that the trial 
court is not allowed to send judicial documents directly to witnesses located abroad; but in-
stead, has to transmit them through channels of international judicial assistance.
265
 The latter is, 
as has been explained earlier, often a cumbersome and time-consuming process. This holds 
true not only for international judicial assistance in evidence-taking, but also for the service of 
judicial documents abroad, in particular where no relevant convention or treaty applies.
266
 In 
recent years, the cooperation on the service of judicial documents abroad in civil and commer-
cial matters has been intensified. Many states either became a member of a relevant conven-
tion, such as the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Ex-
trajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
267
 or, with respect to the member states 
of the European Union, the Regulation of 13 November 2007 on the Service in the Member 
States of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
268
 or entered 
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into bilateral treaties with other states.
269
 Although such cooperation facilitates the cross-border 
service of judicial documents, it cannot entirely remove the delays that necessarily occur where 
authorities of two different states are involved in such transmission. Trial courts are thus 
tempted to avoid forwarding documents, in particular a request for a transfer of foreign evi-
dence, via international judicial assistance, but try instead to send them directly to the foreign 
witness without the assistance of the foreign state. 
From the perspective of the trial court, the service of judicial documents via international judi-
cial assistance to a foreign litigant may become obsolete, once the latter designated a person 
domiciled in the jurisdiction of the trial court who is authorised to accept service on his be-
half.
270
 As a result, there is, with regard to the service of process, no longer an international 
element involved, and the judicial documents may be transmitted as if the foreign litigant was 
domiciled in the jurisdiction of the trial court. Where provided for by the relevant domestic 
rules, the trial court should, at the outset of a lawsuit, request a foreign litigant to designate an 
agent to receive process in its jurisdiction.
271
 
b) Service of a Request for a Transfer of Foreign Evidence by International Judicial 
Assistance? 
The prevailing view
272
 maintains that a request for a transfer of foreign evidence cannot be di-
rectly forwarded from the trial court to the foreign witness by postal channels, but has instead 
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to be transmitted through channels of international judicial assistance.
273
 This is based on the 
qualification of service of process as an act of state and thus applies notwithstanding the con-
tent of the request, in particular, irrespective of whether or not the latter includes any measures 
of compulsion merely taking effect in the trial court’s jurisdiction.274 Mössle maintains that 
where the trial court sends the request directly to the foreign witness, the transmission of the 
request is only completed once it has been handed over to the foreign witness. She thus argues 
that the transmission of the request by the trial court to the domestic post office ultimately 
takes effect in the foreign state.
275
 
Bertele maintains that the activities of the foreign postal officer dealing with the document are 
to be imputed to the trial court, and that the direct transmission without the assistance of any 
authority of the foreign state therefore violates the latter’s sovereignty.276  
Stürner argues with the protective function of the sovereignty of states. He considers the sover-
eignty as “Schutzschild”, literally “protective shield”, which protects residents of a particular 
state against interference from any other state. According to Stürner, this particularly includes 
protection from transmissions of judicial documents by other ways than international judicial 
assistance. Stürner considers such protection as necessary, as often the foreign witness may not 
be familiar with the laws of the trial court, and may face language difficulties and poor transla-
tion of the respective documents. This may, according to Stürner, result in misunderstandings, 
confusion and legal uncertainty on the side of the foreign witness that prevent him from effec-
tive legal protection in the civil proceedings before the trial court.
277
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By contrast, another school of thought opines that the forwarding of a request for a transfer of 
foreign evidence without the involvement of the foreign state is permitted under public interna-
tional law, provided the trial court does not use any compulsion, be it indirect or direct. Ac-
cordingly, Mann maintains that the direct transmission by the trial court is compatible with 
public international law, if the trial court merely requests the foreign witness to voluntarily co-
operate.
278
 
Schabenberger argues that whenever the addressee of a judicial document has to be protected, 
that is, where indirect or direct compulsion taking effect in the jurisdiction of the trial court are 
used,
279
 the document has to be served by international judicial assistance. According to 
Schabenberger, such protection can only be provided, if the addressee is able to fully under-
stand the content of the relevant document, which requires that the latter is properly translated 
and such translation can be verified by the state where the addressee is located.
280
 
Schack emphasises that the public international law principle, according to which a state is not 
allowed to perform acts of state on foreign territory, is limited. He brings forth the argument 
that an absolute ban of judicial acts on foreign soil only applies with regard to acts that involve 
measures of compulsion taking effect in foreign states. Accordingly, Schack regards the service 
of judicial documents without the assistance of the foreign state not as a violation of foreign 
sovereignty, provided no compulsion is applied abroad.
281
 
Mössle regards a direct transmission as compatible with public international law, if the sover-
eign interests of the foreign state are safeguarded. According to Mössle, this is the case if the 
foreign state obtains knowledge of the judicial document and is in a position to advise the ad-
dressee on the document’s significance. Mössle therefore suggests that judicial documents can 
be directly served, provided the document is accompanied by an official translation and the 
foreign state is notified about the transmission.
282
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Geimer opines that summons, pleadings, or court decisions do not have to be transmitted 
through channels of international judicial assistance, as foreign sovereignty is not infringed. He 
argues that the trial court does not perform any act of state on foreign territory, but merely in 
its own jurisdiction where the respective decisions are taken. According to Geimer, the trans-
mission abroad thus only serves as notification of a judicial act that has already been taken in 
the state of the trial court.
283
  
Finally, Wiehe argues that a transmission without the involvement of the foreign state does not 
constitute a judicial act merely because the trial court requires the cooperation of the foreign 
postal authorities. He maintains that the said court does not perform an act of state on foreign 
territory, as the actions of the foreign postal authorities cannot be imputed to the trial court, but 
the latter merely uses an international means of communication.
284
 
It is submitted that a trial court may directly transmit a request for a transfer of foreign evi-
dence, which includes direct or indirect compulsion taking effect in its jurisdiction, to a foreign 
witness, provided such request is accompanied by an official translation and the foreign state is 
informed about the request. A request for voluntary cooperation of a foreign witness, however, 
can be transmitted without a translation and notification of the foreign state. It is, however, in 
the interest of the trial court to provide, where necessary, the witness with a translation, as the 
latter increases the chances that the witness may voluntarily cooperate. 
Where a request for a transfer of foreign evidence is not forwarded by means of international 
judicial assistance, foreign sovereignty is, if at all, only marginally impaired. In this context, 
one has to keep in mind that neither a member of the trial court nor any other public official of 
the state of the said court becomes active on foreign territory. Civil-law countries should there-
fore renounce their excessive adherence to their current course of policy regarding cross-border 
service of process and should promote a more liberal approach. This should particularly be 
seen in the light of the fact that in practice, trial courts may resort to substituted service, nota-
bly service by publication, where a judicial document cannot be personally served upon wit-
nesses.
285
 In the context of international litigation, this may, for instance, mean that a foreign 
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defendant does not become aware of a lawsuit that is pending before the trial court and is thus 
not able to exercise his procedural rights, in particular the right to be heard. The same holds 
true where in civil proceedings before a trial court, the service of a judicial document relating 
to a foreign third party is made by public notice. One has furthermore to keep in mind that 
where a litigant is in default, the trial court may give a default judgment.
286
 Although a foreign 
litigant may resist the enforcement of such judgment in his state of residence, the decision will 
most likely be enforceable in the jurisdiction of the trial court, provided the litigant has assets 
in the relevant state.
287
 Having said this, cross-border service of process should not be unneces-
sarily complicated, as otherwise a trial court may be tempted to serve the document by public 
notification. The above shows that excessive requirements stipulated by a foreign state for the 
service of judicial documents are not always necessarily in the interest of its residents. 
On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that in the majority of cases, a foreign witness is 
confronted with a legal system he is not familiar with and a foreign language of the proceed-
ings when facing a request for a transfer of foreign evidence. In comparison with litigants and 
third parties domiciled in the state of the trial court, a foreign witness thus needs more protec-
tion when being involved in civil proceedings before a trial court. Such protection is particular-
ly essential where he faces detrimental legal consequences when failing to comply with orders 
issued by the trial court. Adverse effects not only occur where direct compulsion is applied to-
wards a foreign witness, but also in case of consequences of a merely procedural nature. No 
particular protection, however, is necessary where the foreign witness does not face any detri-
mental consequences, that is, where he is asked by the trial court for his voluntary cooperation. 
In order to be able to fully assess the legal consequences that non-compliance with a request 
for a transfer of foreign evidence may have, the foreign witness must be in a position to under-
stand the content of the relevant request which requires, in case the latter is in a foreign lan-
guage, a proper translation. Unlike in the case of a direct transmission of the request by the trial 
court to the foreign witness, the service of process via international judicial assistance enables 
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the competent foreign authority to ensure that the relevant document is duly translated.
288
 The 
involvement of the foreign authority, however, is not limited to securing a proper translation of 
the order of the trial court, but also allows the relevant authority to scrutinise the content of the 
judicial document and advise the foreign witness on its significance.
289
 The service of process 
by means of international judicial assistance has furthermore a warning function. The formali-
ties associated with a request for international judicial assistance are better suited to inform a 
foreign witness about the significance of a court order than if the latter is directly transmitted 
by the trial court which is a rather informal process.
290
 Again, such warning function is only 
needed with regard to court orders that use direct or indirect compulsion towards foreign wit-
nesses. 
The transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence through channels of interna-
tional judicial assistance, however, is not the only means to enable the foreign state to scruti-
nise the said request and give relevant advice to the foreign witness. Rather, such examination 
is also possible where the trial court directly forwards the request to the foreign witness and at 
the same time, notifies the foreign state about the transmission and the content of the request. 
Such procedure allows the foreign state to intervene if necessary, but also facilitates and expe-
dites the transmission of requests for a transfer of foreign evidence and ultimately the cross-
border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. Where, from the perspective of the 
foreign state, the proceedings before the trial court are conducted in a foreign language, the re-
quest for a transfer of foreign evidence should be accompanied by an official translation. 
c) Service of a Request for a Transfer of Foreign Evidence and Article 271 of the 
Swiss Criminal Code 
Like other civil-law countries, Switzerland regards the service of judicial documents as an act 
of state that is entrusted to the competent Swiss authorities. Judicial documents issued by a 
court abroad and addressed to witnesses residing in Switzerland have thus to be transmitted by 
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way of international judicial assistance.
291
 An exception, however, applies where the said doc-
uments have no legal effect, or are not liable to have any such effect on the addressee. Under 
Swiss law, a request for a transfer of foreign evidence issued by a court abroad and applying 
direct or indirect compulsion has therefore to be forwarded through channels of international 
judicial assistance. The above contradicts the position the author has taken earlier with regard 
to the transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence.
292
 This conflict results from 
the more conservative approach Swiss law takes in relation to cross-border service of process. 
A request wherein the trial court asks a witness in Switzerland for his voluntary collaboration, 
however, can be directly transmitted without the assistance of Swiss authorities.
293
 
Under Swiss law, the transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence using direct or 
indirect compulsion to an individual residing in Switzerland without the assistance of the com-
petent Swiss authorities does not only violate public international law, but also constitutes a 
criminal offence. The service of such request without the involvement of Swiss authorities is 
considered as “activity on behalf of a foreign state” in the sense of Article 271(1) of the Swiss 
Criminal Code.
294
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VI. Conclusion 
From the perspective of a trial court, the collection of foreign evidence through channels of in-
ternational judicial assistance is often a burdensome and time-consuming process. A trial court 
is thus often anxious to obtain such evidence by means other than through judicial assistance, 
namely via a so-called “transfer of foreign evidence”. Here, the evidence originally located in a 
foreign state is transferred to the jurisdiction of the trial court where it is heard by the latter. As 
a consequence, the evidence is no longer taken on foreign territory, but in the jurisdiction of the 
trial court. From the perspective of the said court, the evidence-taking thus constitutes a purely 
domestic matter which is under its sole control. Having said this, there is no need for the trial 
court to involve the foreign state where the evidence was located prior to its transfer.  
A transfer of foreign evidence not only avoids the delays usually associated with a request for 
international judicial assistance, but it also means that the relevant evidence is heard by the trial 
court in accordance with its own laws. This not only minimises the risk that foreign evidence is 
of merely limited probative value, or even inadmissible in the proceedings before the trial court 
due to differences in the rules on evidence-taking in the states involved; it also avoids the evi-
dence being “filtered” by a foreign authority, a commissioner, a diplomatic officer or a consu-
lar agent prior to its transmission to the trial court. 
Irrespective of the fact that the trial court does not act physically on foreign territory when evi-
dence is transferred to its jurisdiction, a request of the said court for a respective transfer has an 
effect beyond the state where the court is located. From a civil-law perspective, which qualifies 
the evidence-taking as a judicial act, the question therefore arises as to whether a request for a 
transfer of foreign evidence impairs the sovereignty of the state where the means of proof were 
originally situated. It is well established that under public international law, not every court or-
der taking effect abroad interferes with foreign sovereignty. This holds true particularly for a 
request for a transfer of foreign evidence whose admissibility under public international law 
hinges on two factors, namely the addressee of such a request and whether the latter includes 
any compulsion towards its addressees. 
A request for a transfer of foreign evidence either aims at foreign litigants or third parties. It is 
generally recognised that under public international law, foreign litigants have the same obliga-
tions as domestic parties and are thus under an obligation to cooperate with the trial court. In 
contrast, it is controversial whether and, if so, to what extent foreign non-party witnesses have 
to collaborate. While one approach rejects any obligation to cooperate under public interna-
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tional law, another favours such obligation, albeit the reasoning given by the relevant scholars 
differs. It is submitted that foreign third parties having the same nationality as the trial court are 
under an obligation to collaborate with the latter. Here, the personal sovereignty of the state of 
the trial court prevails over the territorial sovereignty of the state where the third party is locat-
ed. No such obligation, however, exists with regard to foreign third parties who have a differ-
ent nationality than the trial court. In this context, the latter cannot invoke the personal sover-
eignty; rather, it is the territorial sovereignty of the state, where the foreign non-party witness is 
domiciled, that comes out on top.  
Where foreign witnesses are under an obligation to collaborate, the question arises whether 
and, if so, to what extent the trial court can enforce such obligation. The said obligation of liti-
gants and third parties is only as good as the trial court is able to compel recalcitrant witnesses 
to cooperate. It is well established that under public international law, a trial court is not al-
lowed to apply direct compulsion, that is, coercive measures that either aim at the foreign wit-
ness himself or his assets, that takes effect in a foreign state. The use of such measures is con-
sidered as a violation of foreign sovereignty. By contrast, it is contentious whether the use of 
direct compulsion limited to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is compatible with public inter-
national law. The author regards such compulsion not as a violation of foreign sovereignty, as 
both the threat and the execution of the coercive measures take place in the jurisdiction of the 
trial court. The same holds true for indirect compulsion, that is, consequences of a merely pro-
cedural nature. Such measures are based on the procedural relation between the foreign litigant 
and the trial court, and their effects are confined to the latter’s jurisdiction. 
Given the aforesaid obligation of foreign litigants to comply with a request for a transfer of 
foreign evidence, a trial court may apply direct compulsion limited to its jurisdiction as well as 
indirect compulsion towards foreign litigants. With regard to foreign third parties, the use of 
compulsion is more restricted. Firstly, only non-party witnesses having the same nationality as 
the trial court are under an obligation to collaborate. Secondly, the use of indirect compulsion 
towards third parties is not feasible, as they are not party to the proceedings and thus no proce-
dural relationship with the trial court exists. Consequently, the use of coercive measures to-
wards foreign non-party witnesses is only allowed where the latter have the same nationality as 
the trial court, and the compulsion is direct as well as limited to the trial court’s jurisdiction. By 
contrast, both requests for a transfer of foreign evidence that use direct compulsion having im-
pact on foreign territory as well as requests aimed at foreign third parties whose nationalities 
are different to the trial court interfere with foreign sovereignty. Where a trial court cannot 
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compel foreign witnesses to collaborate, it may ask them for their voluntary cooperation. Such 
request is deemed compatible with public international law and does not require the judicial 
assistance of the foreign state. 
Where a trial court wishes to obtain means of proof through a transfer of foreign evidence, it 
has several options. It may order a foreign witness to appear in court, to testify by videolink or 
telephone, to give evidence based on a questionnaire, or to submit documents or movable 
property. Moreover, the court may appoint a domestic expert to make investigations abroad 
which are necessary for the preparation of the expert opinion. 
A request, wherein a trial court summons a foreign witness to attend court, constitutes a trans-
fer of foreign evidence. Such a request not only avoids the burdensome and time-consuming 
process of international judicial assistance, but it also has the advantage that the witness exam-
ination is conducted in the presence of the trial court based on the latter’s rules. Compared to 
the evidence-taking by international judicial assistance, the trial court, however, is restricted in 
using compulsion towards foreign witnesses who refuse to appear in court. A witness who re-
sides in Switzerland and travels abroad to give testimony in foreign civil proceedings does not 
violate Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, as the evidence-taking does not occur on 
Swiss soil. 
Whether an examination by videolink interferes with foreign sovereignty when conducted 
without the involvement of the foreign state is controversial. The author regards such interroga-
tion as a transfer of foreign evidence, as the trial court hears the evidence in its jurisdiction, and 
the evidence-taking is only concluded once the trial court has taken note of the witness’ testi-
mony. Under Swiss law, however, in the absence of any respective reported case law and based 
on the narrow interpretation of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code by the Swiss Federal 
Court and other relevant Swiss authorities, it can be assumed that the questioning of a witness 
residing in Switzerland by a court abroad via videoconference is regarded as violation of the 
said provision. The advantages and disadvantages mentioned in the context of the aforesaid 
summons of a foreign witness to appear in court also apply with regard to an examination by 
videolink. In addition, it must be noted that the foreign witness does not have to travel to the 
state of the trial court when testifying by videoconference. One has furthermore to bear in mind 
that the examination does not occur in a courtroom which may have detrimental consequences 
for the accuracy of the witness’ testimony. 
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The foregoing comments apply mutatis mutandis to an interrogation of a foreign witness by 
telephone. Here, however, it has to be kept in mind that the trial court’s perception of the wit-
ness is reduced to what it hears over the phone. This not only hampers the verification of the 
witness’ identity, but it also prevents the said court from observing the witness’ demeanour 
with its own eyes. 
Whether the examination of a foreign witness by the trial court based on a questionnaire consti-
tutes a transfer of foreign evidence or not is contentious. It is submitted that such interrogation 
does not require the assistance of the foreign state where the witness to be questioned is locat-
ed. As in the case of an interrogation via videolink, the evidence-taking ultimately occurs in the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, as the examination is only concluded once the latter has reviewed 
the questionnaire. Compared to the evidence-taking through the means of international judicial 
assistance, the procedure at hand is not only more swift, but it allows the witness to complete 
the questionnaire without time constraint, which may minimise the risks of incomplete and in-
consistent answers. It has, however, to be kept in mind that an examination by questionnaire 
may not be suitable for all cases. This particularly applies where the subject of the hearing of 
evidence is complex and/or highly contested, or the witness to be questioned lacks the intellec-
tual abilities and/or capacity of expressing himself in writing. Here, an examination before the 
trial court, be it by summoning the witness to attend court or interrogating him via videolink 
may prove more successful. Mention must also be made of the fact that an examination by 
means of questionnaire lacks the traditional judicial surroundings thought to convey the seri-
ousness of court testimony. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that the trial court has limited 
powers to use compulsion towards recalcitrant witnesses. Again, it can be assumed that an in-
terrogation of a witness residing in Switzerland based on a questionnaire for the benefit of pro-
ceedings abroad is regarded as an infringement of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code 
when conducted without the permission of the competent Swiss authorities. 
Where documents or movable property are under the control of a foreign witness, the trial court 
may order the latter to submit such evidence to the court. The author regards such evidence-
taking as a transfer of foreign evidence which does not require the assistance of the foreign 
state. The collection of the documents or movable property by the foreign witness constitutes 
merely a preparatory measure, while the review of such evidence takes place in the jurisdiction 
of the trial court. The comments made earlier on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
summons of a foreign witness to appear in court apply mutatis mutandis. In a decision in 1988, 
the Swiss Federal Court insinuated that the submission of documents by a witness residing in 
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Switzerland to a court abroad is not an “activity on behalf of a foreign state” in the sense of 
Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. In the light of the absence of a published decision 
expressly dealing with the procedure at hand, however, witnesses domiciled in Switzerland 
should abstain from forwarding any documents or movable property to courts abroad without 
the permission of the competent Swiss authority. 
In cases where a trial court located in a civil-law country lacks the expertise to determine the 
material facts of a lawsuit, it appoints a suitable expert. Where information, which is necessary 
for the preparation of the opinion of an expert, is situated in a foreign state, the trial court usu-
ally appoints an expert who is domiciled in its jurisdiction and requests him to make the neces-
sary investigations abroad. Having said this, the question arises as to whether investigations 
conducted on foreign territory by an expert appointed by a trial court interfere with foreign 
sovereignty. This question is controversial; while one school of thought opines that the expert 
merely acts as a private individual who has no judicial power, another brings forth the argu-
ment that the expert’s activities cannot be seen as a purely private act and thus requires the 
permission of the competent foreign authorities. The former view is shared by the author. The 
gathering of information abroad by a court-appointed expert merely constitutes a preparatory 
measure. The evidence-taking therefore does not occur on foreign territory, but in the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court. Moreover, no governmental authority is vested in the expert, as he cannot 
apply any compulsion towards recalcitrant witnesses. It goes without saying that a trial court 
could also request the competent authority of the foreign state, where the investigations are to 
be made, to appoint an expert. Such procedure, however, would not only be more time-
consuming, but the appointment as well as the activities of the expert would usually be gov-
erned by the rules of the foreign state. In contrast to the trial court and the expert, the foreign 
authority could, however, apply coercive measures taking effect on its territory. The Swiss 
Federal Court has not yet dealt with the question whether an expert appointed by a court abroad 
violates Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code when making investigations in Switzerland. 
Given the aforesaid narrow interpretation of such provision, it is, however, highly probable that 
such activities are to be considered as violations of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
In the foregoing cases, the trial court directly contacts the foreign witness from whom it wishes 
to obtain the relevant evidence. In relation to the testimony of a foreign third party or docu-
ments and movable property controlled by the latter, the said court may, however, try to obtain 
such evidence via a litigant. In other words, the court may request a litigant to procure a written 
statement from a particular foreign third party or other evidence administered by the latter. 
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Again, it is controversial whether such a request interferes with the sovereignty of the state 
where the third party is domiciled. It is submitted that neither the trial court nor the litigant, let 
alone the non-party witness, infringes foreign sovereignty. The litigant asks the foreign third 
party merely for his voluntary cooperation. The latter forwards the evidence to the litigant who 
then submits it to the trial court. The evidence-taking thus ultimately takes place in the trial 
court’s jurisdiction. In practice, trial courts usually prefer to deal directly with foreign third 
parties. The fact that a judicial authority is involved in relation to the foreign third party may 
encourage the latter to testify more carefully and moreover minimises the risk of the non-party 
witness being influenced by the litigant who called him as witness. It has also to be borne in 
mind that neither the trial court nor the litigant can apply any measures of compulsion towards 
the third party who refuses to cooperate with the litigant. With regard to Article 271(1) of the 
Swiss Criminal Code, the relevant comments made in relation to a request wherein a trial court 
orders a foreign witness to procure documents or movable property also apply here. In order to 
avoid any criminal prosecution, litigants domiciled in Switzerland are thus advised not to com-
ply with an order of a court abroad to obtain evidence from a third party. Third parties, howev-
er, located in Switzerland, who voluntarily provide a litigant with evidence which the latter 
then submits to a court abroad, do not contravene Article 271(1). 
In the previously mentioned cases, the transfer of foreign evidence to the trial court’s jurisdic-
tion is initiated by the trial court. A foreign witness, in practice mostly a litigant, may, howev-
er, present evidence without having been asked to do so by the trial court. Such presentation is 
a purely private act which does not interfere with foreign sovereignty. The same holds true in 
relation to Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. Witnesses residing in Switzerland do not 
infringe the said provision when voluntarily furnishing evidence to a court abroad. 
The question of whether a transfer of foreign evidence is compatible with public international 
law must be strictly separated from the question of how a request issued by a trial court has to 
be served upon foreign witnesses. In countries following the civil-law tradition, the service of 
process is considered as a judicial act which is entrusted to the authorities of the state where the 
addressee of the judicial document is domiciled. As a general rule, therefore, a trial court is, 
from a civil-law perspective, not allowed to send judicial documents directly to foreign wit-
nesses, but has to forward them through channels of international judicial assistance. Given the 
delays usually associated with the latter, trial courts often prefer to avoid judicial assistance 
and instead try to transmit judicial documents directly to foreign witnesses.  
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Having said this, the question arises as to whether the direct transmission of a request for a 
transfer of foreign evidence from the trial court to the foreign witness is allowed under public 
international law. Again, this issue is controversial. While the traditional approach maintains 
that such a request has to be forwarded through international judicial assistance, a more recent 
view takes into consideration the content of the request, and advocates a direct transmission 
where no compulsion, be it direct or indirect, is used by the trial court. The author suggests that 
a request for a transfer of foreign evidence using any compulsion compatible with public inter-
national law, can be directly forwarded to a foreign witness, provided it is accompanied by a 
translation and the foreign state is informed about the transmission and the content of the re-
quest. Compared to witnesses domiciled in the state of the trial court, foreign witnesses need 
special protection, as they are confronted with a legal system and a language of the proceedings 
with which they are not familiar. This holds particularly true where they face indirect and di-
rect compulsion when failing to comply with the trial court’s request. The aforesaid notifica-
tion of the foreign state ensures such protection, as it enables the foreign authority to scrutinise 
the request and advise the witness on its significance. No such protection, however, is neces-
sary where the foreign witness is asked for his voluntary cooperation. Accordingly, such a re-
quest can be directly transmitted without informing the foreign state. Switzerland regards the 
transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence without the assistance of the compe-
tent Swiss authorities not only as violation of public international law, but also as a criminal 
offence under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. An exception, however, applies 
where the judicial document has no legal effect on the addressee residing in Switzerland. Con-
sequently, a request for the voluntary cooperation of a witness domiciled in Switzerland can be 
transmitted without the assistance of Swiss authorities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CROSS-BORDER TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS IN SWITZERLAND, SOUTH AFRICA, BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, 
NIGERIA, AND UGANDA 
 
I. Introduction 
The foregoing chapters analysed the conditions under which the taking of foreign evidence in 
civil and commercial matters is allowed under public international law. The present Chapter 
deals with the rules in Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda 
that govern the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters through chan-
nels of international judicial assistance.
1
 In this context, a distinction is made according to 
whether a particular country seeks evidence abroad, or whether it is asked to take evidence for 
the benefit of another state; in other words, whether it acts as a requesting or a requested state.
2
 
Where a particular state is a member of a convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civ-
il and commercial matters, the main principles of evidence-taking based on such an interna-
tional agreement are outlined. The Chapter furthermore analyses the rules of the aforesaid 
countries that govern transborder evidence-taking in the absence of a relevant international 
treaty. Once the relevant set of rules for each jurisdiction covered by this thesis is established, 
the Chapter assesses the status quo of each of the said countries with regard to cooperation in 
the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters and, where necessary, rec-
ommendations are made for the improvement of the existing situation. 
II. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in Switzerland 
A. General Remarks 
International judicial assistance in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters between 
Switzerland and other states is mainly governed by two conventions, namely the Hague Evi-
dence Convention and the Hague Procedure Convention.
3
 In this context, it has to be remem-
                                                     
1
 And not by means of a so-called “transfer of foreign evidence”. See in this regard Chapter 3. 
2
 For the terms “requesting state” and “requested state”, cf. Chapter 2 para. V.A. 
3
 Cf. also in this regard Chapter 2 fns. 163 and 164. With numerous, mostly European states, Switzerland has 
entered into bilateral agreements regarding the transmission of requests for judicial assistance in civil and 
commercial matters (for instance, allowing direct communication between courts) and the language in which 
such requests have to be drafted. There are no relevant bilateral treaties between Switzerland, on the one hand, 
and South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and, Uganda, on the other, on cross-border evidence-taking in 
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bered that conventions on judicial cooperation mainly stipulate the conditions under which the 
requested state is obliged to render assistance, as well as the forms of such assistance. The 
methods and procedure to be followed when executing a request for judicial assistance, howev-
er, are usually governed by the law of the requested state,
4
 which in the case of Switzerland is 
by the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. The same holds true for the decision of the trial court, 
whether or not the internal conditions for issuing a request for judicial assistance to obtain evi-
dence located abroad are fulfilled. 
The following subchapters first highlight the evidence-taking in Switzerland in accordance 
with the Hague Evidence Convention and the Hague Procedure Convention and, second, out-
line the principles of judicial cooperation involving Swiss authorities based on courtoisie in-
ternationale.
5
 
B. Taking of Evidence based on the Hague Evidence Convention  
1. Relation between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Hague Procedure  
Convention 
The Hague Procedure Convention was concluded in 1954. It not only contains provisions on 
the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters,
6
 but, amongst other things, also in-
cludes regulations on the communication of judicial documents,
7
 security for costs,
8
 or free le-
gal aid.
9 The Convention came into force in Switzerland in 1957 and has to date been ratified 
                                                                                                                                                                        
civil and commerical matters or the transmission of respective requests. See, however, the Exchange of Notes 
between Switzerland and Uganda of 24 March/26 May 1965 regarding the Maintenance of the Swiss-British 
Agreement of 3 December 1937 on Civil Procedure, SR 0.274.186.181; 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/i2/0.274.186.181.de.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). The said Swiss-British 
agreement (SR 0.274.183.671, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/i2/0.274.183.671.de.pdf (date of use: 31 January 
2013)) includes provisions on access to justice, the requirement of a cautio judicatum solvi, legal aid, and on 
imprisonment pending the payment of a debt. For more on international treaties of Switzerland, cf. Federal Of-
fice of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 
2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 8 (date of use: 31 Janu-
ary 2013); Volken P ʻVor Art. 11ʼ in Girsberger A et al (eds) Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG 2004 146 n. 41, 
145 n. 31; Switzerland Response of Switzerland to the Questionnaire of 2008 Relating to the Hague Conven-
tion of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters (undated) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008switzerland20.pdf 17 (date of use: 31 January 2013). For a list of inter-
national bilateral and multilateral treaties of Switzerland, see 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/topics/intla/intrea/dbstv.html (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
4
 Cf. Chapter 2 para. V.C. See also Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 82 n. 62. 
5
 For more on courtoisie internationale, see Chapter 2 para. V.B.1 above. 
6
 Articles 8-16 of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
7
 Articles 1-7 of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
8
 Articles 17-19 of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
9
 Articles 20-24 of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
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by 46 other countries.
10
 England, the United States, as well as other common-law countries, 
however, have not acceded to the Convention, as it did not take account of the particularities of 
the common-law system.
11  
The Hague Evidence Convention was concluded in 1970. It was intended to renew Articles 8-
16 of the Hague Procedure Convention on evidence-taking by facilitating the transmission and 
execution of letters of request,
12 and to “create a link between the system of taking of evidence 
of the civil law and that of the common law” by accommodating common-law methods for the 
taking of evidence.
13
 The latter was achieved by including rules on the taking of evidence by a 
commissioner. As a result, England, the United States, and other common-law countries, such 
as Australia, ratified the Convention. Today, 57 states, including Russia, China, and India, are 
parties to the Hague Evidence Convention. In Switzerland, the Convention came into force in 
1995.
14
 Switzerland considers the provisions of the Convention to be of a self-executing char-
acter. Hence, they are directly applicable in Switzerland and no implementing law is required.
15
 
With respect to contracting states to the Hague Evidence Convention that are also members of 
the Hague Procedure Convention, the Hague Evidence Convention replaces Articles 8-16 of 
the Hague Procedure Convention.
16
 In relation to Switzerland, Articles 8-16 of the Hague Pro-
                                                     
10
 For a list of the countries that have ratified the Hague Procedure Convention, cf. 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=33 (date of use: 31 January 2013). South Af-
rica, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are not members of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
11
 See, amongst others, Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 15.  
12
 Cf. the preamble to the Hague Evidence Convention. 
13
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Report on the Work of the Special 
Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (April 1989) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/scrpt89e_20.pdf 8 (date of use: 31 January 2013). See also Amram PW Explana-
tory Report on the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention (1970) http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl20e.pdf 1 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 91 n. 90 et seq.; Meier 
AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Beweisaufname für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 16; Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend 
Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssa-
chen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1271. 
14
 For a list of the countries that have ratified the Hague Evidence Convention, see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (date of use: 31 January 2013). Botswana, 
Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are not members of the Hague Evidence Convention. With regard to the status 
of South Africa, see para. III.B.1 below. 
15
 Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichti-
gung der Beweisaufname für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 17. 
16
 Article 29 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
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cedure Convention are still in force with regard to eleven states,
17
 while the Hague Evidence 
Convention applies to 56 states. 
With regard to the 193 states recognised by the United Nations,
18
 68 countries, or, put differ-
ently, 30% of the recognised states are covered by the Hague Evidence Convention and the 
Hague Procedure Convention. In this context, it is notable that the vast majority of the afore-
said 68 countries are located in Europe, and that, for instance, only four states in South Ameri-
ca and four African countries acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention or the Hague Proce-
dure Convention.
19
 
Given the fact that the Hague Evidence Convention includes a more detailed regulation on 
cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters than the Hague Procedure 
Convention, the following deals first with the Hague Evidence Convention and then addresses 
the evidence-taking under the Hague Procedure Convention, thereby focusing on the main dif-
ferences between the two conventions. A comprehensive treatise on the taking of evidence un-
der the said conventions would by far exceed the scope of this thesis. The following two sub-
chapters thus outline the main principles of evidence-taking based on the two conventions. 
These comments not only shed light on the conditions under which Switzerland renders judi-
cial assistance based on the said conventions, but also serve as reference points for the devel-
opment of basic principles for a convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda outlined 
in Chapter 6. 
2. Scope of the Hague Evidence Convention 
The scope of the Hague Evidence Convention is limited to the taking of evidence in “civil or 
commercial matters”.20 The Convention does not, however, define this term.21 In order to en-
hance judicial assistance in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters between the con-
tracting states as much as possible, the notion should be interpreted extensively. In Switzer-
land, it is well established that it is the nature of the substantive claim that is crucial and not the 
                                                     
17
 As per 6 February 2013: Austria, Belgium, Egypt, Japan, Suriname, Armenia, the Holy See, Kyrgyzstan, Leb-
anon, the Republic of Moldova, and Uzbekistan. 
18
 For the list of member states, cf. http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
19
 Egypt, Morocco, Seychelles, and South Africa. 
20
 Article 1(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
21
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internatio-
nalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1265. 
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type of proceedings or the name of the authority before which the proceedings are pending.
22 
Accordingly, proceedings for the collection of debts as well as bankruptcy proceedings are, 
amongst others, covered by the Convention, provided they include private law claims.
23
 By 
contrast, tax or expropriation proceedings, for instance, do not fall within the scope of the 
Hague Evidence Convention, even if the relevant matters were, according to the laws of the 
requesting state, to be decided by a civil court.
24
  
Whether the term “civil or commercial matters” is to be interpreted according to the law of the 
requesting state, or the law of the requested state, or the laws of both states cumulatively, is 
controversial. To date, the Swiss Federal Court has left this question open.
25
 It appears that, in 
practice, the qualification based on the law of the requested state prevails.
26
 As a consequence, 
the interpretation of “civil or commercial matters” in the requested state may differ from that 
in the requesting state, which may result in the refusal by the requested state to execute a re-
quest for judicial assistance. To avoid such dismissal, and to achieve a more uniform applica-
tion of the Convention amongst the contracting states, the term of “civil or commercial mat-
                                                     
22
 See, amongst others, Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im 
Bereich der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1266; 
Nobel P ʻDie Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen im Lichte der Ratifikation der Haager Konvention von 1970 über die 
Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 1995 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- 
und Finanzmarktrecht 75; Volken P ʻVor Art. 11ʼ in Girsberger A et al (eds) Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG 
2004 147 n. 50; Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 94 n. 98; Markus AR ʻNeue Ent-
wicklungen bei der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 2002 Schweizerische Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 69; ZR 88 (1989) no. 23 consideration 8. 
23
 BGE 96 III 65 consideration 1; BGE 94 III 37 consideration 2; Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend 
Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssa-
chen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1266; Markus AR ʻNeue Entwicklungen bei der internationalen 
Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 2002 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarkt-
recht 69; Breitenmoser S ʻ§ 23 Internationale Amts- und Rechtshilfeʼ in Uebersax P et al (eds) Ausländer-
recht: Eine umfassende Darstellung der Rechtsstellung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern in der Schweiz – 
von A(syl) bis Z(ivilrecht) 2009 1222 n. 23.69. 
24
 Volken P ʻVor Art. 11ʼ in Girsberger A et al (eds) Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG 2004 147 n. 49; Nobel P 
ʻDie Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen im Lichte der Ratifikation der Haager Konvention von 1970 über die Beweis-
aufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 1995 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Fi-
nanzmarktrecht 75; VPB 49 (1985) no.16 79 et seq. See also Geiger R ʻLegal Assistance between States in 
Civil Mattersʼ in Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Volume III 194. 
25
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internatio-
nalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1266; Markus AR ʻNeue 
Entwicklungen bei der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 2002 Schweizerische Zeit-
schrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 70; Nobel P ʻDie Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen im Lichte der Rati-
fikation der Haager Konvention von 1970 über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 
1995 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 75. 
26
 Markus AR ʻNeue Entwicklungen bei der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 2002 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 70 with further references; Breitenmoser S 
ʻ§ 23 Internationale Amts- und Rechtshilfeʼ in Uebersax P et al (eds) Ausländerrecht: Eine umfassende Dar-
stellung der Rechtsstellung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern in der Schweiz – von A(syl) bis Z(ivilrecht) 
2009 1221 n. 23.67. 
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ters” should be interpreted autonomously.27 In this context, the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law stated the following:
28
 
“a The Commission considered it desirable that the words ‘civil or commer-
cial matters’ should be interpreted in an autonomous manner, without ref-
erence exclusively either to the law of the requesting State or to the law of 
the requested State, or to both laws cumulatively. 
b In the ‘grey area’ between private and public law, the historical evolution 
would suggest the possibility of a more liberal interpretation of these 
words. In particular, it was accepted that matters such as bankruptcy, in-
surance and employment might fall within the scope of this concept. 
c In contrast, other matters considered by most of the States to fall within 
public law, for example tax matters, would not yet seem to be covered by 
the Conventions as a result of this evolution. (...).” 
Among the contracting states, it is disputed whether or not the Hague Evidence Convention has 
mandatory character. In this context, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law formulated the following question: “Must a State Party have recourse 
to the Convention on each occasion that it intends to take evidence that is located in another 
State Party?”.29 The answer to this question is of importance with regard to a transfer of for-
eign evidence in cases where both the state of the trial court and the state, where the evidence 
is originally located, are members of the Hague Evidence Convention.
30
 In the case of the ex-
clusive character of the Convention, a contracting state that orders a witness residing in another 
contracting state to transfer evidence without the assistance of the latter state would violate the 
Hague Evidence Convention. As a result, the relevant evidence could only be obtained with the 
                                                     
27
 Cf. also Nobel P ʻDie Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen im Lichte der Ratifikation der Haager Konvention von 1970 
über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 1995 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirt-
schafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 75; Markus AR ʻNeue Entwicklungen bei der internationalen Rechtshilfe in 
Zivil- und Handelssachenʼ 2002 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht 70. 
28
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Report on the Work of the Special 
Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (April 1989) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/scrpt89e_20.pdf 7 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
29
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law The Mandatory/Non-mandatory 
Character of the Evidence Convention (December 2008) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd10e.pdf 3 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). 
30
 Cf. Stadler A ʻGrenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahmen in der Europäischen Union – die Zukunft der Rechts-
hilfe in Beweissachenʼ in Schütze RA (ed) Einheit und Vielfalt des Rechts: Festschrift für Reinhold Geimer 
zum 65. Geburtstag 2002 1282. With regard to the transfer of foreign evidence, see Chapter 3. 
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permission of the state where the evidence is located and pursuant to the methods stipulated in 
the Convention.
31
 
While contracting states following the civil-law tradition advocate the mandatory nature of the 
Hague Evidence Convention,
32
 most common-law countries reject the exclusive character of 
the Convention.
33
 This difference in opinion has a lengthy history and culminated in the 1980s 
in the so-called “Justizkonflikt”, literally “justice conflict”, or, in this instance, jurisdiction 
conflict, between the United States and several European civil-law countries following the so-
called Aerospatiale-case.
34
 In this decision, the American court ruled that where a foreign liti-
gant is involved in proceedings pending before a court in the United States, such court is al-
lowed to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in enforcing a request for evidence and has 
not necessarily to abide by the judicial assistance route stipulated by the Hague Evidence Con-
vention.
35
 Like the vast majority of the civil-law countries, Switzerland considers the nature of 
                                                     
31
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law The Mandatory/Non-mandatory 
Character of the Evidence Convention (December 2008) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd10e.pdf 3 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). 
32
 Amongst others, most of the member states of the European Community. In 2008, the Permanent Bureau of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law invited states parties to express their view on whether the 
Hague Evidence Convention has mandatory or non-mandatory character. For the relevant questionnaire, see 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating 
to the Hague Convention of 19 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(Evidence Convention) (May 2008) 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=4298&dtid=33 (date of use: 31 January 
2013). For the summary of responses to this questionnaire, see Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law Summary of Responses to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Evidence 
Convention, with Analytical Comments (Summary and Analysis Document) (January 2009) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd13e.pdf 24 et seq. (date of use: 31 January 2013). With regard to 
Switzerland, see Switzerland Response of Switzerland to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague 
Convention of 19 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (undated) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008switzerland20.pdf 19 (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
33
 Amongst others, the United States and Australia. Cf. Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law Summary of Responses to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Evidence Conven-
tion, with Analytical Comments (Summary and Analysis Document) (January 2009) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd13e.pdf 24 et seq. (date of use: 31 January 2013). With regard to the 
position taken by South Africa, see para. III.B.1 below. Cf. also Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law The Mandatory/Non-mandatory Character of the Evidence Convention (Decem-
ber 2008) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd10e.pdf 3 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
34
 Sociėtė Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale et al. v United District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522 (1987). Cf. ʻSupreme Court Decision in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale et al. v. United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (Hague Evidence Convention; Extraterritorial Discovery 
in U.S. Courts) ʼ 1987 International Legal Materials 1021-1044. 
35
 Albrecht CJC and Bühler CB ʻSwitzerlandʼ in Campbell D and Cotter S (eds) Serving process and obtaining 
evidence abroad 1998 434. The view of the court of first instance was shared by the Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme Court also rejected the mandatory character of the Hague Evidence Convention. It stated, amongst 
other things, that the “treaty may be viewed as an undertaking amongst sovereigns to facilitate discovery to 
which an American court should resort when it deems that course of action appropriate, after considering the 
situation of the parties before it as well as the interests of the concerned foreign states”, ʻSupreme Court De-
cision in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale et al. v. United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa (Hague Evidence Convention; Extraterritorial Discovery in U.S. Courts) ʼ 1987 International Le-
gal Materials 1027. For more on the “Justizkonflikt” , see, amongst others, Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum 
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the Hague Evidence Convention as mandatory. As a consequence, when ratifying the Conven-
tion in 1995, Switzerland submitted a declaration to Article 1 of the Convention wherein it ex-
pressly stated the Convention’s exclusivity.36 In contrast, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law has not taken a view on the question at hand, but 
merely encourages the contracting states to resolve the issue.
37
 
3. Forms of Evidence-taking under the Hague Evidence Convention 
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence can be obtained in three different ways, 
namely by means of a letter of request, through commissioners, or via diplomatic officers or 
consular agents. As has been mentioned earlier,
38
 evidence-taking by letter of request consti-
tutes, from the perspective of the requested state, active judicial assistance, while the gathering 
of evidence through commissioners, diplomatic officers and consular agents is to be qualified 
as passive judicial assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b 
Eʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte 
und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 12 n. 23 et seqq.; Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkom-
mens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für U.S.-amerikanische Zivilpro-
zesse 1999 46 et seqq.; Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 99 n. 112 et seqq.; Swiss 
Federal Council Botschaft betreffend Genehmigung von vier Übereinkommen im Bereich der internationalen 
Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 1993 1281 et seqq.; Jagmetti Greiner M 
ʻNeuerungen im internationalen Rechtshilfeverkehr der Schweizʼ 1996 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 
195 et seqq.; Schlosser P EU-Zivilprozessrecht: EuGVVO, AVAG, VTVO MahnVO, BagatellVO, HZÜ, EuZ-
VO, HBÜ, EuBVO 2009 473 n. 1 et seqq. See also Rogers JM ‘On the Exclusivity of the Hague Evidence 
Conventionʼ in 1985-1986 Texas International Law Journal 441 et seqq. 
36
 The wording of this declaration is as follows: “With regard to Article 1, Switzerland takes the view that the 
Convention applies exclusively to the Contracting States. Moreover, regarding the conclusions of the Special 
Commission which met in The Hague in April 1989, Switzerland believes that, whatever the opinion of the 
Contracting States on the exclusive application of the Convention, priority should in any event be given to the 
procedures provided for in the Convention regarding requests for the taking of evidence abroad.” For the text 
of this declaration, cf. http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn (date of 
use: 31 January 2013). See also Swiss Federal Council Botschaft betreffend Genehmigung von vier Überein-
kommen im Bereich der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen vom 8. September 1993 BBl 
1993 1282, 1292 et seq., 1301 et seq.; Switzerland ʻBrief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitionersʼ 1986 International Legal Materials 1551 et seqq. See, however, Müller-Chen M ʻAus 
dem US-amerikanischen Discovery-Verfahren gewonnene Beweise im internationalen Zivilprozess- und 
Schiedsrecht in der Schweizʼ in Gauch P, Werro F and Pichonnaz P (eds) Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre 
Tercier 2008 941, who rejects the mandatory character of the Hague Evidence Convention and refers to Arti-
cle 27(c) of the said Convention, which stipulates that its provisions shall not prevent a contracting state from 
permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in the Con-
vention. 
37
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law The Mandatory/Non-mandatory 
Character of the Evidence Convention (December 2008) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd10e.pdf 7, 
15 (date of use: 31 January 2013). See also Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 
Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (February 2009) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jac_concl_e.pdf 9 no. 53 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
38
 See above Chapter 2 para. V.D.1. 
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Given the foregoing differentiation, the following two subchapters distinguish between the tak-
ing of evidence based on a letter of request on the one hand, and that by means of commission-
ers, diplomatic officers and consular agents on the other. They elaborate on the content of a 
request for judicial assistance, the transmission of such request, its examination and execution, 
and the applicable law governing the execution of the request. Finally, the relation between a 
letter of request and pre-trial discovery procedure is addressed.  
a) Letter of Request under Chapter 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention 
Article 3 of the Hague Evidence Convention specifies the minimum content of a letter of re-
quest. Accordingly, such request must, amongst other things, specify the evidence to be ob-
tained, as well as the witness to be questioned. With regard to the latter, it also has to include 
the relevant questions or a statement of the subject matter about which the person is to be ex-
amined. Where the production of documents is sought, the request must identify them.
39
 These 
requirements shall ensure that the request is sufficiently specified and is not used for the pur-
pose of so-called “fishing expeditions”.40 It is crucial to provide the foreign authority, which 
examines the witness, with all the facts that are necessary for the questioning. From the per-
spective of the trial court, it is thus advisable not only to furnish the foreign authority, as stipu-
lated in Article 3(1)(f) of the Hague Evidence Convention with either the questions or a state-
ment of the subject matter, but with both cumulatively.  
A special commission of the Hague Conference on International Private Law developed a 
model form for a letter of request, the use of which, however, is not mandatory.
41
 In Switzer-
land, the Federal Office of Justice published its own model form which is preferably used 
when dealing with Swiss authorities.
42
 
                                                     
39
 Article 3(1)(d)-(g) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
40
 Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- 
und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b E ʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales 
Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 20 n. 40. For more on fishing expeditions, 
see the comments below regarding Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
41
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and 
Access to Justice Conventions (February 2009) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jac_concl_e.pdf 9 no. 54 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). For the model form, see http://www.hcch.net/upload/actform20e.pdf (date of 
use: 31 January 2013). See also Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters 
Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 2005) 
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 25 (date of use: 31 January 
2013). 
42
 For the model form, see Muster eines internationalen Rechtshilfeersuches in Zivilsachen gemäss HBewUe 70 
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/rhf/de/home/rhf/muster.html (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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Letters of request have to be drafted “in the language of the authority requested to execute or 
be accompanied by a translation into that language”.43 Requests addressed to Swiss authori-
ties must be in German or French or Italian, or accompanied by a translation into one of these 
languages, depending on the part of Switzerland in which the requests are to be executed.
44
 
Consequently, letters of requests in English are not accepted in Switzerland. 
Under Swiss law, letters of requests have to be issued by a judicial authority and not by a pri-
vate individual.
45
 This particularly applies in cases where evidence located in Switzerland has 
to be obtained for use in civil proceedings abroad where the evidence-taking is controlled by 
the parties. From the perspective of the litigant bearing the burden of proof, it is thus crucial 
that it is the trial court that issues the letter of request. 
The requesting state has to transmit the letter of request via the so-called “Central Authority” 
of the requested state designated by the latter when ratifying the Convention.
46
 Due to the fact 
that Switzerland is a federal republic consisting of 26 cantons,
47
 Switzerland appointed 26 cen-
tral authorities, that is, one central authority for each canton.
48
 A letter of request has thus to be 
lodged with the central authority of the canton where the evidence to be obtained is located. 
Where the means of proof are situated in different cantons, a separate request for each canton 
has to be sent to the respective central authority. A letter of request, however, can also be 
lodged with the Federal Office of Justice
49
 which forwards it to the competent central authori-
                                                     
43
 Article 4(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
44
 Article 4(3)-(4) of the Hague Evidence Convention read in conjunction with the “Declaration of Switzerland 
second and third paragraphs”. For the wording of this declaration, see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn (date of use: 31 January 
2013). 
45
 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 107 n. 138; Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum 
Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b 
Eʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte 
und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 16 n. 32; Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil 
Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 2005) 
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 24 (date of use: 31 January 
2013). See also Article 2(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention which expressly mentions “Letters of Request 
coming from a judicial authority of another Contracting State”. 
46
 Article 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention read in conjunction with Article 35(1) of the Hague Evidence 
Convention. 
47
 23 cantons and six half-cantons. 
48
 See Article 24(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention read in conjunction with Switzerland Declaration Re 
Articles 2 and 24 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn (date of use: 
31 January 2013). For a list of central authorities in Switzerland under Article 2 of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, see http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=523 (date of use: 31 January 
2013) as well as http://www.rhf.admin.ch/rhf/de/home/zivil/behoerden/zentral.html (date of use: 31 January 
2013). In the vast majority of cantons, the court of second instance (“Obergericht”, “Kantonsgericht”, “tri-
bunal cantonal”, “tribunale di appello”) acts as central authority. 
49
 Article 24(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention read in conjunction with Switzerland Declaration Re Articles 
2 and 24 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn (date of use: 31 Jan-
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ty.
50
 From the perspective of the requesting state, such submission makes particular sense 
where evidence to be obtained in Switzerland is located in more than one canton.
51
 Where the 
letter of request is addressed to the wrong authority, the latter has to forward it to the compe-
tent authority.
52
 Requests of Swiss courts to obtain evidence in another contracting state do not 
have to be transmitted via the cantonal central authority, but can be sent directly to the central 
authority of the requested foreign state.
53
 
On receipt of the letter of request, the competent central authority examines the formal and 
substantive requirements of the request.
54
 Where the central authority regards the request as 
non-compliant with the rules stipulated in the Hague Evidence Convention, it will notify the 
requesting state specifying the objections to the letter of request.
55
 A letter of request may be 
refused where the lawsuit underlying the request is not civil or commercial in nature,
56
 where it 
does not fulfil formal requirements,
57
 if it is not drafted in the proper language, or if it does not 
include the required translation.
58
 In addition, a request may be rejected in cases where its au-
thenticity is unclear, where the execution of the request is not within the jurisdiction of the ju-
diciary,
59
 where the requested state considers that its sovereignty or security would be preju-
diced,
60
 or where the requested method of execution of the request is contrary to the law of the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
uary 2013). See also Jagmetti Greiner M ʻNeuerungen im internationalen Rechtshilfeverkehr der Schweizʼ 
1996 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 192 et seq. 
50
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 24 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); BGE 129 III 110 consideration 1.2.2. 
51
 Jagmetti Greiner M ʻNeuerungen im internationalen Rechtshilfeverkehr der Schweizʼ 1996 Zeitschrift für Zi-
vilprozeß International 193. 
52
 Article 6 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
53
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 24 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 107 n. 137. 
54
 See in this regard Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im 
Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b Eʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I 
(eds) Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 20 n. 40 et seqq. 
55
 Cf. Article 5 of the Hague Evidence Convention. See also Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum Haager Überein-
kommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b Eʼ in Walter G, 
Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterun-
gen Band 2 1999 22 n. 47. 
56
 See para. II.B.2 above. 
57
 Cf. Article 3 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
58
 See Article 4 of the Hague Evidence Convention.  
59
 Cf. Article 12(1)(a) of the Hague Evidence Convention. This may, for instance, be the case where an amount 
of money has to be collected in Switzerland, and the litigant has to act by way of forcible execution, Federal 
Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in Ju-
ly 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 28 (date of use: 31 
January 2013). 
60
 See Article 12(1)(b) of the Hague Evidence Convention. Swiss sovereignty may, for example, be violated 
where the court abroad ordered the use of compulsion in Switzerland, Federal Office of Justice International 
Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 2005) 
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requested state.
61
 Where a letter of request does not comply with formal or language require-
ments, the central authority should, before refusing the request, ask the requesting authority to 
rectify the request. The same holds true where the requested form of execution contravenes the 
law of the requested state. Here, the central authority should enquire whether the requesting 
state accepts the execution of the request carried out according to the rules of the requested 
state.
62
 
The examination of the letter of request by the central authority under Article 5 of the Hague 
Evidence Convention is of merely summary nature. In other words, the authority to which the 
central authority forwards the request for execution may again examine the request and refuse 
to execute the latter, if it considers the request as non-compliant with the Convention.
63
 In 
Switzerland, the execution of a letter of request is carried out by the competent court of the 
canton in which the evidence is located. It is for each canton to designate the competent court, 
usually the single judge of the court of first instance.
64
 
At the request of the requesting state, the requested state lets the former know of the time and 
the venue where the proceedings for the taking of evidence will take place.
65
 Given the prior 
authorisation of the competent central authority, members of the trial court may be present at 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 28 (date of use: 31 January 
2013). The security of Switzerland may, amongst others, be affected where the evidence to be obtained in-
cludes secret information on military installations in Switzerland.  
61
 See Article 9(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention. Cf. also Federal Office of Justice International Judicial 
Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 2005) 
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 28 (date of use: 31 January 
2013); Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 108 n. 140 et seqq., 110 n. 148 et seqq.; 
Amram PW Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention (1970) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl20e.pdf 9 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
62
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 28 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013). See also Article 9(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
63
 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 109 n. 142; Meier AL Die Anwendung des Haa-
ger Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für U.S.-
amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 157 et seqq.; BGE 129 III 111 consideration 1.2.3. See, however, Walther 
FMR ʻErläuterungen zum Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Han-
delssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b Eʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- 
und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 22 n. 46, who maintains that the decision of the 
central authority that the request fulfills the formal and substantive requirements is binding for the judicial au-
thority competent to execute the request. 
64
 In the Canton of Zurich, for example, the so-called “Einzelrichter” (literally “single judge”), § 31 of the Law 
on Organisation of Courts and Authorities in Civil and Penal Proceedings of 10 May 2010 (LS 211.1) (“Gesetz 
über die Gerichts- und Behördenorganisation im Zivil- und Strafprozess (GOG)”), 
http://www2.zhlex.zh.ch/appl/zhlex_r.nsf/0/C9C6078FD1A80A6EC12577E1004794E5/$file/211.1_10.5.10_7
1.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
65
 Article 7 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
 137 
 
the execution of the letter of request.
66
 Once the request is executed by the competent authority 
of the requested state, such authority transmits the documents establishing the request’s execu-
tion to the requesting authority by the same channel that was used by the latter.
67
 
With regard to evidence-taking by videolink, a special commission of the Permanent Bureau of 
the Hague Conference on International Private Law concluded that such method is consistent 
with the framework of the Hague Evidence Convention.
68
 Consequently, a letter of request can 
be executed by videoconference, provided the law of the requested state allows videolink evi-
dence. According to the Federal Office of Justice in Switzerland, courts abroad, as well as for-
eign litigants and their counsel may participate by videoconference at a hearing of a witness 
located in Switzerland, provided the Swiss judge conducts the examination and is the only per-
son who applies coercive measures.
69
 Again, such participation requires the prior authorisation 
of the relevant cantonal central authority.
70
  
The execution of a letter of request is usually governed by the lex fori,
71
 that is, in Switzerland  
                                                     
66
 Article 8 of the Hague Evidence Convention. Cf. also Switzerland Declaration Re Article 8 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn (date of use: 31 January 
2013). For a list of the competent Swiss authorities under Article 8 of the Hague Evidence Convention, cf. 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=782 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
67
 Article 13(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. See also Article 13(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention for 
cases where a request was not executed. According to the Federal Office of Justice in Response of Switzerland 
to the Questionnaire Relating to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence in Civil 
or Commercial Matters (8 October 2003) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_20ch.pdf 2 no. 8 (date of use: 
31 January 2013), letters of request in Switzerland are usually executed within one to three months. 
68
 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law The Taking of Evidence by Videolink 
Under the Hague Evidence Convention (December 2008) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008pd06e.pdf 11 
no. 1 (date of use: 31 January 2013). According to the special commission, the taking of evidence by videolink 
raises a few new questions regarding the interaction of the law of the requested state and the law of the loca-
tion of the participants to the videoconference. In the opinion of the commission, such issues are to be solved 
based on the law of the requested state.  
69
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 36 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013). See also Federal Office of Justice Response of Switzerland to the Questionnaire Re-
lating to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(8 October 2003) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_20ch.pdf 3 no. 11 (date of use: 31 January 2013). For 
the relevant questionnaire, see Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Ques-
tionnaire Relating to the Hague Convention of 19 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (August 2003) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_pd04e.pdf (date of use: 31 January 
2013). Cf. also Chapter 2 paras. IV.B.2.a) and IV.B.2.c). 
70
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 
2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 28 (date of use: 31 Jan-
uary 2013). Cf. also Switzerland Response of Switzerland to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the 
Hague Convention of 19 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (un-
dated) http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008switzerland20.pdf 25 (date of use: 31 January 2013). Here, it was 
stated that a hearing by videolink always constitutes a “special method” under Article 9 of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention. For more on the taking of evidence by videolink, see Chapter 3 para. V.C.1. 
71
 Article 9(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention.  
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by the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.
72
 This particularly holds true for measures of compulsion 
to be applied on Swiss soil.
73
 Where, however, the requesting state asks for the application of 
its own law, the requested state applies such law, unless it is incompatible with its own rules, 
or where the application of that law is impossible due to practical difficulties.
74
 With regard to 
“incompatible”, Amram stated the following:75 
“To be ‘incompatible’ with the internal law of the State of execution does not 
mean ‘different’ from the internal law. It means that there must be some constitu-
tional inhibition or some absolute statutory prohibition. No Civil Law delegation 
suggested that his country had constitutional or statutory provisions which would 
prevent the examination of witnesses and the preparation of the transcript of the 
testimony ‘Common Law style’.” 
The same applies with regard to “impossible”. According to Amram: 
“It is not sufficient for the foreign practice to be ‘difficult’ to administer or ‘in-
convenient’; compliance must be truly ‘impossible’.” 
Under Swiss law, the cross-examination of a witness residing in Switzerland is, for instance, 
admissible, provided the Swiss judge remains in control of the interrogation.
76
 In this context, 
it has to be kept in mind that the application of the law of the requesting state instead of the lex 
fori shall prevent the evidence obtained through international judicial assistance from being of 
merely limited probative value, or even being inadmissible in the proceedings before the trial 
court.
77
  
In the sense of a most-favoured-nation clause, the witness requested to give evidence may not 
only invoke the privileges under the law of the requested state, but also those of the requesting 
                                                     
72
 Since 1 January 2011, Switzerland has uniform rules on civil procedure which apply to all 26 cantons includ-
ing half-cantons. Before 2011, each canton had its own civil procedure law. See also Article 11(1) of the Swiss 
Private International Law Act of 18 December 1987, SR 291; “Bundesgesetz über das Internationale 
Privatrecht (IPRG)”). According to this provision. Swiss authorities apply Swiss law when rendering interna-
tional judicial assistance. 
73
 Article 10(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
74
 Article 9(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention. See also Article 3(1)(i) of the Hague Evidence Convention 
which provides that a letter of request shall specify any special method or procedure to be followed under Ar-
ticle 9 of the said Convention. 
75
 Amram PW Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention (1970) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl20e.pdf 11 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
76
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 27 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); Walther FMR ʻErläuterungen zum Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisauf-
nahme im Ausland in Zivil- und Handelssachen (HBÜ), no. 61 b Eʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and 
Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterungen Band 2 1999 27 n. 
56.  
77
 See in this regard, Chapter 2 para. V.D.4. 
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state.
78
 In the second case, the privileges have to be specified in the letter of request, or they 
must be otherwise confirmed by the requesting state.
79
 The privileges, however, may be 
claimed not only by the requesting state, but also by the relevant witness.
80
  
As a general rule, the requested state cannot charge any costs for the execution of a letter of 
request. In cases, however, where fees for experts and/or interpreters incur, the requested state 
may claim compensation for such expenses. The same applies to costs occasioned by the use of 
a special procedure requested by the requesting state under Article 9(2) of the Hague Evidence 
Convention.
81
 
According to Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention, a contracting state may declare 
“that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discov-
ery of documents as known in Common Law countries”. Ratio legis of this provision is to pre-
vent so-called “fishing expeditions”, that is, unspecified requests for the production of docu-
ments as known in the process of collecting evidence in the United States. To put it differently, 
the said provision protects the requested states and foreign witnesses against the unlimited 
search for or discovery of documents.
82
 Having said this, discovery proceedings, which require 
specified requests for the production of documents, do not fall under the said provision. 
In contrast to American law, not only the laws of countries sharing the civil-law tradition, in-
cluding Switzerland, but also common-law countries, such as England, South Africa, Botswa-
na, Namibia,
83
 Nigeria, and Uganda, stipulate stricter requirements for the specification of facts 
                                                     
78
 Article 11(1) of the Hague Evidence Convention. A declaration as stipulated by Article 11(2) of the Hague 
Evidence Convention has not been given by Switzerland. For more on the right of witnesses to refuse to give 
evidence in Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, see Chapter 5 paras. II.B.3, 
II.C.2, III.A.2, IV.A.2, V.A.2, VI.A.2, and VII.A.2. 
79
 Cf. Articles 3(2) and 11(1)(b) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
80
 Amram PW Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention (1970) 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl20e.pdf 14 (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
81
 For instance where a civil-law judge had to appoint a commissioner who chairs the cross-examination of a 
witness. Cf. Article 14(1)-(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention.  
82
 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 134 n. 213 et seqq.; Meier AL Die Anwendung 
des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in der Schweiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufname für 
U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozesse 1999 134 et seqq.; Beckmann R ʻDas Haager Beweisübereinkommen und 
seine Bedeutung für die Pre-Tiral Discoveryʼ 1990 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 
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and evidence in civil litigation and do not allow “fishing expeditions”.84 Under Swiss law, liti-
gants have, inter alia, to specify the documents proffered in their pleadings as evidence by in-
dicating the type and content of the documents. Whether the date of the document, its actual 
content, or the individual who drafted the document has to be indicated depends on the facts of 
the particular case. In any event, the person from whom the document is requested must be in a 
position to determine which document is required.
85
 
In the light of the above, Switzerland has made a declaration relating to Article 23 of the Hague 
Evidence Convention.
86
 This declaration requires a letter of request to specify clearly the doc-
uments to be obtained from the witness in Switzerland, and the purpose for which the docu-
ments are requested. Letters of request, which have no direct and necessary link with the pro-
ceedings pending before the trial court and/or that require the witness to produce documents 
other than those mentioned in the request, will not be executed by the Swiss authorities. This 
holds particularly true for requests wherein the witness is asked to indicate what documents 
relating to the case are or were under his control.
87
 Having said this, Swiss authorities do not 
generally refuse the execution of letters of request relating to pre-trial discovery proceedings, 
but only requests that do not specify the documents to be produced and the purpose for such 
production.
88
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b) Application under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention 
Unlike in the case of a letter of request,
89 the Hague Evidence Convention does not include a 
provision that deals particularly with the content of an application under its Chapter 2 to obtain 
evidence through a diplomatic officer, consular agent, or commissioner. Only Article 21(b)-(c) 
of the Convention contains some requirements as to the application’s content.90 In Switzerland, 
the Federal Office of Justice published a list regarding the requirements for content of an appli-
cation under Chapter 2 of the Convention. Such list, includes, amongst other things, a brief de-
scription of the nature and subject matter of the proceedings, the name and addresses of the 
persons involved, the form of the intended procedural formalities, as well as a date for the re-
quested taking of evidence.
91
 Where the evidence is to be taken through a commissioner,
92
 the 
decision of the trial court appointing the commissioner has to be attached to the application.
93
 
Neither the Hague Conference on Private International Law nor the competent Swiss authority 
developed a model form for an application under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion. Unless the witness domiciled in Switzerland is a national of the requesting state, the ap-
plication must be drafted in German, French, or Italian, depending on the part of Switzerland in 
which the application is to be executed, or it has to be accompanied by a translation into one of 
these languages.94 
An application for the taking of evidence under Chapter 2 has to be transmitted via the compe-
tent cantonal central authority. The Federal Office of Justice recommends that, before sending 
such an application, written confirmation is requested from the witness residing in Switzerland 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Hague Conference on Private International Law Report on the Work of the Special Commission of May 1985 
on the Operation of the Convention (September 1986) http://www.hcch.net/upload/scrpt85e_20.pdf 6 et seq. 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). 
89
 See Article 3 of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
90
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latter is not compelled to appear before the foreign authority or to give evidence. 
91
 Federal Office of Justice Conditions for a Commissioner or Diplomatic or Consular Officer to Obtain Evi-
dence in Switzerland (June 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0048.File.tmp/mb-a17-
e.pdf 1 et seq. (date of use: 31 January 2013); Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in 
Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last updated in July 2005) 
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 Article 17 of the Evidence Convention.  
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 Article 21(b) of the Hague Evidence Convention. See in this regard also Switzerland Declaration Re Article 4 
second and third paragraphs http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=561&disp=resdn 
(date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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asserting that “it is aware that it is cooperating of its own accord, that it knows it cannot be 
subjected to any coercive measures, that it cannot be forced to participate or to appear and 
that it has the right to invoke an exemption or a prohibition to give evidence provided for by 
the law of the State addressed or of the State of origin”.95 This is in order to avoid unnecessary 
applications in cases where the witness is not willing to collaborate.96 Switzerland has not 
made a declaration as stipulated in Article 18(1) of the said Convention. Consequently, a wit-
ness residing in Switzerland cannot be compelled to cooperate with diplomatic officers, consu-
lar agents, or commissioners. 
Where evidence in Switzerland is to be taken under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, a prior authorisation by the Federal Office of Justice is required.97 In order to expedite the 
process, it is advisable not only to transmit the application to the competent cantonal authority 
but, at the same time, to send a copy to the Federal Office of Justice.98 Applications under 
Chapter 2 do not have to be filed by a judicial authority. Here, it is sufficient for the application 
to be submitted by a litigant or his counsel, provided a power of attorney from the litigant or an 
authorisation by the trial court is attached.99 
The foregoing comments on the examination of a letter of request apply mutatis mutandis to 
applications under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention.
100
 However, one has to bear 
in mind that, unlike in the case of a letter of request, the application at hand also requires the 
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2013). 
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authorisation of the Federal Office of Justice. Once the competent cantonal central authority 
has examined the application, it forwards it to the Federal Office of Justice, thereby indicating 
whether or not it supports the application and, if so, whether certain accompanying conditions 
have to be taken.
101
 Where the requirements of Article 21(b)-(c) of the Convention are met, the 
authorisation by the Federal Office of Justice is granted, provided an advance on procedural 
costs is paid by the litigant requesting the evidence-taking on Swiss soil.
102
 As the Federal Of-
fice of Justice has to give notice of its decision on the granting of the authorisation, and such 
decision has usually to be served abroad by means of international judicial assistance, the ap-
plicant is advised to nominate a domicile in Switzerland for the purpose of such notification.
103
 
Where an application under Chapter 2 of the Convention has not been granted by the relevant 
Swiss authorities, the requesting state may seek the taking of evidence in Switzerland through a 
letter of request.
104
 
Unlike in the case of a letter of request, it is not a Swiss court that takes the evidence in Swit-
zerland, but a diplomatic officer, consular agent, or commissioner. In the absence of any condi-
tions laid down in accordance with Article 19 of the Hague Evidence Convention, neither the 
competent cantonal central authority, nor the Federal Office of Justice is involved in the execu-
tion of the application. It is also the diplomatic officer, consular agent, or commissioner who, 
again without the assistance of any Swiss authority, transmits the results of the evidence-taking 
to the requesting state. 
Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention includes two methods for the taking of evidence 
abroad, on the one hand, the evidence-taking by a diplomatic officer or consular agent, and, on 
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the other, that through a commissioner. A diplomatic officer or consular agent representing the 
requesting state in Switzerland may on Swiss soil, within the area where he exercises his dip-
lomatic or consular functions, take the evidence of nationals of the requesting state, of Switzer-
land, or a third state in aid of proceedings pending in the requesting state, provided the Federal 
Office of Justice has given its prior authorisation.
105
 
By contrast Article 17 of the Hague Evidence Convention on evidence-taking through commis-
sioners does not distinguish between witnesses having the nationality of the requesting state 
and those having another nationality. In practice, the individual acting as commissioner is usu-
ally nominated by the trial court. In the absence of such an appointment, however, it is possible 
that the commissioner is nominated by the relevant cantonal central authority.
106
 In Switzer-
land, commissioners appointed under Article 17 of the Hague Evidence Convention are mostly 
common-law counsel who take evidence for the benefit of civil proceedings pending in a 
common-law country.
107
 Trial courts in countries following the civil-law tradition prefer, as 
mentioned earlier,
108
 to obtain foreign evidence by means of letters of request. 
When executing an application under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention, the diplo-
matic officer, consular agent, or commissioner applies the law of the requesting state, provided 
the manner stipulated by such law is not contradictory to the permission of the competent cen-
tral authority or the Federal Office of Justice and is not forbidden by the law of the requested 
state. This particularly holds true for the kinds of evidence such person may take.
109
 A diplo-
matic officer, consular agent, or commissioner, however, is not allowed to use any coercive 
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measures in Switzerland, nor can he apply to any Swiss authority for assistance to obtain evi-
dence by compulsion.
110
 As a consequence, evidence located in Switzerland can only be taken 
based on Articles 15-17 of the Hague Evidence Convention, if the witness voluntarily cooper-
ates. In Switzerland, the cross-examination of a witness on Swiss soil by the counsel of the liti-
gants for the benefit of foreign proceedings is regarded as compatible with Swiss law. In this 
context, the Federal Office of Justice suggests two approaches. On the one hand, the appoint-
ment of a sole commissioner who chairs the evidence-taking and ensures that the examination 
by the litigants’ counsel is carried out in accordance with Swiss law (that is, no coercive 
measures, and reminder of exemptions or of any prohibition from giving evidence), and, on the 
other, the nomination of each party’s counsel as commissioner. While in the first case, only 
one authorisation is granted by the Federal Office of Justice, permission is given to each coun-
sel in the second case.
111
  
As in the case of a letter of request, a witness examined under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention may invoke the privilege to refuse to give evidence under the law of the re-
quested state, as well as that of the requesting state.
112
 
C. Taking of Evidence based on the Hague Procedure Convention 
1. Scope of the Hague Procedure Convention 
Like the Hague Evidence Convention, the Hague Procedure Convention applies to “civil or 
commercial matters”.113 As has been mentioned earlier, the Hague Evidence Convention was 
intended to renew the provisions of the Hague Procedure Convention on evidence-taking in 
civil and commercial matters and was therefore based on the Hague Procedure Convention.
114
 
With regard to both conventions, the notion of “civil or commercial matters” should therefore 
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114
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be interpreted in the same manner. The comments on “civil or commercial matters” made in 
the context of the Hague Evidence Convention thus apply here accordingly.
115
 
Compared to the Hague Evidence Convention, the Hague Procedure Convention only provides 
for one method for the taking of evidence, namely by means of letter of request. 
2. Taking of Evidence based on a Letter of Request 
The Hague Procedure Convention does not contain any provisions specifying the (minimum) 
content of a letter of request. In Switzerland, the Federal Office of Justice published a model 
form of a letter of request under the Hague Procedure Convention which is preferably used for 
requests to be executed on Swiss soil. According to this model form, the request should, 
amongst other things, contain information on the requesting judicial authority, the litigants, the 
subject matter of the lawsuit, and on the evidence to be obtained in Switzerland. In addition, 
the name and address of the witness to be examined, and the questions to be put to him should 
be included in the request, as well as any special method or procedure to be followed by the 
relevant Swiss authorities.
116
 A letter of request has to be written in the language of the canton 
where the evidence is located, or it must be accompanied by a certified translation into that 
language.
117
 
A letter of request must be issued by a judicial authority and not by a private individual.
118
 The 
requesting state sends the request to its consul in Switzerland, who then transmits it to the Fed-
eral Office of Justice which, in turn, forwards the request to the competent cantonal authori-
ty.
119
 This procedure also applies to a letter of request wherein a Swiss court asks for judicial 
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assistance from another contracting state. Accordingly, the trial court forwards the request to 
the Federal Office of Justice, which sends it to the consul representing Switzerland in the re-
quested state. The Swiss consul then transmits the request to the competent foreign authori-
ty.
120
 
The foregoing comments on the grounds for refusal of a request under Chapter 1 of the Hague 
Evidence Convention apply mutatis mutandis to a letter of request based on the Hague Proce-
dure Convention.
121
 If the authority, to which the letter of request was sent, is not competent to 
execute it, the request has to be automatically forwarded to the competent authority of the re-
quested state.
122
  
A letter of request may be executed either by the competent authority of the requested state, or 
by a diplomatic officer or consular agent of the requesting state.
123
 The latter, however, re-
quires the conclusion of a relevant agreement between the requesting and the requested state, 
or that the latter does not object to an execution through diplomatic officers or consular agents. 
To date, Switzerland has not entered into any such treaty and does not, as a general principle, 
accept the aforesaid individuals taking evidence on Swiss soil.
124
 Nationals of the requesting 
state, however, may voluntarily make declarations in the diplomatic or consular representations 
of the requesting state in Switzerland.
125
  
Under Swiss law, a letter of request is executed by the competent cantonal authority in whose 
jurisdiction the evidence to be taken is located, usually by a single judge of the court of first 
instance.
126
 
The competent authority of the requested state generally applies its own law when executing a 
letter of request. This holds particularly true for the use of compulsion.
127
 In Switzerland, the 
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http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
125
 VPB 49 (1985) no.16 91. 
126
 Article 14 of the Hague Procedure Convention. See also fn. 64 above. 
127
 Articles 14(1) and 11 of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
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court executes a letter of request in accordance with the rules of the Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code. When, however, asked by the requesting authority, the Swiss court may apply a special 
method or procedure stipulated by the law of the requesting state, provided such method is not 
contrary to the law of Switzerland.
128
 As a consequence, the cross-examination of a witness 
domiciled in Switzerland, or the evidence-taking by a commissioner appointed by the trial 
court of the requesting state is possible.
129
 
A witness residing in Switzerland can only invoke the privileges to refuse to give evidence as 
stipulated by Swiss law, unless a special method or procedure according to Article 14(2) of the 
Hague Procedure Convention applies.
130
 
As a general principle, the execution of a letter of request under the Hague Procedure Conven-
tion is free of charge. However, fees paid to witnesses or experts, and costs that are incurred 
because a witness did not appear voluntarily, have to be reimbursed by the requesting state. 
The same holds true for expenses arising from the application of a special method or procedure 
under Article 14(2) of the Hague Procedure Convention.
131
 
Compared to the Hague Procedure Convention, the Hague Evidence Convention provides gen-
uine improvements which considerably facilitate the taking of evidence by means of letters of 
request amongst the contracting states. These improvements include the transmission of letters 
of request via central authorities, the specification of the minimum content of a request, as well 
as the strengthening of the witness’ right to refuse to give evidence.132 In addition, the Hague 
Evidence Convention introduced a new form for obtaining evidence abroad, namely evidence-
taking by commissioners. This paved the way for countries following the common-law tradi-
tion to become members of the Hague Evidence Convention.
133
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 Article 14(2) of the Hague Procedure Convention. 
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 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 88 n. 80.  
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 For more on the rights to refuse to give evidence under the laws of Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Na-
mibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, see Chapter 5 paras. II.B.3, II.C.2, III.A.2, IV.A.2, V.A.2, VI.A.2, and VII.A.2. 
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 Article 16 of the Hague Procedure Convention. No reimbursement may occur where there are relevant bilateral 
treaties. See in this regard, Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 91 n. 89. 
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 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 92 n. 91. 
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 See also in this regard para. II.B.1 above. 
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D. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
1. General Remarks 
Where the Hague Procedure Convention or the Hague Evidence Convention applies, the taking 
of evidence between Switzerland and the respective contracting states is governed by the pro-
visions of such conventions. Accordingly, the request of a Swiss court to obtain evidence in 
another contracting state, as well as the request of the latter to take evidence in Switzerland, are 
governed by the same convention.  
The situation, however, is different where no convention applies and international judicial as-
sistance is, if at all, rendered on the basis of courtoisie internationale.
134
 Here, a distinct set of 
rules applies, depending on whether Switzerland acts as the requested or requesting state. In the 
first case, it is not only up to Switzerland to decide whether or not judicial assistance is grant-
ed, but it is also Switzerland that establishes the rules that govern the evidence-taking for pro-
ceedings pending abroad. By contrast, in the second configuration, where evidence is taken 
abroad for the benefit of a Swiss court, Switzerland, due to the concept of sovereignty, is not 
entitled to lay down the rules for evidence-taking on foreign territory. It is merely allowed to 
impose the rules which stipulate under which conditions a litigant in proceedings pending in 
Switzerland can make an application to the Swiss court to obtain evidence abroad. 
In the light of the above, the following comments deal first with requests emanating from a 
foreign state to obtain evidence on Swiss soil. In a second step, the case where a party in civil 
proceedings pending in Switzerland seeks evidence abroad is addressed. 
2. Obtaining Evidence in Switzerland for the Benefit of a Court Abroad 
With regard to requests for taking evidence in Switzerland of states that are neither a party to 
the Hague Procedure Convention, nor the Hague Evidence Convention, Swiss authorities apply 
the provisions of the Hague Procedure Convention by analogy.
135
 Switzerland thus merely 
grants active judicial assistance based on a letter of request. Accordingly, it is the single judge 
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 For more on courtoisie internationale, see Chapter 2 para. V.B.1. 
135
 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 35 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); VPB 49 (1985) no.16 80.  
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of the court that has jurisdiction over the area where the evidence is situated, who executes the 
request usually by applying the rules of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.
136
 
The Federal Office of Justice recommends the use of the same model form as in the case of a 
request under Articles 8-16 of the Hague Procedure Convention.
137
 The request has to be draft-
ed in the language of the requested authority and must be transmitted through consular chan-
nels.
138
 
Unlike in the case of Article 16 of the Hague Procedure Convention, all costs and expenses can 
be charged to the requesting state. In practice, however, Swiss authorities only claim compen-
sation if the amounts are substantial and the requesting state does not execute requests for judi-
cial assistance from Switzerland free of charge.
139
 
3. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of a Swiss Court 
Neither the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, nor any other act in Switzerland contains provisions 
which deal with the procedure to be followed, in case a litigant in civil proceedings pending 
before a Swiss court proffers foreign evidence.
140
 This holds particularly true for the conditions 
under which a Swiss court gives leave to a relevant request of a litigant.
141
  
Under Swiss law, witnesses give evidence viva voce before the court in the presence of the liti-
gants and their counsel.
142
 Depositions drafted by litigants or third parties are not suitable to 
prove the accuracy of the respective statements
143
 and can thus not replace the oral testimony 
of a witness.
144
 According to Article 152, read in conjunction with Article 150 of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code, each litigant has the right to expect that the court will admit any admis-
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 For the principles governing a letter of request under the Hague Procedure Convention, see para. II.C.2 above.  
137
 Regarding the model form, cf. http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0039.File.tmp/must-HUe54-
d.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
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(date of use: 31 January 2013).  
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 Federal Office of Justice International Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters Guidelines (3rd ed 2003; last up-
dated in July 2005) http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0064.File.tmp/wegl-ziv-e.pdf 36 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013); VPB 49 (1985) no.16 92. 
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 Articles 194-196 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code merely include provisions dealing with judicial assistance 
amongst courts located in different cantons. 
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 This is in contrast to South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. See in this regard paras. III.C.2, 
IV.B.2, V.B.2, VI.B.2, and VII.B.2. 
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 See Articles 170, 172-173, and 191(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.  
143
 They merely prove that a certain statement was made. 
144
 See Dolge A ʻArt. 177ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zi-
vilprozessordnung 2010 827 n. 12; Frank R, Sträuli H, and Messmer G Kommentar zur zürcherischen Zivilpr-
zoessordnung 1997 528 n. 3. 
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sible evidence that he has offered in time and in proper form, provided such evidence is rele-
vant to the court’s decision.145 The latter lies within the discretion of the court and has to be 
decided based on the facts of the particular case. It appears that in Switzerland, the question of 
whether or not a court should grant a request for obtaining foreign evidence is hardly contro-
versial as no reported case law was found in this regard. The reason for the absence of such 
case law may be that Swiss courts take a fairly open approach in deciding whether or not to 
issue a request for judicial assistance.
146
 
The foregoing comments do not only apply where a litigant in civil proceedings pending in 
Switzerland requests the taking of evidence in a foreign state which is not a party to any rele-
vant convention, but also where the Hague Procedure Convention or the Hague Evidence Con-
vention apply. In the latter case, the provisions of the said conventions only come into play 
once the Swiss court decides to issue a request for judicial assistance. 
With regard to requests for judicial assistance to foreign states which are not members of a 
convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, the Federal Of-
fice of Justice recommends the use of the same model form as in the case of a letter of request 
under the Hague Procedure Convention.
147
 The request should be drafted in the language of the 
requested state, or it must be accompanied by a translation, and has to be transmitted through 
diplomatic channels.
148
 Accordingly, the Swiss court has to address the request to the Federal 
Office of Justice, which then forwards it to the Swiss representative in the requested state. The 
latter transmits the request to the department of foreign affairs of the requested state which, in 
turn, sends it to the competent local authority.
149
 
E. Position of Switzerland with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 
Cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters between Switzerland and its 
immediate neighbouring countries, the vast majority of European countries, as well as Switzer-
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 For the translation of Article 152 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 
563. 
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 In other words, requests of litigants to have evidence taken abroad are usually granted by the court so that 
there is no need for the litigants to appeal against a court decision rejecting their respective requests. 
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(date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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 Volken P Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Zivilsachen 1996 58 n. 88. 
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land’s major trading partners, is governed by the Hague Evidence Convention and the Hague 
Procedure Convention. In relation to these states, the execution of requests for international 
judicial assistance is guaranteed,
150
 and the procedural principles governing the transborder 
taking of evidence are defined.
151
 
With respect to requests received from states that are party neither to the Hague Procedure 
Convention nor to the Hague Evidence Convention, Switzerland applies by analogy the rules 
of the Hague Procedure Convention. In practice, also in the absence of any international obli-
gation to render judicial assistance in evidence-taking, foreign states can expect Swiss courts to 
execute their requests swiftly, provided the latter fulfil the necessary formal and substantive 
requirements, and there are no grounds for refusal. Swiss courts requesting assistance in evi-
dence-taking from foreign countries which are not party to the Hague Procedure Convention or 
to the Hague Evidence Convention are at the mercy of the foreign states in which the evidence 
sought is located. This issue, however, exists not only with regard to Switzerland, but is a gen-
eral problem. It ultimately results from the sovereignty of states and the latter’s authority to 
decide whether and, if so, to what extent international judicial assistance is granted in the ab-
sence of a relevant international agreement. 
In the light of the above, it seems fair to say that Switzerland is rather well-positioned with re-
spect to cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. From a Swiss per-
spective, however, there is need for action regarding requests from courts in Switzerland to ob-
tain evidence from countries that have not acceded to the Hague Procedure Convention or 
Hague Evidence Convention. This particularly holds true for African countries. The most effi-
cient method for improving this situation is the negotiation of bilateral treaties with such states. 
With regard to the judicial cooperation between Switzerland and the member states of the Eu-
ropean Union, one may wonder whether Switzerland should make an attempt to adopt the rules 
of the European Evidence Regulation. By adopting these rules, Switzerland would contribute 
to the creation of a uniform legal area in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters in 
Europe and would in this regard be treated like a member state of the European Union.  
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 The contracting states are under an international obligation to render judicial assistance in accordance with the 
rules laid down in the Hague Evidence Convention and Hague Procedure Convention.  
151
 Between 2003-2007, the number of received letters of request under Chapter 1 of the Hague Evidence Con-
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III. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in South Afri-
ca 
A. General Remarks 
Since South Africa is a member of the Hague Evidence Convention, cross-border taking of ev-
idence in civil and commercial matters between South Africa and other contracting states is 
governed by the rules of the said convention. With regard to other countries, South Africa ren-
ders judicial assistance based on courtoisie internationale. Here, a different set of rules applies, 
depending on whether it is a foreign state that wishes to obtain evidence in South Africa, or 
whether evidence located abroad is sought for the benefit of proceedings pending before a 
South African court.  
The following remarks first deal with the evidence-taking based on the Hague Evidence Con-
vention and then addresses the gathering of evidence based on courtoisie internationale. Final-
ly, the status quo of South Africa with regard to the cross-border taking of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters is analysed. 
In this context, it should be mentioned that South Africa is a member of the Vienna Consular 
Convention.
152
 As already mentioned, Article 5(j) of the Convention allows consular agents to 
take evidence in a foreign state for the courts of the sending state. Consequently, a witness re-
siding outside South Africa may be examined by a consular agent representing South Africa in 
the foreign state, provided the latter permits such evidence-taking.
153
 
B. Taking of Evidence based on the Hague Evidence Convention 
1. Applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention in South Africa 
South Africa acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention in 1997.
154
 However, to date, this 
Convention has not yet been incorporated into South African law. With regard to the applica-
tion of international law in domestic law, one has to distinguish between the so-called “monist 
approach” and the “dualist approach”. While in the first case, the international law applies di-
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 Cf. also fn. 124. For a list of the contracting states to this Convention, see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-
6&chapter=3&lang=en#Participants (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
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  See also South African Law Reform Commission Project 121: Consolidated Legislation Pertaining to Inter-
national Judicial Co-operation in Civil Matters - Report (December 2006) 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj121_2006dec.pdf 19 (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
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 Cf. http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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rectly in the state,
155
 a transformation of international law into domestic law is required in the 
second configuration which applies particularly to South Africa.
156
 In this context, the South 
African Law Reform Commission referred to Article 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, which provides that “a self-executing provision of an agreement that 
has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or an Act of Parliament”. The South African Law Reform Commission noted that 
there is no indication that the Hague Evidence Convention falls within the said constitutional 
provision, and that therefore individuals residing in South Africa can claim no rights under the 
Hague Evidence Convention as long as the latter’s provisions are not incorporated into South 
African law.
157
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it appears that in the past, South Africa has applied the rules of 
the Hague Evidence Convention both to incoming and outgoing requests for judicial assistance 
in evidence-taking. In its response to a questionnaire issued by the Hague Conference on Inter-
national Private Law in 2008, South Africa stated that in the years 2003-2007, it received 37 
letters of request under Chapter 1 of the Convention and sent two requests to other contracting 
states. During the same period, South Africa executed 37 applications for the taking of evi-
dence through commissioners and transmitted two applications abroad.
158
 
In the light of the above, it seems that the incorporation of the provisions of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention into South African law is just a matter of time.
159
 Having said this, it makes 
sense to deal again with the Hague Evidence Convention, thereby, however, focusing on the 
particularities that apply with regard to South Africa. Where there are no fundamental differ-
ences in the application of the Convention in Switzerland and South Africa, reference can be 
made to the relevant comments relating to Switzerland.
160
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2. Scope of the Hague Evidence Convention 
Based on South Africa’s response to the aforesaid questionnaire, the term “civil or commercial 
matters” is, compared to Switzerland, interpreted more broadly. It includes, inter alia, not only 
bankruptcy, insolvency, consumer protection, or employment matters, but also issues regarding 
the regulation and oversight of financial markets and stock exchanges, as well as the proceeds 
of crime and taxation.
161
 
Unlike Switzerland,
162
 South Africa considers the character of the Hague Evidence Convention 
as non-mandatory.
163
  
3. Forms of Evidence-taking under the Hague Evidence Convention 
When acceding to the Hague Evidence Convention, South Africa excluded the application of 
Articles 15-16 of the Convention.
164
 As a result, South Africa does not execute any applica-
tions for the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or consular agents on South African soil. 
Due to South Africa’s reservation, other contracting states may refuse to let diplomatic officers 
and consular agents representing South Africa take evidence on their territory.
165
 Evidence lo-
cated in South Africa, however, may be taken based on a letter of request under Chapter 1 of 
the Hague Evidence Convention, as well as through commissioners, pursuant to Article 17 of 
the Convention. 
a) Letter of Request under Chapter 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention 
When addressing a request under Chapter 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention to South Afri-
ca, the use of the relevant model form developed by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law is recommended. The letter does not only have to include 
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 South Africa Response of South Africa to the Questionnaire of 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of 18 
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters (undated) 
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a list of matters to be addressed during the relevant witness examination, but, amongst other 
things, it must also provide the specific questions to be put to the witness.
166
  
Letters of request have to be drafted in one of the eleven official languages in South Africa, 
which are English, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, isiN-
debele, isiXhosa, or isiZulu.
167
 
Requests addressed to South Africa have to be transmitted via the central authority.
168
 South 
Africa appointed the Director-General of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Devel-
opment as the central authority.
169
 The same holds true for a letter of request of a South African 
court for obtaining evidence abroad. Such a request has to be forwarded via the Director-
General and cannot be sent directly to the foreign central authority.
170
 
Once the Director-General has approved an incoming letter of request,
171
 he forwards it to the 
Registrar of the High Court in whose jurisdiction the evidence to be obtained is located. The 
Registrar then submits the request to a judge in chambers, in order to give effect to the letter of 
request.
172
 
South Africa’s reservation under Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention with respect to 
letters of request relating to pre-trial discovery is unlimited. It provides that all “letters of re-
quest issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in com-
mon law countries, will not be executed”.173 In this context, the South African Law Reform 
Commission emphasised that the declaration of South Africa is too broad, as the original pur-
pose of Article 23 of the Convention was to exclude “fishing expeditions”. The Law Reform 
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Commission thus recommended limiting the said declaration when incorporating the provi-
sions of the Convention into domestic law, and adopting a wording that is similar to the United 
Kingdom’s declaration under Article 23.174 
b) Application under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention 
As mentioned earlier, under Chapter 2 of the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence in South 
Africa can only be taken through commissioners. The prior authorisation under Article 17(1)(a) 
of the Convention is given by the High Court in whose jurisdiction the application is to be exe-
cuted.
175
  
In contrast to Switzerland,
176
 a commissioner authorised in the above sense may apply to the 
High Court to obtain the evidence by compulsion. The coercive measures have to be appropri-
ate and prescribed by South African law for use in domestic proceedings.
177
 
C. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
As mentioned earlier, in cases where the Hague Evidence Convention does not apply one has 
to distinguish between two different configurations: on the one hand, the situation where a 
court or litigant located abroad wishes to obtain evidence in South Africa, and, on the other, the 
case where a litigant in civil proceedings pending before a South African court seeks means of 
proof situated in a foreign state.  
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The following two subchapters deal first with requests emanating from foreign states and then 
with the opposite type of case where a litigant in civil proceedings in South Africa seeks evi-
dence abroad. 
1. Obtaining Evidence in South Africa for the Benefit of a Court Abroad 
a) General Remarks 
A trial court or foreign litigant may ask for evidence to be taken in South Africa based on two 
different laws, namely the Foreign Courts Evidence Act
178
 and the Supreme Court Act. In its 
report on international judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters,
179
 the South Afri-
can Law Reform Commission referred to another possibility to obtain evidence in South Afri-
ca, namely that based on Section 53 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act.180 According to this provi-
sion, a “court may in any case which is pending before it, (...) appoint a person to be a 
commissioner to take evidence of any witness, whether within the Republic or elsewhere (...)”. 
This provision requires that the lawsuit, for which the evidence is sought in South Africa, is 
pending before a South African magistrate’s court. However, in the case at hand, that is, where 
evidence located in South Africa is to be obtained for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings, 
the lawsuit is not pending in South Africa, but in a foreign state. It is thus submitted that Sec-
tion 53(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act does not refer to applications of courts or litigants 
abroad to obtain evidence in South Africa. 
b) Taking of Evidence based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act 
Where a trial court or a foreign litigant wishes to obtain evidence in South Africa based on the 
Foreign Courts Evidence Act, an application has to be lodged with the High Court
181
 in whose 
jurisdiction the evidence is located.
182
 The request can either be submitted by the trial court, or 
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by the litigant who proffered the particular evidence. In both cases, proof has to be supplied 
that the trial court having jurisdiction to hear the civil proceedings is “desirous of obtaining the 
evidence in relation to such proceedings”.183 Such proof may, for instance, be given where the 
litigant’s application is accompanied by the order wherein the trial court decided that evidence 
is to be obtained in South Africa.
184
 Where these requirements are met, the application for tak-
ing evidence in South Africa is granted, unless the furnishing of the requested information con-
travenes Section 1 of the Protection of Businesses Act.
185
 
When granting the request for taking evidence in South Africa and ordering the examination of 
the particular witness, the High Court of South Africa also appoints the person before whom 
the witness has to testify.
186
 Where the trial court or the foreign litigant suggests a particular 
individual to conduct the examination, the judge usually appoints said person. In cases where 
no such proposal is made, or if there are good grounds for the judge not to follow the recom-
mendation, the latter will appoint a suitable individual, usually the magistrate at the domicile of 
the witness.
187
 
The witness, whose examination is requested in the application under Section 2(1) of the For-
eign Courts Evidence Act, is summoned to appear before the person appointed by the High 
Court to testify viva voce, or to produce any book, document, or object. The witness is sum-
moned in the same way as if he were a witness in proceedings before a magistrate’s court.188 
Where he fails, without sufficient cause, to attend the examination or to produce the relevant 
means of proof, or refuses to answer the questions put to him, he is guilty of an offence and 
liable to a fine or to imprisonment.
189
  
The foreign witness is examined in accordance with the rules of a magistrate’s court that apply 
in similar proceedings to those in connection with which the witness’ evidence is sought.190 
                                                                                                                                                                        
cording to Section 3 of the said Act, be directed to a magistrate in South Africa. In this context, it has to be re-
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This holds particularly true for the right of the witness to refuse to give evidence.
191
 Where the 
application under Section 2(1) of the Foreign Courts Evidence Act is accompanied by a ques-
tionnaire, it can be expected that the examiner will not ask other questions except to elucidate 
the answers given by the witness.
192
 In the absence of any questionnaire, the examiner will in-
terrogate the witness in full on specified topics.
193
 From the perspective of the trial court, it is 
advisable to provide the South African court with a list of questions to be put to the witness in 
order to ensure that the latter is asked all the relevant questions. In this context, one has to bear 
in mind that the examiner is not familiar with the court case for whose benefit the witness is to 
be examined. It is therefore crucial to provide the High Court in any case with the relevant 
facts underlying the lawsuit. Only in this way can an application under Section 2(1) of the For-
eign Courts Evidence Act succeed and provide the trial court with the necessary information. 
Once the examination of the witness is concluded, the examiner certifies the correctness of the 
evidence and transmits it to the Registrar of the High Court that granted the application.
194
  
There is little published case law with regard to the Foreign Courts Evidence Act. The reported 
decisions dealt mainly with Section 7 of the Act,
195
 but did not further elaborate on the request 
under Section 2(1), or the procedure under Section 4 of the Act. 
c) Taking of Evidence based on Section 33 of the Supreme Court Act 
Section 33(1) of the Supreme Court Act provides for another method to obtain evidence locat-
ed in South Africa for the benefit of proceedings pending abroad.
196
 Here, a letter of request 
has to be addressed to the Director-General of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development. The wording of the said provision suggests that the application has to be made 
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 In Saunders and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1997 (2) SA 1090 (C) at 1096, the purpose of a let-
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er in the Republic. The evidence taken before the commissioner in the Republic becomes part of the evidence 
before the foreign court.”  
 161 
 
by the competent authority of the requesting state and not by a private individual.
197
 The letter 
of request has either to be drafted in English or Afrikaans, or has to be accompanied by a trans-
lation into either of the two languages.
198
 In order to achieve an optimal result from the evi-
dence-taking in South Africa, the request should, inter alia, include the questions to be put to 
the witness, as well as a summary of the relevant facts underlying the lawsuit. In this context, 
one has to bear in mind that when provided with a questionnaire, the examiner will not ask 
other questions than those listed except to clarify any ambiguous answers given by the wit-
ness.
199
 
When granting the request, the Director-General sends the letter of request to the Registrar of 
the High Court in whose jurisdiction the evidence to be obtained is located.
200
 If, however, the 
Minister of Justice considers it undesirable that the request for evidence-taking be granted, and 
that the litigants or their counsel should rather make an application directly to the competent 
High Court under Section 2(1) of the Foreign Courts Evidence Act,
201
 the Director-General no-
tifies the foreign authority accordingly and returns the letter of request.
202
 Uys maintains that 
this may be the case, for instance, where the Minister of Justice regards the matter as so com-
plex that the assistance of counsel or experts is necessary.
203
 In addition, the execution of a let-
ter of request may be refused based on Section 1 of the Protection of Businesses Act.
204
 
In cases where the application for evidence-taking in South Africa is granted, the Registrar of 
the competent High Court forwards the request to a judge in chambers, who, in turn, makes the 
necessary order for the appointment of an examiner to interrogate the witness.
205
 The judge 
usually appoints the magistrate at the domicile of the witness as examiner.
206
 He may, howev-
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er, also appoint any other suitable individual, including a person suggested by the relevant for-
eign authority, or he may himself act as examiner.
207
  
Having received the respective court order, the examiner summons the witness to appear before 
him. The witness examination is conducted in accordance with the South African rules of pro-
cedure and evidence.
208
 As already mentioned, the examiner is, bound by the scope of the letter 
of request and cannot change the questions to be put to the witness provided by the trial 
court.
209
 Once the examination is concluded, the examiner certifies the correctness of the an-
swers given by the witness and forwards the evidence to the Registrar of the competent High 
Court. The latter verifies the relevant documents and sends them to the Director-General for 
transmission abroad.
210
  
Except where the Minister of Justice otherwise directs, no fees other than disbursements are 
recovered from the requesting state.
211
 
Compared to a letter of request under Section 33(1) of the Supreme Court Act, the procedure 
for an application based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act appears to be simpler. In the latter 
case, the application can be directly lodged with the High Court, and no involvement of the Di-
rector-General is required. In addition, no intimation of the Minister of Justice is necessary un-
der the Foreign Courts Evidence Act. Having said this, it can be expected that the decision as 
to whether or not an application for taking evidence in South Africa is to be granted is made 
more swiftly under the Foreign Courts Evidence Act than requests made in terms of Section 
33(1) of the Supreme Court Act.
212
 
d) Restrictions on the Obtaining of Evidence in South Africa based on the Protection 
of Businesses Act 
According to Sections 1(1)(a) and 1(3) of the Protection of Businesses Act, no commission 
rogatoire, letter of request, or any other request that emanates from outside South Africa in 
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connection with any civil proceedings, shall be enforced in South Africa without the permis-
sion of the Minister of Economic Affairs (now presumably the Minister of Trade and Industry), 
provided it arose from any act or transaction which took place at any time, whether before or 
after the commencement of the said Act, and is related to mining, production, importation, ex-
portation, refinement, possession, use or sale of or ownership to any matter or material, of 
whatever nature, whether within, outside, into, or from South Africa. Section 1(1)(b) read in 
conjunction with Section 1(3) of the Act furthermore provides that, save with the authorisation 
of the aforesaid Minister, no person shall in compliance with, or in response to, any commis-
sion rogatoire, letter of request, or any other request arising from outside South Africa in con-
nection with any civil proceedings, furnish any information as to any business, whether carried 
on within or outside South Africa.
213
 
The main purpose of the Protection of Businesses Act was “to protect South Africans from the 
draconian effects of certain foreign laws, in particular those allowing awards of penal or mul-
tiple damages”.214 According to Forsyth and Leon, the said Act is a classic example of legisla-
tive overkill.
215
 The ambit of the aforesaid sections of the Protection of Businesses Act is so 
broad
216
 that the Act embraces almost all ranges of human activity and practically prohibits any 
form of international judicial cooperation, including the taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters, unless the aforesaid Minister grants permission.
217
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With regard to the application of Section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Businesses Act, the South 
African courts take a restrictive approach by, for instance, interpreting the term of “any matter 
or material” in a narrow manner, and thus limit the scope of application of the Act. In Tradex 
Ocean Transportation SA v MV Silvergate (or Astyanax) and Others,
218
 and Chinatex Oriental 
Trading Co v Erskine,
219
 it was held that the notion that “any matter or material” includes on-
ly raw materials or substances, and that manufactured goods do not fall within Section 1(1)(a) 
of the Protection of Businesses Act. Kirk-Cohen J stated in Jones v Krok
220
 that the object of 
Section 1(1)(a) read in conjunction with Section 1(3) of the Protection of Businesses Act is 
“limited to punitive damages awarded in cases which may loosely be termed product liability 
claims”221. In other court decisions, no mention was made that the plaintiff has received an au-
thorisation of the relevant minister. The South African Law Reform Commission noted with 
regard to the enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa, that in practice, the Protection 
of Businesses Act is not applied, unless a foreign judgment involves multiple or punitive dam-
ages.
222
 Needless to say, the above comments should not only apply with regard to Section 
1(1)(a) of the Protection of Businesses Act or the enforcement of foreign judgments, but also to 
Section 1(1)(b) of the said Act and the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial 
matters.  
With respect to the incorporation of the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention into the 
domestic law, the South African Law Reform Commission pointed out that the Protection of 
Businesses Act violates South Africa’s international obligations under this Convention to exe-
cute requests for the taking of evidence. In this context, the Commission held that the said Act 
may protect interests in the sense of Article 12(1)(b) of the Hague Evidence Convention.
223
 It, 
however, emphasised that the unlimited discretion the said Act gives to the court and the com-
petent minister is in contradiction with the aforesaid international obligations of South Africa. 
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The Commission thus recommended the repeal of the Protection of Businesses Act when trans-
forming the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention into South African law.
224
 
2. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of a South African Court 
a) General Remarks 
While the foregoing subchapter elaborated on the configuration where a trial court or foreign 
litigant seeks evidence in South Africa, the following remarks address the situation where a 
litigant in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of South Africa wishes to obtain 
evidence located abroad. The respective application of a litigant to the High Court is governed 
by Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules.  
Following some general remarks on the taking of evidence on commission based on Rule 38(3) 
of the High Court Rules, the subsequent subchapter deals with the conditions for the granting 
of a commission regarding witnesses outside South Africa, the application for commission, as 
well as its execution. Rule 38(3) of the said Rules does not only apply where a litigant in civil 
proceedings before the High Court of South Africa seeks means of proof located in a foreign 
state which is not party to any international treaty on evidence-taking, but also where the 
Hague Evidence Convention applies. The provisions of this Convention only come into play 
once the High Court decides to issue a request for taking evidence abroad. 
b) Taking of Evidence based on Order 38(3) of the High Court Rules 
In terms of Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules, a court may, “where it appears convenient or 
necessary for the purposes of justice, make an order for the taking of evidence of a witness (...) 
before a commissioner of the court”. As a result, the witness, as would be the normal proce-
dure in High Court,
225
 no longer appears personally in court to be examined viva voce before 
the judge who ultimately decides the case, but he gives evidence before a commissioner ap-
pointed by the court. Once the witness has been examined by the commissioner, the litigant 
applying for the taking of evidence on commission may tender the witness’ deposition as evi-
                                                     
224
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dence at the trial.
226
 As a consequence, the judge no longer has the opportunity to observe the 
demeanour of the witness, and to put any questions to the latter.
227
 Having said this, Rule 38(3) 
of the High Court Rules provides for an exception from the ordinary way of taking evidence, 
namely by dispensing with the need for a witness to appear in court.
228
 Such an exception only 
applies where a witness cannot attend the trial to be questioned in presence of the trial judge. 
The evidence-taking based on the aforesaid provision is also referred to as so-called “commis-
sion de bene esse”. The term “de bene esse” literally means “as being well done for the pre-
sent” but, in the context of the said provision, it stands for “conditionally”. The condition be-
ing, in the words of van Zyl: 
“that the evidence shall be used only if the witness should not be present at the 
trial; but if the witness appears, it is not to be used, and he is to give his evidence 
viva voce.”229 
Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules applies in all cases where evidence is to be taken on com-
mission, irrespective of whether the witness is located in or outside South Africa. With regard 
to foreign witnesses, however, it has to be kept in mind that Rule 38(3) merely stipulates the 
conditions under which the High Court gives leave to an application for the taking of evidence 
on commission. Whether the respective evidence can actually be obtained on foreign territory 
depends, in the absence of a relevant international agreement, on the foreign state.
230
 The same 
holds true for the procedure for the taking of the foreign evidence once the foreign state has 
decided to grant judicial assistance. As a result, Rule 38(4)-(7) of the High Court Rules does 
not apply in cases where foreign evidence is to be taken on commission. These provisions reg-
ulate the procedure for the taking of evidence on commission and are merely binding for com-
missioners within South Africa. 
                                                     
226
 Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules. See also Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Win-
sen The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa Volume 1 2009 872. Cf. also Rule 38(8) of the 
High Court Rules. 
227
 Petė S et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2011 247. See also Meyerson v Health Beverages (Pty) Ltd 
1989 (4) SA 667 (C) at 676D-F. 
228
 Cf. Hills v Hills (II) 1933 NPD 293 at 294. 
229
 Van Zyl GB The Theory of the Judicial Practice of South Africa 1921 412. See also Nelson v Nelson (1881) 1 
SC 139 at 139; Cohen v Cohen (1884) 4 EDC 40 at 41; Janisch v Herold 1914 CPD 258; Shield Insurance Co 
Ltd v Deysel and Another 1978 (2) SA 164 (SE) at 167C-E.  
230
 Cf. Van Loggerenberg DE Jones & Buckle The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa Vol-
ume I: The Act 2012 Act 358. 
 167 
 
Apart from the mention that evidence may be taken before a commissioner where “it appears 
convenient and necessary for the purposes of justice”,231 Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules 
contains no indication of the conditions under which a commission de bene esse may be grant-
ed. Whether or not a court may issue an order for the taking of evidence on commission thus 
lies within its discretion and must be found in the case law based on the facts of the particular 
case.
232
 
In Nxasana v Minister of Justice and Another,
233
 it was held that the aforesaid discretion is not 
of an absolute nature and may be exercised in accordance with recognised principles which 
have evolved over the years. The factors a court has to take into consideration when deciding 
on an application for commission de bene esse include, amongst others, the materiality
234
 and 
relevance
235
 of the evidence, the inability of the witness to appear before the court,
236
 and the 
prospects that the foreign evidence would indeed be forthcoming if the commission is grant-
ed.
237
 With regard to the latter, the court must consider whether the respective witness would 
be compellable, whether he will have valid ground on which he could refuse to testify before 
the commissioner even if he was compellable, and whether the witness has committed himself 
to giving such evidence in writing.
238
 In addition, the court has to take into account whether the 
litigant applying for the commission de bene esse acted diligently in pursuing alternatives to 
obtain the foreign evidence,
239
 whether there was unreasonable delay in making the relevant 
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application,
240
 and how convenient and expensive the evidence-taking before the commissioner 
will be.
241
 Moreover, the court must also consider whether the foreign witness can be properly 
examined and cross-examined if his testimony is taken on commission.
242
 The court has fur-
thermore to take into account what will be the prejudice to the litigant seeking the commission 
if the latter is refused and the detriment to the opponent if the application is granted,
243
 as well 
as how important it would be for the court to see and hear the particular witness at trial.
244
 Fi-
nally, courts do not look favourably at an application for the examination of an expert domi-
ciled abroad on commission, if the possibility of obtaining such evidence through an expert 
located in South Africa has not been sufficiently explored.
245
 Moreover, the mere fact that a 
foreign witness is more expert than those in South Africa, is generally not sufficient to take the 
relevant evidence on commission. It, however, goes without saying that a commission will be 
granted where there is no suitable expert available in South Africa.
246
 
Depending on whether the application for the appointment of a commission refers to foreign 
litigants or third parties, the court exercises its discretion in a different way.
247
 With regard to 
non-party witnesses, South African courts generally grant a commission, unless the litigant not 
applying for commission is not likely to have a fair trial, if the evidence is taken by a commis-
sioner.
248
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In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,
249
 Wessels J held the following: 
“I take it as a general rule that, if a witness in a cause cannot, by subpoena, be 
brought before this Court, rather than do without or lose his evidence the Court 
will issue a commission de bene esse to examine him in his own domicile. The 
Court cannot compel an unwilling person to come from a foreign country to give 
evidence here, and in these circumstances the next best thing that the Court can 
do is to take his testimony upon paper.” 
He furthermore pointed out that: 
“(...) the exclusion of the testimony of witnesses whose attendance cannot be en-
forced by this Court is more likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice than to have 
their testimony on paper.”250 
Where foreign third parties cannot be compelled by the trial court and are not willing to volun-
tarily attend the trial, the courts in South Africa prefer to obtain the evidence of such witnesses 
on commission, rather than not having their testimony at all.
251
 
In this context, one has to bear in mind that the litigant, whose application for taking evidence 
on commission is granted, is at a disadvantage in respect of the efficacy of such evidence.
252
 In 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd, the court held in this regard that:
253
 
“the person who produced on paper the evidence of a witness is as a rule at a 
disadvantage, because the Court will pay more attention to the evidence of wit-
nesses who appear before it, who are examined and cross-examined before it, 
than to those witnesses whom it has not had an opportunity of seeing, and, if a 
question arises as to the credibility of such a witness, or whether the Court ought 
to accept his testimony, it would prefer to base its judgment on what it has seen 
and heard than on testimony about which some doubt may exist.” 
In the light of the above, before applying for a commission under Rule 38(3) of the High Court 
Rules, the litigant should try to persuade the foreign witness to come to South Africa and testi-
fy before the trial court. 
By contrast, South African courts are generally reluctant to allow a plaintiff domiciled abroad 
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to give evidence on commission, as it was the plaintiff who has chosen the forum. In this con-
text, Wessels J stated the following: 254 
“(...) the Court will often insist on the plaintiff appearing in person, because it is 
the plaintiff who invokes the aid of the Court and it is not too much to expect of 
him that he will submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court and appear in per-
son (...). 
In Princess Eugenie of Greece v Prince Dominique Radziwill, the court refused to take the evi-
dence of a plaintiff domiciled in France on commission. Here, the court held that: 
“where the evidence sought to be given elsewhere is of great importance and the 
amount in dispute substantial, the Court is naturally slow to grant a party the in-
dulgence of a commission de bene esse, and the Court is particularly disinclined 
to accede to such a request when the party asking for such relief is the plaintiff 
and, in addition a peregrinus. Furthermore, where the issues involved are of a 
serious character and where (...) a determination of these issues must largely de-
pend upon the credence to be placed upon the evidence of the respective parties, 
it is difficult to see how justice can be done if the order is granted.”255 
In contrast to a foreign plaintiff, courts are more willing to grant an order for taking the evi-
dence of a defendant domiciled abroad on commission, provided the latter can show good 
grounds for it.
256
 Courts, however, are reluctant to grant a commission of a foreign defendant 
where difficult issues of fact are involved.
257
  
In cases where both the plaintiff and defendant are domiciled outside South Africa, a commis-
sion de bene esse is usually not granted. The ratio for such refusal is presumably that such cas-
es should rather be heard by a court in a country where either one or both of the litigants are 
located.
258
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A commission de bene esse cannot be granted only with respect to formal evidence,
259
 but also 
in relation to contentious evidence issues.
260
 In practice, however, courts will more readily 
grant a commission, if evidence of a formal nature is involved.
261
 Where the foreign evidence 
relates to fraud, courts give even closer consideration to the question of whether there is fear of 
miscarriage of justice in case a commission de bene esse is issued.
262
 Here, evidence is only to 
be given abroad if a “cogent and compelling case” has been established as to why the testimo-
ny should be taken on commission.
263
  
The application for a commission de bene esse is made on notice of motion supported by an 
affidavit as to the facts upon which the applicant relies for relief.
264
 The application has, inter 
alia, to elaborate on the nature of the proposed evidence and its relevance,
265
 and it has to in-
clude the names of the witnesses to be questioned.
266
 Moreover, it has to set out why it is con-
venient or necessary for the purposes of justice to take the evidence on commission. The appli-
cation has to state the reasons why the witness cannot appear in person before the trial court.
267
 
Finally, the request may also suggest the person who may act as commissioner.
268
  
In addition to the aforesaid notice of motion, the litigant requesting a commission de bene esse 
has to apply for the issue of a letter of request to the competent authority of the state where the 
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evidence to be obtained is located.
269
 Once such application is granted by the South African 
court, the letter of request is forwarded to the foreign state.
270
  
As a general principle, an application under Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules is only granted 
once the litigants have concluded their pleadings. Only at this stage have the issues underlying 
the lawsuit been defined, and it is clear what evidence is required.
271
 In exceptional cases, 
however, the court may order a commission de bene esse before the pleadings have been 
closed. This may, for instance, be the case where there is a danger that the evidence gets lost 
before the litigants submitted their pleadings.
272
 
When granting the application for the taking of foreign evidence on commission, the court may 
suggest a suitable person who shall act as commissioner. Such an individual is preferably dom-
iciled in the state where the letter of request is to be executed. The competent foreign authority, 
however, is not bound by such a proposal. In practice, however, it will not overrule such sug-
gestion without good cause.
273
 
As mentioned earlier, it is the foreign state, where the witness is located, that decides whether 
or not, and if so, to what extent judicial assistance is granted. Where the foreign state does not 
allow the taking of evidence via commissioners, the request for judicial assistance will be re-
jected.
274
 This holds particularly true for Switzerland, which does not permit evidence-taking 
through commissioners when rendering judicial assistance based on courtoisie internationale. 
It is, however, submitted that the taking of evidence on commission should be allowed in Swit-
zerland, if the Swiss judge, in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located, is acting as commis-
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sioner. The situation is different in countries adopting the common-law model, as they general-
ly allow the taking of evidence through commissioners on their territory. 
D. Position of South Africa with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 
South Africa is a party to the Hague Evidence Convention, but has not yet incorporated the 
Convention’s provisions into its domestic law. Despite the lack of transformation into national 
law, South Africa has applied the Convention in the past. It has not only executed requests for 
judicial assistance received from other contracting states, but it has also sent requests abroad. 
Regardless of such application, one has to keep in mind, however, that litigants in civil pro-
ceedings pending in South Africa cannot claim direct rights under the Hague Evidence Con-
vention due to the aforesaid lack of transformation. 
With regard to countries for which the Hague Evidence Convention is not applicable, litigants 
in South Africa are at the mercy of the foreign states when seeking evidence located in the lat-
ter’s territory, provided there is no bilateral treaty on cross-border taking of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters. To date, South Africa has not entered into any such international trea-
ty. The above holds particularly true for South Africa’s immediate neighbouring countries, and 
all other African states.
275
 
Where a trial court or a litigant in civil proceedings pending abroad wishes to obtain evidence 
in South Africa based on courtoisie internationale, South African law provides two methods, 
namely the procedure as stipulated in the Foreign Courts Evidence Act, and that in Section 
33(1) of the Supreme Court Act. The fact that there are two options when seeking evidence in 
South Africa is confusing for the said courts and litigants.  
In the light of the above, the need for South Africa to change the legal situation relating to in-
ternational cooperation in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters is evident. In 2000, 
the South African Law Reform Commission was asked by Parliament to look into the issue of 
“Consolidated Legislation Pertaining to International Co-operation in Civil Matters” which, 
amongst others, also included the taking of evidence for use in civil proceedings. In its report 
released in 2008, the South African Law Reform Commission emphasised the aforesaid prob-
lems regarding the cross-border taking of evidence under South African law and made various 
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recommendations. The latter included the incorporation of the Hague Evidence Convention 
into domestic law and, at the same time, the repeal of the Protection of Businesses Act.
276
 The 
report also suggested the harmonisation of domestic rules governing requests of trial courts and 
litigants in foreign civil proceedings to obtain evidence in South Africa by consolidating the 
relevant provisions in the Supreme Court Act into the Foreign Courts Evidence Act in order to 
provide the said courts and litigants with a uniform method for gathering evidence in South 
Africa. Furthermore, the negotiation of bilateral treaties with neighbouring states was recom-
mended.
277
 So far, neither the recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commis-
sion, nor any other changes pertaining to the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters have been implemented in South African law. 
With regard to South Africa and other African countries, there is, in addition to the suggestions 
of the South African Law Reform Commission, another approach to achieve cooperation in 
evidence-taking between the said countries, namely through an autonomous convention on 
cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters prepared by and for the said 
countries.
278
 Compared to the Hague Evidence Convention, the preparation of a new conven-
tion has the major advantage that it can be tailored to the particular needs of the aforesaid 
countries. This is all the more important given that the Hague Evidence Convention was draft-
ed not only with common-law countries in mind, but also with regard to civil-law jurisdictions. 
To overcome some of the differences in evidence-taking between these two systems mentioned 
earlier,
279
 compromises were made when the Hague Evidence Convention was drafted. It goes 
without saying that compared to the negotiation of bilateral treaties, the drafting of a new con-
vention is a more lengthy and cumbersome process, as more than just two states are involved. 
However, amongst the member states of the convention, a uniform legal area in evidence-
taking in civil and commercial matters would be created where all the states involved would be 
under the same obligation to render judicial assistance and their requests for cross-border tak-
ing of evidence would be governed by the same rules. 
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IV. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in Botswana 
A. General Remarks 
Botswana is not a contracting state to the Hague Procedure Convention
280
 and the Hague Evi-
dence Convention,
281
 and it has not entered into any other international treaty on the cross-
border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters.
282
 Botswana is, however, a party to 
the Vienna Consular Convention.
283
 As a result, judicial assistance in evidence-taking in civil 
and commercials matters between Botswana and other states is, if rendered at all, based on 
courtoisie internationale.
284
  
With regard to the latter, two scenarios can be distinguished: on the one hand, the case where a 
trial court or litigant in foreign civil proceedings wishes to obtain evidence situated in Botswa-
na, and, on the other, the situation where foreign evidence is sought by a party in civil proceed-
ings pending in Botswana. While in the first case, the relevant requests are governed by the 
Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act,
285
 applications from litigants in Botswana are regulated by 
Order 44 of the Rules of the High Court. In this context, mention has also to be made of the 
Compulsion of Witnesses Act.
286
 This Act deals, inter alia, with the procedure for compelling 
persons domiciled in Botswana to appear in court in Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land, and Zimbabwe.
287
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B. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
1. Obtaining Evidence in Botswana for the Benefit of a Court Abroad  
The application for obtaining evidence in Botswana has to be lodged with the High Court in 
whose jurisdiction the witness to be questioned is located.
288
 The request has to be accompa-
nied by a certificate under the hand of an accredited ambassador, minister, other diplomatic 
officer, or consular agent. Such a certificate has to confirm that any matter, in relation to which 
an application is made, is a civil or commercial matter pending before a court in the requesting 
state, and that such court is desirous of obtaining the testimony of the witness referred to in the 
application.
289
 Where no such certificate is produced, other evidence to that effect is admissi-
ble.
290
 Having said this, it can be assumed, for instance, that the order wherein the relevant 
court ruled that the testimony of a particular witness is to be taken in Botswana is sufficient 
under the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, provided such order is duly certified in accordance 
with the laws of the requesting state. It is submitted that an application under the said Act can-
not only be made by the court before which the civil proceedings are pending, but also by the 
litigant who called the foreign witness, provided he can produce the aforesaid certificate or 
other suitable evidence. 
If it appears to the High Court that the trial court is desirous to obtain evidence in Botswana, it 
orders the examination of the relevant witness by oath, interrogatories, or otherwise before the 
person named in such order.
291
 The High Court not only appoints the commissioner, but it also 
gives directions as to the time, place, and manner of the examination, and instructs the witness 
to appear in court and/or to produce any documents specified in the request for judicial assis-
tance.
292
 Such directions may be enforced in the same manner as an order made in a lawsuit 
pending in the High Court.
293
  
The examination of the witness in Botswana is conducted in accordance with the rules of pro-
cedure and evidence that apply in civil proceedings before the High Court. This particularly 
holds true for the witness’ right to refuse to testify. According to Section 6 of the Foreign Tri-
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bunals Evidence Act, a witness may decline to give evidence which may incriminate himself, 
and to answer questions which he may refuse as witness in any claim before the High Court.
294
 
The Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act does not include a reservation similar to that in Section 
2(2) of the South African Foreign Courts Evidence Act, which prohibits the furnishing of in-
formation that contravenes the Protection of Businesses Act.
295
  
2. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of a Court in Botswana 
a) General Remarks 
In the past, there were statutory provisions dealing with the procedure for requests emanating 
from Botswana to obtain evidence in civil and commercial matters in a foreign country. The 
relevant acts seem to have ceased to apply though, and it appears that there are no longer statu-
tory provisions in this regard. A litigant in Botswana seeking evidence abroad can thus merely 
invoke Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court.
296
  
b) Taking of Evidence based on Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court 
The wording of the aforesaid provision is virtually identical with that of Rule 38(3) of the 
South African High Court Rules. According to Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court, a 
judge may “in any matter where it appears convenient, or necessary for the purpose of justice, 
make an order for taking the evidence of a witness (...) by a commissioner of the judge”. As in 
the case of Rule 38(3) of the South African High Court Rules, Order 44(3) stipulates an excep-
tion from the normal procedure for the examination of a witness, namely an examination viva 
voce in presence of the trial court.
297
 By granting a commission under Order 44(3), the court 
dispenses with the need for a witness to appear in court.
298
 
Like the corresponding rule in South African law, Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court 
does not differentiate between a commission regarding evidence within Botswana and a com-
mission relating to evidence located abroad. Again, it is the competent authority of the request-
ed state that decides whether a request for taking of evidence issued by a court in Botswana is 
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executed on its territory, and if so, how the examination will be conducted. Order 44(4)-(8) of 
the said Rules regulating the procedure for a commission are thus only binding for commis-
sioners taking evidence in Botswana.
299
 
Whether or not the taking of evidence on commission is allowed under Order 44(3) of the 
Rules of the High Court lies within the discretion of the High Court of Botswana. The respec-
tive principles have thus to be developed by case law.
300
 To date, there has only been one re-
ported case, First National Bank of Botswana Ltd v Eastgate Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Oth-
ers,
301
 that dealt with foreign evidence taken on commission under the said provision. In this 
decision, Lord Coulsfield JA held the following:
302
  
“Order 44 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court is in substantially the same terms 
as the corresponding rule in South Africa and guidance as to its application can 
be found in decided cases there.” 
In his reasoning, Lord Coulsfield JA thus applied the principles that were formulated by South 
African case law in relation to Rule 38(3) of the South African High Court Rules.
303
 Since such 
principles have already been outlined earlier, it is not necessary to elaborate further on the 
principles for a commission under Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court.
304
 
The application for the appointment of a commission is brought on notice of motion supported 
by an affidavit outlining the facts upon which the applicant bases his request.
305
 In addition, the 
litigant has to apply to the High Court for the authorisation of a letter of request wherein the 
competent authority of the foreign state is asked for judicial assistance.
306
 According to Kakuli, 
such a letter of request should particularly outline the matters upon which the witness’ evi-
dence is requested.
307
 It is furthermore advisable to include a list of the questions to be put to 
the foreign witness. Once the application for commission including the letter of request is 
                                                     
299
 For more in this regard, cf. the relevant comments made under South African law in para. III.C.2.b) above. 
300
 First National Bank of Botswana Ltd v Eastgate Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Others [2008] 1 BLR 279 (CA) at 
282A. See also Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 155. 
301
 [2008] 1 BLR 279 (CA). 
302
 At 282C. 
303
 See First National Bank of Botswana Ltd v Eastgate Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Others [2008] 1 BLR 279 (CA) 
at 282C et seqq. 
304
 See in this regard para. III.C.2.b) above. 
305
 Order 44(3) read in conjunction with Order 12(1) of the Rules of the High Court. See also Kakuli GM Civil 
Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 155. For more on the content of the application, 
see para. III.C.2.b) above. For an example of a court order regarding a commission, see First National Bank of 
Botswana Ltd v Eastgate Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Others [2008] 1 BLR 279 (CA) at 286C-E. 
306
 See First National Bank of Botswana Ltd v Eastgate Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Others [2008] 1 BLR 279 (CA) 
at 286D. See also Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 154. 
307
 Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 157. 
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granted, the latter is forwarded to the competent foreign authority through the diplomatic routes 
of the Foreign Office of Botswana.
308
 
As a general rule, leave for an application to take evidence on commission is only granted once 
the litigants have concluded their pleadings.
309
 
With regard to the execution of a letter of request regarding the taking of evidence on commis-
sion outside Botswana, the relevants remarks made in relation to South Africa apply mutatis 
mutandis to Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court.
310
 Accordingly, the competent foreign 
authority conducts the examination of the witness in accordance with its own law when execut-
ing the letter of request of the High Court of Botswana. 
C. Position of Botswana with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 
Since Botswana is not a party to any international agreement on cross-border taking of evi-
dence in civil and commercial matters, litigants in civil proceedings pending in Botswana, who 
wish to obtain evidence abroad, are at the mercy of the foreign state on whose territory the evi-
dence is located.  
The position of such litigants can only be improved by adopting internationally legally binding 
instruments on evidence-taking. This holds particularly true for the accession of Botswana to 
the Hague Evidence Convention.
311
 Such an approach, however, would only enhance the legal 
situation with regard to evidence located in contracting states to the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, but not in relation to other states. This particularly applies to the vast majority of the Afri-
can countries, including Botswana’s immediate neighbours.312 To overcome this problem, Bot-
swana should, in the short-term, negotiate bilateral treaties with its neighbouring countries, as 
well as its leading trading partners. In the longer term, Botswana should pursue the creation of 
regional cooperation in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters.
313
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 Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 157. 
309
 Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court. See in this regard also the relevant remarks relating to South Afri-
can law in para. III.C.2.b). 
310
 See para. III.C.2.b) above. 
311
 Including the latter’s implementation in the domestic law.  
312
 With the exception of South Africa, Morocco, and the Seychelles, which are members of the Hague Evidence 
Convention. For a list of contracting states to this Convention, see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
313
 See in this regard above para. III.D and Chapter 6. 
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V. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in Namibia 
A. General Remarks 
Namibia is neither a member of the Hague Procedure Convention or the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, nor has it entered into any bilateral treaty on the taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters. Namibia, however, is a party to the Vienna Consular Convention.
314
 As a re-
sult, judicial assistance in cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters 
between Namibia and other states is, if at all, granted based on courtoisie internationale.
315
  
Again, one has to differentiate between requests emanating from foreign states to obtain evi-
dence in Namibia and applications of litigants in proceedings before the Namibian High Court 
for the collection of evidence abroad. In the first case, Namibian law provides two methods: 
requests can either be based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act,
316
 or on Section 29 of the 
High Court Act.
317
 In the second configuration, a litigant has to apply for a commission de 
bene esse based on Section 28 of the High Court Act. 
B. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
1. Obtaining Evidence in Namibia for the Benefit of a Court Abroad  
a) Taking of Evidence based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act 
Namibia enacted the Foreign Courts Evidence Act in 1995. This Act repealed the South Afri-
can Foreign Courts Evidence Act No. 80 of 1962, which was applicable in Namibia before 
1995.
318
 It therefore comes as no surprise that the Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act is 
                                                     
314
 For a list of the contracting states to this Convention, see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-
6&chapter=3&lang=en#Participants (date of use: 31 January 2013). See also in this regard para. III.A and fn. 
124 above. 
315
 For more on courtoisie internationale, see Chapter 2 para. V.B.1. 
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 Act No. 2 of 1995. 
317
 Act No. 16 of 1990. 
318
 See Section 13 of the Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act. For the South African Foreign Courts Evidence 
Act, see para. III.C.1.b) above. Between 1915 and 1990, Namibia (then called “South West Africa”) was under 
the administration of South Africa. As a result, South African legislation, including the South African Foreign 
Courts Evidence Act, applied in Namibia. At the independence of Namibia in 1990, some South African stat-
utes were inherited by Namibia. This holds particularly true for the South African Foreign Courts Evidence 
Act. See in this regard Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: Index to the Laws of Namibia (2010 update) 
http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Intro.pdf Introduction-2, Introduction-5, History-1 et seqq. (date of use: 31 Jan-
uary 2013); Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: Index to the Laws of Namibia - Evidence (2010 update) 
http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Evidence.pdf Evidence-2 (date of use: 31 January 2013). In order to avoid any 
confusion between the Act applicable in South Africa and that in Namibia, reference will be made either to the 
“South African Foreign Courts Evidence Act” or the “Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act”. 
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inspired by the aforesaid South African Act. As a result, the wording of both acts is virtually 
identical.  
In the light of the above and in order to avoid repetition, reference can thus be made to the 
comments on the South African Foreign Courts Evidence Act.
319
 It appears that to date, there 
has not been any reported case law on the Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act.
320
 
An application under Section 2(1) of the Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act has to be 
lodged with the High Court in whose jurisdiction the evidence to be obtained is located.  
b) Taking of Evidence based on Section 29 of the High Court Act  
The wording of Section 29 of the High Court Act is practically identical with that of Section 33 
of the South African Supreme Court Act.
321
 Accordingly, Section 29(1) of the High Court Act 
stipulates the intimation that the Minister of Justice considers it desirable that effect should be 
given to a request of a foreign court to obtain evidence in Namibia without requiring the liti-
gants to apply directly to the High Court. By virtue of Section 29(1), the letter of request has to 
be lodged with the Permanent Secretary for Justice. The request has either to be drafted in Eng-
lish, or has to be accompanied by a translation.
322
 Since the identical South African legislation 
has already been discussed, there is no need to elaborate further on Section 29 of the High 
Court Act.
323
 
c) Restrictions on the Obtaining of Evidence in Namibia based on the Second Gen-
eral Law Amendment Act 
Under Section 2(1) of the Second General Law Amendment Act,
324
 no person shall, except 
with the permission of the Minister of Economic Affairs (now presumably the Minister of 
Trade and Industry), in compliance with any order, direction or letter of request issued or ema-
nating from outside Namibia, furnish any information as to any business, whether operating in 
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 Cf. para. III.C.1.b) above. 
320
 See, however, S v Lofty-Eaton & Others (2) 1993 NR 405 (HC) concerning the applicability of the South Afri-
can Foreign Courts Evidence in Namibia. 
321
 Cf. para. III.C.1.c) above. 
322
 Section 29(1) of the High Court Act. See also S v Koch 2006 (2) NR 513 at 535E. 
323
 See para. III.C.1.c) above. With regard to the main differences between the taking of evidence under the Na-
mibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act and Section 29 of the High Court Act, the comments made in para. 
III.C.1.c) apply mutatis mutandis. 
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 No. 94 of 1974. At the independence of Namibia, this Act was inherited by Namibia. See Legal Assistance 
Centre Namlex: Index to the Laws of Namibia - Evidence (2010 update) 
http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Evidence.pdf Evidence-2 (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
 182 
 
or outside Namibia.
325
 As in the case of Section 1 of the South African Protection of Business-
es Act,
326
 the ambit of Section 2(1) of the Second General Law Amendment Act is so broad 
that it prevents any international judicial cooperation of Namibia, including the cross-border 
taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, unless the aforesaid Minister grants per-
mission. To this day, there has not been any reported case law on Section 2 of the Second Gen-
eral Law Amendment. 
Based on Section 2(2) of the Namibian Foreign Courts Evidence Act, a request for taking evi-
dence in Namibia is, amongst others, not granted, if it appears to the High Court that such evi-
dence is the furnishing of information in contravention of Section 2 of the Second General Law 
Amendment Act. Needless to say, the latter provision also applies to requests emanating from 
foreign states based on Section 29 of the High Court Act. 
2. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of a Namibian Court  
a) General Remarks 
Namibian legislation includes a provision, Section 28 of the High Court Act, which particularly 
deals with the request of a litigant in civil proceedings before the High Court who seeks evi-
dence located abroad. Rule 38(3)-(8) of the High Court Rules of Namibia contains virtually 
identical provisions regarding the taking of evidence on commission like Rule 38(3)-(8) of the 
South African High Court Rules. Rule 38(3)-(8) of the High Court Rules of Namibia, however, 
only applies to evidence taken on commission in Namibia, while Section 28 of the High Court 
Act deals with requests to obtain evidence abroad. There is no reported case law with regard to 
Section 28 of the said Act. 
b) Taking of Evidence based on Section 28 of the High Court Act 
A litigant in civil proceedings before the High Court of Namibia who is unable to secure the 
attendance of a witness at the hearing due to the fact that such witness is resident outside Na-
mibia, may apply to the High Court for the issue of a letter of request to the competent foreign 
court asking the said court to appoint a particular person to act as commissioner to take evi-
dence of such a witness.
327
 
                                                     
325
 According to Section 2(3) of the Second General Law Amendment Act, any person, who contravenes Section 
2(1), shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine or imprisonment.  
326
 Cf. para. III.C.1.d) above. 
327
 Section 28(1) of the High Court Act. 
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Compared to the rules on taking evidence on commission in South Africa and Botswana,
328
 
Section 28(1) of the High Court Act is a very straightforward provision. It merely requires that 
the witness to be examined is resident abroad, and that his attendance at the hearing before the 
High Court cannot be secured by the litigant wishing to call such witness. In this context, one 
has to keep in mind that neither the litigant nor the High Court can compel a foreign third party 
to come to Namibia to be examined viva voce, but it requires the assistance of the relevant for-
eign state to obtain such evidence.
329
 With regard to foreign litigants, the High Court should 
allow them to give evidence abroad only in exceptional cases. This holds particularly true for 
plaintiffs having chosen the forum.
330
 
The application for the issue of a letter of request is made on notice of motion supported by an 
affidavit as to the facts upon which the application relies for relief.
331
 The affidavit should, in-
ter alia, set out the name of the witness to be examined, as well as the nature and relevancy of 
the proposed evidence. Moreover, the application should include proof that the witness is resid-
ing abroad and not willing to appear before the High Court. Finally, it is advisable to attach a 
list with the questions to be put to the witness.
332
 Although the commissioner is appointed by 
the foreign court,
333
 it is reasonable for the litigant to make a suggestion for the individual to be 
nominated as commissioner. The foreign court, however, is not bound by such proposal, but 
will not overrule the latter without good cause. 
Section 28 of the High Court Act is silent on the time when an application for the issue of a 
letter of request can be made. It is submitted that such an application is, as a general rule, only 
granted once the litigants have closed their pleadings.
334
 
Where an application under Section 28(1) of the said Act is granted, the Registrar of the High 
Court forwards the relevant certificate together with the letter of request through diplomatic 
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 See paras. III.C.1.b) and IV.B.2.b) above. 
329
 Cf. Bidoli v Ellistron t/a Ellistron Truck & Plant 2002 NR 451 (HC) at 458. See also Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1918 TPD 420 at 421. See also Hespel v Hespel 1948 (3) SA 257 (E) at 264; S v 
Hoare and Others 1982 (3) SA 306 (N) at 307; Meyerson v Health Beverages (Pty) Ltd 1989 (4) SA 667 (C) at 
677F. 
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 See in this regard the comments made in para. III.C.2.b) above. 
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 Section 28(1) of the High Court Act read in conjunction with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Na-
mibia. 
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 See also Section 28(4) of the High Court Act.  
333
 Sections 28(1) in fine and 28(5) of the High Court Act.  
334
 Cf. Rule 38(3) in fine of the High Court Rules of Namibia. According to this provision, an application for the 
taking of evidence on commission located in Namibia can be made after the close of pleadings. 
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channels to the competent authority of the foreign state where the witness to be examined is 
domiciled.
335
 
Section 28(1) in fine of the High Court Act stipulates that the commissioner may take evidence 
“by means of interrogatories or otherwise”.336 In this context, one has to keep in mind that it is 
the foreign state that decides in what form requests for judicial assistance are executed.
337
 
Where a foreign witness refuses to give evidence before the commissioner, Section 28(6) of the 
said Act instructs the Registrar of the High Court to provide the foreign authority with the nec-
essary documents to enable the latter to compel the witness’ attendance. 
By virtue of Section 28(5) of the High Court Act, evidence recorded and duly certified by the 
relevant commissioner abroad is received as evidence in the proceedings pending before the 
High Court. 
C. Position of Namibia with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 
Namibia is neither a contracting state to the Hague Procedure Convention or Hague Evidence 
Convention, nor to any other international treaty on the taking of evidence in civil and com-
mercial matters. Its legal position in relation to cross-border taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters is thus identical with that of Botswana. Since the latter has already been 
discussed, there is no need to further elaborate Namibia’s position.338  
With regard to requests emanating from foreign states to obtain evidence on Namibian territo-
ry, the provisions in Section 29 of the High Court Act should be consolidated into the Foreign 
Courts Evidence Act to provide courts located abroad and litigants in foreign civil proceedings 
with one single method to seek evidence located in Namibia.
339
 In addition, Namibia should 
repeal or, at least, limit the ambit of Section 2 of the Second General Law Amendment Act in 
order to enhance judicial cooperation in evidence-taking. 
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 Section 28(2)-(3) of the High Court Act. 
336
 See also Section 28(4) of the High Court Act. 
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 Cf. the relevant comments made in para. III.C.2.b) above. 
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 See para. IV.C above. 
339
 Cf. in this regard para. III.D above. 
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VI. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in Nigeria 
A. General Remarks 
Nigeria has not acceded to the Hague Procedure Convention, the Hague Evidence Convention, 
or to any other international agreement on taking evidence in civil and commercial matters. It 
is, however, a member of the Vienna Consular Convention.
340
 
Nigeria is a federation comprising 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, which 
each have a high court. Unlike in the other countries dealt with in this thesis, there are no uni-
form rules on civil procedure which apply to all high courts in Nigeria.
341
 Having said this, the 
following comments concentrate on the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territo-
ry which were introduced in 2004.
342
 
In the light of the above, the following subchapter focuses on judicial assistance based on cour-
toisie internationale.
343
 It analyses the procedure for requests emanating from outside Nigeria 
to obtain evidence in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, as well as applications from litigants 
in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, 
seeking evidence abroad. 
B. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
1. Obtaining Evidence in the Jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja, for the Benefit of a Court Abroad 
a) General Remarks 
Before 1990, the Evidence by Commission Act of 1859 and the Foreign Tribunals Evidence 
Act of 1856 regulated requests from courts abroad wishing to obtain evidence in Nigeria. 
While the Evidence by Commission Act dealt with requests from other Commonwealth courts, 
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 For a list of the contracting states to this Convention, see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-
6&chapter=3&lang=en#Participants (date of use: 31 January 2013). See also in this regard para. III.A and fn. 
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 There is, however, the so-called “Federal High Court” that has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to specific 
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the Federal High Court is governed by the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000. 
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 The official title of these Rules is the “High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Civil Procedure 
Rules, 2004”. For the sake of simplicity, these rules are referred to as “Rules of the High Court of the Federal 
Capital Territory” throughout the thesis. 
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 For more on courtoisie internationale, see Chapter 2 para. V.B.1. 
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the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act governed applications emanating from states outside the 
Commonwealth. Both acts were United Kingdom statutes
344
 and were repealed in Nigeria in 
1990.
345
 They are thus no longer applicable in Nigeria, and it appears that these days, requests 
issued by courts located outside Nigeria are governed by the rules of the high court in whose 
jurisdiction the evidence to be obtained is located.  
b) Taking of Evidence based on Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the 
Federal Capital Territory 
Where it appears to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, that a court located 
outside Nigeria is desirous to obtain the testimony of a witness domiciled in the jurisdiction of 
the High Court, the latter may give effect to the intention of the respective letter of request. The 
application to the High Court may be made by any person, provided he is duly authorised to 
make the application and produces the letter of request, or such other evidence.
346
 Having said 
this, an application under Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory cannot only be made by the court located abroad, but also by the litigant seeking evi-
dence in Nigeria, provided he can prove the court’s desire to obtain the said evidence. Order 
38(41) does not contain any further provisions on the taking of evidence for the benefit of civil 
proceedings pending abroad.  
The wording of Order 38(41)  of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory 
and that of the first portion of Section 1 of the aforesaid Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 
1856 are very similar.
347
 This is not surprising, as it can be assumed that Order 38(41) was in-
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 See Aguda TA Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of Nigeria 
1980 503 n. 42.93. See also Radio Corporation of America v Rauland Corporation and Another [1958] 1 QB 
618 at 629.  
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 Order 1 read in conjunction with Schedule 1 Part I no. 36, 37 and 51 of the Revised Edition (Authorised Omis-
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 Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
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 The wording of Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory reads as follows: 
“When any civil (...) matter is pending before a court (...) of a foreign country and it is made to appear to the 
Court by (...) letter of request or other sufficient evidence that that court (...) is desirous of obtaining the testi-
mony in relation to the matter of any witness (...) within the jurisdiction, the Court may, on the ex parte appli-
cation of any person shown to be duly authorised to make the application on behalf of the foreign court (...) 
and on production of the (...) letter of request or such other evidence as the Court may require or consider suf-
ficient make such order (...) as may be necessary to give effect to the intention of the (...) letter of request.” 
The wording of Section 1 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856 was as follows: “Where, upon an 
application for this purpose, it is made to appear to any court (...) having authority under this Act that any 
court (...) of competent jurisdiction in a foreign country, before which any civil or commercial matter is pend-
ing, is desirous of obtaining the testimony in relation to such matter of any witness (...) within the jurisdiction 
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spired by the repealed Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856. Based on the law reports of 
Nigeria accessible to the author,
348
 there is no reported case law on Order 38(41) of the Rules 
of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. The same holds true for the Foreign Tribu-
nals Evidence Act of 1856. The sparse legal literature in Nigeria that dealt with this Act before 
its repeal in 1990 made reference to the principles governing the taking of evidence in Nigeria 
for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings as developed by the English case law in relation to 
the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856.
349
 
As long as the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, has not established its own 
principles with regard to Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, it is submitted that the rules developed by the English courts under the Foreign Tri-
bunals Evidence Act of 1856 should apply mutatis mutandis.
350
 In Seyfang v GD Searle & Co 
and Another,
351
 Cooke J highlighted the following five principles that governed the examina-
tion of a witness located in England for the benefit of foreign proceedings under the Foreign 
Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856: 
“(1) Judicial and international comity requires that any request of a foreign 
court for evidence to be taken under the Act of 1856 should be treated with sym-
pathy and respect and complied with so far as the principles of English law per-
mit. 
(2) The principles of English law to be applied in the case of an application un-
der the Act of 1856 are the same as those which the English courts apply to the 
calling and examination of witnesses in proceedings initiated in the courts of this 
country. 
(3) Following those principles the English courts will generally oblige a witness 
to testify to a fact which is in issue. 
(4) On the other hand the English courts will not as a general rule require an ex-
pert to give expert evidence against his wishes in a case where he has no connec-
tion with the facts or the history. (...). 
                                                                                                                                                                        
of such first-mentioned court (...) it shall be lawful for such court (...) to order the examination upon oath, up-
on interrogatories or otherwise, before any person (...) named in such order, of such witness (...); and it shall 
be lawful for the said court (...), to command the attendance of any person named in such order, for the pur-
pose of being examined or the production of any writings or other documents to be mentioned in such order, 
and to give all such directions as to the time, place, and manner of such examination, and all other matters 
connected therewith, as may appear reasonable and just; and any such order may be enforced in like manner 
as an order made by such court (...) in a cause depending in such court (...).” 
348
 Cf. in this regard Chapter 1 para. III. 
349
 See, for instance, Aguda TA Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts 
of Nigeria 1980 503 n. 42.94, 506 n. 42.104. 
350
 In this context, it should be noted that the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856 is no longer applicable in 
the United Kingdom, as it was repealed in 1975 following the latter’s accession to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention. See in this regard In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation M.D.L. No. 
235 [1977] 3 WLR 430 at 436.  
351
 [1973] QB 148 at 151 et seq. 
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(5) (...) the English court will not allow the procedure of the Act of 1856 to be 
used as a means of obtaining discovery against a person not a party to the pro-
ceedings. (...).” 
With regard to the second principle, it was held in Radio Corporation of America v Rauland 
Corporation and Another
352
 that, although the evidence-taking should generally be governed 
by English law, the courts “should endeavour to comply with the requirements of the foreign 
court in so far as they properly can”. In connection with the fifth principle, the same decision 
stated that an application having the “the nature of a ‘fishing’ proceeding” is not allowed un-
der Section 1 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856.
353
 In Eccles & Co v Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad Company,
354
 Vaughan Williams L.J. emphasised that the said Act em-
powers the English court to make a relevant order as will enable the evidence of a witness in 
England to be given before a commissioner appointed to take his evidence, but not to order the 
discovery of documents.
355
 
As explained above, the foresaid principles should apply mutatis mutandis to the examination 
of a witness domiciled in Nigeria for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings. Consequently, 
the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, should assist courts abroad in the taking 
of evidence in Nigeria so far as it possibly can. Only in exceptional cases, should the High 
Court reject requests for judicial cooperation, for instance where such applications prejudice 
Nigeria’s sovereignty or security, or where a court located abroad requests a procedure which 
is incompatible with the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.  
An application under Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Terri-
tory can be made by the court issuing the letter of request or by any person, provided he is duly 
authorised by the said court to do so. The application has to be made by motion ex parte sup-
ported by affidavit, and should, inter alia, include the name of the witness to be questioned, 
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ers [1891] 2 QB 241 at 244 et seq.; Radio Corporation of America v Rauland Corporation and Another [1956] 
1 QB 618 at 628 et seqq., 639 et seqq., 643 et seqq. 
 189 
 
proof that the court outside Nigeria is desirous of obtaining the relevant testimony, as well as a 
list of questions to be put to the witness, and a summary of the facts underlying the lawsuit.
356
  
When granting the application, the High Court appoints the individual before whom the exam-
ination shall take place. In case the letter of request suggests a specific person to be nominated 
as examiner, the High Court may either appoint such individual or any other person as it may 
see fit.
357
 The High Court may furthermore give directions as to the time, place, and manner of 
the examination. The latter is, as a general principle, conducted in accordance with the Rules of 
the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. This particularly holds true for the cross-
examination of the witness, the enforcement of attendance of the witness, and the consequenc-
es the latter may face when refusing to cooperate with the High Court without good cause. The 
examination should, however, as far as possible, comply with the requirements stated in the 
letter of request.
358
 
2. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of the High Court of the Federal Capi-
tal Territory, Abuja 
Order 38(11)(1) provides that the High Court may, where it appears necessary for the purpose 
of justice, make an order for the examination of any witness before it or any officer of the court 
and at any place. Where the witness examination does not take place in the presence of the trial 
court, the said provision constitutes an exception to the general rule under the Rules of the 
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory that witnesses shall be examined viva voce before 
the trial court.
359
  
Order 38(11) applies to witnesses residing in and outside Nigeria. In the latter case, it is re-
called that the provisions in Order 38 merely stipulate the conditions under which the High 
Court may grant an application for the examination of a foreign witness on commission. 
Whether the foreign state assists in obtaining the evidence of such witness, and if so, how such 
examination is conducted, depends on the laws of the foreign state.
360
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 Order 38(41) read in conjunction with Order 7(8) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territo-
ry. Cf. also Obi Okoye A Essays on Civil Proceedings Volume One 1986 314. With regard to the content of the 
application, see also para. III.C.1.b) above. 
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 Cf. Obi Okoye A Essays on Civil Proceedings Volume One 1986 315. 
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 See also Obi Okoye A Essays on Civil Proceedings Volume One 1986 315. 
359
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 Cf. also para. III.C.2.b) above.  
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As indicated above, in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja, evidence of foreign witnesses may be taken on commission, if “it appears 
necessary for the purpose of justice”.361 In Industrial Bank Limited (Merchant Bankers) v Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria,
362
 it was held that it is a matter of judicial discretion whether or not a 
commission is granted, and that such discretion is to be exercised according to the particular 
circumstances of each case. It appears that Industrial Bank Limited (Merchant Bankers) v Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria is the only Nigerian court decision that has been published in relation to 
the taking of foreign evidence on commission. In this decision, Odunowo J held that he is not 
aware of any local authority dealing with the issue, and that this is not entirely surprising, as 
applications for taking evidence abroad on commission feature only sparingly in Nigerian 
courts.
363
 
According to Industrial Bank Limited (Merchant Bankers) v Central Bank of Nigeria, a court 
will refuse a grant of commission where the evidence to be adduced is not directly relevant. It 
was furthermore held that an application for the taking of evidence on commission will be re-
jected “where it appears under the procedure of the foreign court, the witness will not be 
cross-examined in the ordinary way as it is done in Nigeria”.364 These principles were formu-
lated based on English case law. With reference to the English cases of New v Burns
365
 and 
Ross v Woodford,
366
 Aguda emphasised that a court will not, without good reasons, grant an 
application for commission of a foreign plaintiff to be examined outside Nigeria, as it was the 
plaintiff who had chosen the forum.
367
 A defendant domiciled abroad, however, who is sued in 
Nigeria is, according to Aguda, entitled to give evidence before a commissioner at the place 
where he lives.
368
 Based on the English decision of Coch v Allcock & Co,
369
 Aguda further-
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 Order 38(11)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
362
 (1998) FHCLR 72 at 73, 79 with reference to Coch v Allcock & Co (1888) LR 21 QBD 178 at 181. 
363
 (1998) FHCLR 72 at 78. 
364
 (1998) FHCLR 72 at 73 et seq., 78 et seq. with reference to Ehrmann v Ehrmann [1886] 2 Ch D 611 at 614 
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the effect of his examination-in-chief. I decline to delegate my discretion to any other tribunal (...).” 
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 (1894) 64 LJ QB 104 at 105. 
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 [1894] 1 Ch 38 at 40. 
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 Aguda TA Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of Nigeria 1980 
491 n. 42.47 
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 Aguda TA Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of Nigeria 1980 
491 n. 42.47.  
369
 (1888) LR 21 QBD 178. 
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more concluded that where the examination of a non-party witness abroad would be much less 
expensive than bringing the witness to Nigeria, and the presence of the witness before the Ni-
gerian court is not essential, a commission will be granted. In cases, however, where the at-
tendance of the third-party witness is crucial, the litigant applying for commission must, ac-
cording to Aguda, clearly show that he cannot bring the witness to Nigeria.
370
  
An application under Order 38(11)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory is made by motion supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds on which the liti-
gant requests the taking of evidence on commission.
371
 With regard to the content of the affi-
davit, the comments regarding the application for commission under Rule 38(3) of the South 
African High Court Rules apply mutatis mutandis.
372
 
Neither Order 38(11) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, nor any 
other provision in the said Rules stipulates the time when the application for the taking of evi-
dence on commission is to be made. As a general rule, such application should only be granted 
once the litigants have concluded their pleadings. Only at this stage it is clear what evidence is 
required.
373
 
Once the application under Order 38(11)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capi-
tal Territory is granted,
374
 the High Court issues a letter of request to take evidence abroad. The 
subsequent procedure differs depending on whether or not there is a relevant convention to 
which Nigeria and the foreign state, where the evidence is located, are parties. Where such a 
convention exists, the litigant making the application has to file in the Registry of the High 
Court an undertaking to be responsible for all the expenses incurred by the Nigerian govern-
ment in respect of the execution of the letter of request.
375
 In addition, a copy of the interroga-
tories and cross-interrogatories to be put to the witness, and, where necessary, a translation 
thereof in the official language of the foreign state, have to be attached. The High Court then 
issues a letter of request addressed to the competent judicial authority of the foreign state in-
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 Aguda TA Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of Nigeria 1980 
491 n. 42.48 with reference to Lawson v Vacuum Brake Company [1884] LR 27 Ch D 137 at 143.  
371
 Orders 7(2)(1), and 7(3) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
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 See also in this regard para. III.C.2.b) above. 
374
 Order 38(13)(2) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory read in conjunction with Form 
63 in the Appendix to these Rules. 
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 Order 38(14)(a) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. Cf. also Form 65 in the Ap-
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cluding a translation in the language of such state.
376
 Based on Form 66 in the Appendix to the 
Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, it seems that the High Court does not 
name a particular individual as commissioner in the letter of request, but leaves this issue en-
tirely to the competent foreign authority. 
In case of a convention allowing Nigerian diplomatic agents to examine witnesses in the rele-
vant foreign country, Order 38(15) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Terri-
tory stipulates a simplified procedure. Here, the High Court merely issues an order for the ap-
pointment of the Nigerian diplomatic agent to act as a special examiner. Based on Form 67 in 
the Appendix to the aforesaid Rules, it appears that such an order is not addressed to any au-
thority of the foreign state, but only to the Nigerian diplomatic agent in the said country. 
Hence, it is submitted that due to the concept of sovereignty, the procedure in Order 38(15) on-
ly applies where the relevant convention or the laws of the foreign state allows Nigeria to have 
evidence taken by its diplomatic agents without the prior authorisation of the said state.
377
 
Where no convention on cross-border taking of evidence between Nigeria and the relevant for-
eign state exists, Order 38(13) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory 
applies. This provision makes reference to Form 64 in the Appendix to the said Rules, namely 
the letter of request addressed to the competent foreign authority, but does not, unlike Order 
38(14), mention any other documents that have to accompany such request. The said Form, 
however, makes reference to “the interrogatories which accompany this letter of request”. 
Needless to say, the letter of request should, where necessary, be transmitted to the foreign 
state together with a translation in the official language of the said state. It is furthermore sub-
mitted that the litigant should also provide the High Court with the aforesaid undertaking in 
Form 65 in the Appendix to the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, un-
less the execution of the letter of request by the foreign state is free of charge. 
In case of Order 38(13) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the ex-
amination of the foreign witness is conducted in accordance with the rules of the state where 
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 Order 38(14)(b)(i)-(iii) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory read in conjunction with 
Form 66 in the Appendix to these Rules. In this context, one has to keep in mind that the procedure stipulated 
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the witness is resident.
378
 The same holds true for Order 38(14).
379
 Where the witness is inter-
rogated through a Nigerian diplomatic officer based on Order 38(15), the examination is con-
ducted in terms of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. It goes without 
saying that the diplomatic officer is not allowed to exercise any compulsory power on foreign 
territory.
380
 From the above it follows that the obtaining of foreign evidence under Order 
38(13)-(14) constitutes active judicial assistance, while Order 38(15) refers to passive judicial 
assistance. 
C. Position of Nigeria with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 
Nigeria’s position in relation to the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial 
matters is similar to that of Botswana and Namibia, as Nigeria is not party to any international 
agreement on evidence-taking.
381
 A litigant in civil proceedings pending in Nigeria, who ap-
plies for the taking of evidence in a foreign state, is thus at the latter’s mercy, as he cannot be 
sure whether or not that state will render judicial assistance. 
Following the repeal of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856 and the Evidence by 
Commission Act of 1859 in 1990, Nigeria lacks uniform rules governing letters of request re-
garding the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters issued by foreign states, as each 
of the 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, have their own set of rules. 
This not only complicates requests emanating from foreign states to obtain evidence in Nigeria, 
but it also hampers the development of uniform principles in dealing with foreign letters of re-
quest.  
There is no doubt that the accession of Nigeria to the Hague Evidence Convention would re-
duce some of the foregoing shortcomings. The contracting states to the said Convention would 
be under a public international law obligation to execute requests for judicial assistance ema-
nating from Nigeria.
382
 Moreover, requests from other contracting states would be governed by 
the same rules, irrespective of where in Nigeria the evidence to be obtained is located. Further 
improvement could be achieved by Nigeria entering into bilateral treaties, at least with its 
                                                     
378
 See Form 64 in the Appendix to the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
379
 Cf. Form 66 in the Appendix to the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. According to this 
provision, the High Court, however, asks the competent foreign authority to examine the witness viva voce in 
the presence of the litigants’ counsel, and to allow the parties to interrogate the witness. 
380
 See Form 67 in the Appendix to the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
381
 Cf. paras. IV.C and V.C above. 
382
 Needless to say, the same applies for Nigeria with regard to requests from other contracting states. 
 194 
 
neighbouring countries and leading trading partners, or by pursuing the creation of a regional 
convention in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters.
383
 Experience has shown, 
however, that the negotiation of bilateral treaties and the drafting of an international convention 
can be a lengthy and cumbersome process. A partial correction of the aforesaid shortcomings 
may thus be achieved faster on a national or state level. Such improvement can best be realised 
through the harmonisation of the rules on cross-border taking of evidence in the various states 
of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, for instance, by reactivating a modernised 
version of the repealed Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856.  
VII. Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters in Uganda 
A. General Remarks 
Uganda is neither a member of the Hague Procedure Convention or the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, nor has it entered into any other agreement on the taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters. Further, Uganda is not a party to the Vienna Consular Convention.
384
 
Thus, judicial assistance in evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters between Uganda 
and other states, if rendered at all, is based on courtoisie internationale.
385
 
In the light of the above, the subsequent subchapter investigates, on the one hand, the execu-
tion of requests emanating from foreign states to obtain evidence on Ugandan soil and, on the 
other, applications of litigants in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of Uganda 
seeking evidence abroad. 
B. Taking of Evidence based on Courtoisie Internationale 
1. Obtaining Evidence in Uganda for the Benefit of a Court Abroad 
Requests for taking evidence in Uganda for the benefit of civil proceedings pending abroad are 
governed by Sections 5-10 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act.
386
 Section 5(1) of the said 
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Act provides that where it appears to the High Court of Uganda
387
 that a court of competent 
jurisdiction in a Commonwealth country or foreign state, before which a civil or commercial 
matter is pending, is desirous to obtain the testimony of a witness within the jurisdiction of the 
High Court, the latter may order the examination of such witness upon oath, affirmation, inter-
rogatories, or otherwise before any person named in the order. By virtue of Section 5(2) of the 
Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, the High Court may command the attendance of the witness 
for the purpose of being examined, or the production of any document to be mentioned in the 
order. The Ugandan Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act was inspired by the English Foreign Tri-
bunals Evidence Act of 1856.
388
 It therefore comes as no surprise that the wording of Section 
5(1)-(2) of the Ugandan Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act is virtually identical with that of Sec-
tion 1 of the English Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856.
389
 
It seems that there is no reported case law on the taking of evidence on Ugandan soil for the 
benefit of civil proceedings pending abroad.
390
 Given the practically identical wording of Sec-
tion 5 of the Ugandan Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act and Section 1 of its English counterpart, 
it is submitted that, when faced with a request based on the former Act, the High Court of 
Uganda should take into account the relevant principles developed by English case law under 
Section 1 of the English Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856. Since these principles have 
already been outlined in relation to Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal 
Capital Territory in Nigeria, reference can be made to the relevant comments.
391
 
The request for obtaining evidence in Uganda has, as a general rule, to be accompanied by a 
certificate under the hand of a diplomatic representative of the state where the civil proceed-
ings, for whose benefit the evidence is to be obtained, are pending. Such certificate has to state 
that the lawsuit, in relation to which the application is made, is a civil or commercial matter 
pending before a court of the country which the diplomatic agent represents, and that the said 
court is desirous of obtaining the testimony of a particular witness in Uganda.
392
 It is submitted 
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that the application cannot only be made by the trial court, but also by a litigant, provided the 
latter can produce the aforesaid certificate.
393
 When granting the application, the High Court 
may give directions as to the time, place, and manner of the examination, as well as all other 
matters connected with the examination as may appear reasonable and just. Such directions are 
enforced in like manner as an order made by the High Court in a lawsuit pending before it.
394
 
The witness in Uganda may decline to answer questions tending to incriminate him, as well as 
other questions which he in any lawsuit pending before the High Court would be entitled to 
refuse to answer. The same holds true with regard to the production of documents.
395
 
Apart from the aforesaid directions and the provision on the privileges of the witness, the For-
eign Tribunals Evidence Act is silent on what rules govern the taking of evidence located in 
Uganda. Order 28(19) of the Civil Procedure Rules refers to “commissions issued by foreign 
courts”. It stipulates that the provisions as to the “execution and return of commissions for the 
examination of witnesses” shall apply to commissions emanating by courts situated in any part 
of the Commonwealth other than Uganda, as well as by courts of any foreign country for the 
time being in alliance with the state of Uganda. While it can be assumed that “return of com-
missions” refers to Order 28(7) of the Civil Procedure Rules,396 it is not fully clear to what Or-
der(s) “provisions as to the execution” relates. It is submitted that reference is made to Order 
28(16)-(18) of the aforesaid Rules, which regulates the powers of a commissioner as well as 
the procedure for the taking of evidence on commission in civil proceedings pending in Ugan-
da. Neither the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act nor the Civil Procedure Rules addresses the 
relation between Sections 5-10 of the said Act and Order 28(19) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
It is submitted that Order 28(19) supplements the provisions in Sections 5-10 of the Foreign 
Tribunals Evidence Act. This makes sense, as Sections 5-10 of Foreign Tribunals Evidence 
Act, with the aforesaid exceptions, do not include any provisions on the conduct of the witness 
examination. The same applies with regard to the powers of the commissioner. In this context, 
it is furthermore submitted that compared to Order 28 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Foreign 
Tribunals Evidence Act constitutes lex specialis and thus prevails over Order 28. As a conse-
quence, the provisions in Order 28(16)-(18) of the Civil Procedure Rules should only apply, if 
they do not contravene any rules laid down in the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act. 
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It follows from the above, that the examination of a witness residing in Uganda for the benefit 
of foreign civil proceedings is conducted in accordance with Ugandan law, in particular with 
the Civil Procedure Rules. This holds particularly true for the summoning, attendance, and 
questioning of the witness, as well as the measures to be taken in the event the witness fails to 
cooperate with the commissioner or the High Court.
397
 The commissioner may apply to the 
High Court by which he was appointed for the issue of any process that he may find necessary 
to issue to or against the witness.
398
 The High Court ordering the commission directs that the 
litigants shall appear before the commissioner in person, by their agents, or advocates. Where 
any of the parties fails to appear, the commissioner may proceed in their absence.
399
 Order 
28(16)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules stipulates that the commissioner may examine the par-
ties and any witness whom they may produce and any other person whom the commissioner 
thinks proper to call upon to give evidence. The commissioner may furthermore call for and 
examine documents, and other things relevant to the subject of the inquiry.
400
 It is submitted 
that Order 28(16)(a) and (b) does only apply to a limited extent where a witness in Uganda is 
examined for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings. Here, the commissioner should only ex-
amine the witnesses mentioned in the letter of request. The same should apply with regard to 
the production of documents.  
2. Obtaining Evidence Abroad for the Benefit of a Ugandan Court 
Section 53(a) of the Civil Procedure Act
401 empowers the court to issue a commission to exam-
ine any person. In case the witness is resident abroad, the High Court may, in lieu of ordering a 
commission, issue a letter of request to examine the witness at any place outside Uganda.
402
 
Order 28(5) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that “where any court to which application 
is made for the issue of a commission for the examination of a person residing at any place not 
within Uganda is satisfied that the evidence of such person is necessary, the court may issue 
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such commission or a letter of request”. This provision constitutes an exception from the gen-
eral rule that under Ugandan law, witnesses give evidence viva voce and in open court.
403
 
Order 28 of the Civil Procedure Rules includes, with the exception of Order 28(5) and (19),
404
 
provisions on commissions for the examination of witnesses located in Uganda. In this context, 
one has to keep in mind that with regard to foreign witnesses, Order 28 of the said Rules can 
only stipulate the conditions under which a litigant in civil proceedings pending in Uganda 
may apply to the High Court for evidence to be taken on commission. How the examination of 
the witness is conducted in the foreign state, is, however, governed by the laws of such state.
405
 
The power of the High Court to issue a commission under Order 28(5) of the Civil Procedure 
Rules is discretionary. Accordingly, the said provision does not issue a right to the litigant ap-
plying for commission, rather the commission has to be justified by showing good reasons.
406
 
In Batten & Others v Kampala African Bus Company,
407
 it was held: 
“the court is not bound to issue a commission if it may result in manifest injustice 
to any party, or where it is not calculated to permit of evidence being tested fair-
ly, or when the application is made to avoid cross-examination before the court.”
 
 
The considerations to be taken into account when deciding whether or not to grant an applica-
tion for commission were summarised in Uganda Revenue Authority v Toro & Mityana Tea Co 
Ltd.
408
 In this decision, the court stated that an application does not only have to be made bona 
fide,
409
 but also without delay. It was furthermore held that the nature of the evidence to be tak-
en has to be considered, and that a commission will more readily be issued where the evidence 
required is of a formal nature than where exhaustive cross-examination is likely. Moreover, it 
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the fact, that the applicant failed to disclose the actual reasons for the refusal of the foreign witness to come to 
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subject to a warrant of arrest. 
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was pointed out that the court has to take into consideration the expenses of bringing a foreign 
witness to Uganda and the costs for a commission conducted abroad.
410
 
With regard to an application from foreign litigants to have evidence taken on commission, it 
was furthermore held in Uganda Revenue Authority v Toro & Mityana Tea Co Ltd
411
 that the 
onus on a plaintiff is normally substantially heavier than that on the defendant, because the 
plaintiff has chosen the forum. The court pointed out that the burden of proof is also heavier 
where the evidence required is that of a litigant than where it is the evidence of any third party, 
as the unwillingness of a litigant to appear in person as opposed to his inability is no reason to 
allow a commission. It was also emphasised that a litigant cannot compel the attendance of a 
non-party witness located abroad. The court furthermore held that in any case, the applicant 
must show that the evidence is necessary, and that there is some good reason why he should be 
excused from appearing or calling his witness, as the case may be, in person. In the case of a 
foreign litigant, it was stated that there may be some personal reasons, such as ill health,
412
 or 
the inability to obtain a visa. Similar reasons may apply to a non-party witness, or the applica-
tion may be based on the latter’s refusal to attend. 
In Uganda Revenue Authority v Toro & Mityana Tea Co. Ltd, the application for taking evi-
dence on commission was, amongst other things, refused as the application for commission did 
not aver that the foreign witness was the only competent witness, and that there was no other 
person aware and conversant with the particular subject of the hearing of evidence.
413
 
An application for the issue of a commission is made by a motion setting out the grounds for 
the application and supported by affidavit.
414
 Once the application is granted, the High Court 
issues a letter of request, which is then sent through the diplomatic channels under the foreign 
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 Cf. also Batten & Others v Kampala African Bus Company [1959] EA 328 at 329B. 
411
 [2007] UGCommC 23 (http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/commercial-court/2007/23; date of use: 31 January 
2013) with reference to Premchand Raichand Ltd & Anor v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others 
[1969] EA 514 at 515I-516D. 
412
 See also in this regard Sarin Industrial Corporation v Charles Twongere [2011] UGCommC 105 
(http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/commercial-court/2011/105; date of use: 31 January 2013). 
413
 [2007] UGCommC 23 (http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/commercial-court/2007/23; date of use: 31 January 
2013). Cf. furthermore Premchand Raichand Ltd & Anor v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others 
[1969] EA 514 at 516D-E, where it was held that the decisions in older cases dealing with the taking of evi-
dence on commission should only be applied with caution, and that the onus on an applicant today will tend to 
be heavier than was formerly the case. In this context, it was mentioned that with modern means of transport, a 
witness will in most cases be able to attend a trial without being away from his home or business for more than 
a few days, whereas in the past, the journey might have taken weeks or months. 
414
 Order 28(2) read in conjunction with Order 52(1) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Rules. With regard to the rea-
sons to be stated in the application, see the comments made in para. III.C.2.b) above. 
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office to the competent authority in the state where the witness is located.
415
 It is submitted that 
in the letter of request, the High Court may suggest a particular individual as commissioner. 
The foreign authority, however, is not bound by such a proposition and may appoint any per-
son it deems fit to examine the witness. 
Order 28 of the Civil Procedure Rules is silent on the time when an application for commission 
can be made. Once again, such application should, as a general rule, only be granted once the 
litigants have concluded their pleadings.  
C. Position of Uganda with Regard to Cross-border Taking of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 
Uganda’s position regarding transborder evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters is 
similar to that of Botswana. In order to avoid any unnecessary repetition, reference can thus be 
made to the relevant comments in this regard.
416
  
VIII. Conclusion 
With regard to the countries dealt with in this thesis, cross-border taking of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters can be divided into two main categories, namely the group composed 
of Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria and Uganda, and the category comprising Switzerland. This 
dichotomy is, on the one hand, based on the differentiation between civil- and common-law 
countries and, on the other, on the fact of whether judicial assistance is granted based on cour-
toisie internationale, or on a relevant international treaty. While Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Uganda follow the common-law tradition and are not party to any international agreement 
on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, Switzerland is a civil-law 
country that is a member of both the Hague Procedure Convention and the Hague Evidence 
Convention. Compared to the aforesaid countries, South Africa is in an intermediate position, 
as it shares the common-law tradition,
417
 but it has also acceded to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention. 
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 Section 55 of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 28(5) of the Civil Procedures Rules. See also Sarin Industrial 
Corporation v Charles Twongere [2011] UGCommC 105 (http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/commercial-
court/2011/105; date of use: 31 January 2013). 
416
 Cf. para. IV.C above. 
417
 Strictly speaking, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia, follow a hybrid system. The rules on civil procedure 
in these countries are, however, derived from English law. Consequently, South Africa, Botswana, and Namib-
ia share the common-law tradition with regard to civil procedure. Cf. also Chapter 2 para. IV.B.2.a). 
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Switzerland ratified the Hague Procedure Convention in 1957. Under this Convention, Switzer-
land renders judicial assistance based on a letter of request issued by the competent judicial 
authority of the requesting state. The request is executed by the competent Swiss judge in 
whose jurisdiction the evidence is located, in accordance with the rules of the Swiss Civil Pro-
cedure Code. Letters of request have to be transmitted by consular channels to the Federal Of-
fice of Justice which forwards it to the competent judge. In 1995, Switzerland acceded to the 
Hague Evidence Convention, which provides for three methods to obtain evidence abroad, 
namely by letter of request, through commissioners, or by diplomatic officers and consular 
agents. Letters of request are executed by the aforesaid Swiss judge applying Swiss law. By 
contrast, it is not a member of the Swiss judicial authority who acts as commissioner, but any 
private individual who examines the witness in Switzerland in accordance with the law of the 
requesting state. The same applies when a diplomatic officer or consular agent representing the 
requesting state in Switzerland conducts the examination of the relevant witness. Requests un-
der the Hague Evidence Convention have to be sent to the central authority of the Swiss can-
ton, usually the court of second instance, in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located. Appli-
cations for the taking of evidence through commissioners, diplomatic officers, and consular 
agents require a special authorisation of the Federal Office of Justice. With respect to requests 
to obtain evidence in Switzerland emanating from foreign states that are neither members of 
the Hague Procedure Convention, nor of the Hague Evidence Convention, Switzerland applies 
by analogy the provisions of the Hague Procedure Convention. Consequently, requests are ex-
ecuted by a Swiss judge based on Swiss law. Unlike the other countries dealt with in this the-
sis, Swiss law does not contain a specific rule on the conditions under which a litigant in civil 
proceedings pending in Switzerland may apply to the trial court for evidence to be taken 
abroad. In case the Swiss court gives leave to an application, it issues a request wherein the 
foreign state is asked to assist in taking the relevant evidence. It is up to the foreign state to de-
cide whether, and if so, in what manner, it renders judicial assistance. Accordingly, the evi-
dence is taken in accordance with the relevant rules of the foreign state, unless the latter allows 
the evidence to be examined based on the law of the requesting state. This not only holds true 
for letters of request issued by Swiss courts, but also for those emanating from the other coun-
tries dealt with in this thesis. 
South Africa acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention in 1997. Although the provisions of 
this Convention have not yet been incorporated into domestic law, South Africa has in the past 
not only executed requests emanating from other contracting states based on the Convention, 
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but has also sent requests to other member states. Unlike Switzerland, South Africa only exe-
cutes letters of request and applications for evidence-taking by commissioners, but not requests 
for the collection of evidence through diplomatic officers and consular agents. Letters of re-
quest are usually executed by the magistrate in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located in 
accordance with South African law, while a commissioner applies the law of the requesting 
state when conducting the examination in South Africa. Requests under the Hague Evidence 
Convention to obtain evidence in South Africa have to be sent via the Director-General of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. In case the evidence is to be taken by a 
commissioner, the application has to be authorised by the High Court in the jurisdiction of 
which the evidentiary material is situated.
418
 Where the Hague Evidence Convention is not ap-
plicable, South African law provides two different procedures for obtaining evidence in South 
Africa. Under the Foreign Courts Evidence Act, a request may be lodged with the High Court 
in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located. If it appears to the High Court that the court in 
the foreign state is desirous to obtain the relevant evidence in relation to civil proceedings 
pending before such court, it orders the examination and appoints a commissioner. The latter 
conducts the examination in accordance with the rules of a magistrate’s court that apply in pro-
ceedings similar to those in connection with which the evidence is sought. Alternatively, evi-
dence in South Africa may be sought based on Section 33(1) of the Supreme Court Act. Here, 
the letter of request has to be addressed to the Director-General who grants the request, unless 
the Minister of Justice considers it desirable that the litigants should make an application di-
rectly to the High Court based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act. Once the request is granted 
by the Director-General, it is forwarded to the competent High Court which makes the neces-
sary order for the appointment of a commissioner who, in turn, examines the witness in ac-
cordance with the South African rules of procedure and evidence. Both under the Foreign 
Courts Evidence Act and Section 33(1) of the Supreme Court Act, a request for taking evi-
dence in South Africa may be refused based on Section 1 of the Protection of Businesses Act. 
This provision prohibits the cross-border furnishing of information relating to any business 
conducted in or outside South Africa in response to letters of request emanating from foreign 
countries. Where a litigant in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of South Africa 
wishes to obtain evidence abroad, he has to apply for a so-called “commission de bene esse” 
based on Rule 38(3) of the High Court Rules. Under this provision, the High Court may dis-
pense with the appearance of a foreign witness in court, if it appears convenient or necessary 
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 See also in this regard fn. 175. 
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for the purposes of justice that his evidence is taken abroad through a commissioner. The tak-
ing of evidence on commission constitutes an exception from the general rule that witnesses 
are examined viva voce before the trial court. A commission de bene esse is thus only granted 
when certain requirements are met which include, inter alia, the materiality and relevancy of 
the evidence, as well as the witness’ inability to appear before the trial court. In addition, the 
High Court has to take into account how convenient and expensive the evidence-taking through 
a commissioner will be, what will be the prejudice to the party seeking the commission, if the 
latter is refused, and the detriment to the opponent if the commission is granted, as well as how 
important it would be for the trial court to observe the witness’ demeanour at trial. As a general 
rule, South African courts are reluctant to allow foreign litigants to give evidence abroad. This 
particularly holds true for plaintiffs having chosen the forum. By contrast, applications for the 
taking of evidence of foreign non-party witnesses by a commissioner are usually granted, as 
the High Court cannot compel them to come to South Africa to testify in court. Once the High 
Court has granted the application for commission, it issues a letter of request to the foreign 
state where the evidence is located. 
Botswana has not entered into any international treaty on the taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters. Between Botswana and other states, judicial assistance in evidence-taking, 
if rendered at all, is based on courtoisie internationale. Applications for obtaining evidence in 
Botswana for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings are, based on the Foreign Tribunals Evi-
dence Act, to be lodged with the High Court in whose jurisdiction the evidence is located. The 
latter grants the application, if it appears that the court situated abroad is desirous of obtaining 
the relevant evidence in Botswana. The High Court appoints a commissioner who conducts the 
examination in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence that apply in civil proceed-
ings pending before the High Court. Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court governs appli-
cations of litigants in civil proceedings before the High Court, who wish to obtain evidence sit-
uated outside Botswana. The wording of this provision is virtually identical with that of Rule 
38(3) of the South African High Court Rules. It therefore comes as no surprise that the High 
Court of Botswana applies the principles South African case law formulated with regard to 
Rule 38(3) of the South African High Court Rules.  
Namibia has neither acceded to the Hague Procedure Convention and the Hague Evidence 
Convention, nor to any other international agreement on evidence-taking in civil and commer-
cial matters. Namibian law provides for two methods for the obtaining of evidence in Namibia 
for the benefit of civil proceedings pending abroad. An application can either be lodged with 
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the competent High Court based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act, or with the Permanent 
Secretary for Justice based on Section 29 of the High Court Act. The wording of the Namibian 
Foreign Courts Evidence Act is practically identical with that of the South African Foreign 
Courts Evidence Act. The same holds true with regard to Section 29 of the High Court Act and 
Section 33 of the South African Supreme Court Act. Under Section 2 of the Second General 
Law Amendment Act, the furnishing of information as to any business, whether operating in or 
outside Namibia, in compliance with any letter of request emanating from a foreign state is 
prohibited, except with the permission of the Minister of Trade and Industry. In terms of Sec-
tion 28 of the High Court Act, a litigant in civil proceedings pending before the High Court of 
Namibia, who is unable to secure the attendance of a witness at the trial because of the latter’s 
foreign domicile, may lodge an application with the High Court for the issue of a letter of re-
quest to the competent foreign authority to examine such witness.  
Like Botswana and Namibia, Nigeria is not a party to any international treaty on the taking of 
evidence in civil and commercial matters. Where a court outside Nigeria is desirous of obtain-
ing evidence located in the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abu-
ja, an application may, based on Order 38(41) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal 
Capital Territory, be lodged with the High Court. When granting such application, the High 
Court appoints a commissioner who takes the evidence in accordance with Nigerian law. Order 
38(11) of the aforesaid Rules governs the application of a litigant in proceedings before the 
High Court for obtaining evidence outside Nigeria. The High Court grants such application 
where it appears necessary for the purpose of justice to make an order for the examination of a 
foreign witness on commission. When determining whether or not to grant an application for 
commission, the High Court takes, inter alia, into consideration the relevancy of the evidence, 
as well as the fact whether under the foreign procedure, the witness will be cross-examined in 
the ordinary way. While a commission in relation to foreign non-party witnesses should gener-
ally be granted, the High Court should be more reluctant to allow a foreign litigant, in particu-
lar a plaintiff, to be examined abroad.  
Since Uganda is not a party to any international agreement on evidence-taking in civil and 
commercial matters, judicial assistance between Uganda and other states in this regard, if ren-
dered at all, is based on courtoisie internationale. Applications for obtaining evidence in 
Uganda for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings are governed by Section 5 of the Foreign 
Tribunals Evidence Act. By virtue of this provision, the High Court appoints a commissioner 
who conducts the examination in accordance with Ugandan law. Based on Order 28(5) of the 
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Civil Procedure Rules, a litigant in civil proceedings pending before the Ugandan High Court 
may lodge an application with the latter to have foreign evidence taken on commission. When 
considering whether or not to order a commission, the court takes into account, amongst other 
things, whether the refusal or granting of a commission will result in manifest injustice to any 
litigant, the application was made bona fide and without delay, and whether the evidence is rel-
evant. In comparison with foreign third parties and defendants, the High Court is generally re-
luctant to allow a plaintiff to testify abroad. When granting a commission for the examination 
of a witness abroad, the High Court issues a letter of request to the competent authority in the 
foreign state.  
The foregoing shows that the basic principles governing cross-border taking of evidence in 
Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are similar. A court in the 
requesting state or a litigant in civil proceedings pending in such state has to lodge a request 
with the competent authority of the requested state to take evidence located on the latter’s terri-
tory. Where no relevant international treaty applies, such a request has either to be addressed to 
the department of justice of the requested state, or directly to the high court in whose jurisdic-
tion the evidence to be obtained is situated. In both cases, it is the competent court of the re-
quested state that makes the necessary order for the taking of the relevant evidence.
419
 In South 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, the court usually appoints a commissioner to 
conduct the examination of the relevant witness. By contrast, in Switzerland, no commissioner 
is nominated, but it is the court that questions the witness. In all of the aforesaid countries, the 
commissioner or court usually conducts the examination in accordance with the rules of the 
requested state. 
With regard to the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, Switzer-
land is fairly well-positioned. In relation to its immediate neighbouring countries, as well as the 
member states of the European Union, the evidence-taking is either governed by the Hague Ev-
idence Convention, or by the Hague Procedure Convention. The same holds true for the major 
trading partners of Switzerland. Having said this, it should be the aim of Switzerland to negoti-
ate bilateral treaties with states that are not parties to the foregoing conventions. Only in this 
way can an international obligation to render judicial assistance and binding principles govern-
ing the evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters between Switzerland and these coun-
tries be established.  
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 Once the application has been granted by the department of justice, the latter forwards the request to the com-
petent high court. 
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By acceding to the Hague Evidence Convention, South Africa ensured that its leading trading 
partners and the vast majority of European countries are under an international obligation to 
execute requests for evidence-taking emanating from South Africa. To enable litigants in civil 
proceedings pending before a South African court to claim direct rights under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, South Africa should, however, incorporate the provisions of the Convention 
into its domestic law. The situation is different with regard to South Africa’s immediate neigh-
bouring countries, as well as other African states. Here, in the absence of any relevant interna-
tional agreement, litigants in civil proceedings in South Africa seeking evidence in another Af-
rican country are at the latter’s mercy, as such a state is under no international obligation to 
render judicial assistance. In the short-term, this shortcoming could be overcome by negotiat-
ing bilateral treaties with the aforesaid countries. In the long-term, however, the preparation of 
a regional convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters 
amongst sub-Saharan African states may be a more sustainable option. Among the participat-
ing countries, the drafting of such a convention would create a uniform legal area in evidence-
taking in civil and commercial matters. It is furthermore recommended that South Africa har-
monise its domestic rules governing requests emanating from foreign states to obtain evidence 
in South Africa. Here, the provisions in Section 33 of the Supreme Court Act should be consol-
idated with the Foreign Courts Evidence Act. Finally, South Africa should repeal the Protec-
tion of Businesses Act. This Act not only violates South Africa’s international obligation to 
execute requests for judicial assistance under the Hague Evidence Convention, but it practical-
ly also prohibits any form of international cooperation in evidence-taking in civil and commer-
cial matters. 
The recommendations for South Africa regarding the preparation of bilateral treaties, as well as 
of a regional convention also apply to Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. In addition, 
the said countries should accede to the Hague Evidence Convention. Compared to South Afri-
ca, the need to change the status quo in these countries in relation to cross-border taking of ev-
idence in civil and commercial matters is more pressing, as they are not party to the Hague Ev-
idence Convention (and the Hague Procedure Convention). With respect to Namibia, the 
consolidation of the rules in Section 29 of the High Court Act with the Foreign Courts Evi-
dence Act is recommended. Furthermore, Namibia should also repeal Section 2 of the Second 
General Law Amendment Act. In relation to Nigeria, consideration should be given to the har-
monisation of the domestic rules governing requests emanating from foreign states to obtain 
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evidence in Nigeria. Currently, there are no uniform rules in this regard, although each of the 
36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, has its own set of rules. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MEANS OF PROOF AND PROCEDURE FOR THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN 
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN SWITZERLAND, SOUTH AFRICA, 
BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, NIGERIA, AND UGANDA 
 
I. Introduction 
The preceding Chapter 4 focused on the conventions, statutes, and rules that apply in Switzer-
land, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, and stipulated under what condi-
tions evidence in the said countries can be obtained for the benefit of civil proceedings pending 
abroad. Chapter 4 also investigated the requirements under which a litigant in civil proceedings 
pending in one of the aforementioned countries may apply for the taking of evidence located in 
a foreign state. By contrast, this Chapter outlines the means of proof
1
 available in civil pro-
ceedings in Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, as well as the 
procedure for the taking of evidence in these countries. 
When executing a request for obtaining evidence abroad by means of active judicial assistance, 
the competent authority in the requested state usually applies its own law.
2
 As has been men-
tioned earlier,
3
 discrepancies between the means of proof and the procedures for the taking of 
evidence in the laws of the requesting and requested state may, in the last resort, result in the 
inadmissibility of the foreign evidence in the proceedings pending in the requesting state. Hav-
ing said this, it is recommended that a litigant, who seeks evidence abroad, investigates first the 
nature of the particular means of proof as well as the procedure for the taking of evidence un-
der the laws of the foreign state, before requesting the evidence to be taken abroad. This allows 
the party to better assess the prospects of success of cross-border taking of evidence, or, in oth-
er words, to evaluate whether he is able to obtain the foreign evidence and, if so, to what extent 
the latter will be admissible in the proceedings before the trial court.  
To identify the abovementioned discrepancies, it is necessary to outline the means of proof, 
and the procedure for the taking of evidence in civil proceedings in each of the aforesaid coun-
tries. This analysis also forms the starting point for the establishment of basic principles for a 
                                                     
1
 Means of proof deal with how the affected party may tender his evidence in court. See in this regard, amongst 
others, Omage VA A Digest of the Nigerian Law of Evidence 1993 94. 
2
 See in this regard Chapter 2 para. V.C. 
3
 Cf. Chapter 3 para. V.D.4. 
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convention on the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters between 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda dealt with in Chapter 6. A comprehen-
sive account of the means of proof and the procedure for the taking of evidence in Switzerland, 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda would by far exceed the scope of this 
thesis. The following comments thus only provide a general overview in this regard. 
II. Switzerland 
A. General Remarks  
Article 168(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code specifies the means of proof available in or-
dinary proceedings in civil and commercial matters in Switzerland,
4
 namely witness testimo-
ny,
5
 documents,
6
 inspection,
7
 expert opinions,
8
 written information,
9
 party testimony,
10
 and tes-
timony given under oath.
11
 The said rule provides for a numerus clausus. In other words, other 
means of proof than those mentioned in Article 168(1) are generally not permitted.
12
 
By virtue of Article 11a(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act,
13
 a Swiss court taking 
evidence for the benefit of civil proceedings pending abroad may, upon petition of the request-
ing authority, apply a foreign legal procedure for the enforcement of the claim abroad, unless 
there are important reasons in relation to the witness domiciled in Switzerland not to do so.
14
 
Moreover, a Swiss judge may issue documents or take an affidavit from an applicant in accord-
ance with a form of foreign law if the Swiss form is not recognised abroad and if a claim merit-
ing protection could not be asserted there.
15
 As a result, the aforesaid numerus clausus may not 
be relevant where a Swiss judge takes evidence based on the law of the requesting state, and 
                                                     
4
 Cf. Chapter 1. See also Article 254 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
5
 In German, so-called “Zeugnis”. 
6
 In German, so-called “Urkunden”. 
7
 In German, so-called “Augenschein”. 
8
 In German, so-called “Gutachten”. 
9
 In German, so-called “schriftliche Auskunft”. 
10
 In German, so-called “Parteibefragung”. 
11
 In German, so-called “Beweisaussage”. 
12
 See, amongst others, Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 168ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C 
(eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1028 n. 1, 1029 n. 4; Hafner P ʻArt. 168ʼ in 
Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 800 
n. 1; Reinert P ʻArt. 168ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 679 n. 
1; Hasenböhler F ʻDas Beweisrechtʼ 2007 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess- und Zwangsvollstre-
ckungsrecht 387; Spühler K, Dolge A, and Gehri M Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht und Grundzüge des in-
ternationalen Zivilprozessrechts 2010 252 n. 149 et seq. See, however, Article 168(2) of the Swiss Civil Pro-
cedure Code which excludes the numerus clausus with regard to child affairs in family disputes.  
13
 Of 18 December 1987, SR 291.  
14
 See also Article 9(2) of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
15
 Article 11a(3) of the Swiss Private International Law Act. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said 
Act, cf. http://www.umbricht.ch/de/frameset7.html#2 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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such law includes means of proof that are not listed in Article 168(1) of the Swiss Civil Proce-
dure Code. A court in Switzerland may thus, for instance, question a non-party witness under 
oath, although the Swiss Civil Procedure Code does not provide for such procedure. The same 
holds true for the cross-examination of witnesses by the parties’ counsel, a technique that is 
generally not available under Swiss law.
16
 
B. Witness Testimony 
1. Distinction between Party Witnesses, Non-party Witnesses, and Experts 
The Swiss Civil Procedure Code distinguishes between the oral testimony of “parties” and that 
of “witnesses”, or in the terminology used in this thesis, of non-party and third party witnesses, 
respectively. A litigant cannot be a “witness” and vice versa.17 As a result, the rules on viva 
voce evidence of litigants are distinct from those on oral testimony of non-party witnesses. Ar-
ticles 169-176 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code on “witness testimony” thus only apply to the 
examination of non-party witnesses, but not to the oral evidence of litigants.  
In addition, the Swiss Civil Procedure Code regards an expert not as a non-party witness, but 
treats the expert opinion as an independent means of proof.
18
 Consequently, rules other than 
those on the testimony of a non-party witness apply to the expert. 
2. Competence and Compellability of Non-party Witnesses 
Before outlining the competence of a third-party witness under the Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code, it is necessary to briefly explain the differences between the competence, compellability, 
and privileges of a witness. An individual, be it a litigant or a non-party witness, is competent 
to testify, if he may lawfully give evidence. He is compellable, if he may be obliged to testify. 
A non-compellable witness can decline altogether to enter the witness box and give evidence. 
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 Müller HA ʻArt. 168ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1017 n. 5; Spühler K, Dolge A, and Gehri M Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht und 
Grundzüge des internationalen Zivilprozessrechts 2010 283 n. 327; Schwander I ʻBundesgesetz über das In-
ternationale Privatrecht, no. 1ʼ in Walter G, Jametti Greiner M and Schwander I (eds) Internationales Privat- 
und Verfahrensrecht: Texte und Erläuterungen 2000 15 n. 4; Volken P ʻArt. 11ʼ in Girsberger A et al (eds) 
Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG 2004 159 n. 10; Berti SV ʻArt. 11ʼ in Honsell H et al (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Internationales Privatrecht 2007 87 n. 6. 
17
 Article 169 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See also Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 169ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, 
Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1031 n. 
1; Guyan P ‘Art. 169ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 807 n. 3; Reinert P ʻArt. 169ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozess-
ordnung (ZPO) 2010 681 n. 1.  
18
 Article 168(1)(d) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
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By contrast, a person, who can merely claim a privilege, that is, a right to refuse to answer spe-
cific questions put to him by the court or by a party, is obliged to enter the witness box and 
must listen to the queries, but can decline to reply to a particular question which is covered by 
a privilege, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the privilege of legal advisers.
19
 
Under Swiss law, each individual, who is not a litigant, is competent to testify as non-party 
witness, provided he is physically and mentally fit to do so. The person must be in a position to 
reasonably apprehend what is going on around him, and to convey his observations in an un-
derstandable way to the court. As a result, the Swiss Civil Procedure Code does not stipulate a 
minimum age for non-party witnesses.
20
  
Based on Article 165(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the following persons cannot be 
compelled to give evidence in court: a party’s spouse,21 former spouse, or concubine; a person 
who has children with a litigant; a party’s direct relatives and in-laws in the same line22 and in 
the parental line
23
 to and including the third degree; a litigant’s foster parents, foster children, 
and foster siblings; a party’s guardian, or welfare advocate. The list in Article 165 of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code is exhaustive.
24
 A third party falling under one of the foregoing catego-  
                                                     
19
 See, amongst others, Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 805, 573 et seq.; 
Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 2010 421; Osipitan T ʻCompetence and Com-
pellability of Witness’ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 381.  
20
 See Article 160(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. According to this provision, the court rules at its discre-
tion as to whether a minor has a duty to cooperate, and takes the welfare of the child into account. For the (un-
official) English translation of the said provision, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 564. See also 
Schmid EF ʻArt. 160ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 779 n. 60; Higi P ʻArt. 160ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizeri-
sche Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 956 n. 22 et seqq.; Reinert P ʻArt. 169ʼ in Baker & McKen-
zie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 681 n. 3 et seqq.; Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 169ʼ 
in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessord-
nung 2010 1033 n. 3 et seqq.; Spühler K, Dolge A, and Gehri M Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht und 
Grundzüge des internationalen Zivilprozessrechts 2010 255 n. 164 et seq. 
21
 According to Article 165(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, registered partnerships are treated in the same 
way as marriage. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, 
CCP 2009 565. 
22
 Parents and siblings (first degree); grandparents and grandchildren (second degree); great-grandparents and 
great-grandchildren (third degree). See Schmid EF ʻArt. 165ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) 
Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 790 n. 6. By virtue of Article 165(2) of the 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code, step siblings are treated in the same way as siblings. For the (unofficial) English 
translation of the said provision, see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 565. 
23
 Brothers and sisters (second degree; in the parental line, there is no first degree); nieces, nephews, uncles and 
aunts (third degree). See Schmid EF ʻArt. 165ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kom-
mentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 790 n. 6. 
24
 Higi P ʻArt. 165ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) 
Kommentar 2011 987 n. 9. Ratio legis of the said rule is the protection of the intimacy of the family and regis-
tered partnership. A family member or member of a partnership shall be prevented from giving evidence to the 
detriment of another member, as cooperation with the court usually causes conflict of interests and loyalty 
within a family or partnership. See in this regard Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivil-
 212 
 
ries can refuse to testify without giving any further reasons.
25
 
A compellable non-party witness is under an obligation to cooperate with the court. This not 
only includes the obligation to appear in court to give evidence, but, amongst other things, also 
to tell the truth when testifying, to produce documents,
26
 or to allow experts to inspect his 
property.
27
 Where a non-party witness declines to cooperate in court without good cause,
28
 the 
court may impose a fine, threaten punishment pursuant to Article 292 of the Swiss Criminal 
Code,
29
 order compliance by force, or impose the costs caused by the refusal.
30
 The extent to 
what compliance by force can be ordered is not entirely clear, and will have to be defined by 
case law. There is, however, no doubt that coercive detention is excluded.
31
 Where a non-party 
witness refuses to collaborate, the court may not only apply one of the aforesaid measures, but 
may combine several measures.
32
 Default by a non-party witness has the same consequences as 
                                                                                                                                                                        
prozessordnung (ZPO) (28 June 2006) http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf 7317 (date of use: 31 Janu-
ary 2013); Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 165ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar 
zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1010 n. 6; Higi P ʻArt. 165ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and 
Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 987 n. 6; Berni M ʻArt. 165ʼ in 
Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 662 n. 3. 
25
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (28 June 2006) 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf 7317 (date of use: 31 January 2013). See, however, Article 296(2) 
of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code which stipulates a duty to cooperate in examinations to determine parent-
age. This duty prevails over the right to refuse to cooperate under Article 165 of the said Act. Cf. Berni M 
ʻArt. 165ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 662 n. 2. 
26
 With the exception of correspondence between counsel relating to the professional representation of a litigant 
or a third party, Article 160(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) translation of the said 
provision, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 564. For more on this issue, see, amongst others, Schmid 
EF ʻArt. 160ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zi-
vilprozessordnung 2010 771 n. 16 et seqq.; Berni M ʻArt. 160ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zi-
vilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 648 n. 12; Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 160ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and 
Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 993 n. 7. 
27
 Article 160(1)(a)-(c) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.  
28
 See Articles 165-166 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
29
 Article 292 of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as follows: “Any person who fails to comply with an official 
order that has been issued to him by a competent authority or public official under the threat of the criminal 
penalty for non-compliance in terms of this Article shall be liable to a fine”. For the (unofficial) English trans-
lation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 
2013).  
30
 Article 167(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the (unofficial) English translation of the 
said provision, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. 
31
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (28 June 2006) 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf 7320 (date of use: 31 January 2013); Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 167ʼ in 
Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessord-
nung 2010 1025 n. 14; Schmid EF ʻArt. 167ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommen-
tar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 798 n. 1; Berni M ʻArt. 167ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schwei-
zerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 676 n. 7; Lendemann J ʻArt. 167ʼ in Gehri MA and Kramer M (eds) 
ZPO Kommentar 2010 310 n. 1. 
32
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (28 June 2006) 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf 7320 (date of use: 31 January 2013); Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 167ʼ in 
Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessord-
nung 2010 1025 n. 9; Schmid EF ʻArt. 167ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 798 n. 3; Berni M ʻArt. 167ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizeri-
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an unjustified refusal to cooperate.
33
 The order, wherein a non-party witness is requested to ap-
pear in court to give evidence or to otherwise cooperate with the court, is issued by the court.
34
 
3. Privileges of Non-party Witnesses 
By virtue of Article 166 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, a compellable non-party witness 
can refuse to cooperate with the trial court in establishing particular facts which fall within the 
scope of a privilege listed in the said provision.
35
 The list of privileges in the said provision is 
exhaustive.
36
 The third party invoking a privilege under Article 166 has to show prima facie 
the existence of one of the reasons listed in this provision.
37
  
Article 166(1)(a) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code provides for the privilege against self-
incrimination. By virtue of this rule, a non-party witness can decline to cooperate in establish-
ing facts that would expose him, or a person close to him, within the meaning of Article 165 of 
the said Code to the risk of penal investigation, or civil liability.
38
  
Article 166(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code guarantees the privilege of certain profes-
sionals. Cooperation can be refused, if it would fulfil the offence of divulging secrets in the 
meaning of Article 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code, with the exception of auditors.
39
 Article 
                                                                                                                                                                        
sche Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 675 n. 4; Lendemann J ʻArt. 167ʼ in Gehri MA and Kramer M (eds) 
ZPO Kommentar 2010 310 n. 1. 
33
 Article 167(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, 
cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. For the notion of “default”, see Higi P ʻArt. 167ʼ in Brunner A, 
Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1006 n. 19 et 
seq. 
34
 Articles 136(a) and 170(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
35
 Unlike under Article 165 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the non-party witness cannot refuse altogether to 
give evidence, but can merely decline to collaborate with regard to specific facts. 
36
 Higi P ʻArt. 166ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) 
Kommentar 2011 993 n. 6. 
37
 Higi P ʻArt. 166ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) 
Kommentar 2011 993 n. 8; Berni M ʻArt. 166ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 
(ZPO) 2010 668 n. 2; Schmid EF ʻArt. 166ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 794 n. 3.  
38
 With regard to the (unofficial) English translation of Article 166(1)(a) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, cf. 
Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. 
39
 For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 166(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, cf. Berti SV 
(ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. Article 321(1)-(3) of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as follows: “1. Any per-
son who in his capacity as a member of the clergy, lawyer, defence lawyer, notary, patent attorney, auditor 
subject to a duty of confidentiality under the Code of Obligations, doctor, dentist, pharmacist, midwife or as 
an auxiliary to any of the foregoing persons discloses confidential information that has been confided to him 
in his professional capacity or which has come to his knowledge in the practice of his profession shall be lia-
ble to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. 2. A student who discloses con-
fidential information that has come to his knowledge in the course of his studies is also liable to the foregoing 
penalties. A breach of professional confidentiality remains an offence following the termination of professional 
employment or of the studies. 3. No offence is committed if the person disclosing the information does so with 
the consent of the person to whom the information pertains or on the basis of written authorisation issued in 
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166(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code protects those persons, who have access to confi-
dential information exhaustively listed in Article 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
40
 This is the 
case for members of the clergy, lawyers, defence lawyers, notaries, doctors, dentists, pharma-
cists, midwives, students, and any individuals acting as auxiliaries to any of the aforesaid per-
sons.
41
 The privilege of these professionals is, however, not of an absolute nature. They have to 
give evidence, if they are under an obligation to report offences, or where they have been re-
leased from their duty to observe professional secrecy, unless they make a credible argument 
that their interest in maintaining secrecy outweighs the interest in learning the truth.
42
 This, 
however, does not apply to members of the clergy and lawyers who both have an absolute right 
to refuse to give evidence. It goes without saying that the right under Article 166(1)(b) of the 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code only exists in relation to information that was entrusted to the said 
persons in the normal course of the exercise of their profession, or with regard to facts they 
have noticed due to their profession. Put differently, there must be a connection between the 
professional activity and the knowledge of the relevant secret.
43
 Both Article 166(1)(b) of the 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code and Article 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code apply to lawyers, who 
are qualified to practice as attorneys in Switzerland, as well as abroad.
44
 By contrast, the ques-
tion of whether in-house counsel falls under Article 166(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code is controversial.
45
 To date, the Swiss Federal Court has not made a ruling on the matter.
46
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
response to his application by a superior authority or supervisory authority.” For the (unofficial) English 
translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 Janu-
ary 2013). 
40
 BGE 83 IV 196 consideration D. 
41
 Cf. Trechsel S and Vest H ʻArt. 321ʼ in Trechsel S and Pieth M (eds) Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch Praxis-
kommentar 2013 1452 n. 4 et seqq. 
42
 Article 166(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the relevant (unofficial) English translation, cf. Berti 
SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. The interest in maintaining secrecy may, for instance, override the interest 
in discovering the truth where a doctor refuses to testify on the terminal disease of his patient, as the doctor is 
afraid that the patient would be heavily stressed by the diagnosis, Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung vom 28. Juni 2006 BBl 2006 7319.  
43
 Berni M ʻArt. 166ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 669 n. 6 with 
reference to Frank R, Sträuli H, and Messmer G Kommentar zur zürcherischen Zivilprozessordnung 1997 495 
n. 19; Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 166ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1020 n. 134; Trechsel S and Vest H ʻArt. 321ʼ in Trechsel S and 
Pieth M (eds) Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch Praxiskommentar 2013 1459 n. 21 et seq. With regard to the 
privilege of lawyers, cf., amongst others, the decision of the Swiss Federal Court 1_B.101/2008 of 28.10.2008 
consideration 4.4. 
44
 Trechsel S and Vest H ʻArt. 321ʼ in Trechsel S and Pieth M (eds) Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch Praxis-
kommentar 2013 1453 n. 5. 
45
 Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 167ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schwei-
zerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1018 n. 21 et seqq. 
46
 See in this regard the decision of the Swiss Federal Court 1_B.101/2008 of 28.10.2008 consideration 4.2. For 
more on this topic, see, amongst others, Trechsel S and Vest H ʻArt. 321ʼ in Trechsel S and Pieth M (eds) 
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch Praxiskommentar 2013 1324 n. 5; Rodriguez R ʻDer Geheimnisschutz in der 
neuen Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnungʼ 2010 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß 312, 318; Weber P ʻLegal privi-
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By virtue of Article 166(1)(c) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, a non-party witness may re-
fuse to cooperate in establishing facts entrusted to him as an official in the meaning of Article 
110(3) of the Swiss Criminal Code,
47
 or in his official capacity as member of an authority, or in 
the exercise of his office. Such persons, however, have to give evidence, where they have a du-
ty to report offences, or where they have been authorised to testify by their superior authority.
48
 
Ombudsmen and mediators enjoy a privilege with regard to facts learned while acting in such 
capacity.
49
 
Article 166(1)(e) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code refers to the privilege of professional 
journalists. Journalists, who are engaged in the editing department of a periodical medium, 
may invoke a privilege as regards the identity of an author, or the contents and sources of in-
formation. The same holds true for assistants of such journalists.
50
 
According to Article 166(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, other persons aware of statuto-
rily protected secrets can decline to give evidence, if they show that the interest in maintaining 
secrecy overrides the interest in discovering the truth.
51
 This rule constitutes a catch-all provi-
sion, and includes the statutorily protected secrets not falling under Article 166(1) of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code.
52
 Unlike the individuals mentioned in the latter provision, the persons 
                                                                                                                                                                        
lege für in-house lawyers?ʼ 2009 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess International 264 et seqq.; Schwarz J 
ʻAnwendung von Art. 321 StGB auf Unternehmensjuristen – Einige Gedanken zu einer laufenden Diskussionʼ 
2006 Anwaltsrevue 2006 338 et seqq.; Pfeifer M ʻGilt das Berufsgeheimnis nach Art. 321 StGB auch für Un-
ternehmensjuristen?ʼ 2006 Anwaltsrevue 166 et seqq.; Niggli MA ʻUnterstehen dem Berufsgeheimnis nach 
Art. 321 auch Unternehmensjuristen?ʼ 2006 Anwaltsrevue 277 et seqq.; Wohlmann H and Weiner A ʻDie Ver-
antwortung des Unternehmensjuristenʼ 2009 Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 174. In recent years, the imple-
mentation of a code on rights and obligations of in-house counsel was discussed, and the Swiss Federal Coun-
cil prepared a draft of a relevant code. Based on the latter, registered in-house counsel would have had a 
restricted right to refuse to cooperate. Since the outcome of the consultation procedure to this draft was very 
controversial, the Swiss Federal Council decided in 2010, to no longer pursue the aforesaid code. See also Ro-
driguez R ʻDer Geheimnisschutz in der neuen Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnungʼ 2010 Zeitschrift für Zi-
vilprozeß 319 et seq. 
47
  Article 110(3) of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as follows: “Public officials are the officials and employees 
of a public administrative authority or of an authority for the administration of justice as well as persons who 
hold office temporarily or are employed temporarily by a public administrative authority or by an authority 
for the administration of justice or who carry out official functions temporarily.” For the (unofficial) English 
translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 Janu-
ary 2013). 
48
 Cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566 for the (unofficial) English translation of Article 166(1)(c) of the 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
49
 Article 166(1)(d) of the Swiss Civil Code. For the relevant (unofficial) English translation, see Berti SV (ed) 
ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. 
50
 For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566. 
51
 See Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 566 regarding the (unofficial) English translation of Article 166(2) of 
the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
52
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung vom 28. Juni 2006 BBl 2006 7320. 
See also Trechsel S and Vest H ʻArt. 321ʼ in Trechsel S and Pieth M (eds) Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 
Praxiskommentar 2013 1456 n. 15 et seqq. 
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under Article 166(2) are, as a general rule, under an obligation to give evidence. Only where 
they can credibly argue, that the interest in maintaining secrecy outweighs the interest in dis-
covering the truth, may they refuse to cooperate. Statutory secrets falling under Article 166(2) 
of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code are, inter alia, business secrecy in relation to auditors,
53
 
manufacturing or trade secrecy,
54
 and banking secrecy.
55
 
4. Examination of Non-party Witnesses 
Non-party witnesses are examined viva voce by the court.
56
 The judge questions the third-party 
witness on his particulars, his personal relationship with the parties, and on other circumstances 
which might influence the credibility of his testimony, as well as on what he witnessed with 
respect to the matter in question.
57
 In relation to the latter, the court generally first encourages 
the non-party witness “to tell his story”. Where the statements of the third-party witness are 
unclear or ambiguous, or additional information is needed, the court puts additional questions 
to the non-party witness. It goes without saying that the court has to refrain from influencing 
the third party by, for instance, asking leading questions.
58
 Once the judge has concluded the 
interrogation of the non-party witness, the litigants can request the court to put additional ques-
                                                     
53
 Article 730b(2) of the Swiss Code of Obligations of 30 March 1911, SR 220. The wording of this provision is 
as follows: “The auditor safeguards the business secrets of the company in its assessments, unless it is re-
quired by law to disclose such information. In its reports, in submitting notices and in providing information to 
the general meeting, it safeguards the business secrets of the company.” For the (unofficial) translation of the 
Swiss Code of Obligations, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/220.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
54
 Article 162 of the Swiss Criminal Code. This provision reads as follows: “Any person who betrays a manufac-
turing or trade secret that he is under a statutory or contractual duty contract [sic] not to reveal, any person 
who exploits for himself or another such a betrayal, shall on complaint be liable to a custodial sentence not 
exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.” For the (unofficial translation) of the Swiss Criminal Code, 
cf. http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
55
 Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 November 1934, SR 952. Article 47(1)-
(2) of the said Act reads as follows: “1. Imprisonment of up to three years or [a] fine will be awarded to per-
sons who deliberately a. disclose a secret that is entrusted to him in his capacity as body, employee, appointee, 
or liquidator of a bank, as body or employee of an audit company or that he has observed in this capacity; b. 
attempts to induce such an infraction of the professional secrecy. 2. Persons acting with negligence will be pe-
nalized with a fine up to 250’000 francs.” For the (unofficial) English translation of this Act, cf. 
http://www.kpmg.com/CH/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub_20090101-BankA.pdf (date of use: 
31 January 2013). For more on statutorily protected secrets, see, amongst others, Schmid EF ʻArt. 166ʼ in 
Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 796 
n. 16 et seqq.; Berni M ʻArt. 166ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 
673 n. 15 et seqq. 
56
 See Article 172 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the testimony of a third party questioned by 
a private individual, see ZR 106 (2007) no. 14 consideration VI.5.  
57
 Article 172 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 568 for the (unoffi-
cial) English translation of the said provision. 
58
 Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 171ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1044 n. 8; Guyan P ʻArt. 171ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infan-
ger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 815 n. 6; Higi P ʻDie richterliche 
Zeugenbefragung im Zivilprozess – Technik und Praxisʼ 2006 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 1097 et seqq. For 
the notion of “leading questions”, see para. III.A.3.a). 
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tions to the third party. With the court’s consent, the parties are allowed to directly question the 
non-party witness.
59
 As a general principle, the third party must testify from memory. Where 
the issues on which the non-party witness testifies are complex, the court may, however, allow 
him to refer to documents.
60
  
Based on the principle of judicial control over the procurement of evidence, the court has the 
power to recall a non-party witness who has already testified. Due to the principle of party 
presentation, the court, however, is not allowed to call a third party as a witness whose testi-
mony has not been proffered by one of the litigants.
61
  
The Swiss Civil Procedure Code does not provide for the administration of oath or affirmation 
by non-party witnesses.
62
 Before testifying, the non-party witness, however, is exhorted to tell 
the truth and, if he is older than 14 years, informed of the penal consequences of perjury pursu-
ant to Article 307 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
63
 According to Article 176(1) of the Swiss Civil 
Procedure Code, a record is kept of the essential contents of the testimony, and a litigant can 
request the recording of questions that were disallowed by the court.
64
 The said provision does 
not exclude per se a verbatim transcript, but does not issue a right to third parties and litigants 
                                                     
59
 Article 173 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of this provision, cf. 
Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 568. 
60
 Article 171(3) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the (unofficial) translation of the said provi-
sion, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 567. For more on the examination of non-party witnesses and li-
tigants, see, amongst others, Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 171ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuen-
berger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1043 n. 6; Higi P ʻDie richterliche 
Zeugenbefragung im Zivilprozess – Technik und Praxisʼ 2006 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 1093-1105; Schu-
macher P ʻEinvernahmetechnik im Zivilprozessʼ 2005 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 695-704. 
61
 Cf. Chapter 2 paras. IV.B.2.b) and IV.B.2.d). See, however, Article 153 of the Swiss Civil Procedure that pro-
vides for the taking of evidence ex officio. Based on this rule, the court takes evidence of its own motion where 
the facts are to be ascertained ex officio (e.g. in certain disputes relating to lease of living accommodation; see, 
amongst others, Articles 247 and 296 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code), or where the court has substantial 
doubts as to the correctness of an undisputed fact. For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 153, cf. 
Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 563. 
62
 Guyan P ʻArt. 171ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 812 n. 2. 
63
 Article 171(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, 
cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 567. Article 307(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as follows: “Any 
person who appears in judicial proceedings as a witness, expert witness, translator or interpreter and gives 
false evidence or provides a false report, a false expert opinion or a false translation in relation to the case 
shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty.” For the (unofficial) 
English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 
31 January 2013). 
64
 With regard to the (unofficial) English translation of Article 176(1), see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 
568. 
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to have their testimony literally recorded.
65
 In practice, in the vast majority of the cases, no 
verbatim record is made.  
The Swiss Civil Procedure Code does not recognise the concept of written testimony, be it in 
form of deposition or affidavit.
66
 It merely provides for the so-called “written information” in 
cases, where the oral examination of a non-party witness appears unnecessary.
67
  
Under Swiss law, the communication of a counsel with a potential non-party witness or expert 
is, as a general rule, regarded as a violation of the counsel’s obligation to exercise his profes-
sion in a thorough and diligent manner.
68
 This obligation follows from the principle of judicial 
control over the procurement of evidence, and includes, inter alia, that a counsel refrains from 
exercising undue influence on non-party witnesses or experts. The communication of a counsel 
with a potential third-party witness or expert is thus only allowed, if justified by an objective 
reason. Such reason may, for instance, exist where the communication is necessary to assess 
the chances of success of a lawsuit, or is in relation to a motion to take evidence.
69
 Where there 
is an objective reason, the counsel should observe the following rules: first, the communication 
has to serve the interests of his client. Second, the establishing of the facts through the court 
must be safeguarded, and the counsel has to refrain from influencing the non-party witness or 
expert. Finally, there must be an objective need for the communication.
70
 In the light of the 
                                                     
65
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung vom 28. Juni 2006 BBl 2006 7322 
with reference to BGE 129 I 85 and BGE 126 I 15. See also  Müller HA ʻArt. 176ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, 
and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1059 n. 7 et seq.; Weibel 
H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 176ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1058 n. 3 et seqq.; Guyan P ʻArt. 176ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, 
and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 822 n. 7. For more on the 
record of hearings, see Article 235 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
66
 Müller HA ʻArt. 171ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1031 n. 4 in fine; Berni M ʻArt. 171ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zi-
vilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 687 n. 6; Dolge A ʻArt. 177ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) 
Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 827 n. 12; Spühler K, Dolge A, and Gehri M 
Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht und Grundzüge des internationalen Zivilprozessrechts 2010 253 n. 152; 
Frank R, Sträuli H, and Messmer G Kommentar zur zürcherischen Zivilprzoessordnung 1997 528 n. 3. 
67
 Article 190(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For more on written information, see para. II.G below. 
68
 Decision of the Swiss Federal Court 2C_8/2010 of 4.10.2010 consideration 3.2.1 with further references; 
Fellmann W ʻArt. 12ʼ in Fellmann W and Zindel GG (eds) Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz: Bundesgesetz über 
die Freizügigkeit der Anwältinnen  und Anwälte (Anwaltsgesetz, BGFA) 2011 150 n. 23a. See also Article 
12(a) of the Law on Advocates of 23 June 2000, SR 935.61. 
69
 Fellmann W ʻArt. 12ʼ in Fellmann W and Zindel GG (eds) Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz: Bundesgesetz über 
die Freizügigkeit der Anwältinnen  und Anwälte (Anwaltsgesetz, BGFA) 2011 149 n. 22, 150 n. 23; Müller-
Chen M ʻAus dem US-amerikanischen Discovery-Verfahren gewonnene Beweise im internationalen Zivilpro-
zess- und Schiedsrecht in der Schweizʼ in Gauch P, Werro F and Pichonnaz P (eds) Mélanges en l’honneur de 
Pierre Tercier 2008 941 et seq. 
70
 Fellmann W ʻArt. 12ʼ in Fellmann W and Zindel GG (eds) Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz: Bundesgesetz über 
die Freizügigkeit der Anwältinnen  und Anwälte (Anwaltsgesetz, BGFA) 2011 150 n. 23 with further refe-
rences; Nater H ‘Zur Zulässigkeit anwaltlicher Zeugenkontakte im Zivilprozess’ 2006 Schweizerische Juris-
tenzeitung 257 et seq.; 2006 Basler Juristische Mitteilungen 48 et seqq.; 1991 Basler Juristische Mitteilungen  
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above, it is clear that a “preparation” of a non-party witness or expert by a counsel prior to the 
witness examination is considered inadmissible under Swiss law.
71
 Such contact would not on-
ly be a breach of the Law of Advocates,
72
 but would, at least from the view of the counsel con-
ducting the “preparation”, be self-defeating. A Swiss judge will have serious doubts about the 
reliability of the testimony of a third-party witness or expert who previously has discussed the 
case with counsel, or who has consulted unduly with a party.
73
 
C. Evidence by Litigants 
1. Competence and Compellability of Litigants 
A litigant is, as with a non-party witness, competent to give evidence if he is physically and 
mentally fit to do so. Thus, the comments made in relation to the competence of non-party wit-
nesses apply here mutatis mutandis.
74
 In contrast to non-party witnesses, however, litigants 
competent to testify are always compellable to cooperate with the court, and can merely in-
voke, if at all, a privilege under Article 163 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.
75
 
The duty of parties to cooperate in the taking of evidence is the same as that of non-party wit-
nesses.
76
 Where a litigant declines to collaborate without good cause, the court takes into ac-
count such refusal when weighing the evidence.
77
 In cases where, for instance, a defendant re-
jects to produce a document as requested by the plaintiff, the court can assume that the content 
of such document corresponds to the allegations made in the plaintiff’s pleadings.78 Unlike in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
163; ZR 106 (2007) no. 81; ZR 96 (1997) no. 44; ZR 95 (1996) no. 43; ZR 81 (1982) no. 40; ZR 53 (1954) no. 
174; ZR 52 (1953) no. 68; ZR 49 (1950) no. 46; ZR 47 (1948) no. 123. On how the counsel can avoid any un-
due influence, see the decision of the Swiss Federal Court 2C_8/2010 of 4.10.2010 consideration 3.2.1 with 
further references; Fellmann W ʻArt. 12ʼ in Fellmann W and Zindel GG (eds) Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz: 
Bundesgesetz über die Freizügigkeit der Anwältinnen  und Anwälte (Anwaltsgesetz, BGFA) 2011 150 n. 23a. 
71
 Such “preparation” may, for instance, include the rehearsal of the answers to be given by the non-party witness 
at the hearing.  
72
 Based on Article 17 of the Law on Advocates, the counsel, who “prepared” a non-party witness or expert, is 
subject to disciplinary sanctions. 
73
 See Langbein JH ʻThe German Advantage in Civil Procedureʼ 1985 University of Chicago Law Review 834. 
74
 Cf. para. II.B.2 above. 
75
 See para. II.C.2 below. 
76
 Article 160(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See also para. II.B.2 above. 
77
 Article 164 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the (unofficial) English translation of this provi-
sion, cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 565. 
78
 Higi P ʻArt. 164ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) 
Kommentar 2011 983 n. 8; Schmid EF ʻArt. 164ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kom-
mentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 788 n. 2; Hasenböhler F ʻDas Beweisrechtʼ 2007 Schweize-
rische Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess- und Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht 383, 384. See, however, Hasenböhler F 
ʻArt. 164ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 1006 n. 4 et seqq. and Berni M ʻArt. 164ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zi-
vilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 660 n. 7 who argue that a litigant’s refusal does not result in a reversal of the 
burden of proof, but merely in a relaxation of the onus. 
 220 
 
the case of an unjustified refusal by a non-party witness, the court cannot apply any coercive 
measures or other sanctions mentioned in Article 167(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code in 
relation to a recalcitrant litigant. The court may, however, by analogy to Article 167(1)(d), im-
pose on the litigant the costs caused by his refusal.
79
 The reason for the differential treatment 
between non-party witnesses and litigants is that the latter are, unlike third parties, under no 
obligation to cooperate, but merely under a procedural burden.
80
 
2. Privileges of Litigants 
In comparison to third parties,
81
 the privileges of litigants to refuse to collaborate in the taking 
of evidence are more limited. The list of privileges in Article 163 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
is exhaustive.
82
 A litigant invoking such privilege has to show prima facie the existence of one 
of the reasons mentioned in the said provision.
83
 By virtue of Article 163(1)(a) of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code, a litigant can decline cooperation where it would subject a closely relat-
ed person within the meaning of Article 165 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code to the risk of 
penal investigation, or civil liability.
84
 As a result, a litigant cannot refuse to give evidence in 
order to protect himself from the risk of penal investigation, or civil liability.
85
 
 
Article 163(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code provides for the professional privilege of 
litigants. Since this provision is virtually identical with Article 166(1)(b) of the said Code, ref-
erence can be made to the foregoing comments.
86
 The same applies to the privilege of parties 
                                                     
79
 Schmid EF ʻArt. 164ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 788 n. 3. 
80
 In German, so-called “prozessuale Last”. See Higi P ʻArt. 164ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I 
(eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 983 n. 7; Schmid EF ʻArt. 164ʼ in Spühler 
K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 788 n. 1. 
81
 See para. II.B.3 above. 
82
 Higi P ʻArt. 163ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) 
Kommentar 2011 977 n. 2, 978 n. 6; Berni M ʻArt. 163ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilpro-
zessordnung (ZPO) 2010 656 n. 1. 
83
 Schmid EF ʻArt. 163ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 786 n. 7. 
84
 For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 163(1)(a) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, cf. Berti SV 
(ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 565. With regard to Article 165 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, see para. II.B.3 
above. 
85
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung vom 28. Juni 2006 BBl 2006 7317. 
For criticsm in this regard, see, amongst others, Schmid EF ʻArt. 163ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger 
D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 786 n. 5 et seq.; Hasenböhler F ʻArt. 
163ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilpro-
zessordnung 2010 1002 n. 8 et seqq. 
86
 See para. II.B.3. 
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who are privy to statutory secrets other than those covered by Article 163(1)(b) of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code.
87  
3. Examination of Litigants 
With regard to the oral testimony of litigants, the Swiss Civil Procedure Code distinguishes 
between two forms, namely the party testimony under Article 191, and the testimony given un-
der oath pursuant to Article 192. The difference between these two means of proof is the sanc-
tion a litigant may face when willingly making a false statement. Article 191(2) of the said 
Code provides for a disciplinary sanction, namely a fine, while Article 192(2) stipulates a crim-
inal penalty by referring to Article 306 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
88
  
In relation to the party testimony, the testimony given under oath is of subsidiary nature. In 
other words, the court first questions a litigant pursuant to Article 191 of the Swiss Civil Pro-
cedure Code, and then decides, based on the statements of the litigant, whether the latter is to 
be examined under Article 192 of the said Code.
89
 The court determines ex officio, whether a 
litigant has to testify under oath. The request of a party to be examined or having the opponent 
interrogated under oath is thus not sufficient. An order for a testimony given under oath should 
only be made to eliminate the last doubts of the court.
90
 By being questioned under oath, the 
party is put under additional pressure to tell the truth, as false statements may trigger criminal 
penalties.
91
 
                                                     
87
 Article 163(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Cf. in this regard the relevant comments in para. II.B.3. 
88
 Article 306(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code reads as follows: “Any person who is a party to civil proceedings 
and, following an express caution by the judge that he must tell the truth and notification of the penalties for 
failure to do so, gives false evidence in relation to the case shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceed-
ing three years or to a monetary penalty.” For the (unofficial) English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code, 
see http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (date of use: 31 January 2013).  
89
 Müller HA ʻArt. 191ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1171 n. 36, 1172 n. 39; Müller HA ʻArt. 192ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwan-
der I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1176 n. 3, 1183 n. 23; Hafner P ʻArt. 
191ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 
2010 889 n. 1; BGE 112 Ia 369. See, however, Leuenberger C ‘Parteiberfragung und Beweisaussage im Ent-
wurf für eine Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnungʼ in Leupold M et al (eds) Der Weg zum Recht: Festschrift 
für Alfred Bühler 2008 61. 
90
 Swiss Federal Council Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung vom 28. Juni 2006 BBl 2006 7326. 
See also Müller HA ʻArt. 192ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessor-
dung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1177 n. 5, 1180 n. 17 et seq.; Carcagni Roesler R ʻArt. 192ʼ in Baker & 
McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 750 n. 2 et seq. 
91
 Hasenböhler F ʻDas Beweisrechtʼ 2007 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess- und Zwangsvollstre-
ckungsrecht 392; Leuenberger C ‘Parteiberfragung und Beweisaussage im Entwurf für eine Schweizerische 
Zivilprozessordnungʼ in Leupold M et al (eds) Der Weg zum Recht: Festschrift für Alfred Bühler 2008 59. 
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The examination of litigants is conducted and recorded in the same way as that of non-party 
witnesses.
92
 Reference can thus be made to the foregoing comments.
93
 
D. Documentary Evidence 
Compellable litigants and third parties have a duty to produce documents, unless they can 
claim a privilege.
94
 Pursuant to Articles 221(1)(e) and 222(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code, the evidence offered for the allegations of fact has to be indicated in the statement of 
claim and the statement of defence, respectively. This particularly holds true where a litigant 
requires documents that are in the possession or under the control of the opponent or a third 
party. As has been explained earlier,
95
 Swiss law forbids so-called “fishing expeditions”.96 
Consequently, a litigant has to specify the documents he requires from the opponent, or a third 
party by, at least, indicating the type and content of the documents. The opponent or third party 
must easily be able to determine what document is requested.
97
  
Once the litigants have concluded their pleadings, the court issues an order for the taking of 
evidence
98
 which indicates the evidence admitted and specifies which party bears the onus of 
proof for which facts.
99
 Where such order includes documents, which are not in the possession 
or under the control of the party requesting them, but in that of the opponent, the order directs 
the latter to submit the relevant documents to the court, which keeps them in its court files. 
Where documents are to be obtained from a third party, the judge issues a separate order 
wherein he instructs the particular third party to supply the court with the relevant docu-
                                                     
92
 Müller HA ʻArt. 191ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1165 n. 17. With regard to the record, see also Article 193 of the Swiss Civil Proce-
dure Code. 
93
 See para. II.B.4. 
94
 Article 160(1)(b) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
95
 See Chapter 4 para. II.B.3.a) in fine. 
96
 In German, so-called “Ausforschungsbeweis”.  
97
 Leuenberger C ʻArt. 221ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schwei-
zerischen 2010 1269 n. 53; Schmid EF ʻArt. 160ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kom-
mentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 772 n. 23 et seq.; decision of the Swiss Federal Court 
1P.32/2005 of 11.7.2005 consideration 3.2; ZR 108 (2009) no. 3 consideration 1.4.c; ZR 95 (1996) no. 62 192; 
ZR 60 (1961) no. 72; ZR 50 (1951) no. 216; 1998 Basler Juristische Mitteilungen 158 et seqq.  
98
 In German, the so-called “Beweisverfügung”. 
99
 Article 154 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) translation of the said provision, cf. Berti 
SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 563.  
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ments.
100
 It goes without saying that the litigants have a right of access to the court files, and to 
make copies of the documents.
101
 
E. Evidence by Inspection 
According to Article 181(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the court can carry out an in-
spection to gain a personal impression, or a better understanding of the facts.
102
 By means of an 
inspection, the court is able to examine a location, or movable or immovable property at first 
hand. The object of inspection must be brought to the court where this is possible without caus-
ing the object detriment.
103
  
A party, who proffered movable property as evidence located outside the state where the civil 
proceedingsa are pending, should try to have it brought to the trial judge to be inspected. 
Where it is not possible to bring the evidence to the trial court, or where the inspection refers to 
a location or to immovable property, the inspection has to take place abroad. In this case, one 
has to bear in mind that it is usually not the trial court which gains a personal impression, but 
the competent foreign authority or the commissioner
104
 executing the relevant request for judi-
cial assistance that inspects the particular evidence. Having said this, it is doubtful whether the 
taking of foreign evidence by inspection makes sense, unless a member of the trial court partic-
ipates in the inspection.
105
  
Litigants and third parties have a duty to allow the inspection of their property or person, un-
less they have a right to refuse to cooperate.
106
 The litigants and their counsel have a right to be 
present at the inspection.
107
 Where the participation of non-party witnesses or experts is neces-
sary at the inspection, the court may summon them. As in the case of an ordinary examination 
                                                     
100
 Infanger D ʻArt. 63ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 747 n. 5. 
101
 Article 53(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
102
 For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 181(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, see Berti SV (ed) 
ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 569. 
103
 Article 181(3) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the relevant (unofficial) English translation, 
see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 569.  
104
 Or the diplomatic officer or consular agent.  
105
 It goes without saying that such participation is only possible based on a relevant international agreement or, in 
absence of the latter, if it is allowed by the law of the requested state. 
106
 Article 160(1)(c) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See in this regard also Dolge A ʻArt. 181ʼ in Spühler K, 
Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 838 n. 8. With 
regard to the compellability and privileges of witnesses, cf. paras. II.B.2, II.B.3, II.C.1, and II.C.2 above. 
107
 Article 155(3) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. See also Dolge A ʻArt. 181ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and 
Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 838 n. 9 et seq.; Müller HA 
ʻArt. 181ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung (ZPO) Kommen-
tar 2011 1091 n. 13; Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 181ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C 
(eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1081 n. 13 et seq. 
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in a courtroom, the judge may interrogate litigants, non-party witnesses, or experts during the 
inspection. The same holds true for a litigant, who may, generally via the court, put questions 
to the opposing party, non-party witnesses, and experts.
108
 The court makes a record of the in-
spection which may be supplemented with plans, drawings, photographs, and other technical 
means.
109
 
F. Expert Evidence 
With regard to civil proceedings pending outside Switzerland, the Swiss rules on expert evi-
dence only apply where the trial court requests a Swiss court to obtain an expert opinion in 
Switzerland. In this context, it is recalled that, where an expert opinion is necessary with regard 
to foreign evidence in civil proceedings pending before a civil-law court, the latter generally 
prefers to appoint a domestic expert.
110
 In practice, the situation referred to at the outset of this 
paragraph thus rarely occurs. 
1. Appointment and Instruction of Experts 
As indicated earlier,
111
 under Swiss law, experts in the sense of Articles 183-188 of the Swiss 
Civil Procedure Code are appointed by the court, and not by the parties.
112
 Consequently, ex-
perts are considered as neutral aides of the court who perform a judicial act.
113
 The grounds for 
incapacity to act as a judge thus also apply to experts.
114
 By contrast, individuals selected as 
                                                     
108
 Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 181ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1081 n. 13 et seq., 1082 n. 16 et seq. See also para. II.B.4. 
109
 Article 182 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, cf. 
Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 569. See also Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 182ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Ha-
senböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1084 n. 6 et 
seq.  
110
 Cf. Chapter 4 para. V.G.2. 
111
 See Chapter 4 para. V.G.2. 
112
 The expert fees have thus to be paid by the party who ultimately loses the lawsuit. 
113
 Experts are therefore, based on Article 184(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, subject to the official secre-
cy obligations under Article 320 of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
114
 Article 183(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. The grounds for incapacity to act as a judge are listed in 
Article 47 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. By virtue of this provision, a person may not be appointed as an 
expert if he has, amongst other things, a personal interest in the case, is married to a party or a party’s counsel, 
or might lack impartiality due to friendship or enmity with a litigant or a litigant’s lawyer. For the (unofficial) 
translation of Articles 183 and 47, see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 569. See also Dolge A ʻArt. 183ʼ 
in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 
849 n. 28; Müller HA ʻArt. 184ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozess-
ordung (ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1104 n. 3; BGE 118 Ia 144 consideration 1.c. For more on the impartiality of 
experts, see, amongst others, Bühler A ʻDie Stellung von Experten in der Gerichtsverfassung – insbesondere 
im Spannungsfeld zwischen Gericht und Anwaltschaftʼ 2009 Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 329-334; Cavelti 
UJ ʻDie Expertise im Bauprozess’ in Koller A (ed) Bau- und Bauprozessrecht: Ausgewählte Fragen 1996 303 
et seq. 
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“experts” by litigants115 do not constitute experts in the sense of the aforesaid provisions, but 
are regarded as mere non-party witnesses falling under Articles 169-176 of the Swiss Civil 
Procedure Code. As a result, Swiss courts treat opinions drafted by party-selected experts in 
the same way as an allegation of a party.
116
  
Before appointing an expert, the court must hear the parties.
117
 The judge may invite the liti-
gants to make proposals as to whom it shall appoint as expert. However, the court is not bound 
by any such suggestion.
118
  
By virtue of Article 185(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the court instructs the expert, 
and puts the relevant questions in writing, or orally at a hearing.
119
 The court gives the parties 
the opportunity to comment on the questions and to suggest changes or additions.
120
 The in-
structions to the expert not only include the questions to be answered by the expert, but also 
other directions, for instance regarding the rights and duties of the expert,
121
 the investigations 
to be conducted by the expert,
122
 or the form of the opinion.
123
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terialgüter-, Informations- und Wettbewerbsrecht 610 et seqq.; ZR 105 (2006) no. 77; BGE 132 III 87 
consideration 3.4. 
117
 Article 183(1) in fine of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
118
 Müller HA ʻArt. 183ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1100 n. 15; Dolge A ʻArt. 183ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler 
Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 849 n. 29; Perroulaz K ʻArt. 183ʼ in Baker & McKenzie 
(ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 716 n. 14; Bühler A ʻGerichtsgutachter und –gutachen 
im Zivilprozessʼ in Heer M and Schöbi C (eds) Gericht und Expertise – La justice et l’expertise 2005 44 et 
seq., 46. 
119
 For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 185, see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 570. It is sub-
mitted that where expert evidence is to be obtained for the benefit of civil proceedings outside Switzerland, the 
request for judicial assistance should, inter alia, be accompanied by the questions to be put to the expert. 
120
 Article 185(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 570 for the (unoffi-
cial) English translation of the said provision. It is submitted that this rule does not apply where expert evi-
dence is obtained for the benefit of a court located outside Switzerland, provided the questions were submitted 
together with the request for international judicial assistance. 
121
 Article 184(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
122
 Article 186 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
123
 Article 187 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code.  
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2. Preparation and Form of the Expert Opinion 
The expert is bound by the truth,
124
 and is liable under Article 307(1) of the Swiss Criminal 
Code when providing a false opinion.
125
 In relation to the litigants, the expert has a strict obli-
gation of neutrality.
126
  
With the court’s consent, the expert can make his own investigations.127 In the course of such 
investigations, as well as throughout the preparation of his opinion, the expert has to ensure the 
litigants’ right to be heard, and the principle of the equality of the parties.128 The expert is not 
allowed to apply any coercive measures against litigants or third parties, who refuse to collabo-
rate, but may apply to the court for appropriate assistance. The court may take the evidence 
pursuant to the rules governing the evidentiary proceedings (Articles 169-182 and 190-193 of 
the Swiss Civil Procedure Code) or may, with regard to a recalcitrant third party, apply the 
measures stipulated in Article 167(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. In relation to a liti-
gant, the judge may take into account an unjustified refusal when weighing the evidence.
129
 
The court can order that the opinion be given orally, or in writing.
130
 Once the court has re-
ceived the expert opinion, it gives the litigants the opportunity to request elucidation of the 
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 Article 184(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. With regard to the (unofficial) English translation of the 
said provision, see Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 569. 
125
 Article 184(2) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
126
 Müller HA ʻArt. 184ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1106 n. 9; Bühler A ʻGerichtsgutachter und –gutachen im Zivilprozessʼ in Heer M 
and Schöbi C (eds) Gericht und Expertise – La justice et l’expertise 2005 35. See also Article 183(2) read in 
conjunction with Article 47 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. 
127
 Article 186(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of Article 186(1), cf. 
Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 570. Such investigations may, for instance, include the inspection of a lo-
cation or the obtaining of documents. 
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 Dolge A ʻArt. 184ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kommentar Schweizerische Zivil-
prozessordnung 2010 855 n. 7. 
129
 Müller HA ʻArt. 186ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1120 n. 14; Dolge A ʻArt. 186ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler 
Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 864 n. 5. 
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 Article 187(1) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the (unofficial) English translation of the said provision, 
cf. Berti SV (ed) ZPO, CPC, CCP 2009 570. With regard to the conduct of an oral examination of an expert, 
see para. II.B.4 above. Where expert evidence is obtained for civil proceedings pending outside Switzerland, 
the opinion should be given in writing. 
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opinion, or to put additional questions to the expert.
131
  
G. Written Information 
According to Article 190 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the court can request an authority 
or private individual to provide written information. In the latter case, however, such a request 
can only be made where examination as a witness under Article 169-176 of the said Code 
seems unnecessary.
132
 By contrast, litigants cannot provide written information.
133
 Whether 
authorities and private individuals have a duty to cooperate is controversial.
134
 
Written information under Article 190 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code must be requested by 
the court. Accordingly, a written statement of an authority or a private individual, which is 
submitted without the court’s request, does not fall under the said provision.135  
As a matter of practice, courts request written information mainly from authorities
136
 as it can 
be expected that the latter provide true information. In addition, such information is generally 
limited to details recorded in official files.
137
 By contrast, courts are normally reluctant to ob-
tain written information from private individuals, unless the information is confined to simple 
and clear events, which are undisputed.
138
 In any event, a court should not request written in-
formation, because a private individual prefers to make a statement in writing, or is not able to 
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 Article 187(4) of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. For the relevant (unofficial) English translation, see Berti 
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 Müller HA ʻArt. 190ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 1152 
n. 8, 1157 n. 27 et seqq.; Perroulaz K ʻArt. 190ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) Schweizerische Zivilprozessord-
nung (ZPO) 2010 744 n. 2; Hafner P ʻArt. 190ʼ in Spühler K, Tenchio L, and Infanger D (eds) Basler Kom-
mentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2010 886 n. 1; Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 190ʼ in Sutter-Somm 
T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1121 
n. 7. 
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 Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 190ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1121 n. 9. 
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 Müller HA ʻArt. 190ʼ in Brunner A, Gasser D, and Schwander I (eds) Schweizerische Zivilprozessordung 
(ZPO) Kommentar 2011 1153 n. 10. 
138
 E.g. details of a bank account provided by the bank. 
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attend court due to time constraints.
139
 The same applies where the private individual is domi-
ciled abroad, and has to be examined through channels of judicial assistance.
140
 Moreover, 
written information of a private individual is not feasible where the particular subject of the 
hearing of evidence plays an important role, or is complex, or where it is not clear whether that 
person is biased.
141
  
III. South Africa 
In civil proceedings pending before the High Court of South Africa, a party may tender evi-
dence in three different ways: by the testimony of a witness, the presentation of documentary 
evidence, and the presentation of real evidence. The testimony of a witness covers litigants, as 
well as third parties, including experts. When called as witnesses, litigants, third parties and 
experts are thus generally subject to the same rules. Different rules, however, apply with regard 
to documentary evidence. Only litigants, but not third parties, are subject to discovery proceed-
ings.
142
  
The foregoing remarks also apply to civil proceedings before the High Court of Botswana, of 
Namibia, and of Nigeria, and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, respec-
tively. 
A. Testimony of Witnesses 
1. Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
By virtue of Section 8 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act,
143
 every person is presumed to 
be competent and compellable to give evidence in any civil proceedings, unless the Act or any 
other law provides otherwise.
144
 Based on Section 9 of the said Act, a mentally disordered or 
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 Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 190ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1120 n. 2. 
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 Weibel H and Nägeli S ʻArt. 190ʼ in Sutter-Somm T, Hasenböhler F, and Leuenberger C (eds) Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung 2010 1122 n. 10; Perroulaz K ʻArt. 190ʼ in Baker & McKenzie (ed) 
Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 2010 746 n. 8. See also ZR 102 (2003) no. 14. 
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 For more on discovery in South Africa, see para. III.B below. 
143
 No. 25 of 1965.  
144
 See in this regard also Section 42 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act. This provision stipulates that the law 
relating to the competency and compellability of witnesses, which was in force in respect of civil proceedings 
on 13 May 1961, shall apply in any case not provided for by the Act, or any other law. For the distinction be-
tween the competence, compellability, and privileges of witnesses, see para. II.B.2 above. 
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intoxicated individual is incapable of being a witness, if deprived of the proper use of reason. 
In other words, a person, who appears mentally disordered, but whose mental condition still 
allows him to convey his observations in an understandable way to the court, is a competent 
witness.
145
  
The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act does not contain a rule on the competence of children to 
give evidence in court. It is, however, recognised that a child may testify if he appreciates the 
duty of speaking the truth, has sufficient intelligence, and can communicate effectively.
146
 Ac-
cordingly, there is no specific age limit in relation to a child’s competence to give evidence.147 
The spouse of a litigant in civil proceedings is a competent and compellable witness for and 
against the party concerned.
148
 
Judges and magistrates are not competent to give evidence on matters related to their judicial 
function.
149
 
A litigant, who desires the attendance of a witness to give evidence at the trial, may have is-
sued subpoenas by the office of the Registrar for that purpose.
150
 The subpoena provides, 
amongst other things, that a non-cooperative witness may render himself liable to a fine, or to 
imprisonment.
151
 Where the subpoena was duly served upon the witness, and the relevant wit-
ness expenses were offered, but the witness fails without reasonable excuse to attend court, the 
court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
152
 The same applies where the witness appears before 
the court, but refuses to be sworn in or to make an affirmation, to answer any questions put to 
him, or to produce a document without any just excuse.
153
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 S v Zanzile 1992 (1) SACR 444 (C) at 446. For the test to be applied by the court as to whether a person with a 
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 Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 2010 423. 
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 Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 812; Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe 
SE Principles of Evidence 2010 423. 
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 Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 2010 427. 
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 Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 815; Schwikkard PJ and Van der Merwe 
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subpoena is a notice to a witness telling him that he is required to attend court to give evidence, Petė S et al 
Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2008 264.  
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 See Form 16 of the First Schedule to the High Court Rules. 
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 Section 30(2) of the Supreme Court Act. 
153
 Section 31(1) of the Supreme Court Act.  
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2. Privileges of Witnesses 
A compellable witness may decline to answer questions which tend to expose him to a criminal 
charge, a penalty, or forfeiture.
154
 No privilege, however, applies to answers that may establish 
that the witness owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil suit.
155
  
The communication between a legal adviser and his client is privileged,
156
 provided the follow-
ing requirements are cumulatively fulfilled: the legal adviser was acting in his professional ca-
pacity
157
 and was consulted in confidence,
158
 the communication was made for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice,
159
 and the advice does not facilitate the commission of a crime or 
fraud.
160
 The professional legal privilege also extends to in-house counsel, provided the com-
munications could be equated to the confidential advice of an independent legal adviser.
161
 In 
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148. 
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 Resisto Dairy (Pty) Ltd v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (2) SA 408 (C) at 409 et seqq.; S v Kearney 
1964 (2) SA 495 (A) at 499 et seq.; Danzfuss v Additional Magistrate, Bloemfontein and Another 1981 (1) SA 
115 (O) at 120A-212E; Lane and Another NNO v Magistrate, Wynberg 1997 (2) SA 869 (C) at 882A-I, 885B-
D. See also Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 660 et seq.  
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 Schlosberg v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and the Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg, In re R v Sand-
ing and Others 1936 WLD 59 at 65; Botes v Daly and Another 1976 (2) SA 215 (N) at 222; Harksen v Attor-
ney-General of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (2) SACR 681 (C) at 691H-I; Waste 
Products Utilisation (Pty) Ltd v Wilkes and Another 2003 (2) SA 590 (W) at 593.  
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 Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (2) 1145 (C) at 1156J. At 1154F-H of 
this decision, Hoffman AJ stated the following: “To limit the scope of legal professional privilege to clients 
and lawyers in private practice is not justified in law. This would considerably dislocate the established prac-
tice and would force (...) private corporations with in-house legal advisers to reorganise (...) their modus op-
erandi so that all advice required is received from independent legal advisers rather than engaging salaried 
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See in this regard also Van den Heever v Die Meester en Andere 1997 (3) SA 93 (T) at 102B-F with reference 
to Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise (2) [1972] 2 All ER 353 
(CA); Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth 1995 (2) SA 433 (SE) at 446D; Schwikkard PJ and Van der 
Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 2010 147 et seq.; Olivier L ʻPrivilege and tax practitionersʼ 2008 South Af-
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addition, the privilege applies to interpreters, articled clerks, secretaries, and other employees 
in a law firm.
162
 
Not only communications between a legal adviser and his client are privileged, but also those 
between a counsel or his client and an agent or third party.
163
 In this context, however, a privi-
lege can only be claimed, if the communications have been made for the purpose of submitting 
to the counsel in order to enable him to advise
164
 and after litigation was contemplated.
165
 
Compared to the aforesaid legal advice privilege, the litigation privilege is limited. While the 
former applies irrespective of whether litigation is envisaged or not, the latter privilege only 
extends to communications that were made with regard to a possible litigation.
166
 
In Israelsohn v Power NO and Ruskin NO (1),
167
 it was held that the privilege being for the 
protection of the client in his subjective freedom of consultation, it would plainly be defeated if 
the disclosure of the confidences, though not compellable from the legal adviser, were still ob-
tainable from the client. As a consequence, the client's own testimony is equally privileged. In 
other words, the witness cannot, as a general principle, be asked what communications, if any, 
he made to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining the attorney's or counsel's opinion.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
2001 South African Law Journal 20 et seqq.; Zeffert D ʻConfidentiality and the courtsʼ 1974 South African 
Law Journal 448 et seq. 
162
 S v Mushimba en Andere 1977 (2) SA 829 (A) at 388D-F. 
163
 So-called “litigation privilege”. The third party may, for instance, be a detective, as in International Tobacco 
Co (SA) v United Tobacco Cos (South) Ltd (3) 1953 (4) SA 251 (W) at 255G-256H. See also R v Steyn 1954 
(1) SA 324 (A) at 334D; Vengtas v Nydoo and Others 1963 (2) SA 504 (D) at 504G-H; Zeffert DT and Paizes 
AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 678 et seq.; Unterhalter D ‘Professional Privilege and the Proof 
of Innocence’ 1998 South African Law Journal 295 et seqq. 
164
 Cf. A Sweidan and King (Pty) Ltd and Others v Zim Israel Navigation Co Ltd 1986 (1) SA 515 at 518A, 519A. 
See also Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa Volume 1 2009 803 et seqq.; Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evi-
dence 2009 680. 
165
 General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v Goldberg 1912 TPD 494 at 504; United Tobac-
co Companies (South) Ltd v International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd 1953 (1) SA 66 (I) at 70; Potter v South Brit-
ish Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (3) SA 5 (W) at 6A-F, 7A-C; Boyce v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation 
Ltd 1966 (1) SA 544 (SR) at 546D-547C; Dingana v Bay Passenger Transport 1971 (1) SA 540 (E) at 542F-
G; Bagwandeen v City of Pietermaritzburg 1977 (3) SA 727 (N) at 733C; S v B 1980 (2) SA 946 (A) at 952G-
H. See also Cilliers AC, Loots C, and Nel HC (eds) Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the Su-
preme Court of South Africa Volume 1 2009 802 et seq.; Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of 
Evidence 2009 680 et seq.; Landman A ʻStretching professional legal privilege beyond breaking pointʼ 2001 
South African Law Journal 23 et seqq. 
166
 Zeffert DT and Paizes AP The South African Law of Evidence 2009 668; Zeffert DT and Paizes AP Essential 
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 1953 (2) SA 499 (W) at 501B-C. 
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Professionals other than legal advisers do not enjoy a professional privilege.
168
 This holds par-
ticularly true for doctors,
169
 clergymen,
170
 journalists,
171
 insurers,
172
 or accountants.
173
 One has, 
however, to keep in mind that by virtue of Section 14(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, everyone has the right to privacy which includes, amongst others, the right 
not to have the privacy of their communications infringed. It may thus be arguable that the 
communications of professional relationships other than the lawyer-client relationship may be 
protected by the Constitution.
174
 In recent years, several South African court decisions dealt 
with the question of whether and, if so, under what circumstances communications involving 
professionals other than legal advisers should be protected. This holds particularly true for 
communications of clergymen. Both in S v Makhaye
175
 and in O v O,
176
 the courts hinted that a 
privilege of spiritual advisers may exist.
177
 Future case law will show whether and, if so, to 
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 Olivier L ʻPrivilege and tax practitionersʼ 2008 South African Law Journal 507 et seq. Cf. also Chantrey Mar-
tin v Martin [1953] 2 QB 286 at 294. 
174
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what extent the professional privilege will be extended to professionals other than legal advis-
ers. 
In terms of Section 10 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, no spouse can be compelled to 
disclose any communication made to him by the other spouse during the marriage.
178
 Based on 
the wording of the provision, it appears that only the spouse to whom the communication was 
made, but not the spouse who made the communication, may invoke the privilege.
179
 The mari-
tal privilege continues after divorce for communications made during the marriage.
180
 
Section 12 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act stipulates that a person may refuse to give 
evidence in cases where his spouse would be able to invoke a privilege. Consequently, a wit-
ness may, for instance, decline to answer questions, which would incriminate the spouse, or 
refer to marital communications made to the spouse. By contrast, a third party, who intercepts 
the communication between the spouses cannot refuse to reveal it.
181
 
Section 13 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act excludes the disclosure of evidence on the 
grounds of public policy or public interest, which includes, inter alia, national security, state 
secrets, or matters of great international diplomatic importance.
182
 Under this provision, a wit-
ness is not compellable to testify, unless the evidence relates to a communication alleging the 
commission of an offence, and the making of that communication prima facie constitutes an 
offence.
183
  
Finally, correspondence made “without prejudice” is privileged. This includes correspondence 
that was made explicitly or impliedly “without prejudice” in the course of bona fide efforts of 
both parties to an action to settle their dispute. A statement of a party is not privileged, because 
it contains the phrase “without prejudice”. The decisive aspect is whether the statement was 
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made in a genuine attempt to negotiate a settlement. In other words, a statement not prefaced 
with the words “without prejudice” may be privileged, provided it constitutes a bona fide at-
tempt to resolve a dispute. Statements which have no connection with the settlement negotia-
tions are not covered by the privilege.
184
  
3. Examination of Witnesses 
As a general rule, litigants and third parties, including experts, give their evidence viva voce 
before the trial court.
185
 In addition, the evidence of witnesses may also be taken on commis-
sion, by interrogatories, or on affidavit.
186
 
a) Oral Testimony before the Trial Court 
The examination of witnesses at the trial is conducted by the litigants, and not by the judge. 
The counsel of the litigant, who bears the burden of proof, first calls and examines each of his 
witnesses.
187
 In this so-called “examination-in-chief”, the counsel leads the witness through the 
latter’s version of events, the method usually being that of question-and-answer.188 Following 
his examination-in-chief, the witness may be cross-examined by the counsel for the opposing 
party. The counsel, who originally questioned the witness, may then re-examine the latter.
189
 
Once all witnesses called by the counsel of the party bearing the onus have been examined, the 
same procedure applies with regard to the witnesses called by the opponent. Leading questions, 
that is, questions that suggest an answer or assume disputed facts, are, as a general principle, 
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not allowed in examination-in-chief and re-examination, but can be asked in cross-
examination.
190
 
As a general rule, a witness has to testify without using any documents. Under certain circum-
stances, however, he may refer to a document to refresh his memory.
191
 
The judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, put questions to the witness to clarify ambigu-
ous points. Such interrogation, however, should not be extensive. In S v Rall,
192
 it was held that 
the judge should conduct the trial in a manner that his open-mindedness, impartiality, and fair-
ness are manifest to all concerned. The court further stated that the judge should refrain from 
questioning witnesses in a way or to an extent which conveys partiality. Finally, it was held 
that the judge should avoid interrogating witnesses in such a manner that may intimidate or 
disconcert the witness, and thus affect his demeanour, or impair credibility.
193
  
 Only with the consent of the parties may the court call a witness.
194
 The court, however, may, 
without the litigants’ approval, recall a witness for further examination.195 
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As a general principle, witnesses are to be examined under oath. Individuals, however, who 
object to taking an oath, can make an affirmation. Witnesses, who are unable to understand the 
nature or religious obligation of an oath or affirmation, may be allowed to give evidence with-
out being upon oath or affirmation.
196
 The testimony of a witness is recorded in a verbatim 
transcript.
197
 
Communications prior to the trial between counsel and non-party witnesses, including experts, 
are allowed under South African law. This is a consequence of the principle of party control 
over the procurement of evidence prevailing in South African law.
198
 In practice, such commu-
nications are the rule; non-party witnesses may meet counsel to give a statement, or to be pre-
pared for delivering testimony at the trial.
199
  
b) Evidence on Commission 
By virtue of Order 38(3) of the High Court Rules, the court may, where it appears convenient 
or necessary for the purpose of justice, make an order for taking the evidence of a witness be-
fore a commissioner. Since the nature and general principles of a commission de bene esse 
have already been discussed,
200
 reference can be made to the comments in this regard. In prac-
tice, the court may order the examination before a commissioner where, for instance, the wit-
ness domiciled in South Africa is unable to appear before court due to illness,
201
 old age,
202
 or 
great inconvenience.
203
 
The examination of the witness before the commissioner appointed by the trial court is con-
ducted in accordance with Rule 38(3)-(8) of the High Court Rules. The evidence is adduced 
upon oral examination in the presence of the commissioner, the litigants and their counsel, and 
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the witness is subject to cross- and re-examination.
204
 The evidence taken on commission is 
recorded in the same manner as evidence taken before the trial court.
205
 
c) Evidence based on Interrogatories 
The evidence of a witness on commission is generally adduced upon viva voce examination.
206
 
The court, however, may deviate from this rule, and order that a witness testifies by way of in-
terrogatories.
207
 The difference between these two methods of taking evidence is that the oral 
examination relates to general evidence, while in the case of interrogatories, specific questions 
are put to the witness.
208
 Both forms, however, have in common that they deviate from the 
normal procedure for examining witnesses
209
 by allowing the latter to be questioned in the ab-
sence of the trial court.  
The litigant who requests the examination by interrogatories provides the court with the list of 
questions he wants to be put to the witness.
210
 The opposing party may ask the court for per-
mission to have cross-interrogatories be directed to the witness.
211
 The court may also add 
questions of its own.
212
 The commissioner appointed by the court then puts the questions to the 
witness. The latter gives evidence in the presence of the commissioner alone, that is, in the ab-
sence of the parties and their counsel. Consequently, there is no cross-examination or re-
examination.
213
 The commissioner records the answers, and returns the record to the trial court 
where the interrogatories are read as evidence at the trial.
214
 
d) Evidence on Affidavit 
By virtue of Rule 38(2) of the High Court Rules, the court may, upon request and for sufficient 
reason, order that evidence be given on affidavit. An affidavit is a written and sworn statement 
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of evidence given by an individual which replaces the viva voce evidence.
215
 As witnesses are 
generally to be examined orally in the presence of the trial court,
216
 judges are usually reluctant 
to allow evidence to be proved by affidavit. In practice, evidence by affidavit is thus usually 
limited to the proof of isolated facts,
217
 to evidence of a formal nature,
218
 or to evidence that is 
unlikely to be contested by the opposing party.
219
 Where it appears to the court that the oppos-
ing party reasonably requires the attendance of the particular witness for cross-examination, 
and the witness can be produced, evidence may not be given on affidavit.
220
  
e) Expert Witnesses 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of South Africa, experts are appointed and paid by 
the parties.
221
 This fact, however, does not make the experts mere partisan witnesses. Rather, 
an expert owes allegiance to the court, and not to the party who called him.
222
 In Schneider NO 
and Others v AA and Another,
223
 Davis J summarised the role of experts in civil proceedings as 
follows: 
“An expert comes to court to give the court the benefit of his (...) expertise. 
Agreed, an expert is called by a particular party, presumably because the con-
clusion of the expert, using his (...) expertise is in favour of the line of argu-
ment of the particular party. But that does not absolve the expert from provid-
ing the court with as objective and unbiased an opinion, based on his (...) 
expertise, as possible. An expert is not a hired gun who dispenses his (...) ex-
pertise for the purposes of a particular case. An expert does not assume the 
role of an advocate, nor gives evidence which goes beyond the logic which is 
dictated by the scientific knowledge which that expert claims to possess.”
 224
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Prior to the hearing, a litigant has to notify the opponent of his intention to call an expert, and 
to provide him with a written summary of the expert’s opinion.225 The ratio of this provision is 
to remove the element of surprise for the opposing party, and to enable experts to exchange 
their views before the hearing.
226
 
Experts, as any other witnesses, are subject to cross-examination and re-examination by the 
litigants’ counsel.227 
B. Documentary Evidence 
According to Rule 35(1) of the High Court Rules, a party to any action may require any other 
party to make discovery on oath of all documents relating to any matter in question in such ac-
tion which are or have been, at any time, in the possession or control of such other party.
228
 
The time for a litigant to seek discovery is generally after the close of pleadings.
229
 
A litigant may require only discovery from the opposing party, but not a third party.
230
 Where a 
litigant wishes to obtain documents from a third party, he may have issued a so-called “sub-
poena duces tecum” by the office of the Registrar.231 In other words, the litigant has to call the 
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particular individual who is required to produce the specified document(s) to the court at the 
trial as a witness.
232
 
A party may request only the documents relevant to any matter in question, irrespective of 
whether or not such matter is one arising between the party requiring discovery and the party 
requested to make discovery.
233
 In the English case Compagnie Financiėre et Commerciale du 
Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company,
234
 Brett L.J. stated the following: 
“It seems to me that every document relates to the matters in question in the 
action, which not only would be evidence upon any issue, but also which (...) 
contains information which may – not which must – either directly or indirect-
ly enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case or to 
damage the case of his adversary. I have put in the words “either directly or 
indirectly,” because, (...) a document can properly to be said to contain infor-
mation which may enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance 
his own case or to damage the case of his adversary, if it is a document which 
may fairly lead him to a train of inquiry, which may have either of these two 
consequences.” 
Brett L.J. went on to say that: 
“in order to determine whether certain documents are within that description, 
it is necessary to consider what are the questions in the action: the Court must 
look not only at the statement of claim and the plaintiff’s case, but also at the 
statement of defence and the defendant’s case.” 
The principles laid down in this decision were adopted by South African case law.
235
 Notwith-
standing the broad meaning ascribed to the relevancy of documents under Rule 35(1) of the 
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High Court Rules,
236
 so-called “fishing expeditions” are not permitted under South African 
law.
237
  
Under Rule 35(1) of the High Court Rules, discovery extends to any document which is or has 
at any time been in the possession or control of a party. The litigant required to make discovery 
has to specify on oath
238
 the documents in his or his agent’s possession,239 the documents re-
garding which he has a valid objection to produce,
240
 as well as the documents that are no 
longer in his or his agent’s possession.241 Statements of witnesses, as well as communications 
between attorney and client, and between attorney and advocate do not have to be disclosed.
242
 
Where the party who requested discovery believes that there are, in addition to the documents 
listed in the affidavit, other documents relevant to any matter in question, he may require fur-
ther discovery.
243
 
Based on Rule 35(6) of the High Court Rules, a party may require the other party, who made 
discovery, to make the documents falling under Rule 35(2)(1)(a) of the High Court Rules 
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quired to make discovery, see Rule 35(2)(2) of the said Rules.  
242
 Rule 35(2)(2) in fine of the High Court Rules. 
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available for inspection.
244
 Privileged documents
245
 have to be discovered under Rule 35(2) of 
the High Court Rules, but are not subject to inspection under Rule 35(6) of the said Rules.
246
 
If a party fails to give discovery or inspection, the other party may apply to the court, which 
may order compliance with the relevant rules and, failing such compliance, may dismiss the 
claim, or strike out the defence.
247
 
C. Real Evidence 
In S v M,
248
 real evidence is described as “an object which, upon proper identification, be-
comes, of itself, evidence”. Real evidence may include any object, person,249 or place which is 
examined by the court in order to draw a conclusion as to any factual issue.
250
 Where real evi-
dence includes a location or an object, which cannot be produced in court, the judge conducts a 
so-called “inspection in loco”.251  
A litigant in civil proceedings pending abroad will only request evidence located in South Af-
rica to be examined in South Africa, if such evidence cannot be brought to the trial court. This 
is particularly the case for immovable property, and locations. The following comments thus 
focus on inspections in loco. The remarks made earlier in relation to Swiss law on whether or 
not an inspection abroad for the benefit of a trial court makes sense, also apply here.
252
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which provides for the power of court to hold inspections in loco. See in this regard East London Municipality 
v Van Zyl 1959 (2) SA 514 (E) at 516F-517B. 
252
 See para. II.E above. 
 243 
 
As a general rule, litigants and their counsel have the right to be present at an inspection in lo-
co.
253
 The judge conducting the inspection should make a record of the observations he made 
on the spot, and communicate them to the litigants present at the inspection in order to be able 
to clarify any ambiguities or disputes regarding his observations.
254
 At the inspection, the par-
ties and any non-party witnesses are neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination, and 
the judge can thus not rely on statements such persons made during the inspection. Following 
the inspection, the judge should therefore recall the litigants and non-party witnesses to give 
evidence on what was indicated in the course of the inspection.
255
  
IV. Botswana 
A. Testimony of Witnesses 
1. Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
As a general rule, every person is competent to give evidence in civil proceedings pending be-
fore the High Court of Botswana.
256
 An individual, however, afflicted with insanity, or labour-
ing under imbecility of mind arising from intoxication or otherwise, whereby he is deprived of 
the proper use of reason, is incompetent to testify while under the influence of such malady or 
disability.
257
  
Pursuant to Section 5(1) of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act, a child is competent to testi-
fy, provided he understands the nature and recognises the religious obligation of an oath. It is 
submitted that a child must also be in a position to comprehend the questions put to him, and to 
give reasonable answers. 
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 Hansen v Rex 1924 NPD 318 at 320 et seq. 322 et seq.; R v Mouton 1934 TPD 101 at 102, 103. For an excep-
tion to such rule, see Akoon v Rex 1926 NPD 306 at 306 et seq. 
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 Section 4 of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act. 
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By virtue of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act, no person is incompetent to testify due to any rela-
tion, either by consanguinity or affinity, subsisting between such person and the person for or 
against whom he shall give evidence. This particularly holds true for the spouse of a litigant.  
Where a competent witness fails without reasonable cause to attend court to give evidence, the 
court may issue a warrant for his arrest, provided the subpoena was duly served, and the rele-
vant expenses have been paid or offered to the witness.
258
 
2. Privileges of Witnesses 
A witness may refuse to answer any question which might have a tendency to expose him to 
any pains, penalty or punishment, forfeiture, or criminal charge, or to degrade his character.
259
 
No privilege, however, can be invoked with regard to questions that may expose the witness to 
a risk of civil liability.
260
  
By virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act, no spouse can be compelled 
to disclose any communication made to him by the other spouse during the marriage.
261
 Sec-
tion 9 of the said Act makes marital communications privileged after the dissolution of the 
marriage.
262
 Furthermore, a witness cannot be compelled to answer questions which his spouse, 
if under examination, might lawfully refuse.
263
 By contrast, individuals, who intercepted mari-
tal communications, cannot invoke the privilege.
264
 
Section 10 of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act provides for the legal professional privi-
lege. Under this provision, not only communications between counsel and client are protect-
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ed,
265
 but also those between counsel or client and third parties.
266
 In the first case, the infor-
mation communicated by the lawyer to his client or vice versa has to be furnished for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice and has to be of a confidential nature.
267
 The legal advice privi-
lege does thus not extend to non-confidential facts the counsel or party observed in the course 
of their relationship as legal adviser and client.
268
 Not only counsel in private practice can in-
voke the legal professional privilege, but also in-house legal advisers.
269
 
In order to be protected under the litigation privilege, the communications have to be made for 
the purpose of pending or contemplated litigation. This includes, inter alia, discussions with 
potential witnesses, including experts, and their means of proof.
270
 Communications are made 
in contemplation of litigation, if they were for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, 
or aiding in litigation.
271
 Under both the legal advice and the litigation privilege, confidential 
communications are not privileged, if they relate to any crime or offence that was made before 
the legal adviser was professionally employed, or consulted with regard to the defence of the 
client.
272
 Moreover, no legal privilege can be invoked where the relationship between counsel 
and client is in fact a front for the commission or furtherance of some crime or fraudulent 
act.
273
 
Confidential professional communications other than those between legal advisers and clients, 
as well as between counsel or clients and third parties are not protected. This holds particularly 
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true for communications between priest and penitent,
274
 doctor and patient,
275
 or a journalist 
and his source.
276
 
By virtue of Section 23(1) of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act, a witness may refuse to 
give evidence on the ground of public policy or public interest. In other words, evidence is pre-
vented from being disclosed in civil proceedings, if its communication would prejudice public 
policy or public interest, such as national security or international relations.
277
 
Finally, statements that were made “without prejudice” in the course of negotiating a settle-
ment of a legal dispute are privileged, and can thus not be given in evidence without the con-
sent of the parties.
278
 
3. Examination of Witnesses 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of Botswana, litigants and third parties, including 
experts, are generally examined viva voce before the trial court.
279
 In certain cases, however, 
witnesses may give evidence on commission, or based on interrogatories or affidavits. 
a) Oral Testimony before the Trial Court 
Witnesses are questioned by the parties’ counsel, and are subject to the latter’s examination-in-
chief, cross-examination, and re-examination.
280
 Leading questions cannot be asked in exami- 
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nation-in-chief and re-examination, but are allowed in cross-examination.
281
  
A witness has to testify without referring to any documents. Under certain conditions, howev-
er, he may be allowed to use documents to refresh his memory before giving evidence.
282
 
The court has the power to put questions to witnesses. According to Aguda JA, the judge 
should, however,  
“refrain from asking questions in such a way as to create the impression that 
he is not conducting the trial in an open-minded or impartial manner”.283  
Without the parties’ consent, the judge is not allowed to call witnesses.284 It is, however, sub-
mitted that the court may suo motu recall a witness, who has already testified. 
As a general rule, witnesses give evidence upon oath. Individuals, who decline to take an oath, 
can make an affirmation.
285
 A child who lacks the capacity to understand the nature and reli-
gious obligation of an oath cannot give unsworn evidence and, thus, is not able to testify.
286
 A 
verbatim record is made of evidence given by witnesses.
287
 
The comments on communications between counsel and non-party witnesses prior to the trial 
made in relation to South African law apply mutatis mutandis to Botswana law.
288
 
                                                     
281
 Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evidence 2008 193 et seq., 201, 208. 
282
 Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evidence 2008 194 et seqq. with reference to Anderson v Whalley (1852) 3 
Car & K 54, R v Harvey (1869) 11 Cox CC 546, R v Langton (1876) 2 QBD 296, R v Isaacs 1916 TPD 390, 
Senat v Senat [1965] P 172, R v Richardson (1971) 55 Cr App 244 at 251, R v Fotheringham [1975] Crim LR 
710 (CA), R v Kelsey (1982) 74 Cr App R 213, and R v Da Silva [1990] 1 All ER 29. 
283
 Lemme v The State [1985] BLR 576 (CA) at 580. See in this regard also State v Jeremane [1984] BLR 169 
(HC) at 170; State v Ntshupetsang [1984] BLR 1 (HC); State v Moshotle [1985] BLR 131 (HC) at 133; State v 
Mogotsi and Another [1990] BLR 497 (HC) at 504; Kefilwe v The State [1992] BLR 276 (CA) at 278 et seqq. 
284
 Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evidence 2008 192. 
285
 Sections 6 and 29 of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act. See also Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evi-
dence 2008 57; State v Mopirwa [1981] BLR 211 at 212; The State v Onkemetse Kegopotse [1982] 2 BLR 62 
at 62 et seq.; Komanyane v The State [1997] BLR 11 at 12.  
286
 Section 5(2) of the Evidence in Civil Proceedings Act. See also Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evidence 
2008 58. For the test to be applied by the court to determine whether a child understands the nature of an oath 
or not, cf. State v Dimakatso Zhoba High Court Criminal Trail No. F9 of 1990 cited in Solo K The Law of Evi-
dence in Botswana, Cases and Materials 1999 30 et seqq. See, however, Section 30 of the Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings Act, which provides that persons, who from ignorance arising from youth, defective education, or 
other cause shall be found not to understand the nature, or recognise the religious obligation, of an oath, may 
be admissible to give evidence in any court, without being sworn upon oath. In this case, the court admonishes 
the witness to tell the truth.  
287
 Cf. Order 45(16)(b) of the Rules of the High Court. 
288
 See in this regard para. IV.A.3.a) in fine. 
 248 
 
b) Evidence on Commission 
In terms of Order 44(3) of the Rules of the High Court, the court may, where it appears con-
venient or necessary for the purpose of justice, make an order for taking the evidence of a wit-
ness before a commissioner. Since the nature and general principles of a commission de bene 
esse have already been outlined,
289
 there is no need to further elaborate in this regard. 
The wording of the provisions in Order 44(3)-(8) of the Rules of the High Court, which outline 
the requirements and procedure for a commission de bene esse, is virtually identical with the 
wording of Rule 38(3)-(8) of the South African High Court Rules. Reference can thus be made 
to the relevant comments under South African law.
290
 Accordingly, the evidence is adduced 
upon oral evidence in the presence of the commissioner, the parties, and their counsel, and the 
witness is subject to cross- and re-examination.
291
 The testimony of the witness is recorded in 
the same way when taken before a judge.
292
 
c) Evidence based on Interrogatories 
Based on Order 44(5) of the Rules of the High Court, the court may, when ordering a commis-
sion de bene esse, direct that witnesses are to be examined by interrogatories and cross-
interrogatories. The nature of such interrogatories has already been explained earlier, and refer-
ence can thus be made to the relevant comments.
293
 
The wording of Order 44(5) of the Rules of the High Court and that of Rule 38(5) of the South 
African High Court Rules are identical.
294
 The commissioner therefore questions the witness in 
the absence of the parties and their counsel based on the list of interrogatories and cross-
interrogatories prepared by the litigants.
295
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d) Evidence on Affidavit 
By virtue of Order 44(2) of the Rules of the High Court, the court may allow witnesses to give 
evidence on affidavit.
296
 Again, the wording of this provision is identical with that of Rule 
38(2) of the South African High Court Rules.
297
 Hence, the taking of evidence by affidavit is 
generally limited to the proof of evidence of a formal nature, of isolated facts, or facts that are 
unlikely to be contested by the opposing party. The court does not allow evidence to be given 
on affidavit where the opposing party reasonably requires the attendance of the particular wit-
ness for cross-examination, and such witness can be produced.
298
 
e) Expert Witnesses 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of Botswana, experts are regarded as ordinary third-
party witnesses, who are appointed by the litigants, and are subject to cross- and re-
examination through the parties’ counsel.299 
In Eurafric (Pty) v Leading Auto Engineering (Pty) Ltd,
300
 the court was faced with the diver-
gent opinions of several expert witnesses. In this case, Gyeke-Dako J held that each of the ex-
perts departed from the role of an expert, as they each tailored the respective evidence so that it 
would support the claim of the party calling him. The role of an expert, however, is, according 
to Gyeke-Dako J, to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accu-
racy of their conclusions so as to enable him to form his own independent judgement of the 
application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. Having said this, Gyeke-Dako J 
pointed out that he is not bound to adopt the view of an expert, even if this view stands uncon-
tradicted. From this it follows, that experts should not be mere partisan witnesses, but that they 
should provide the court with as objective and unbiased an expert opinion as possible.
301
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Prior to the hearing, a litigant has to give notice of his intention to call an expert witness, and 
has to deliver a summary of the expert’s opinion.302 
B. Documentary Evidence 
By virtue of Order 39(1) of the Rules of the High Court, a party may apply to the court for an 
order directing any other party to make discovery on oath of the documents which are or have 
been in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question.
303
 Neither Order 39 of the 
said Rules, nor any other statutory provision determines the stage at which a party may apply 
for discovery. According to Kakuli, courts will not, as a general rule, order a defendant to pro-
duce documents until a writ of summons has been served upon him. With regard to documents 
in the possession of a plaintiff, Kakuli maintains that discovery should not be granted until the 
plaintiff has filed his declaration, or statement of claim.
304
 
Discovery of documents can only be requested from a litigant, but not from a third party.
305
 
Where a litigant wishes to obtain documents from a non-party witness, the issue of a subpoena 
duces tecum is required.
306
 
A party may only request the discovery of documents “relating to any matter in question”.307 
Whether this requirement is fulfilled or not, is to be determined based on the relevant principles 
developed in Compagnie Financiėre et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Compa-
ny.
308
 Since these principles have already been discussed in relation to discovery under South 
African law, there is no need to further elaborate in this regard.
309
 It should, however, be em-
phasised that so-called “fishing expeditions” are not allowed. 
Discovery under Order 39(1) of the Rules of the High Court extends to all documents, which 
are or have been in the possession or power of the party required to make discovery. Such party 
has to specify by affidavit the aforesaid documents as well as the documents regarding which 
                                                     
302
 Order 41(9) of the Rules of the High Court. The wording of this rule is virtually identical with that of Rule 
36(9) of the South African High Court Rules. With regard to the latter, see para. III.A.3.e) above. See also 
Quansah EK The Botswana Law of Evidence 2008 123. 
303
 Cf. also Order 39(5) of the Rules of the High Court, which entitles a party to request the production of docu-
ments that were referred to in the opponent’s pleadings, or affidavits.  
304
 Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 135 et seq.  
305
 Order 39(1) of the Rules of the High Court. See also Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High 
Court of Botswana 2005 133.  
306
 With regard to the so-called “subpoena duces tecum”, see para. III.B above. See also Order 44(1)(2) of the 
Rules of the High Court. 
307
 Order 39(1) of the Rules of the High Court. 
308
 (1882) 11 QBD 55. See Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 136. 
309
 See the relevant comments made in para. III.B. 
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he has a valid objection to produce.
310
 Where the party requesting discovery believes that the 
opponent is in possession or power of relevant documents, which were not disclosed in the af-
fidavit, he may apply to the court for further discovery.
311
 
By virtue of Order 39(3) of the High Court Rules, a litigant may, at any time during which the 
claim is pending or during the hearing, apply to the judge for an order for the production of 
documents.
312
 Privileged documents have to be disclosed in the affidavit, but are not subject to 
inspection.
313
 
A party, who fails to comply with an order for discovery or inspection of documents, is liable 
to committal. Where a plaintiff fails to cooperate, the court may dismiss the claim for want of 
prosecution. With regard to a defendant, the court may strike out the defence, and may place 
the defendant in the same position, as if he had not entered a defence.
314
 
C. Real Evidence 
The comments on what constitutes real evidence made in relation to South African law,
315
 also 
apply to civil proceedings before the High Court of Botswana. The same holds true for the ear-
lier remarks on whether or not an inspection of evidence located in Botswana for the benefit of 
foreign civil proceedings makes sense.
316
 
With regard to an inspection in loco, it was held in Tshipidi v The State,
317
 that both parties 
must be accorded an opportunity to be present. The court decision furthermore stated that the 
                                                     
310
 Order 39(2) of the Rules of the High Court read in conjunction with Form 12 in the First Schedule to the said 
Rules. Form 12 (para. 5) not only mentions documents in the possession, custody, or power of the party, but 
also those in the possession, custody, or power of his attorney, agent, or any other person on his behalf. Also, 
Form 12 (para. 5) not only makes reference to original documents, but also to copies thereof. See Kakuli GM 
Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 136. With regard to privileged documents, 
cf. para. III.B above. See also Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 
137, 136 with reference to R v Strachan [1895] 1 Ch 439 at 445, 447 et seq.; Knapp v Harvey [1911] 2 KB 725 
(CA) at 730 et seq. 
311
 Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 138 with reference to Jones v 
The Monte Video Gas Co (1880) 5 QBD 556, Kent Coal Concessions Ltd v Duguid [1910] 1 KB 904, British 
Association of Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd v Nettleford [1912] 1 KB 369, and Federated Wine and Brandy 
Co Ltd v Kantor 1958 (4) SA 735 (E). 
312
 According to Kakuli GM Civil Procedure and Practice in the High Court of Botswana 2005 138 et seq., this 
provision only extends to documents, which are in the sole legal possession of the litigant making discovery. 
See also Order 39(8)(2) of the Rules of the High Court.  
313
 See in this regard para. III.B above. 
314
 Order 39(10) of the Rules of the High Court. 
315
 See para. III.C above. 
316
 Cf. para. II.E above. 
317
 [2004] (1) BLR 166 (HC). 
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judge should record his observations made at the inspection,
318
 and share them with the parties 
at the spot, so that, if there is a disagreement, he can have a second look and form his opinion. 
It was also pointed out that no reliance should be made in statements made at the inspection by 
a witness as they are not made under oath and the witness is not subject to cross-examination. 
Accordingly, the court decision emphasised that when the hearing is resumed after the inspec-
tion, the judge should call the witness to give evidence in open court under oath in relation to 
the explanations made at the inspection.
319
  
V. Namibia 
In Namibia, the law of evidence in regard to civil proceedings pending before the High Court is 
governed by the South African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act No. 25 of 1965 as applied in 
South Africa as of 12 November 1979.
320
 The rules on the conduct of civil proceedings before 
the Namibian High Court are contained in the High Court Act
321
 and the Rules of the High 
Court of Namibia.
322
  
A. Testimony of Witnesses 
1. Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
Sections 8 and 9 of the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act are identical with Sections 8 
and 9 of its South African counterpart. The remarks in relation to the competence and compel-
lability of witnesses made under South African law thus apply mutatis mutandis to Namibian 
                                                     
318
 See also Order 45(16)(d) of the Rules of the High Court, which states, inter alia, that a record shall comprise 
the “proceedings of the court generally including any inspection in loco”. 
319
 Tshipidi v The State [2004] (1) BLR 166 (HC) at 167 with reference to Kruger v Ludick 1947 (3) SA 23 (A) at 
31 and Rex v Van der Merwe 1950 (4) SA 17 (O) at 20A. See also Modise v The State [1989] BLR 126 (HC) at 
129 et seq. with reference to R v Holland 1950 (3) SA 37 (C) at 40A-B; Maiphetlho and Others v The State 
[1990] BLR 580 (HC) at 583. 
320
 While Namibia was under the administration of South Africa, the administration of some South African laws, 
including the South African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, was transferred to Namibia. Such transfer had 
the effect of “freezing” the statutes as they stood at the date of the transfer. The administration of the South 
African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act was transferred on 12 November 1979. At the independence of Na-
mibia, the said Act was inherited by Namibia. See in this regard Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: Index to the 
Laws of Namibia (2010 update) http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Intro.pdf Introduction-2, Introduction-5, Histo-
ry-1 et seqq. (date of use: 31 January 2013); Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: Index to the Laws of Namibia - 
Evidence (2010 update) http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Evidence.pdf Evidence-1 (date of use: 31 January 
2013). In order to avoid any confusion between the Act applicable in South Africa and that in Namibia, refer-
ence will be made hereinafter either to the “South African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act” or the “Namibian 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act”. 
321
 No. 16 of 1990. 
322
 Both the High Court Act and the Rules of the High Court of Namibia were enacted after 1990, that is, after 
Namibia gained independence. 
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law.
323
 Accordingly, every person is competent and compellable to testify, unless he suffers 
from insanity or intoxication, and is thereby deprived of the proper use of reason. A child is a 
competent witness, provided he is able to comprehend the questions put to him, and to answer 
rationally. A spouse is competent and compellable to testify in civil proceedings where his wife 
or husband acts as a party. 
The attendance of a person to give evidence at the trial can be secured by the issue of subpoe-
nas based on Rule 38(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia.
324
 Where the subpoena 
was duly served, and the witness expenses have been paid or offered, the court may issue a 
warrant for the arrest of any person, who, without reasonable excuse, fails to obey the subpoe-
na.
325
 The same applies where the witness attends court, but declines to be sworn, to make an 
affirmation, or to answer any questions put to him without any just excuse.
326
 
2. Privileges of Witnesses 
Sections 10-14 of the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act on the privileges of witnesses 
are virtually identical with Sections 10-14 of its South African counterpart. However, one has 
to bear in mind that the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act applies in the version appli-
cable in South Africa as per 12 November 1979. While Sections 10(2) and 10A of the current 
version of the South African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act do not apply in Namibia,
327
 Sec-
tion 11 of the said Act in its version of 1979 is still applicable.
328
 According to this provision, 
the marital privilege continues after the dissolution or annulment of the marriage.
329
 To the 
above extent, the comments on Sections 10-14 of the South African Civil Proceedings Evi-
dence Act thus apply mutatis mutandis to Namibian law.
330
 As a result, Namibian law recog-
                                                     
323
 See para. III.A.1 above. 
324
 The wording of this provision is virtually identical with that of Rule 38(1) of the South African High Court 
Rules. With respect to the latter, see para. III.A.1 above. 
325
 Section 26(1) of the High Court Act. This provision is identical to Section 30(2) of the South African Supreme 
Court Act. Regarding the latter, see para. III.A.1 above. 
326
 Section 27(1) of the High Court Act. The wording of this Section is identical to that in Section 31(1) of the 
South African Supreme Court Act. With regard to the latter, see para. III.A.1 above. 
327
 These provisions were only inserted in 1988 and 1996, respectively. See also Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: 
Index to the Laws of Namibia - Evidence (2010 update) http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Evidence.pdf Evidence-
1 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
328
 In South Africa, this provision was only repealed in 1988. Cf. also Legal Assistance Centre Namlex: Index to 
the Laws of Namibia - Evidence (2010 update) http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Evidence.pdf Evidence-1 (date 
of use: 31 January 2013). 
329
 Section 11 of the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act reads as follows: “No person whose marriage has 
been dissolved or annulled shall be compelled to give evidence as to any fact, matter or thing which occurred 
during the subsistence of the marriage or supposed marriage, and as to which he or she could not have been 
compelled to give evidence if the marriage were subsisting.” 
330
 Cf. para. III.A.2 above. 
 254 
 
nises the privilege against self-incrimination,
331
 the privilege on the grounds of public policy or 
public interest,
332
 as well as the privilege of spouses. 
In addition, Namibian law guarantees the legal professional privilege. In Alexander v Minister 
of Home Affairs and Others,
333
 it was held that such privilege not only includes communica-
tions between a legal adviser and his clients made for the purpose of litigation, but extends to 
all communications made for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice.
334
 
There is no reported case law on the privilege of professionals other than legal advisers. Ac-
cordingly, it can be assumed that under Namibian law, the professional privilege is only ap-
plied to legal advisers, but not to other professionals, such as doctors, clergymen, or journalists. 
In this context, however, mention must be made of Section 13(1) of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Namibia, which provides for the right to privacy in relation to correspondence and 
communications.  Future case law will show whether certain professional communications will 
be protected under the said Section of the Constitution, and whether the professional privilege 
will be extended to professionals other than legal advisers. 
Finally, communications “without prejudice” are privileged, provided they were made by the 
parties in the course of negotiations to settle a legal dispute.
335
 
3. Examination of Witnesses 
Witnesses are generally examined orally in the presence of the trial court.
336
 In certain cases, 
however, the court may order that evidence is given on commission, by means of interrogato-
ries, or by affidavit.
337
  
                                                     
331
 See Gases and Others v The Social Security Commission and Others 2005 NR 325 (HC) at 337 et seqq. Cf. 
also in this regard Section 12(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. According to this 
provision, no persons shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves, or their spouses who shall in-
clude partners in a marriage by customary law. 
332
 See, amongst others, S v Nassar 1994 NR 233 (HC) at 107G-H.  
333
 2010 (1) NR 226 (HC) at 229 et seq. 
334
 For more on the legal privilege, see para. III.A.2 above. 
335
 National Address Buro v South West African Broadcasting Corporation 1991 NR 35 (HC) at 67 et seq.; SOS 
Kinderdorf International v Effie Lentin Architects 1992 NR 390 (HC) at 399 with reference to Naidoo v Ma-
rine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1978 (3) SA 666 (A). For more on “without prejudice” communications, see 
para. III.A.2 above. 
336
 Rule 38(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. The wording of this provision is virtually identical with 
that of Rule 38(2) of the South African High Court Rules. See in this regard para. III.A.3.a) above. 
337
 Cf. S v Koch 2006 (2) NR 513 (SC) at 542. 
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a) Oral Testimony before the Trial Court 
In civil proceedings pending before the High Court of Namibia, witnesses are generally ques-
tioned by the litigants’ counsel, and are subject to the latter’s cross- and re-examination.338 The 
provisions regarding the examination of witnesses in the Rules of the High Court of Namibia 
and those in the South African High Court Rules are identical.
339
 Accordingly, the relevant 
comments made in relation to South African law apply mutatis mutandis to Namibian law.
340
  
In S v Wasserfall,
341
 Strydom JP pointed out that a judge should refrain from questioning any 
witnesses in a way that, because of its frequency, length, timing, form, tone, contents or other-
wise, conveys or is likely to convey that the judge is no longer open-minded, impartial or fair 
to all those who are concerned in the trial and its outcome. Strydom JP emphasised that ques-
tions by a judge should therefore be aimed at clearing up uncertainties or to elicit or elucidate 
the truth more fully in respect of relevant aspects of the case subject to the aforesaid limita-
tions. In Namib Plains Farming and Tourism CC v Valencia Uranium (Pty) Ltd and Others,
342
 
it was held that the court has not the power to call witnesses without the parties’ consent. There 
is no reported case law on whether or not leading questions are allowed in cross-
examination.
343
 It is, however, submitted that the relevant remarks under South African law 
also apply with regard to Namibian law.
344
 The same holds true for the the court’s power to 
recall witnesses as well as the use of documents by a witness to refresh his memory during ex-
amination. 
Witnesses are generally examined upon oath.
345
 Exceptions, however, apply to individuals who 
object to testifying under oath, or are incapable of understanding the nature and religious obli-
                                                     
338
 See Rule 40(8) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
339
 Cf. Rule 40 of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia and Rule 39 of the South African High Court Rules.  
340
 See para. III.A.3.a) above. 
341
 1992 NR 18 (HC) at 21 et seq. with reference to S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) at 831H-832B, S v Van Niekerk 
1981 (3) SA 787 (T) at 795C, and S v Meyer 1972 (3) SA 480 (A) at 483D.  
342
 2011 (2) NR 469 at 483B-D with reference to Buys v Nancefield Trading Stores 1926 TPD 513 and Simon 
Alias Kwayipa v Van den Berg 1954 (2) SA 612 (SR) at 613F-614. 
343
 Cf., however, S v Malumo and Others 2006 (1) NR 323 (HC) at 336, where it was stated that putting a leading 
question to a witness is generally prohibited. 
344
 See para. III.A.3.a) above. 
345
 Section 39(1) of the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act. 
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gation of an oath.
346
 Evidence given by witnesses is recorded in the form of a verbatim tran-
script.
347
 
The comments regarding the communications between counsel and non-party witnesses prior 
to the trial, which have been made in relation to South African law, apply mutatis mutandis to 
Namibian law.
348
 
b) Evidence on Commission 
According to Rule 38(3) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia, the court may, where it 
appears convenient or necessary for the purposes of justice, make an order for taking the evi-
dence of a witness before a commissioner. The nature of a commission de bene esse has al-
ready been discussed earlier and reference can thus be made to the relevant comments.
349
 
Rule 38(3)-(8) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia governing the procedure for a com-
mission de bene esse is identical with Rule 38(3)-(8) of the South African High Court Rules. 
Accordingly, the explanations given with regard to the latter provisions apply mutatis mutandis 
to Namibian law.
350
 Hence, the witness gives evidence viva voce in the presence of the com-
missioner, the parties and their counsel, and is subject to cross- and re-examination.
351
 The evi-
dence taken on commission is recorded in the same manner as evidence taken before the trial 
court.
352
 
c) Evidence based on Interrogatories 
When giving leave to a request for a commission de bene esse, the court may, based on Rule 
38(5) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia, order that the evidence of the witness is not 
adduced upon oral examination, but by means of interrogatories and cross-interrogatories. With 
regard to the nature of interrogatories, reference can be made to the relevant comments under 
South African law.
353
 
                                                     
346
 Sections 39-41 of the Namibian Civil Proceedings Evidence Act. Since these provisions are identical with Sec-
tions 39-41 of the South African Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, reference can be made to the comments in 
para. III.A.3.a). See also S v Boois 2004 NR 74 (HC) at 75 et seqq. 
347
 See Rule 40(16)(b) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. The wording of this provision is identical with 
that of Rule 39(16) of the South African High Court Rules. 
348
 See in this regard para. III.A.3.a) in fine. 
349
 Cf. Chapter 4 para. III.C.2.b). 
350
 See para. III.A.3.b) above. 
351
 Rule 38(5) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia.  
352
 Rule 38(7) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
353
 See para. III.A.3.c) above. 
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The aforesaid Rule and Rule 38(5) of the South African High Court Rules are virtually identi-
cal. Consequently, the remarks made with regard to the latter provision apply mutatis mutandis 
to interrogatories under Namibian law.
354
 Accordingly, the interrogatories and cross-
interrogatories prepared by the parties are put to the witness. The latter gives evidence in the 
presence of the commissioner alone, and is not subject to cross- and re-examination. 
d) Evidence on Affidavit 
By virtue of Rule 38(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia, the court may, for suffi-
cient reason, order that a witness give evidence on affidavit. Since this provision is identical 
with Rule 38(2) of the South African High Court Rules, the comments in relation to South Af-
rican law apply accordingly.
355
 Evidence on affidavit is thus generally limited to the proof of 
isolated facts, the evidence of a formal nature, or facts the opposing party is unlikely to con-
test.
356
 Where it appears that the opposing party reasonably requires the attendance of the wit-
ness for cross-examination, and the witness can be produced, courts usually do not allow evi-
dence to be given on affidavit.
357
 
e) Expert Witnesses 
In civil proceedings pending before the High Court of Namibia, experts are regarded as ordi-
nary non-party witnesses. Consequently, they are appointed by the litigants, and are subject to 
cross- and re-examination by the parties’ counsel.358 There is no reported case law setting out 
the duties expert witnesses may have towards the trial court. Future case law will show wheth-
er the High Court of Namibia will adopt principles similar to those developed by the South Af-
rican courts in this regard.
359
 
                                                     
354
 Cf. para. III.A.3.c) above. 
355
 See para. III.A.3.d) above. 
356
 Cf. in this regard Gabrielsen v Crown Security CC 2011 (1) NR 121 (HC) at 124 et seq. In this decision, the 
High Court allowed the plaintiff’s expert, who was domiciled abroad, to give evidence on affidavit. This was 
based on the facts that the defendant did not call his own experts, that the viva voce evidence of the plaintiff’s 
expert would have been very expensive, and that the cross-examination of the expert could be lead by the de-
fendant in writing. 
357
 Rule 38(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
358
 See para. V.A.3.a) above. 
359
 Cf. in this regard para. III.A.3.e) above. 
 258 
 
A party, who wants to call an expert witness, has not only to give notice to the opponent prior 
to the hearing, but he has also to deliver a summary of the expert’s opinion before the begin-
ning of the trial.
360
  
B. Documentary Evidence 
By virtue of Rule 35(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia, a party to any action may 
require any other party to make discovery on oath of all documents relating to any matter in 
question, which are or have been in the possession or control of such other party. Rule 35 of 
the said Rules, which sets out the procedure for the discovery and inspection of documents, is 
virtually identical with Rule 35 of the South African High Court Rules. Reference can thus be 
made to the comments on documentary evidence in relation to South African law.
361
  
Accordingly, a party may only seek discovery after the close of pleadings. Moreover, a litigant 
may only require discovery from the opposing party, but not from third parties.
362
 With regard 
to documents controlled by non-party witnesses, the issue of subpoenas duces tecum is neces-
sary.
363
  
The party requested to make discovery has to specify on oath the documents that are or have 
been in his or his agent’s possession or control, as well as the documents in respect of which he 
has a valid objection to produce.
364
 Discovery is limited to documents which relate to any mat-
ter in question, and fishing expeditions are thus not allowed.
365
 The litigant who required dis-
covery may request the opposing party to make the disclosed documents, with the exception of 
                                                     
360
 Rule 36(9) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. The wording of this rule is identical with that of Rule 
36(9) of the South African High Court Rules. See in this regard para. III.A.3.e) above. With regard to medical 
examinations, cf. Rule 36(1)-(5) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
361
 See para. III.B above.  
362
 Rule 35(1) in fine of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
363
 Cf. Rule 38(1) in fine of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
364
 Rule 35(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia read in conjunction with Form 11 of the First Schedule 
to the said Rules. 
365
 Rule 35(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. See also South African Sugar Association v Namibia 
Sugar Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1999 NR 241 (HC) at 244 et seq.; Waltraut Fritzsche t/a Reit Safari v Telecom 
Namibia Ltd 2000 NR 201 (HC) at 205; Kanyama v Cupido 2007 (1) NR 261 (HC) at 219I-220F with refer-
ence to Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 311A and Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian 
Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55. See also Marco Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Namibia and 
Others 2008 (2) NR 742 (HC) at 748D-F.  
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privileged documents, available for inspection.
366
 Where a party fails to give discovery or in-
spection, the court may dismiss the claim, or strike out the defence.
367
 
C. Real Evidence 
The remarks on the notion of “real evidence” made under South African law also apply here.368 
The same holds true for the comments on whether or not an inspection of evidence located in 
Namibia for the benefit of a trial court located abroad makes sense.
369
 
There is no reported case law setting out the general principles for the conduct of an inspection 
in loco. Future case law will show whether the High Court will adopt principles, which are 
similar to those developed by the South African courts, when dealing with the conduct of an 
inspection in loco.
370
 Accordingly, the parties and their counsel should have the right to be pre-
sent at the inspection. Any comments or observations made by the court, litigants, or non-party 
witnesses at the spot should be recorded by the court.
371
 Following the inspection, the court 
should recall the parties and non-party witnesses to give evidence on oath on their observations 
during the inspection. 
VI. Nigeria 
As has been mentioned earlier,
372
 there are no uniform rules on the procedure of civil proceed-
ings before the high courts of Nigeria. By contrast, the law of evidence is regulated by a federal 
statute, the Evidence Act,
373
 which applies to all Nigerian high courts. 
A. Testimony of Witnesses 
1. Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
By virtue of Section 175(1) of the Evidence Act, all persons are competent to testify, unless the 
court considers them prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving 
                                                     
366
 Rule 35(6) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
367
 Rule 35(7) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. See also Rule 35(4) of the said Rules which provides 
that an undisclosed document may not, save with the leave of the court, be used for any purpose at the trial by 
the party who was obliged, but failed to disclose it, provided that the other party may use such document. 
368
 See para. III.C above. See also in this regard S v Malumo and Others 2006 (2) NR 629 (HC) at 636 et seq.; S v 
Auala 2008 (1) NR 223 (HC) at 232; S v Malumo and 116 Others (No. 3) 2008 (2) NR 512 (HC) at 513 et seq.; 
S v Malumo and 116 Others (No. 4) 2008 (2) NR 515 (HC) at 516. 
369
 Cf. para. III.C above. 
370
 See para. II.E above. 
371
 Cf, Rule 40(16)(d) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia. 
372
 See Chapter 4 para. VI.A. 
373
 No. 18 of 2011. 
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rational answers, by reason of tender years, extreme old age, disease, or any other cause of the 
same kind. In other words, all individuals, irrespective of age, are competent to give evidence 
in court, provided they have the mental capacity and the intelligence to understand the ques-
tions and rationally answer them.
374
 This particularly holds true for children,
375
 and persons of 
unsound mind. The latter are competent witnesses during lucid intervals.
376
  
Parties to the suit, as well as their spouses are competent witnesses, not only for themselves, 
but also for the opposing party.
377
  
Bankers or officers of a bank or other financial institution are, in any legal proceedings to 
which such institution is not a party, not compellable to produce any banker’s book or financial 
book the contents of which can be proved in the manner provided in Section 89 of the Evi-
dence Act.
378
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 Okoye v The State (1972) 12 SC 115; Monsuru Solola v The State [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460 at 487A-D; 
Osipitan T ʻCompetence and Compellability of Witness’ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in 
Nigeria 2001 382; Babalola A ʻWitnessesʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 
403.  
375
 According to Osipitan T ʻCompetence and Compellability of Witness’ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of 
Evidence in Nigeria 2001 383, a person below the age of 14 years is considered a child. Cf. also Section 
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Isaac Sambo v The State [1990] 7 SCNJ (Pt.1) 128; Ogunsi v State [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 332) at 590. See also 
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ʻCompetency of Children as Witnessesʼ 1996 Nigerian Current Law Review 235 et seqq.; Adah CE The Nige-
rian Law of Evidence 2000 138 et seqq., Tobi N Case Book on the Law of Evidence in Nigeria 2002 109 et 
seq.; Edeko SE Introduction to the Law of Evidence 2003 137 et seqq.; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of 
Evidence and Procedure II 1997 85 et seqq. With regard to the taking of an oath by a child, see para. VI.A.3.a) 
below. 
376
 Section 175(2) of the Evidence Act. See also Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 142. With regard 
to dumb persons, cf. Section 176 of the Evidence Act. It is submitted that this provision applies mutatis mu-
tandis to deaf-mute individuals. For more on Section 176 of the said Act, see Akintola AL and Adedeji AA 
Nigerian Law of Evidence: A Book of Readings 2006 294; Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 143; 
Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 88 et seq.; Aguda TA Law and Practice 
relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 300 n. 23-07. 
377
 Section 178 of the Evidence Act. See Elias v Disu and Others [1962] 1 All NLR 214 at 217; Obolo v Akuko & 
Ors [1976] NMLR 334 at 335; Edokpolo and Company Limited v Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd and Others 
(1980) FHCLR 81 at 84 et seq.; Jinadu v Esurombi-Aro 2 [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) 142 at 190D. Cf. also 
Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 143 et seq.; Aguda TA The Law of Evidence 1999 312 et seq. 
Special rules apply for the evidence of spouses as to adultery. See in this regard Section 186 of the Evidence 
Act. 
378
 Section 177 of the Evidence Act. The same holds true for the appearance as witnesses to prove matters, trans-
actions, and accounts recorded in the banker’s book. See also Aprofim S.A. Geneva v Nigeria National Supply 
Company Limited (1986) FHCLR 350 at 354 et seqq. Section 89 of the Evidence Act allows, as an exception, 
the use of secondary evidence for the proof of the existence, condition or contents of a document.  
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A party requiring the attendance of a particular individual as a witness at the hearing may sub-
poena such person.
379
 Where the latter refuses, without sufficient cause, to appear in court, to 
be sworn, to make an affirmation, or to give evidence, he is liable to a fine, and imprison-
ment.
380
 
2. Privileges of Witnesses 
Section 183 of the Evidence Act provides for the privilege against self-incrimination. Under 
this proviso, no witness can be compelled to answer any question, if the answer thereto would, 
in the opinion of the court, have a tendency to expose the witness or his spouse to any criminal 
charge, penalty, or forfeiture. The privilege, however, does not extend to questions, which may 
establish that the witness owes a debt, or is otherwise liable to any civil suit.
381
 
By virtue of Section 187 of the Evidence Act, no spouse can be compelled to disclose any 
communications made to him during marriage by any person to whom he has been married, 
unless this person gives consent. The privilege also exists after the dissolution of the marriage, 
provided the communications were made during the marriage.
382
 It, however, extends only to 
spouses, but not to third parties who intercepted marital communications.
383
 
Judges and other persons, before whom a proceeding is being held, are not compelled to an-
swer any question as to their conduct in court, or as to anything which came to their knowledge 
in court.
384
 Similarly, magistrates, police officers, and other public officers authorised to inves-
tigate or prosecute offences cannot be compelled in relation to the source of any information as 
to the commission of any offence.
385
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 Order 38(29) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
380
 Section 92 of the High Court Act (Chapter 510) and Order 38(17) of the Rules of the High Court of the Feder-
al Capital Territory read in conjunction with Section 133(2) of the Criminal Code Act (Chapter 77). 
381
 Section 183(b) of the Evidence Act. Section 183(a) and (c) provide for further exceptions, which, however, 
relate to criminal proceedings. See also Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 105 et seq.; Tobi N 
Case Book on the Law of Evidence in Nigeria 229; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Proce-
dure II 1997 106 et seq.; Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 330 n. 24-22 et 
seqq.  
382
 Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 94. 
383
 Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 94 with reference to Rumping v DDP [1962] 2 All ER 256. See 
also Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 101.  
384
 Section 188 of the Evidence Act. Such persons, however, may be examined in relation to other matters, which 
occurred in their presence while they were in their respective function, Section 188 in fine of the said Act. See 
Elabanjo v Tijani (1986) 17 NSCC (Pt. II) 1367 at 1372 et seq.; Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 
95 et seq.; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 102 et seq.; Aguda TA The 
Law of Evidence 1999 318 n. 163. 
385
 Section 189 of the Evidence Act. See also Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evi-
dence in Nigeria 2001 166 et seq. 
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Section 190(1) of the Evidence Act prohibits the disclosure of any unpublished official records 
relating to affairs of state, as well as of evidence derived from such records. The provision ex-
tends to records that may be injurious to the public interest, public security, public service, na-
tional defence, or diplomatic relations. Not only the character of the document is decisive, but 
also the possible consequences of its publication by the state.
386
 By virtue of Section 191 of the 
Evidence Act, a public officer
387
 cannot be compelled to reveal communications made to him 
in official confidence, when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclo-
sure.
388
 In this context, mention has to be made of Section 243(1) of the said Act, which stipu-
lates that the Minister may in any proceedings object to the production of documents or request 
the exclusion of oral evidence, when he is satisfied that the disclosure of documents or the oral 
evidence are against public interest.
389
 
Section 192 of the Evidence Act provides for the privilege of legal advisers. No counsel is, 
without his client’s consent, compellable to disclose any communication made to him in the 
course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or on behalf of his client, or to re-
veal any advice given by him to his client. The same applies to the contents or condition of any 
document with which he has become acquainted in his function as legal adviser.
390
 Communi-
cations made in furtherance of any illegal purpose, and any fact observed by the lawyer in the 
course of his employment, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the 
commencement of his employment, are not protected by privilege.
391
 The privilege extends to 
legal advisers in full-time employment of the client, who are on a monthly salary.
392
 In other 
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 According to Section 190(2) of the Evidence Act, the court, however, can allow evidence derived from official 
records to be given to the judge alone in chambers. See also Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in 
Nigeria 2001 442 et seq.; Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 96; Karibi-Whyte AG The Federal 
High Court: Law and Practice 1986 211; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 
1997 108 et seq.; Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 323 n. 24-07; Boade OA 
ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 178. 
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 A person employed in the public service, Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 
1997 109. 
388
 Based on Section 191(2) of the Evidence Act, the judge, however, can receive evidence derived from such 
communications alone in chambers. 
389
 According to Section 243(3) of the Evidence Act, the court has a discretion whether or not to uphold the objec-
tion made under Section 243(1) of the Evidence Act.  
390
 See also Horn v Richard (1963) NNLR 67; Dawaki Gen Ent Ltd v Amafco Ent Ltd [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) 
224 at 236D-E; Abubakar v Chuks (2007) 12 SC 1 at 28 et seqq. 
391
 Section 192(1)(a)-(b) of the Evidence Act. With regard to the waiver of the legal professional privilege by the 
client, see Section 194 of the Evidence Act. 
392
 Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 327 n. 24-16 with reference to Alfred 
Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs & Excise Commissioners (No. 2) [1972] 2 All ER 353 (CA) at 
376; Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 169 with refer-
ence to Suit No. HAD/10/75 of 6 June 1978. 
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words, in-house counsel are covered by the aforesaid privilege. Legal professional privilege 
extends not only to legal advisers, but also to their interpreters, clerks, and agents.
393
 
Documents which were drafted for the dominant purpose of assisting a party or for use by his 
counsel in an existing or contemplated litigation are also protected.
394
 This includes, inter alia, 
not only draft pleadings, but also documents prepared by an agent of the party for the use of his 
counsel for the purpose of a pending or contemplated claim.
395
 
Professionals other than legal advisers do not enjoy a professional privilege. This holds par-
ticularly true for doctors, clergymen, and journalists.
396
 In this context, however, Boade main-
tains that the judge may, if he thinks fit, allow the aforesaid professionals not to answer a re-
quest concerning confidential information.
397
 In this regard, mention must be made of Section 
37 of the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, which, amongst other things, protects the 
privacy of citizens, their correspondence, and telephone conversations.
398
 
By virtue of Section 195 of the Evidence Act, a person, who has consulted a legal adviser, can-
not be compelled to disclose any confidential communication, which has been exchanged be-
tween him and the counsel. 
A third party cannot be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property, or any document 
in virtue of which he holds any property as pledgee or mortgagee, or any document the produc-
tion of which might tend to incriminate him.
399
 Similarly, a witness is not compellable to reveal 
documents in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce, if 
they were in his possession.
400
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 Section 193 of the Evidence Act. 
394
 Nwadialo F Civil Procedure in Nigeria 1990 512 n. 29.42 with reference to Anderson v Bank of British Co-
lumbia [1876] 2 Ch D 644 at 650 and Seabrook v British Transport Commission [1959] 1 WLR 509. 
395
 Nwadialo F Civil Procedure in Nigeria 1990 512 n. 29.42 with reference to Southwalk and Vauxhall Water Co 
v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315. 
396
 Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 171 et seq.; Adah CE 
The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 102 et seq. with reference to Attorney General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 
477 at 489; Tobi N Case Book on the Law of Evidence in Nigeria 2002 209; Akaniro EG Study Manual on 
Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 104; Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 
1980 328 n. 24-17.  
397
 Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 171, 172. 
398
 See in this regard para. III.A.2 above. 
399
 Section 184 of the Evidence Act.  
400
 Section 185 of the Evidence Act. See in this regard also Aguda TA The Law of Evidence 1999 323 n. 169 with 
reference to Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K & J 88 at 91. Aguda maintains that where a document was commu-
nicated to a person voluntarily, in confidence, and for a limited and restricted use, this individual cannot be 
compelled to divulge the document. 
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Finally, statements which parties made “without prejudice” with the bona fide intention to am-
icably settle a dispute do not have to be disclosed in civil proceedings.
401
 A document which is 
merely marked “without prejudice”, but was not prepared in the course of a settlement of a dis-
pute is not privileged.
402
 The privilege also extends to third parties who, with the consent of the 
parties, acted as conciliator or mediator.
403
  
3. Examination of Witnesses 
Litigants and third parties, including experts, are generally examined viva voce before the 
court.
404
 In certain cases, however, the court may order witnesses to give evidence on commis-
sion, or by affidavit. 
a) Oral Testimony before the Trial Court 
The examination of witnesses at the trial is conducted by the parties. The witnesses are subject 
to examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination through the parties’ counsel.405 
As a general principle, leading questions are not allowed in examination-in-chief and re-
examination, but may be asked in cross-examination.
406
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 Section 196 of the Evidence Act. See also Societe Commerciale de L’Ouest Africains v Olusoga and Another 
(1936) 13 NLR 104; NBA v Fawehinmi [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 21) 224 at 246 et seq.; Nwadike & Others v 
Ibekwe & Others (1987) LNSCC 1219; Jadesimi v Egbe [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) at 25.  
402
 S.C.O.A. v Olusoga and Another (1936) 13 NLR 104. See also Edeko SE Introduction to the Law of Evidence 
2003 109; Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 174 et 
seqq.; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 106; Aguda TA Law and Prac-
tice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 332 n. 24-27.  
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 Akadiri v Tijani Atanda and Ors [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 113 at 124; Chief Gani Fawehinmi v Nigerian Bar 
Association and Ors [1989] 1 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 40. See also Obayemi v Obayemi v [1967] NMLR 212 at 215. For 
more on statements “without prejudice”, see Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 103 et seqq.; 
Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 331 n. 24-26 et seqq.; Karibi-Whyte AG 
The Federal High Court: Law and Practice 1986 212.  
404
 Order 38(2) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
405
 Sections 214-215 of the Evidence Act read in conjunction with Orders 35 (12)-(13) and 38(20) of the Rules of 
the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. With regard to the purpose of cross-examination, see, amongst 
others, Ezewusim v Okoro [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 478 at 493; Ita v Ekpenyong [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt. 695) 
587 at 614A-B; Onwuka v Owolewa [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 713) 695 at 713G-H; Borishade v N.B.N. Ltd [2007] 
NWLR (Pt. 1015) 237D-F. See also Adah CE The Nigerian Law of Evidence 2000 261 et seqq.; Olanipekum 
W ʻCross-examination Techniquesʼ 2003 Nigerian Bar Journal 471 et seqq.; Chapter 2 para. IV.B.2.c). 
406
 Section 221 of the Evidence Act. For the definition of “leading questions”, see Section 221(1) of the said Act. 
Cf. Section 223 for questions that are lawful in cross-examination, as well as Order 35(25) of the Rules of the 
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. See also Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Pro-
cedure II 1997 152; Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 372 n. 27-27.  
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A witness has to testify from his memory, and is, as a general rule, not allowed to use docu-
ments when in the witness box. In certain cases, however, a witness may, while under exami-
nation and with leave of the court, refresh his memory by referring to documents.
407
 
In order to clear up ambiguities or clarify points which have been left obscure in the evidence 
given by any witness, the court may ask any question it pleases of any witness about relevant 
or irrelevant facts.
408
 The judge’s power to put questions to witnesses, however, is limited. In 
Mohammed v The Nigerian Army,
409
 it was held that the liberty given to the judge by Section 
246 of the Evidence Act seems extensive, and is limited by the duty of fairness. The court em-
phasised that “where the intervention of the judge discloses a real likelihood of bias and shows 
an unmistakable breach of the duty of fairness, the proceedings stand vitiated for lack of fair-
ness”, and that therefore the said Section “should be used with circumspection and moderation 
and only where questions are necessary in the interest of justice”. Having said this, it is recog-
nised that the court can ask questions to clarify answers given by a witness, or points that have 
arisen ex improviso.
410
 Without the consent of the parties, the court cannot call any witness.
411
 
The judge, however, may recall witnesses without the litigants’ consent.412  
As a general rule, oral evidence must be given on oath or affirmation.
413
 A child below the age 
of 14 years is not to be sworn and gives evidence otherwise than on oath or affirmation, pro-
vided he is sufficiently intelligent to justify the reception of his evidence and comprehends the 
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 Section 239 of the Evidence Act. Cf. also Amoo & Ors v The Queen (1959) 1 NSCC 91 at 92 et seq.; Kada v 
State [1991] 8 NWLR (Pt. 208) 124 at 154E-F. See furthermore Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evi-
dence and Procedure II 1997 153 et seqq.; Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 
385 n. 27-64 et seq.; Babalola A ʻWitnessesʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 
424 et seqq. 
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 Section 246 of the Evidence Act. This provision also applies with regard to the production of any document or 
thing.  
409
 [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 557) 232 at 240A-C. 
410
 Grace Akinfe v The State (1988) 7 SC (Pt. II) 131 at 139, 147 et seqq. with reference to Rex v Asuquo Edem & 
Ors (1943) 9 WACA 25; West v Police (1952) 20 NLR 71; Lawrence Agbaje v The Republic [1964] 1 All 
NLR 295 at 297. See also David Uso v Commissioner of Police [1972] 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 390 at 394 et seq. It 
goes without saying that a court cannot compel a witness to answer questions in relation to which the latter can 
invoke a privilege, Section 246(3) of the Evidence Act.  
411
 Sunju Bell-Gam v Grace Bell Gam [1965] NMLR 245 at 247; Evoyoma & Ors v Daregba & Ors [1968] 
NMLR 389; Eric Ordor v James Nwosu [1974] 1 All NR 478 at 484 et seq.; Onibudo v Akibu [1982] All NLR 
207 at 219; Hyacinth Anyanwa v Robert A. Mbara and Another [1992] 6 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 22; Michael Dan Udo v 
Chief Christopher Udom Ushiet [1994] 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 483 at 487; Mambok Diyelpwan v Danbang Golok 
[1996] 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 599 at 601. 
412
 Ogbodu v Odogha & Anor [1967] 1 All NLR 173 at 176; Eric Ordor v James Nwosu (1974) 12 SC 104; 
Omorogbee v Lawani SC.89/1979 108 at 120 et seq. See also Babalola A ʻWitnessesʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law 
and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 422, 447 et seqq., 457 et seqq.; Aluko O The Civil Procedure of the 
Superior Court in Nigeria 1997 75; Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evidence and Procedure II 1997 
172; Nwadialo F Civil Procedure in Nigeria 1990 559 n. 30.33; Karibi-Whyte AG The Federal High Court, 
Law and Practice 1986 290 et seqq. 
413
 Section 205 of the Evidence Act.  
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duty of speaking the truth.
414
 The evidence given viva voce before the court is recorded in a 
verbatim transcript.
415
  
The comments on communications between counsel and non-party witnesses prior to the trial 
made in relation to South African law apply mutatis mutandis to Nigerian law.
416
 
b) Evidence on Commission 
By virtue of Order 38(11)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 
the court may, for the purpose of justice, make an order for the examination of a witness upon 
oath before an examiner. Since the nature of a commission de bene has already been outlined 
earlier, reference can be made to the relevant comments.
417
 An order for evidence to be taken 
on commission will particularly be made where a witness resides in the jurisdiction of another 
Nigerian court, or is unable to attend court, for instance due to illness, old age, or similar infir-
mity.
418
  
The witness gives viva voce evidence in the presence of the examiner appointed by the court, 
the litigants and their legal advisers, and is subject to cross- and re-examination.
419
 The exam-
iner may put questions to the witness as to the meaning of any answer, or as to any matter aris-
ing in the course of the examination.
420
 The witness’ testimony is to be taken down in writing, 
not ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as nearly as may be, the statement 
of the witness.
421
 
c) Evidence on Affidavit 
According to Order 38(3)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 
the court may order that any evidence shall be given by affidavit. The witness who testified by 
affidavit is generally not subject to cross-examination and does not need to attend the trial for 
                                                     
414
 Section 209(1) of the Evidence Act. Cf. also Section 208 of the Evidence Act for another exception to Section 
205 of the said Act based on the religious belief of the witness.  
415
 See also in this regard Section 78(1) of the High Court Act; Order 38(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the 
Capital Territory.  
416
 Cf. in this regard para. III.A.3.a) in fine. 
417
 See Chapter 4 para. III.C.2.b). 
418
 Aguda TA Law and Practice relating to Evidence in Nigeria 1980 488 n. 42.39 with reference to SI Dabiri v 
VO Dabiri (1957) NRNLR 121 and Re Bradbrook (1889) 23 QBD 226. 
419
 Order 38(20) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.  
420
 Order 38(21)(3) in fine of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
421
 Order 38(21)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. See also Order 38(21)(3) of 
the said Rules, which states, that in certain circumstances, the examiner may record any particular question or 
answer, provided there should appear any special reasons for doing so.  
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that purpose.
422
 The opposing party, who received an affidavit, may file a counter affidavit.
423
 
In N.D.I.C. v Sheriff,
424
 it was held that in civil proceedings, the court has the power to order 
that all or specified facts be proved by affidavit.
425
 It was furthermore stated that when deter-
mining applications for evidence by affidavits the court takes into account whether the credibil-
ity of the evidence depends on the opportunity of the court to evaluate the witness, and whether 
the evidence is such that it would be strongly contested. In Uzondu v Uzondu,
426
 it was held  
“When a court is faced (...) with affidavits which are irreconcilably in conflict, 
it should first hear oral evidence from the deponents or such other witnesses 
as the parties may be advised to call. However, it is not only by calling oral 
evidence that such conflicts in affidavit evidence can be resolved. Such conflict 
can also be resolved by authentic documentary evidence which supports one of 
the affidavits in conflict where the court has enough documentary evidence at 
its disposal.” 
Similarly, it was stated in Nwosu v Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority,
427
 that evi-
dence by affidavit is entitled to be given weight where there is no conflict, or where the conflict 
has been resolved from appropriate oral or documentary evidence.
428
 
d) Expert Witnesses 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, expert witnesses 
are regarded as ordinary non-party witnesses. Accordingly, experts are appointed by the parties 
and subject to cross- and re-examination through the litigants’ counsel.429 In Adebajo v Adeba-
jo,
430
 it was held that experts, notwithstanding the fact that they are selected and paid by the 
parties, have to testify the truth and not mislead the court. 
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 Cf. also Section 107 of the Evidence Act. See furthermore Alimi LO The 2004 Lagos State (Civil Procedure) 
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426
 [1997] NWLR (Pt. 521) 466 at 481. 
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 [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 668 at 718. 
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 Cf. also Falobi v Falobi (1976) 9 & 10 SC 1 at 14 et seq. with further references; Kalu Mark & Anor v Chief 
Gabriel Eke [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 529) 523 et seq. In addition, see Akaniro EG Study Manual on Law of Evi-
dence and Procedure I 1997 200 et seq.; Nwadialo F Civil Procedure in Nigeria 1990 541 n. 30.04; Senlong 
CP ʻAffidavitʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 231 et seqq.  
429
 Cf. AG Federation & 2 Ors v Abubakar & 3 Ors (2007) 4 SC (Pt. II) 247 at 247 et seq.  
430
 [1971] 2 All NLR 276 at 292 et seq. See also Aluko O The Civil Procedure of the Superior Court in Nigeria 
1997 77; Boade OA ʻPrivilegeʼ in Babalola A (ed) Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria 2001 160 et seq.; 
Ijaiyi H ‘The Legal Rights and Obligations of Doctors in Nigeria’ 2003 Nigerian Bar Journal 577 et seq. 
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At or before the trial, the court may direct that the number of medical or expert witnesses who 
may be called at the trial is limited.
431
 In actions arising out of an accident on land due to a col-
lision, the oral evidence of certain experts
432
 is not receivable unless a copy of the report con-
taining the substance of the expert evidence has been made available to all parties for inspec-
tion.
433
 Based on the wording of the relevant provision, it appears that only experts who are 
called to give evidence in the aforesaid actions and whose expertise relates to motor vehicles, 
have to provide a report in advance, but not other experts.
434
 
B. Documentary Evidence 
By virtue of Order 30(9)(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, a 
party may apply to the court for an order directing the opposing party to make discovery on 
oath of documents relating to any matter in issue, which are or have been in the opponent’s 
possession or power.
435
 Order 30 of the said Rules does not specify a particular time when an 
application for discovery can be made. It is submitted that, as a general rule, such application 
can only be made after the close of pleadings, that is, once the issues tried between the litigants 
are defined.
436
 
A litigant may only require discovery of documents from the opposing party, but not from a 
third party. Where a litigant requires documents in the possession or power of a third party, the 
issue of a subpoena duces tecum is required.
437
 
A party can only apply for the discovery of documents “relating to any matter in issue”.438 
Having said this, discovery is not only allowed with regard to documents directly admissible as 
evidence, that will prove or disprove a particular claim, but it extends to documents which may 
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 Order 38(5) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. For the question, whether such 
limitation is consistent with the Evidence Act, see Ojukwu E ʻA Critical Review of the New Lagos State Civil 
Procedure Rulesʼ 2003 Nigerian Bar Journal 548. 
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 Engineers to be called on account of their skills and knowledge with respect to motor vehicles. 
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 Order 38(7) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
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allows the delivery of interrogatories once the parties have concluded their pleadings. See also Obi Okoye A 
Essays on Civil Proceedings Volume One 1986 304 n. 340.  
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 See, amongst others, Nwadialo F Civil Procedure in Nigeria 1990 515 n. 29.46, 527 n. 29.62. Cf. also Section 
218 of the Evidence Act and Order 38(29) of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. 
438
 Order 30(9)(1) in fine of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.  
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enable the party to advance his case or damage that of his opponent.
439
 By contrast, fishing ex-
peditions are not allowed under Nigerian law.
440
  
The party who is required to make discovery has to make an affidavit which specifies the doc-
uments he has or has had in his possession or power, as well as the documents he objects to 
produce.
441
 Discovery thus not only extends to documents which are or have been physically 
under the control of the party, but also to documents which are under the party’s legal control 
and which the party is entitled to obtain from the person physically controlling the docu-
ments.
442
 Where the party requiring discovery believes that the opponent did not tender all the 
material documents in his possession or power, he may apply for further discovery.
443
 
Since discovery of documents only includes the production of a list of documents, but not their 
physical production,
444
 the party requesting discovery may apply for inspection of docu-
ments.
445
 Documents protected by a privilege have to be disclosed, but are not subject to pro-
duction to the opposing party.
446
 
Where a party fails to comply with an order for discovery or inspection of documents, he is lia-
ble to committal. While a plaintiff will have his action dismissed for want of prosecution, the 
defendant’s defence will be struck out and he will be placed in the same position as if he had 
not defended.
447
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C. Real Evidence 
With regard to the notion of “real evidence”, the comments made in relation to South African 
law apply mutatis mutandis.
448
  
Section 127 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to conduct an inspection of immovable 
property and provides for two procedures for the inspection. In the first case, the court is ad-
journed to the place where the subject-matter of the inspection is located, and the proceedings 
continue at that place. Evidence is thus taken at the site of the inspection, and the witnesses 
give evidence like in a normal courtroom.
449
 In the second case, the court makes an inspection 
of the subject-matter only, while evidence of what transpired during the inspection is given in 
court afterwards.
450
  
An inspection in loco has to be conducted in the presence of the parties and their counsel.
451
 In 
R v Albert Dogbe,
452
 it was held that at the inspection each of the witnesses needs to point out 
material places and things. Where the court merely conducts an inspection at the relevant loca-
tion under Section 127(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, the witness should, on the re-assembly of the 
court, be put into the witness box and state on oath the observations he made during the inspec-
tion. The judge has not only to refrain from using his own observations made at the inspection 
and placing himself in the position of a witness, but also from arriving at conclusions of which 
there is no evidence upon the record.
453
 Finally, the court that conducts the view has to make a 
record of the inspection.
454
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D. Discovery of Facts 
With regard to discovery, the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory distin-
guish between discovery of facts,
455
 so-called “interrogatories”, and discovery of documents.456 
While the latter relates to documents, which may be produced at the trial, interrogatories con-
cern facts which may be given viva voce in evidence at the hearing.
457
 
Order 30(1) of the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory provides that after 
the close of pleadings, a party may, by leave of court, deliver interrogatories in writing for the 
examination of the opponent.
458
 Ojukwu and Ojukwu define an interrogatory as “written cross-
examination before trial,”459 or, in the words of Karibi-Whyte, interrogatories are a series of 
questions drawn up by a party and served on the opponent requiring the latter to answer.
460
 In-
terrogatories enable a party to obtain facts from the opposing party where there are no material 
documents to be disclosed via discovery. They have a dual function: to enable the securing of 
admissions from the other party, which facilitates the proof at the trial, and to ascertain as 
much as possible the case of the opponent.
461
  
Only litigants, but not third parties, are subject to interrogatories under Order 30(1) of the 
Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. Statements of facts by a third party 
can only be secured by summoning such person to appear in court to give evidence at the tri-
al.
462
 
The court allows the delivery of interrogatories if they relate to any matters in question and are 
necessary either for disposing fairly of the action or for saving costs.
463
 In Onyiuke v The Voice 
of the People Ltd,
464
 it was held that interrogatories extend to the admission of anything, which 
the plaintiff has to prove in relation to any issue raised between the parties. The facts that are 
sought via interrogatories do not have to be directly in issue, but may be facts that are relevant 
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to the existence of other facts which are directly in issue.
465
 As a result, so-called “fishing inter-
rogatories” are not allowed.466 Similarly, interrogatories aiming at evidence of the other party, 
as opposed to facts, are inadmissible.
467
  
The party interrogated must answer by affidavit and is bound by his answers.
468
 In cases where 
the interrogating party considers the affidavit as insufficient, he may apply to the court for an 
order requiring adequate answers.
469
 Where a party fails to comply with an order to answer in-
terrogatories, the relevant comments made in relation to the discovery of documents apply ac-
cordingly.
470
 
VII. Uganda 
A. Testimony of Witnesses 
1. Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
By virtue of Section 117 of the Evidence Act,
471
 all persons are competent to give evidence, 
unless the court considers them unable to comprehend the questions put to them or to give ra-
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tional answers due to tender years,
472
 extreme old age, disease of body or mind,
473
 or any other 
cause of the same kind.
474
  
By virtue of Section 121 of the Evidence Act, litigants and their spouses are competent wit-
nesses. 
2. Privileges of Witnesses 
Judges and magistrates are not compellable witnesses with regard to questions as to their con-
duct in court, or anything which came to their knowledge in court in their official function. 
They, however, can be compelled to testify in relation to matters which occurred in their pres-
ence while they were so acting.
475
 Magistrates and police officers cannot be compelled to re-
veal the source of their information as to the commission of any offence.
476
 
Section 122 of the Evidence Act prohibits the disclosure of unpublished official records relat-
ing to any affairs of state, except with the permission of the competent public officer. By virtue 
of Section 123 of the said Act, communications made to a public officer in the course of his 
duty are privileged, when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. 
Section 125 of the Evidence Act protects the professional communications of legal advisers. 
Without his client’s consent, a legal practitioner cannot be forced to disclose any communica-
tion made to him in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to state 
the contents or condition of any document, with which he was acquainted in the course of his 
employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client. No privilege, however, exists 
where such communication was made in furtherance of any illegal purpose, or relates to any 
fact showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of the 
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counsel’s employment.477 The above applies not only to legal advisers, but also to their inter-
preters, clerks, and servants.
478
 
Based on Section 128 of the Evidence Act, it is not only the legal adviser who can decline the 
disclosure of confidential professional communication which has been passed between him and 
his client, but also the client.
479
 The privilege furthermore extends to communications the legal 
adviser and/or the client had with third parties, provided such communications were made with 
reference to an actual or anticipated litigation, or to enable the client to obtain or the counsel to 
give legal advice.
480
 
Individuals other than legal practitioners who receive confidential information in the course of 
their profession, such as doctors or priests, do not enjoy a professional privilege.
481
 With regard 
to journalists, mention has to be made of the Press and Journalist Act.
482
 Rule 2 in the Fourth 
Schedule to the said Act provides that no journalist shall disclose the source of his information, 
unless in the event of an overriding consideration of public interest and within the framework 
of the law of Uganda. It appears that there is no reported case law dealing with the privilege of 
journalists and with the aforesaid provision in the Press and Journalist Act in particular. 
A witness who is not a party to a suit is not compellable to produce his title deeds to any prop-
erty or any documents in virtue of which he holds any property as pledgee or mortgagee. The 
same holds true for documents whose disclosure tends to incriminate him.
483
 
By virtue of Section 130 of the Evidence Act, a person cannot be compelled to produce docu-
ments in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce, if they 
were in his possession.
484
 
Section 131 of the Evidence Act provides that a witness is not excused from answering any 
questions upon the ground that the answers may tend to incriminate him, or may tend to expose 
him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The same holds true for answers which may tend to 
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establish that he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit. No such answers, however, 
subject the witness to any arrest or prosecution, or are proved against him in any subsequent 
criminal proceedings, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answers.
485
 
Finally, Section 22 of the Evidence Act provides that in civil cases, no admission is relevant, if 
it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or in circum-
stances from which the court can infer that the parties agreed that evidence of it should not be 
given. In Peter Kaggwa v New Vision Printing & Publishing Corporation and Others,
486
 it was 
held that by heading an acceptance letter “without prejudice”, which was drafted in the course 
of negotiations to settle a dispute, the defendant made clear to the plaintiff that the acceptance 
had been made upon an express condition that evidence of acceptance was not to be given in 
the event of any future proceedings. As a result, the court qualified the acceptance letter as a 
privileged communication. 
3. Examination of Witnesses 
As a general rule, witnesses give evidence orally before the trial court.
487
 In addition, evidence 
of witnesses may also be taken on commission, or by affidavit. 
a) Oral Testimony before the Trial Court 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of Uganda, the examination of witnesses is con-
ducted by the parties. The witnesses are subject to the examination-in-chief, cross-examination, 
and re-examination through the litigant’s counsel.488 Leading questions are not allowed in ex-
amination-in-chief and re-examination, but may be asked in cross-examination.
489
  
As a general rule, witnesses are not allowed to use documents while testifying in court.
490
 
In order to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, the court has the power to ask any question it 
pleases of any witness about any fact relevant or irrelevant. A witness, however, cannot be 
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compelled to answer any questions for which he can invoke a privilege under Sections 119-130 
of the Evidence Act.
491
 By virtue of Order 18(13) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court has 
the power to recall any witness, and to put such questions to him as it thinks fit. E contrario, 
the court cannot call a witness who has not already given evidence, except with the permission 
of the parties.
492
 
Oral evidence is generally given on oath or affirmation. By reason of tender years, or for any 
other sufficient cause, the court may, however, allow a witness to give evidence without oath 
or affirmation.
493
 The testimony of each witness is recorded in writing. Such record does not 
have to be in the form of question and answer, but in that of a narrative.
494
 On the application 
of a party, however, the court may take down any particular question or answer, if there ap-
pears to be any special reason for so doing.
495
 
The comments on the communications between counsel and non-party witnesses prior to the 
trial that were made in relation to South African law apply mutatis mutandis to Ugandan 
law.
496
 
b) Evidence on Commission 
By virtue of Order 28(1) and (4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court may issue a commis-
sion for the examination of a witness resident in Uganda if such witness is, inter alia, located 
in the jurisdiction of another Ugandan court, is about to leave the trial court’s jurisdiction be-
fore the hearing, is unable to attend court due to sickness or infirmity, or is a civil or military 
officer of the Government who cannot, in the opinion of the court, attend without detriment to 
the public service.
497
 Since the nature of a commission de bene esse has already been explained 
earlier, it is not necessary to further elaborate in this regard.
498
  
The relevant witness is questioned in the presence of the commissioner appointed by the court, 
as well as the litigants and their counsel. The witness is subject to examination-in-chief, cross-
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examination, and re-examination.
499
 As indicated earlier,
500
 a commissioner is entrusted with 
wide powers and can, inter alia, not only examine the litigants and any witness whom they 
produce, but any other person whom the commissioner thinks proper to call upon to give evi-
dence in the matter referred to him.
501
 The same applies with regard to documents and other 
things relevant to the subject of the commissioner’s inquiry. Moreover, the commissioner may 
apply to the trial court for the issue of any process which he may find necessary to issue to or 
against the witness.
502
 The witness’ testimony is recorded in the same way as evidence taken 
before the trial court.
503
 
c) Evidence on Affidavit 
According to Order 19(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court may order that any particular 
fact may be proved by affidavit. No such order, however, is issued, if it appears to the court 
that either party desires bona fide the production of the particular witness for cross-
examination.
504
 In order to test the credibility of evidence given in an affidavit, there should, as 
a general principle, be an affidavit in reply or a counter affidavit.
505
 In Regal Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd v Maria Asumpta Pharmaceuticals Ltd,
506
 it was held that it is a celebrated principle that 
where evidence is by affidavit, the matter in question should not be substantially in dispute by 
contrary affidavit evidence.
507
 
d) Expert Witnesses 
In civil proceedings pending before the High Court of Uganda, expert witnesses are regarded 
as ordinary (non-party) witnesses. Consequently, experts are appointed by the parties, and are 
subject to examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination by the litigants’ coun-
sel. 
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In Namaizi Grace v Kinyara Sugar Works Ltd,
508
 the court rejected the report of an expert, be-
cause it was biased in favour of the party who called the expert. In this context, the court stated 
the following: 
“There is a general feeling (...) that expert witnesses are selected to prove a 
case and are often close to being professional liars. It is often quite surprising 
to see with what facility, and to what an extent, their view can be made to cor-
respond with the wishes or the interests of the parties who call them. They do 
not, indeed, wilfully misrepresent what they think, but their judgments become 
so warped by regarding the subject in one point of view, that, even when con-
scientiously disposed, they are incapable of forming an independent opinion.” 
B. Documentary Evidence 
By virtue of Order 10(12)(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, a party may apply to the court for an 
order directing any other party to make discovery on oath of documents, which are or have 
been in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question. It is submitted that an ap-
plication for discovery can only be made once the parties have concluded their pleadings.
509
 
Discovery of documents can only be requested with regard to parties. Consequently, the issue 
of a subpoena duces tecum is necessary where a litigant wishes to obtain documents from a 
third party.
510
 
An application under Order 10(12) of the Civil Procedure Rules is only granted if the discovery 
relates to any matter in question,
511
 and is necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or 
saving costs.
512
 Since the first requirement is determined based on the principles developed in 
Compagnie Financiėre et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company,513 reference 
can be made to the relevant comments under South African law.
514
 
The party requested to make discovery has to issue an affidavit wherein he specifies the docu-
ments that are or have been in his possession, custody, or power, as well as those which he ob-
jects to produce. Discovery thus also extends to documents which are or have been in the pos-
                                                     
508
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session or power of an agent or advocate of a party, or any other person who acted on behalf of 
a party.
515
 The party requiring discovery may apply for further discovery, if he believes that the 
opponent did not tender all the relevant documents.
516
 
The party who made discovery has to allow the other party to inspect the disclosed docu-
ments.
517
 Documents, however, which are privileged are not subject to inspection.
518
 
Where a party fails to comply with any order for discovery or inspection of documents, the 
court may dismiss the plaintiff’s suit for want of prosecution or strike out the defendant’s de-
fence.
519
 
C. Real Evidence 
With regard to the notion of “real evidence”, reference can be made to the relevant comments 
in relation to South African law.
520
 
Order 18(14) of the Civil Procedure Rules empowers the court to inspect a property or thing 
concerning which any question may arise. An inspection in loco is to be held in the presence of 
the parties and their counsel. Where a litigant or third-party witness makes observations during 
the inspection, such observations are to be given on oath, and the witness has to be subject to 
cross-examination by the opposing party. Observations made by the court on site have to be 
recorded. Following the conduct of the inspection, the judge should refrain from constituting 
himself a witness in the case and substituting personal observations for evidence.
521
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 See also Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and Practice in Uganda 2010 242. Cf. also Order 
10(13) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
519
 Order 10(21) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 
520
 See para. III.C above. With regard to the purpose of an inspection in loco, see Mukasa v Uganda [1964] EA 
698 at 700. 
521
 Mukasa v Uganda [1964] EA 698 at 700. See also Matsiko Edward v Uganda [1999] UGCA 18 
(http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/court-appeal/1999/18; date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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D. Discovery of Facts 
The Civil Procedure Rules distinguish between the discovery of facts,
522
 so-called “interrogato-
ries”, and the discovery of documents.523 The nature of interrogatories has already been out-
lined in connection with Nigerian law, and reference can thus be made to the relevant com-
ments in this regard.
524
 
In terms of Order 10(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, a party may apply to the court for leave 
to deliver interrogatories and discoveries in writing for the examination of the opposing par-
ty.
525
 It is submitted that such application can only be made after the close of pleadings, that is, 
once the points of dispute are ascertained and defined.
526
  
An application for delivery of interrogatories can only be made with regard to a litigant, but not 
a third party. Where a litigant wishes to obtain statements regarding facts from a third party, he 
must obtain summons in order to secure the third party’s attendance at the trial.527  
The court only allows delivery of interrogatories which relate to the matters in question.
528
 In-
terrogatories are not limited to facts directly in issue, but they include any facts whose exist-
ence or non-existence is relevant to the existence or non-existence of the facts directly in is-
sue.
529
 Under Ugandan law, so-called “fishing interrogatories” are not allowed.530 In addition, 
interrogatories must be necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.
531
 
This is, for instance, not the case where witnesses are likely to be called at the trial to give evi-
dence on the same matters.
532
  
                                                     
522
 Order 10(1)-(11) of the Civil Procedure Rules. See also Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and 
Practice in Uganda 2010 235. 
523
 Order 10(12)-(20) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Cf. also Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and 
Practice in Uganda 2010 240. 
524
 See para. VI.D above. 
525
 Cf. also Order 10(2)(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. For the form of interrogatories, see Form 2 of Appendix 
B to the said Rules. 
526
 Cf. also Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and Practice in Uganda 2010 236. 
527
 See Order 16(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
528
 Order 10(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
529
 Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and Practice in Uganda 2010 236 with reference to Marriott v 
Chamberlain (1886) 17 QBD 154 at 163. 
530
 Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and Practice in Uganda 2010 236 et seq. 
531
 Order 10(2)(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
532
 Ssekaana M and Ssekaana SN Civil Procedure and Practice in Uganda 2010 237 with reference to Griebart v 
Morris [1920] 2 KB 659 at 666. See also Order 10(7) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which forbids unreasona-
ble, vexatious, prolix, oppressive, unnecessary, or scandalous interrogatories. 
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Interrogatories are to be answered by affidavit.
533
 Needless to say, the party interrogated does 
not have to provide answers in relation to matters that are privileged.
534
 Where the party inter-
rogated omits to answer questions or answers them insufficiently, the other party may apply to 
the court for an order requiring him to answer, or to answer further.
535
 
Where a party fails to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, the relevant comments 
made in relation to the discovery of documents also apply here.
536
 
VIII. Conclusion 
When dealing with the means of proof and the procedure for the taking of evidence in civil 
proceedings in the countries dealt with in this thesis, one has to distinguish between Switzer-
land on the one hand, and South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda on the other. 
Once again, this distinction stems from the fact that Switzerland shares the civil-law tradition, 
while South Africa, Botswana, Namibia,
537
 Nigeria, and Uganda follow the common-law sys-
tem. It therefore comes as no surprise that the means of proof and the principles governing the 
procedure for the taking of evidence in civil proceedings in the said African countries are very 
similar. In order to avoid repetition, the following remarks thus give a summary of the means 
of proof and the relevant procedure in civil proceedings before the High Court of South Africa. 
Only where there are substantial differences between the relevant rules in South Africa and 
those in Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, will reference be made to the latter rules. 
In civil proceedings before the High Court of South Africa, evidence can be given by the testi-
mony of a witness, the presentation of documentary evidence, and the presentation of real evi-
dence. Testimonial evidence covers litigants, third parties, and experts. Every person is pre-
sumed to be competent to give evidence, provided he is able to comprehend the questions put 
to him, and to give reasonable answers. A competent witness may decline to give answers 
which may expose him to a criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture. A spouse may refuse to di-
vulge communications made to him by the other spouse during the marriage, or to answer 
questions regarding which the other spouse would be able to invoke a privilege. The disclosure 
                                                     
533
 Order 10(8) of the Civil Procedure Rules. With regard to the form of the affidavit, see Form 3 of Appendix B 
to the said Rules. 
534
 See in this regard para. VII.A.2 above. 
535
 Order 10(11) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
536
 Order 10(21) of the Civil Procedure Rules. See para. VII.B above. 
537
 Strictly speaking, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia follow a hybrid system. The rules on civil procedure 
in the said countries are, however, derived from the English law. As a result, South Africa, Botswana, and 
Namibia share with regard to civil procedure the common-law tradition. See in this regard Chapter 2 para. 
IV.B.2.a). 
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of evidence can furthermore be declined based on the grounds of public policy, or public inter-
est. The same holds true for “without prejudice” statements of the parties. Finally, communica-
tions between a legal adviser and his client, as well as communications between a counsel or 
his client and an agent or third party are privileged. As a general rule, witnesses are examined 
viva voce before the trial court. The examination is conducted by the parties, and witnesses are 
subject to the examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination by the litigants’ 
counsel. The court may put questions to witnesses in order to clarify ambiguous points. Wit-
nesses are generally examined upon oath, and their testimony is recorded in a verbatim tran-
script. In certain cases, however, the court may deviate from the aforesaid general rule, and 
may allow a witness to give evidence on commission, based on interrogatories, or by affidavit. 
In the first case, the witness gives his oral testimony not in the presence of the trial court, but 
before a court-appointed commissioner in the presence of the parties, and their counsel. The 
witness is subject to the examination-in-chief, cross- and re-examination by the litigants’ coun-
sel. The court may, however, order that evidence before the commissioner is given by interrog-
atories. In this case, the commissioner interrogates the witness based on a list of questions pre-
pared by the litigants. Such examination is conducted in the absence of the parties and their 
counsel, and hence, no examination-in-chief, cross- or re-examination takes place. Further-
more, the court may allow a witness to give evidence on affidavit, that is, based on a written 
and sworn statement of evidence submitted by the witness that replaces the latter’s viva voce 
evidence. The aforesaid procedures also apply to the examination of experts. Although the lat-
ter are selected by the parties, they are not mere partisan experts, but owe allegiance to the 
court, and have to provide the judge with an objective and unbiased expert opinion. Where a 
litigant wishes to use documents as evidence which are not in his possession or power, two dif-
ferent procedures apply, depending on whether the documents are under the control of the op-
posing party or a third party. In the latter case, the litigant has to call the third party as a wit-
ness who is required to produce the relevant documents to the court at the trial. With regard to 
documents controlled by the opponent, the litigant may require the latter to make discovery of 
all documents relating to the action. Discovery extends to documents that contain information, 
which either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring discovery to advance his own case 
or to damage the adversary’s case. So-called “fishing expeditions” are excluded. The party re-
quired to make discovery has to specify the relevant documents that are or have been in his 
possession or power, and has, upon request of the other party, to make the documents available 
for inspection. Privileged documents have to be disclosed, but are not subject to inspection. 
Where the inspection of immovable property or a location by the court is necessary, the parties 
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and their counsel have the right to be present at such inspection. Any observations made on the 
spot by the court, the litigants, or non-party witnesses have to be recorded. As the witnesses are 
not under oath during the inspection, the judge should, following the inspection, recall the for-
mer to testify on their observations at the trial. 
In addition to the privileges under South African law, a non-party witness in civil proceedings 
in Nigeria cannot be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property, or documents the 
production of which might tend to incriminate him. Furthermore, no one can be compelled to 
produce documents in his possession which any other person would be entitled to refuse to 
produce if they were in his possession. Unlike the laws of South Africa, Botswana, and Namib-
ia, the Rules of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria do not provide for 
the examination of witnesses on commission based on interrogatories. The said Rules, howev-
er, distinguish between the discovery of documents and the discovery of facts. In the second 
case, a party may deliver so-called “interrogatories” to the opponent wherein the latter is asked 
to answer the questions drawn up by the other party. The interrogatories have to relate to any 
matters in questions, and so-called “fishing interrogatories” are not allowed. Interrogatories 
allow a litigant to obtain facts from the opposing party where there are no relevant documents 
to be disclosed through discovery.  
The foregoing comments on privileges under Nigerian law apply mutatis mutandis to Ugandan 
law. In contrast to the laws of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Nigeria, Ugandan law 
does not provide for a full-fledged privilege against self-incrimination. Under Ugandan law, a 
witness can be compelled to answer questions which may incriminate him, or tend to expose 
him to any penalty or forfeiture. No such answers, however, subject the witness to any arrest or 
prosecution, or are proved against him in any subsequent criminal proceedings. Like Nigerian 
law, Ugandan law does not recognise the taking of evidence on commission based on interrog-
atories, and distinguishes between the discovery of documents and the discovery of facts. The 
remarks on interrogatories under Nigerian law thus apply mutatis mutandis to civil proceedings 
pending before the High Court of Uganda. 
Under the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, evidence may be given by witness testimony, docu-
ments, inspection, expert opinions, written information, party testimony, and testimony given 
under oath. Swiss law distinguishes between evidence given by litigants (party testimony and 
testimony given under oath), by third parties (witness testimony), and court-appointed experts 
(expert opinion). As a result, different rules apply to evidence, depending on whether it was 
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given by litigants, third parties, or experts. Any individual, who is physically and mentally fit 
to give evidence before court, is a competent witness. A non-party witness, who is married to a 
party, has children with a party, or is a direct relative or in-law of a party, cannot be compelled 
to give evidence. In addition, a third party may refuse to answer questions which may expose 
him, his spouse, the parent of his child, or a direct relative or in-law to the risk of penal inves-
tigation or civil liability. The same holds true for a third party who is subject to a statutorily 
protected secret, such as a doctor, dentist, pharmacist, clergyman, or legal adviser. Moreover, 
public officials, individuals acting as ombudsmen or mediators, as well as journalists may in-
voke a privilege. By contrast, a litigant may only decline to answer questions which may sub-
ject his spouse, the parent of his child, or a relative or in-law to penal investigation or civil lia-
bility. The same applies to a litigant who is privy to a statutorily protected secret. While 
experts may give evidence orally and/or in writing, litigants and third parties may only testify 
viva voce. The examination of litigants, non-party witnesses, and experts is conducted by the 
court. With the leave of the court, a party or his counsel may put questions to the opponent, a 
non-party witness, or an expert. Third parties and experts do not testify on oath; they are, how-
ever, exhorted to tell the truth. The same applies to litigants, unless the court orders them to 
make a testimony under oath. The evidence given by litigants, third parties and experts is rec-
orded in a summary transcript. Experts are regarded as aides of the court. Hence, it is the court 
that appoints the expert, propounds to him the facts to be assumed and investigated, and formu-
lates the questions he has to address. The expert owes allegiance to the court and has, in rela-
tion to the litigants, a strict obligation of neutrality. With the leave of the court, the expert can 
make its own investigations, but he has, at any time, to safeguard the litigants’ right to be 
heard, and the principle of equality of the parties. By contrast, expert witnesses selected by the 
parties are considered as ordinary non-party witnesses. With regard to documentary evidence, 
litigants and third parties have a duty to produce documents, unless the latter are protected by a 
privilege. A litigant, who wishes to use documents which are under the control of the opponent 
or a third party as evidence has to sufficiently specify the documents in his pleadings. So-
called “fishing expeditions” are not allowed. Once the parties have concluded their pleadings, 
the court may issue orders wherein the litigants and third parties are directed to submit the rel-
evant documents to the court. The court has the power to inspect things or locations. The par-
ties and their counsel have a right to be present at an inspection in loco. Where necessary, the 
court may interrogate litigants and non-party witnesses or experts, if any, at the inspection. The 
court has to make a record of the inspection. Finally, the court may request an authority to pro-
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vide written information. The same applies with regard to a private individual, provided his 
oral examination seems unnecessary.  
In the light of the above, the main differences between the means of proof and the procedure 
for the taking of evidence in civil proceedings in Switzerland and those in civil proceedings in 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are obvious. Unlike the laws of these 
African countries, Swiss law distinguishes between the evidence given by litigants, third par-
ties, and court-appointed experts, and thus provides for different rules for the testimony of such 
persons. Compared to the laws of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, the 
compellability of witnesses to give evidence is more limited under Swiss law. Certain third 
parties, such as the spouse or the direct relatives and in-laws of a party, have an unrestricted 
right to refuse to cooperate and cannot be compelled to give evidence. Moreover, under Swiss 
law, not only do legal advisers enjoy a professional privilege, but also other professionals such 
as doctors, clergymen, or journalists. In contrast to South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Uganda, a party in civil proceedings pending in Switzerland cannot invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination for himself, but only in relation to certain third parties. Under the 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the examination of litigants, third-party witnesses, and experts is 
under the control of the court. Consequently, the examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and 
re-examination of witnesses and experts are unknown in Swiss law. The same applies with re-
gard to the taking of evidence on commission (including interrogatories), or based on an affi-
davit. In addition, both the discovery of facts and the discovery of documents are unknown to 
Swiss law. In civil proceedings pending in Switzerland, a party has only to provide the oppo-
nent with documents which the latter sufficiently specified in his pleadings. In other words, a 
litigant is under no obligation to furnish the adversary with documents which may help the lat-
ter to advance his own case or to damage the case of his opponent, unless the opposing party 
identified such documents in his pleadings. Unlike in civil proceedings pending in South Afri-
ca, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, experts under the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, 
are regarded as aides of the courts, and are appointed and instructed by the judge. 
Given the above, a litigant in civil proceedings pending in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, 
Nigeria, and Uganda should particularly consider three factors when contemplating to obtain 
evidence located in Switzerland:
538
 the compellability and privileges of litigants and third par-
ties, the principle of judicial control over the procurement of evidence, and the absence of pre-
                                                     
538
 Provided the taking of evidence is governed by Swiss law. 
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trial discovery. Insufficient investigations in this regard may result in limited probative value 
or even inadmissibility of the evidence obtained in Switzerland in the proceedings pending in 
the aforesaid African countries. Moreover, the party seeking evidence in Switzerland may not 
obtain the evidence he wishes for, as the particular witness, unlike under the laws of the said 
African countries, may not be compellable to give evidence at all, or may invoke a privilege 
with regard to specific questions which is unknown in such countries.
539
 The same may hold 
true due to the fact that under Swiss law, the litigant is not able to request discovery from the 
opposing party.  
                                                     
539
 By contrast, a litigant in civil proceedings before a Swiss court seeking evidence in South Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia, Nigeria, or Uganda may be in a better position, as the privileges in these countries are more restrict-
ed than under Swiss law. 
 287 
 
CHAPTER 6 
REFLECTIONS ON THE DRAFTING OF A CONVENTION ON CROSS-BORDER 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, NIGERIA, AND UGANDA 
 
I. Introduction 
The need for South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda to change their current 
legal position regarding the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters 
has already been outlined. It has also been mentioned that, in the long-term, the position can be 
improved by the drafting of a relevant convention between these countries.
1
 This Chapter 
makes an attempt to develop the basic principles for such a convention. In doing so, existing 
international conventions on cross-border taking of evidence, such as the Hague Procedure 
Convention, the Hague Evidence Convention, the European Evidence Regulation, the Inter-
American Evidence Convention, the Mercosur Protocol, and the Convention on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union of 29 May 2000
2
 
(“European Convention in Criminal Matters”) are taken into account. A convention for South 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, however, should not merely be a copy of an 
existing convention, but it should break new ground in order to overcome long-established 
concepts of sovereignty and to give consideration to the new communication technologies 
available for taking evidence. In this context, one has to keep in mind that existing conventions 
on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, for instance the Hague Ev-
idence Convention or the European Evidence Regulation, were often drafted with civil-law and 
common-law countries in mind and thus constitute compromise solutions in order to accom-
modate the differences of the two legal systems.
3
 Such compromises, however, are not neces-
sary with regard to a convention for South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, as 
all these countries follow the common-law tradition.
4
 A convention between the said countries 
                                                     
1
 See Chapter 4 para. VIII. 
2
 For the text of this Convention, cf. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:197:0001:0023:EN:PDF (date of use: 31 January 
2013). 
3
 Cf. also in this regard Chapter 4 para. II.B.1. See furthermore Stadler A ʻGrenzüberschreitende Beweisauf-
nahmen in der Europäischen Union – die Zukunft der Rechtshilfe in Beweissachenʼ in Schütze RA (ed) Ein-
heit und Vielfalt des Rechts: Festschrift für Reinhold Geimer zum 65. Geburtstag 1282 et seq. 
4
 At least regarding civil procedure. With regard to the hybrid system adopted by South Africa, Botswana, and 
Namibia see Chapter 2 para. IV.B.2.a). 
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should aim at facilitating and expediting the cross-border taking of evidence to the greatest 
possible extent. Needless to say, the practical feasibility of such a convention, in particular in 
relation to the suggested methods to obtain foreign evidence, has to be taken into account.  
In the light of the above, this Chapter first delineates the various vehicles of cross-border tak-
ing of evidence, which may be chosen when drafting a relevant convention for South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Once the most preferable method is established, the 
Chapter discusses the main points to be included in such a convention. 
II. Methods of Taking Evidence under the Convention 
In the majority of cases, cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters is a 
cumbersome and time-consuming process. This holds true not only for evidence-taking based 
on courtoisie internationale, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, where foreign evidence is sought 
under a relevant convention. The arduous nature of judicial assistance in evidence-taking based 
on a convention and the delays associated with the process result mainly from the fact that, in 
addition to the trial court seeking foreign evidence, authorities of the requested state have to be 
involved. The latter examine whether the request for judicial assistance complies with the for-
mal and substantive requirements stipulated in the relevant convention,
5
 and whether there is a 
valid ground to refuse judicial cooperation.
6
 Depending on whether the convention provides for 
active and/or passive judicial assistance, the authorities of the requested state execute the re-
quest for judicial assistance themselves,
7
 or they may merely carry out supervisory activities.
8
 
The involvement of the authorities of the requested state in cross-border taking of evidence of-
ten stems from the concept of sovereignty. In addition, states are often eager to protect the in-
terests of their nationals and the non-nationals resident in their jurisdiction against direct inter-
ference from other states. In the light of the above, it becomes clear that the process for cross-
border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters can only be simplified and accelerat-
ed if the states are willing to relinquish, at least partly, the present concepts of sovereignty and 
limit their involvement to the necessary minimum. 
                                                     
5
 Cf., for instance, Articles 2 and 5 of the Hague Evidence Convention; Articles 6-9 of the European Evidence 
Regulation. 
6
 See, amongst others, Article 12 of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 11(3) of the Hague Procedure 
Convention; Article 16 of the Inter-American Evidence Convention; Article 14(2)(a)-(b) of the European Evi-
dence Regulation. 
7
 Cf., for instance, Articles 1(1) and 9 of the Hague Evidence Convention; Articles 8 and 14 of the Hague Pro-
cedure Convention; Article 10(2) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
8
 See, for example, Article 19 of the Hague Evidence Convention, where a representative of the requested state 
may be present at the taking of evidence through diplomatic officers, consular agents, or commissioners. See 
also Article 17(4)(2) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
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Since the 1970s, the Nordic countries
9
 have established a system of judicial assistance, which 
differs notably from the classical forms of cross-border taking of evidence as adopted by the 
Hague Procedure Convention, the Hague Evidence Convention, the European Evidence Regu-
lation, the Inter-American Evidence Convention, and the Mercosur Protocol, respectively. 
Based on the relevant reciprocal legislation, residents of the said countries are under an obliga-
tion to appear in courts of any Nordic country to testify. Consequently, there is no need to have 
a foreign Nordic witness examined by his home court according to a letter of request, or to take 
evidence directly on foreign soil.
10
 The Nordic approach thus truly overcomes the aforesaid 
hurdles imposed by the sovereignty of states. According to Knöpfel, however, such a system 
could only be adopted because of the social and legal homogeneity the Nordic countries have 
shared over centuries. In this context, Knöpfel also
 
emphasises the importance of the mutual 
trust these countries have in their respective judicial systems.
11
 Similar efforts to improve the 
efficiency of cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters have taken place 
between Australia and New Zealand since the 1990s. Specific reciprocal legislation
12
 stipu-
lates, inter alia, that subpoenas issued by the competent authority in Australia may directly be 
served in New Zealand and vice versa, and that the subpoenaed individual may be required to 
give evidence either in Australia or New Zealand.
13
 Again, such cooperation is only possible 
because Australia and New Zealand are closely related in terms of proximity, culture, and his-
tory.
14
 
It is doubtful whether amongst South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, the 
time is ripe for such a far-reaching cooperation on evidence-taking in civil and commercial 
matters as is the case between the Nordic countries, or Australia and New Zealand. Although 
                                                     
9
 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. 
10
 See Knöfel OL ʻNordische Zeugnispflicht – Grenzüberschreitende Zivilrechtshilfe á la scandinaveʼ 2010 Pra-
xis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 572. 
11
 Knöfel OL ʻNordische Zeugnispflicht – Grenzüberschreitende Zivilrechtshilfe á la scandinaveʼ 2010 Praxis 
des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 576. 
12
 See, amongst others, Sections 150-181 of the New Zealand Evidence Act 69 of 2006, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2006/0069/latest/DLM393463.html (date of use: 31 January 2013); 
New Zealand Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 108 of 2010, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2010/0108/latest/DLM2576223.html (date of use: 31 January 2013); 
Australian Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 35 of 2010, http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010A00035 
(date of use: 31 January 2013); Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of 
Australia on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement of 24 July 2008, Schedule 2 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2010/0108/latest/DLM2576223.html (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
13
 For more in this regard, see Knöfel OL ʻInternationales Zivilverfahrensrecht “Down Under” – Australisch-
neuseeländisches Binnenmarktsprozessrechtʼ 2009 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 603 et seqq.  
14
 Spigelman JJ Cross Border Issues for Commercial Courts: An Overview by the Honourable JJ Spigelmann 
AC, Second Judicial Seminar on Commercial Litigation, Hong Kong 13 January 2010 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Spigelman130110.pdf/$file/Spigelm
an130110.pdf 29 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
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South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda are part of the same law tradition,
15
 
these countries lack the aforementioned cultural, social, and legal homogeneity. Moreover, it is 
open to question whether the said African countries have the necessary confidence in each oth-
er’s judicial systems to break away from long-established concepts of sovereignty. Having said 
this, it seems that the preparation of a convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda can only be 
successful, if it is based on a more classical system of judicial assistance than that adopted by 
the Nordic countries and by Australia and New Zealand, respectively.  
As explained earlier,
16
 under the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence can either be taken 
based on a letter of request, through diplomatic officers or consular agents, or by commission-
ers. The first method of taking foreign evidence is also stipulated by the Hague Procedure 
Convention,
17
 the European Evidence Regulation,
18
 the Inter-American Evidence Conven-
tion,
19
 and the Mercosur Protocol.
20
 With regard to the said forms of evidence-taking, it is re-
called that letters of request are executed by the competent authority of the requested state, 
usually a court, which generally applies its national law. In contrast, a commissioner, who usu-
ally is not a member of the judiciary of the requested state, takes the evidence in accordance 
with the law of the requesting state. The latter also holds true where evidence is taken by a dip-
lomatic officer or consular agent of the requesting state, who exercises his diplomatic or consu-
lar functions in the requested state. In addition to the taking of evidence by letter of request, the 
European Evidence Regulation provides for the “direct taking of evidence by the requesting 
court” in the requested state.21 Such evidence-taking is performed by a member of the trial 
court or any other person, including an expert, who is designated in accordance with the law of 
the requesting state.
22
 When taking the evidence, the relevant individual applies the law of the 
                                                     
15
 See in this regard fn. 4 above. 
16
 Cf. Chapter 4 paras. II.B.3.a) and II.B.3.b). 
17
 See Chapter 4 para. II.C.2. 
18
 Article 10(2). 
19
 Article 5. Articles 9-13 of the Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad of 24 May 1984 provide for the taking of evidence through diplomatic or consular agents. For 
the text of this Protocol, see http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-51.html (date of use: 31 January 
2013). With regard to the list of contracting states, cf. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-51.html (date 
of use: 31 January 2013). For more on the Inter-American Evidence Convention, see amongst others, Low LA 
ʻInternational Judicial Assistance Among the American States – The Inter-American Conventionsʼ 1984 Inter-
national Lawyer 711-714. 
20
 Articles 8 and 12. 
21
 See the heading before Article 17 of the European Evidence Regulation. 
22
 Article 17(3) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
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requesting state.
23
 The direct taking of evidence by the trial court on foreign territory is subject 
to the authorisation of the competent authority of the requested state, which may lay down 
conditions for the performance of the evidence-taking.
24
 Finally, such evidence-taking can only 
take place, if it can be performed on a voluntary basis without the need for coercive 
measures.
25
  
The comments in Chapter 5 on the examination of witnesses in civil proceedings before the 
High Court of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Uganda, and of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja, in Nigeria showed that witnesses generally give evidence viva voce before the trial 
court and that the questioning of the witnesses is conducted by the parties.
26
 Where a witness is 
located abroad, the relevant court may allow the evidence of such witness to be taken on com-
mission in the foreign state.
27
 In cases where a trial court abroad is desirous to obtain evidence 
in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Uganda, or in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a 
commissioner is appointed by the competent court of the said countries. The commissioner 
usually applies the law of the requested state when executing the relevant request.
28
 Taking in-
to account the existing rules on the examination of witnesses in the laws of the aforesaid coun-
tries, it would be logical for a convention on cross-border taking of evidence in these countries 
to provide for the examination of witnesses by commissioners. The adoption of such method, 
with which all the countries involved are familiar, would clearly ease the negotiation process.  
By contrast, the abovementioned method, whereby a court of the requested state executes the 
request for obtaining evidence located in the said country, would not be suitable for a conven-
tion between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. This form of evidence-
                                                     
23
 Article 17(6) of the European Evidence Regulation. For more on Article 17 of the said Regulation, see, 
amongst others, Leipold D ʻNeue Wege im Recht der internationalen Beweiserhebung – einige Bemerkungen 
zur Europäischen Beweisaufnahmeverordnungʼ in Schwenzer I and Hager G (eds) Festschrift für Peter 
Schlechtriem zum 70. Geburtstag 2003 99 et seqq.; Berger C ʻDie EG-Verordnung über die Zusammenarbeit 
der Gerichte auf dem Gebiet der Beweisaufnahme in Zivil- und Handelssachen (EuBVO)ʼ 2001 Praxis des In-
ternationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 526. 
24
 Article 17(1) and (4) of the European Evidence Regulation. The competent authority of the requested state 
may, amongst others, assign a member of a court of the requested state to take part in the performance of the 
taking of evidence. 
25
 Article 17(2) of the European Evidence Regulation. See also Adolphsen J ʻDie EG-Verordnung über die Zu-
sammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Beweisaufnahme in Zivil- oder Handelssachenʼ in Marauhn T (ed) Baustei-
ne eines europäischen Beweisrechts 2007 11; Heß B and Müller A ʻDie Verordnung 1206/01/EG zur Beweis-
aufnahme im Auslandʼ 2001 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 160. 
26
 See Chapter 5 paras. III.A.3.a), IV.A.3.a), V.A.3.a), VI.A.3.a), and VII.A.3.a). 
27
 Cf. Chapter 4 paras. III.C.2, IV.B.2 V.B.2, VI.B.1, and VII.B.2. 
28
 See in this regard Chapter 4 paras. III.C.1, IV.B.1, V.B.1, VI.B.1.b), and VII.B.1. 
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taking is tailored to the civil-law tradition where, in contrast to the common-law system, the 
taking of evidence is generally under the control of the trial court.
29
  
The taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or consular agents is similar to that through 
commissioners. As in the latter case, the evidence is not taken by a court of the requested state, 
but through a diplomatic officer or consular agent representing the requesting state in the re-
quested state.
30
 In comparison to this method, evidence-taking through commissioners appears 
to be more straightforward, as the embassies or consulates of the requesting states do not have 
to be involved. Moreover, it seems that commissioners, who are generally legal practitioners, 
are likely to be more suited to take evidence in the requested state than diplomatic officers and 
consular agents whose core activities lie elsewhere. 
The convention could also allow a trial court to hold a part of the trial in the requested state. In 
this case, the examination of the witness is conducted in the foreign state in the presence of the 
trial court, the parties, and their counsel. From the perspective of the trial court, the advantage 
of this method is that the judge is able to observe the demeanour of the witness during his tes-
timony. Moreover, the examination is conducted in accordance with the law of the requesting 
state.
31
 The main drawback, however, is the fact that not only the parties and their counsel have 
to travel to the requested state, but also the members of the trial court. Such a journey may not 
only be a time-consuming undertaking, but may also generate substantial costs, particularly 
where the foreign witness is not a resident of a neighbouring country of the state of the trial 
court and/or lives in a remote area. Having said this, the method at hand does not appear to be 
the most suitable option for a convention involving South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Uganda, particularly given the distances between South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia on 
the one hand, and Nigeria and Uganda on the other. In cases, however, where the trial court 
and the foreign witness are located in border areas,
32
 the examination of such a witness in the 
presence of the trial court may be a viable option. The same holds true where the trial court 
considers it crucial to conduct an inspection in loco regarding an immovable property or a loca-
tion in the requested state.
33
 
The aforesaid form of cross-border taking of evidence is to be distinguished from the method 
where a member of the trial court is merely allowed to attend the examination of the witness 
                                                     
29
 For more in this regard, see Chapter 2 para. IV.B.3. 
30
 See in this regard Chapter 4 para. III.B.3.b). 
31
 Cf. Article 17(6) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
32
 South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia share borders with each other.  
33
 See also in this regard the comments in Chapter 5 para. II.E. 
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abroad. Here, the said court does not hold part of the trial in the requested state, but is simply 
permitted to be present at the examination of the foreign witness. It is thus the competent for-
eign authority that administers the witness examination, and conducts the latter generally in 
accordance with its own law.
34
 By contrast, with regard to the method dealt with in the preced-
ing paragraph, it is the trial court that is in control of the examination of the foreign witness 
and applies its own rules.
35
  
Another method of taking evidence is the examination via videolink, which allows the trial 
court, the parties, and their counsel to communicate with a foreign witness across national bor-
ders without having to be at the same place as the witness.
36
 The nature of this method has al-
ready been discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and can be summarised as follows: the examination 
by videolink has the advantage that the members of the trial court, the parties, and their counsel 
do not have to travel to the requested state, but receive evidence with real-time audio and visu-
al display at their location at the time of the examination. This not only saves on the costs and 
time generally associated with moving evidence from one jurisdiction to another, but also en-
courages the voluntary cooperation of foreign witnesses. The major disadvantage is that suita-
ble audio- and video-equipment, as well as networks to transmit information have to be availa-
ble at the location of the trial court and of the witness to be examined. Moreover, mention must 
be made of the fact that the examination by videoconference does not take place in the court-
room of the trial court, and the latter is only able to observe the witness’ demeanour by video-
link. Given the fact that the advantages of evidence-taking by videolink clearly outweigh its 
disadvantages, and that videoconferencing technologies have become more affordable, im-
proved and simpler in recent years, it comes as no surprise that the laws of various countries, 
such as England,
37
 Australia,
38
 New Zealand,
39
 or Singapore
40
 provide for the examination of 
witnesses via videolink.
41
 Moreover, some international conventions on the cross-border taking 
                                                     
34
 Cf. Articles 12(1) and 10(2) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
35
 See for instance, Article 17(1) and (3) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
36
 For more on the nature of an examination by videolink, see Chapter 3 para. V.C.1. 
37
 Part 32.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132). 
38
 Sections 24-37 of the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994. 
39
 Sections 168-180 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
40
 Section 62A of the Evidence Act (Chapter 97). 
41
 See also Owners of MV Stella Tingas v MV Atlantica and Another (Trantsnet Ltd t/a Portnet and Another, 
Third Parties) 2002 (1) SA 647 (D) at 659H-J, where in civil proccedings pending in South Africa, the testi-
mony of a witness located in Greece was taken via videoconference. In this context, Booysen J held the fol-
lowing: “He [the witness] was visible on screen and audible to us and we, including counsel who examined 
and cross-examined him, were visible and audible to him. This procedure was adopted by agreement between 
the parties. It is a most sensible way of dealing with the evidence of witnesses who are not available to testify 
in Court. It is a procedure which should in my view be incorporated in the Rules of Court." 
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of evidence, for instance the European Evidence Regulation
42
 or the European Convention in 
Criminal Matters,
43
 as well as bilateral agreements, stipulate the conduct of hearings by vide-
oconference.
44
 Under the European Convention in Criminal Matters, a trial court may request 
the evidence of a witness to be taken by videolink provided it is not desirable or possible for 
the witness to appear in the requesting state. The requested state has to agree to the hearing by 
videoconference, if the latter is not contrary to fundamental principles of its law, and on condi-
tion that it has the technological means to carry out the hearing.
45
  
The convention on cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nige-
ria, and Uganda should also keep pace with the technological developments, and it should 
adopt rules for the taking of evidence by videolink. In this context, it should be recalled that the 
conduct of a hearing by videoconference only marginally interferes, if at all, with foreign sov-
ereignty.
46
 In comparison with the aforementioned regulation contained in the European Con-
vention in Criminal Matters, the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nige-
ria, and Uganda should take an additional step forward by declaring the examination by 
videolink as the primary method of taking evidence and thus limiting the grounds, based on 
which the requested state may refuse a hearing by videoconference, to a minimum. It goes 
without saying that such regulation is only practically feasible, if South Africa, Botswana, Na-
mibia, Nigeria, and Uganda have the technology in place that is required to facilitate a vide-
oconference. To ensure the access to such technology, the convention should provide for the 
obligation of the said countries to put in place the required means. In other words, each country 
would have to establish several locations across its territory that are suitable for the conduct of 
hearings by videoconference.
47
 The witness to be examined by videolink would have to travel 
to the closest location in his region that has access to the means of videoconferencing. The ex-
pense and time connected with such travelling are, however, marginal compared with those 
where the members of the trial court, the parties, and their counsel have to travel abroad to at-
tend a witness examination. In this context, mention must be made of Article 10(4)(4) of the 
European Evidence Regulation, and Article 10(2) of the European Convention in Criminal 
                                                     
42
 Articles 10(4) and 17(4)(3). 
43
 Article 10. 
44
 See, for instance, Article 19(2) of the Agreement on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters and 
Co-operation in Arbitration between the Kingdom of Thailand and Australia of 2 October 1997; Article 24 of 
the Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters between Australia and the Republic of Ko-
rea of 17 September 1999. 
45
 Article 10(1)-(2). 
46
 For more in this regard, see Chapter 3 para. V.C.2. 
47
 For instance the courtroom of a high court or a magistrates’ court could be equipped with the necessary tech-
nological means. 
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Matters, which stipulate that, if the requested state has no access to the technological means of 
videoconferencing, such means may be made available to it by the requesting state. How these 
provisions are implemented in practice remains unclear. 
The advantages mentioned with regard to the hearing of a witness by videolink apply mutatis 
mutandis to the examination of a witness by telephone. The trial court, however, has no visual 
contact with the witness, and the judge’s perception is therefore limited to what he hears over 
the telephone. This not only prevents him from being able to observe the witness’ demeanour, 
but also requires specific measures to verify the witness’ identity. Compared to hearings via 
videoconference, the evidence-taking by telephone has the advantage that it only requires a tel-
ephone line and a telephone, in other words equipment that is undoubtedly available in South 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, with the exception of remote rural areas. 
Although the laws of several countries
48
 and some conventions make reference to the taking of 
evidence by telephone,
49
 it is submitted that the abovementioned disadvantages make telecon-
ferencing a rather unsuitable method of examining witnesses. 
In the light of the above, it becomes clear that with a view to making the examination of a for-
eign witness more efficient, the convention on cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should adopt the examination via videolink as the 
primary method to obtain the testimony of a foreign witness. Compared to evidence-taking by 
a commissioner, the hearing of a witness by videoconference is to be preferred, as it enables 
the trial court to observe and hear the witness during his testimony. By contrast with the direct 
taking of evidence by the trial court on the territory of the requested state, the hearing by vide-
oconference does not require the members of the said court, the parties, and their counsel to 
travel to the location of the foreign witness. As indicated above, the stipulation of videoconfer-
encing as the primary form of evidence-taking in the said convention only makes sense if 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda can ensure access to the necessary 
technical equipment at the time of the entry into force of the convention. Where such access 
cannot be guaranteed by the said countries, the convention has to provide for another method, 
namely the taking of evidence through commissioners. The two methods should be combined 
in such a way that foreign witnesses are generally examined via videolink. Where such a hear-
ing is not possible, because at least one of the states involved does not have the technological 
                                                     
48
 Cf., amongst others, Sections 168(1), 171, and 173 of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006; Sections 25(1), 27, 
and 30 of the Australian Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994.  
49
 See, for instance, Article 10(4) of the European Evidence Regulation; Article 11 of the European Convention 
in Criminal Matters. 
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means for videoconferencing, the evidence is to be taken by a commissioner. In other words, 
where both the requesting state and the requested state have access to the necessary technical 
equipment, evidence is taken by videolink, and where such technology is only available in one 
of the two states, or in neither state, the witness gives evidence before a commissioner. Such a 
regulation allows not only states which have access to videoconferencing equipment to accede 
to the convention, but also other states in which those means are not yet available. In order to 
ensure that evidence-taking by videolink does not remain a mere dead letter, it is important that 
the aforesaid countries take the necessary measures for the installation of videoconferencing 
equipment across their territory. In addition to the taking of evidence by videolink and by 
commissioners, the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Ugan-
da should also allow the trial court to hold a part of the trial in the requested state. Only this 
method will enable the trial court to conduct an inspection in loco on the territory of the re-
quested state.  
Having established the most preferable methods of taking evidence under the convention on 
cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, the 
following subchapter outlines the main points to be considered when drafting such a conven-
tion.  
III. Main Points to Be Considered in the Convention 
Based on the preceding comments, the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, 
Nigeria, and Uganda follows the same approach as other conventions on the cross-border tak-
ing of evidence in civil and commercial matters. The requesting state sends a request for the 
taking of evidence to the requested state. Once the latter made sure that the request complies 
with the conditions laid down in the convention, it approves the request. Since the convention 
between the said countries provides for passive judicial assistance, it is the requesting state, 
either through the trial court or a commissioner that takes the evidence in the requested state.  
A. Scope of the Convention 
In order to avoid any disputes between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda 
regarding the scope of the convention, the latter should include an autonomous definition of 
“civil and commercial matters”. This definition should be formulated extensively in order to 
widen the scope of the convention as much as possible. Where no autonomous definition can 
be found, the convention should stipulate the law, that is, either the law of the requesting state 
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or that of the requested state according to which the term “civil and commercial matters” is to 
be interpreted. Considering the fact that the convention should be applicable in as many civil 
and commercial cases as possible, it should provide that the notion of “civil and commercial 
matters” is to be determined by the law of the requesting state. In other words, the requested 
state should not be allowed to refuse a request for taking evidence merely on the fact that its 
law interprets the term of “civil and commercial matters” more narrowly than the law of the 
requesting state. 
The convention should also define what constitutes taking of evidence, in particular whether 
the convention extends to the preservation of evidence that may take place before proceedings 
are initiated. 
Finally, it should also be stipulated whether or not the convention has mandatory character. In 
other words, whether a member state must have recourse to the convention on each occasion it 
wishes to obtain evidence located in another member state. Given the general need to facilitate 
the cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, the convention between 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should provide the said countries with 
additional methods to obtain foreign evidence without excluding any other forms of evidence-
taking existing outside the convention. Accordingly, the convention should not have an exclu-
sive character.
50
 
B. Content of a Request 
In order to facilitate and expedite not only the issue of requests for judicial assistance by the 
requesting state, but also their examination through the requested state, the convention should 
stipulate the mandatory use of a model form.
51
 A standardised form also reduces the risk of a 
request being refused by the requested state due to incorrect or incomplete provision of infor-
mation.
52
  
The model form should include, inter alia, not only the details of the requesting and the re-
quested authority and of the persons involved,
53
 but also a brief description of the nature and 
                                                     
50
 See in this regard also Chapter 4 paras. II.B.2 and II.B.3.a). 
51
 Cf., for instance, Article 4(1) of the European Evidence Regulation; Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the 
Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad of 24 May 1984. With regard to the Hague Ev-
idence Convention, see Chapter 4 para. II.B.3.a). 
52
 See also Low LA ʻInternational Judicial Assistance Among the American States – The Inter-American Con-
ventionsʼ 1984 International Lawyer 710. 
53
 That is, parties, counsel, witnesses to be examined, and the commissioner. 
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subject matter of the claim pending before the trial court,
54
 a description of the taking of evi-
dence to be performed, as well as a date for the requested taking of evidence. Where the wit-
ness is examined via videolink, the information necessary to set up the videoconference has to 
be provided. In cases where evidence will be taken through a commissioner, a list of the ques-
tions to be put to the witness should be attached to the request.
55
  
In addition, the convention should provide that requests have to be issued by judicial authori-
ties, and drafted in English.
56
 While the first requirement promotes the authenticity of the re-
quest, the second requirement not only makes unnecessary the translation of requests, but also 
avoids translation errors. 
The European Evidence Regulation stipulates that where a request for obtaining foreign evi-
dence is incomplete, the requested court has to give the trial court the opportunity to rectify the 
request within 30 days of receipt of request before it can refuse the request.
57
 This rule makes 
sense, as the trial court does not have to issue a new request if necessary information is missing 
from the initial request.
58
 Having said this, the drafters of the convention on cross-border tak-
ing of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should contemplate 
the adoption of a similar provision.  
C. Transmission of a Request 
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, a request to obtain foreign evidence has to be transmit-
ted via the so-called “Central Authority” of the requested state, which, after examining wheth-
er the request fulfils the relevant formal and substantive requirements, forwards the request to 
the court competent to execute it.
59
 By contrast, the European Evidence Regulation allows the 
direct transmission between the courts of the requesting state and of the requested state.
60
 With 
a view to enhancing judicial assistance between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
                                                     
54
 To determine, amongst others, whether the claim, in relation to which foreign evidence is sought, falls within 
the scope of the convention.  
55
 See also in this regard Form A in the Annex to the European Evidence Regulation. For the ʻModel for Letters 
of Request Recommended for Use in Applying the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Ev-
idence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters’, cf. http://www.hcch.net/upload/actform20e.pdf (date of use: 
31 January 2013). 
56
 In South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, English is either the only official language or one 
of several official languages. 
57
 Article 8(1). 
58
 With regard to the time limit of 30 days, see the comments on the acknowledgment of receipt in para. III.C 
below. 
59
 Articles 2 and 5 of the Hague Evidence Convention. Cf. also Chapter 4 para. II.B.3.a). See also Article 11 of 
the Inter-American Evidence Convention; Article 2 of the Mercosur Protocol. 
60
 Article 2(1). 
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and Uganda, the convention between the said countries should avoid an excessively bureau-
cratic regime by creating central authorities for the receipt of requests for taking evidence, and 
instead it should allow the direct communication between the courts of the requesting state and 
those of the requested state.
61
 In order to make it easier for the courts of the requesting state to 
find the court in the requested state competent for the receipt of a request, the convention 
should include, as a schedule, a list of the relevant courts of each contracting state.
62
 In accord-
ance with the existing rules in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda
63
 on 
taking evidence for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings, the said countries should nominate 
the High Court, in whose jurisdiction the witness to be examined is resident, as the court com-
petent to receive requests under the convention. 
Once the request for judicial assistance has been granted by the competent court in the request-
ed state, the question arises as to whether the trial court can communicate directly with the for-
eign witness, or whether such correspondence has to be transmitted via the requested court to 
the witness. Such communication may, for instance, be required where technicalities regarding 
a witness examination by videolink have to be clarified
 
between the trial court and the wit-
ness.
64 With a view to accelerating the process of obtaining foreign evidence, the convention 
between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should allow such direct 
communication without the involvement of the requested court. Needless to say, the trial court 
cannot use such direct correspondence to circumvent the provisions on the authorisation of a 
request for evidence-taking by the requested court. For the protection of the foreign witness, 
correspondence emanating from the trial court should be drafted in the same language as the 
request for judicial assistance. In addition, it should contain an explicit reference that the wit-
ness may obtain further information from the trial court or the requested court concerning the 
communication.
65
 The direct correspondence between the trial court and the foreign witness, 
however, should not extend to the summons of the witness to give evidence. Rather, it should 
be the competent court in the requested state that summons the witness in accordance with its 
                                                     
61
 See also in this regard Spigelman JJ Cross Border Issues for Commercial Courts: An Overview by the Hon-
ourable JJ Spigelmann AC, Second Judicial Seminar on Commercial Litigation, Hong Kong 13 January 2010 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Spigelman130110.pdf/$file/Spigelm
an130110.pdf 8 (date of use: 31 January 2013). 
62
 See, for instance, Article 2(2) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
63
 Cf. Chapter 4 paras. III.C.1, IV.B.1, V.B.1, VI.B.1, and VII.B.1. 
64
 See in this regard also Article 17(2)(2) of the European Evidence Regulation, which provides that in the case 
of the direct taking of evidence by the trial court in the requested state, the said court shall inform the foreign 
witness that the performance shall take place on a voluntary basis. 
65
 Cf. Article 5(1), (3), and (4) of the European Convention in Criminal Matters, which provides a similar rule for 
the transmission of procedural documents. 
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own law.
66
 Such procedure does not only avoid any sovereignty issues in the requested state, 
but it may also be more efficient. A subpoena issued by a court in the country where the wit-
ness is resident often has a greater impact on the witness than a summons from a court abroad.  
Under the European Evidence Regulation, the requested court must, within seven days of re-
ceipt of the request, send an acknowledgement of receipt to the trial court using a particular 
form.
67
 This rule serves to accelerate the execution of requests.
68
 The same holds true for an-
other provision of the European Evidence Regulation which directs an authority, which has re-
ceived a request, but is not competent to execute it, to promptly transmit it to the competent 
authority of the requested state, and to inform the trial court accordingly.
69
 Although the failure 
to meet the aforesaid time limits does not trigger any international sanctions, the stipulation of 
deadlines indicates the time frame within which the requested court is expected to act under the 
European Evidence Regulation. Having said this, the drafters of the convention on cross-border 
taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should consider 
including similar provisions in the convention. In order to reduce the burden of the requested 
court, model forms for the acknowledgement of receipt and for the information on the trans-
mission of the request to the competent court should be prepared.
70
  
However, the direct transmission of requests between the trial court and the competent court in 
the requested state is of limited use unless such transmission is made by the most rapid 
means.
71
 The swiftest possible means is a transmission that does not require the forwarding of 
a physical copy of a document, namely a transmission by email or fax.
72
 There is no reason 
why a request for cross-border taking of evidence cannot be transmitted by such means, pro-
vided the authenticity and legibility of the request are ensured. By allowing such request to be 
sent by email or fax, the transmission time is a matter of minutes, if not seconds, a considerable 
time saving compared to the transmission by post. In this context, it has also to be noted that an 
efficient transmission by post requires a reliable postal service in both the requesting state and 
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 See also Article 10(4) of the European Convention in Criminal Matters. 
67
 Article 7(1). 
68
 See, amongst others, Leipold D ʻNeue Wege im Recht der internationalen Beweiserhebung – einige Bemer-
kungen zur Europäischen Beweisaufnahmeverordnungʼ in Schwenzer I and Hager G (eds) Festschrift für Peter 
Schlechtriem zum 70. Geburtstag 2003 95 et seq. 
69
 Article 7(2). Cf. also Article 6 of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 3(2) of the Inter-American Evidence 
Convention; Article 9(2) of the Mercosur Protocol. 
70
 See in this regard Form A and Form B in the Annex to the European Evidence Regulation. 
71
 See in this regard Article 6 of the European Evidence Regulation, which provides that requests and communi-
cations under the Regulation shall be transmitted by the swiftest possible means, which the requested state has 
indicated it can accept. 
72
 As well as by telex. However, in practice, this form of transmission is no longer widely used. 
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the requested state. Having said this, the drafters of the convention on cross-border taking of 
evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, should contemplate the 
transmission of requests by email or fax. Such transmission merely requires a telephone line 
and a computer or fax machine, equipment that most courts in the said countries already have 
available. Alternatively, the transmission by private courier service should be considered, as 
such services are generally faster and more reliable than the normal postal service. The above 
holds true not only for the initial request of the trial court to obtain foreign evidence, but for all 
correspondence to be exchanged between the trial court and the competent court in the request-
ed state. 
D. Examination of a Request 
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, it is, as has been explained earlier, the central authority 
of the requested state that examines whether a request complies with the formal and substantive 
requirements stipulated by the Convention. The same authority also decides on whether the 
sovereignty or security of the requested state would be prejudiced by the execution of the re-
quest.
73
 Under the European Evidence Regulation, each member state has to designate a central 
body, which, amongst other things, supplies information to the requested courts and seeks solu-
tions to any difficulties that may arise in respect of a request for taking evidence.
74
 In contrast 
to the central authority under the Hague Evidence Convention, such central body has no ap-
proving authority regarding the request for judicial assistance, but merely exercises supporting 
functions. In other words, under the European Evidence Regulation, it is the requested court, in 
whose jurisdiction the witness to be examined is resident, which decides whether or not a re-
quest complies with the provisions of the Regulation.  
It is obvious that the involvement of a central body in the requested state, that has more than 
just supporting functions, slows down the process of obtaining foreign evidence. Having said 
this, the convention on cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, 
Nigeria, and Uganda should adopt an approach similar to that in the European Evidence Regu-
lation. In this context, one could argue that the lack of an approving central body precludes a 
uniform practice in relation to the examination and authorisation of requests for evidence-
taking within a member state, and that it is easier to centralise the necessary know-how in a 
central body. This argument, however, cannot be accepted, since the central body may issue 
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 Articles 5 and 12 of the Hague Evidence Convention.  
74
 Article 3(1). 
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appropriate directives to the relevant courts, and may provide support, if the courts encounter 
any difficulties regarding a request. Moreover, the fact that the requesting courts have to use a 
model form
75
 limits the scope the requested courts have with regard to the examination of a 
request. At this point, it has also to be noted that, from the perspective of the requested state, 
the designation of a central body with more than just supporting functions is often based on the 
aforesaid concepts of sovereignty,
76
 that is, on the perception that a request for cross-border 
taking of evidence impinges upon the sovereignty of the requested state. Where the countries in 
question are not prepared to leave the examination of such requests solely in the hands of the 
relevant courts, provisions could be made so that the central body is informed of any request, 
without, however, constituting the approving authority in the aforesaid sense. Such a system 
would allow the central body to intercede if it considers the request to be in breach with the 
convention. In other words, requests for taking evidence abroad do not require the approval of 
the central body, but the latter is informed, however, of any request and may intervene if nec-
essary.
77
  
It goes without saying that a requested state may refuse to grant a request for taking evidence, 
if it does not fall within the scope of the convention, or within the functions of the judiciary,
78
 
or if it does not fulfil the formal and substantive requirements.
79
 Under the Hague Evidence 
Convention, the Hague Procedure Convention, the Inter-American Evidence Convention, and 
the Mercosur Protocol, execution may also be declined based on public policy (ordre public).
80
 
By contrast, the European Evidence Regulation does not contain a public policy exception.
81
 It 
is evident that in order to enhance judicial assistance in evidence-taking, it is necessary to re-
strict the possibility of refusing to execute requests for taking evidence to what is strictly nec-
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 Cf. para. III.B above. 
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 See para. II. above. 
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 Cf. Spigelman JJ Cross Border Issues for Commercial Courts: An Overview by the Honourable JJ Spigelmann 
AC, Second Judicial Seminar on Commercial Litigation, Hong Kong 13 January 2010 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Spigelman130110.pdf/$file/Spigelm
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78
 See, for instance, Article 12(1)(a) of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 11(3)(2) of the Hague Procedure 
Convention; Article 14(2)(a)-(b) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
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 Cf. Article 8(1) read in conjunction with Article 14(2)(c) of the European Evidence Regulation. 
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 See Article 12(1)(b) of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 11(3)(3) of the Hague Procedure Convention; 
Article 16 of the Inter-American Evidence Convention; Article 8. 
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 Cf., amongst others, Leipold D ʻNeue Wege im Recht der internationalen Beweiserhebung – einige Bemer-
kungen zur Europäischen Beweisaufnahmeverordnungʼ in Schwenzer I and Hager G (eds) Festschrift für Peter 
Schlechtriem zum 70. Geburtstag 2003 96; Berger C ʻDie EG-Verordnung über die Zusammenarbeit der Ge-
richte auf dem Gebiet der Beweisaufnahme in Zivil- und Handelssachen (EuBVO)ʼ 2001 Praxis des Internati-
onalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 524. See, however, Schütze RA Rechtsverfolgung im Ausland: Prozess-
führung vor ausländischen Gerichten und Schiedsgerichten 2009 135 n. 294, who maintains that under the 
European Evidence Regulation, the requested state may refuse the execution of requests for judicial assistance 
based on ordre public. 
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essary. Accordingly, under the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Uganda, the execution of the said requests should only be refused based on the abovemen-
tioned grounds, excluding public policy reasons. With regard to South Africa and Namibia, the 
exclusion of public policy reasons means that the execution of requests for evidence-taking in 
these two countries could no longer be declined based on Section 1 of the Protection of Busi-
nesses Act, and Section 2 of the Second General Law Amendment Act, respectively.
82
  
E. Execution of a Request 
As explained above,
83
 evidence-taking via videolink and, alternatively, through a commission-
er, are the preferable methods for the cross-border taking of evidence in the convention be-
tween South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. The following subchapters thus 
discuss the main points to be addressed in the convention in relation to these two forms of evi-
dence-taking. These main points include the involvement of the requested state in the execution 
of a request for taking foreign evidence, the applicable law, the privileges of witnesses, the use 
of compulsion, the consequences of perjury, and the costs. 
1. Involvement of the Requested State 
Where a foreign witness is interrogated by videolink or by a commissioner, it is the trial court 
or the commissioner, and not an authority of the requested state, that conducts the examination. 
The question thus arises of whether and, if so, to what extent the authorities of the requested 
state should carry out supervisory functions in the execution of a request for the taking of evi-
dence by the trial court or by a commissioner. It has already been emphasised
84
 that in order to 
make cross-border taking of evidence more efficient, the involvement of the requested state 
should be limited to an absolute minimum. From a practical point of view, no involvement of 
the requested state, let alone any supervisory activity, is necessary; the examination of the for-
eign witness via videolink or through a commissioner is possible without the assistance of the 
requested state. In this context, however, it has to be recalled that the involvement of the re-
quested state, and in particular the conduct of supervisory functions, is often based on the said 
state’s intention to protect its residents.85 Both the Hague Evidence Convention and the Euro-
pean Evidence Regulation provide that where evidence is taken by a commissioner (Hague Ev-
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 See in this regard Chapter 4 paras. III.C.1.d) and V.B.2. 
83
 Cf. para. II. above. 
84
  See para. II. above. 
85
 Cf. in this regard para. II. above. 
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idence Convention), or by the requesting court (European Evidence Regulation), the requested 
state may stipulate conditions with which the relevant individual or court must comply when 
taking evidence. Such conditions may, for instance, include the presence of an interpreter or 
the location where the examination has to take place. In addition, the requested state may as-
sign an individual who is present at the examination and supervises the latter.
86
 From the per-
spective of the requested state, these provisions provide a counterweight for allowing the re-
questing state to perform the taking of evidence on its territory. This counterweight appears all 
the more important where the contracting states lack mutual trust in their judicial systems.  
Where the drafters of the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and 
Uganda consider it necessary to allow the requested state to carry out supervisory functions, 
such functions should be limited to a minimum. In the case of a lack of the aforesaid mutual 
trust, it is doubtful whether, from the perspective of the requested state, the stipulation of con-
ditions with which the trial court or a commissioner has to comply is sufficient. The requested 
state has no guarantee that the conditions will be observed, unless an individual assigned by it 
is present when the evidence is taken. Moreover, given the fact that the supervisory activity 
usually aims at the protection of the witness,
87
 it could be considered to limit such activity to 
witnesses who intend to give evidence in absence of counsel. For witnesses, who are represent-
ed by a legal adviser during their examination, there is, however, no need for protection. Need-
less to say, the above comments also apply to cases where the trial court travels to the request-
ed state to examine the foreign witness, or to conduct an inspection in loco. 
With regard to the evidence-taking by a commissioner, the additional question arises as to who, 
the trial court or the requested court, appoints the individual who will act as commissioner. The 
commissioner should be appointed by the trial court, which then forwards the relevant court 
order together with the request for judicial assistance to the requested court. Compared to the 
requested court, the trial court is often in a better position to select an individual who is suita-
ble to act as commissioner and who is, in particular, familiar with the laws of the requesting 
state. When granting the request for judicial assistance, the requested court should, based on 
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 Articles 17(1)(b) and 19 of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 17(4) of the European Evidence Regula-
tion. 
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 The protection of the sovereignty of the requested state is no longer the main concern, since the requested state 
allows the witness to be examined by the trial court or by a commissioner. 
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the aforesaid court order, confirm the commissioner’s appointment. Only in very exceptional 
cases should the requested court be allowed to refuse an individual as commissioner.
88
  
2. Applicable Law 
The difficulties that may arise if the taking of foreign evidence is governed by the law of the 
requested state, instead of the law of the requesting state, have been explained earlier.
89
 More-
over, from a practical point of view, it should be avoided that the trial court has to take evi-
dence in accordance with rules with which it is not entirely familiar. The examination of a wit-
ness by the trial court via videolink or by a commissioner should thus be conducted in 
accordance with the laws of the requested state.
90
 The same holds true where the trial court 
travels to the requested state to take evidence.  
3. Right to Refuse to Give Evidence  
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, a witness, who is examined by a commissioner, may 
not only claim privileges under the law of the state of the trial court, but also those under the 
law of the requested state.
91
 Where a witness is examined by the trial court under the European 
Evidence Regulation,
92
 he may only invoke the privileges as stipulated by the law of the re-
questing state.
93
 The same should apply where under the convention between South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, a witness is examined by videolink, by a commis-
sioner, or by the trial court on the territory of the requested state. This approach also ensures 
that with respect to the privileges, the examination of the foreign witness is governed by one 
single law, namely that of the state of the trial court. Moreover, witnesses examined for the 
benefit of civil proceedings pending before the said court may invoke the same privileges, irre-
spective of whether they reside in the requesting state or in the requested state.
94
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 For instance, where the individual is not allowed to travel to the requested state due to his criminal record. 
89
 Cf. Chapter 2 para. V.D.4. 
90
 See also in this regard Article 21(d) of the Hague Evidence Convention; Article 17(6) of the European Evi-
dence Regulation. 
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 Article 21(e) read in conjunction with Article 11(1). See also Article 10(5)(e) of the European Convention in 
Criminal Matters.  
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 Article 17. 
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 Cf. Article 17(6), which provides that the witness is examined in accordance with the law of the requesting 
state. Where the witness is examined by the requested court, Article 14(1) stipulates that the witness may 
claim the privileges of the requested state and the requesting state. There is, however, no such provision for 
cases where the trial court examines the witness. 
94
 This is not the case where a foreign witness may invoke not only the privileges of the requesting state, but also 
those of the requested state. 
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4. Use of Compulsion 
As has already been explained earlier,
95
 the performance of coercive measures by the trial court 
in the requested state is regarded as a violation of the latter’s sovereignty. Accordingly, under 
the Hague Evidence Convention, a commissioner is not allowed to take any measures of com-
pulsion on foreign territory, but may apply to the competent authority of the requested state for 
appropriate assistance, provided the said state permitted such application when ratifying the 
Convention.
96
 Where under the European Evidence Regulation, the foreign evidence is taken 
by the trial court in the requested state, such evidence-taking can only take place if it can be 
performed on a voluntary basis without the need for coercive measures.
97
 As a consequence, 
the trial court is not only prevented from taking any measures of compulsion on foreign territo-
ry, but it also cannot apply to the requested state for the use of coercive measures. 
Where a foreign witness refuses to collaborate with a commissioner or the trial court, be it in a 
hearing conducted by the said court in the requested state or by videolink, the witness’ testi-
mony can only be obtained via the application of coercive measures. From the perspective of 
the trial court, it is thus crucial that the convention for cross-border taking of evidence in South 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda allows the said court to apply to the compe-
tent court in the requested state for coercive measures. This is all the more important since the 
said convention, unlike the Hague Evidence Convention and the European Evidence Regula-
tion, does not provide for an alternative method of evidence-taking performed by the requested 
court.
98
 The convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda 
should moreover place an obligation upon the requested court to deal with a request of the trial 
court or of a commissioner for measures of compulsion based on a certificate issued by such 
court or by the commissioner that the particular witness refused to cooperate. In this context, 
the convention should state a time limit within which the requested court should decide on the 
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 See Chapter 3 para. IV.C.3. 
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 Article 18. See also Amram PhW Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention 
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coercive measures.
99
 Furthermore, the convention should also stipulate that the requested court 
applies its own law when deciding on the coercive measures. In other words, the requested 
state applies the measures of compulsion in the same way as if the witness examination takes 
place in a national procedure.  
5. Perjury 
Where a foreign witness lies when giving sworn testimony before a commissioner or in a hear-
ing conducted by the trial court in the requested state or via videolink, the question arises as to 
which law applies with regard to perjury. In both cases, the witness tells a lie in the state where 
he gives evidence, that is, the requested state, but he also obstructs the judicial process in the 
country of the trial court. Whether giving false testimony constitutes a perjury in the requested 
state depends on whether telling a lie to the courts of a foreign country amounts to perjury. The 
same applies mutatis mutandis to the country in which the evidence is received. If a false tes-
timony amounts to perjury in both states, that is, in the country where the witness is located 
and the state of the trial court, a further question arises, namely in which state the witness 
should be punished.
100
  
The convention on cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nige-
ria, and Uganda could remove the aforesaid uncertainties by including either a criminal provi-
sion regarding perjury, or by stipulating that giving false testimony in a hearing conducted by 
the trial court or before a commissioner is regarded as perjury in the requested state. With re-
gard to the latter, it has to be kept in mind that criminal sanctions taking effect in the state 
where the witness is resident, have a greater impact.
101
  
6. Costs 
In order not to create financial hurdles for the litigant or the trial court seeking foreign evi-
dence, requested states should not impose any charges for the execution of a request for taking 
evidence abroad. This holds particularly true with regard to the convention between South Af-
rica, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda where the examination of foreign witnesses 
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should not be conducted by the requested court, but by the trial court or a commissioner.
102
 In 
other words, the requested court, let alone the central body, if any, should not be allowed to 
claim reimbursement of costs arising from the receipt and the examination of requests for judi-
cial assistance, the conduct of supervisory activities, or from the use of coercive measures 
against recalcitrant witnesses. The same should apply for the costs of establishing and servic-
ing the videolink in the requested state, provided the necessary equipment is available in such 
state. Where, however, an interpreter has to be appointed by the requested court, the relevant 
costs should be reimbursed by the requesting state. The convention on cross-border taking of 
evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should furthermore stipu-
late that the foreign witness required to give evidence before the trial court or a commissioner 
is entitled to payment for expenses and loss of time as may be determined by the trial court. 
7. Further Remarks 
The problems regarding discovery proceedings mentioned earlier in relation to the Hague Evi-
dence Convention
103
 do not arise under the convention on cross-border taking of evidence in 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda. The laws of all of the aforesaid coun-
tries recognise discovery proceedings. Moreover, in all of these countries, discovery is limited 
to parties and to documents relating to any matter in question in the relevant action. Where a 
litigant fails to give discovery, the trial court may dismiss the claim or strike out the defence.
104
 
Since these consequences are generally sufficient to ensure the parties’ cooperation in discov-
ery proceedings, requests for judicial assistance regarding discovery are rare in practice. Con-
sequently, there is no need for specific provisions in the convention in this regard. 
Where a foreign witness is only required to produce a document, but not to testify, the conven-
tion between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should allow the witness 
to submit the document not only to the trial court, but also to the requested court. In the latter 
case, the convention should provide that the requested court has to transmit the document to 
the trial court within a specified period of time. 
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In order to avoid any misunderstandings, the convention should furthermore stipulate that the 
approval of a request for the taking of evidence does not imply ultimate recognition of the ju-
risdiction of the trial court issuing the request or a commitment to recognise the validity of the 
relevant judgment.
105
 
The convention on cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nige-
ria, and Uganda, should remain open for accession by any other state. This should not only ap-
ply to common-law countries, but also to countries following the civil-law tradition, since the 
examination of foreign witnesses by videolink is suitable for both legal systems. 
IV. Conclusion 
The convention on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters in South 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should be drafted with the aim of facilitating 
and expediting the evidence-taking between these countries to the greatest possible extent 
which is still practically feasible. Accordingly, the convention should provide for the examina-
tion of foreign witnesses by the trial court via videolink as the primary method of taking evi-
dence. This allows the trial court to observe the witness’ demeanour during his examination 
without having to travel to the requested state. The same holds true for the parties and their 
counsel. Where a location or immovable property is situated in the requested state, the trial 
court may consider it necessary to conduct an inspection in loco abroad. Since such inspection 
cannot be carried out via videolink, the convention should allow the trial court to take evidence 
in the requested state. In other words, the trial court should be permitted to hold a part of the 
trial on foreign territory. This method may also make sense where the trial court and the for-
eign witness are situated in border areas. In other cases, however, particularly where the dis-
tance between the location of the trial court and that of the witness is long, the evidence-taking 
by the said court in the requested state appears not to be the most preferable method, as the 
members of such court have to travel abroad. Where the witness examination by videolink is 
not a realistic option, as the availability of videoconferencing equipment cannot be guaranteed 
in all the contracting states, the convention has to provide for an alternative method, namely 
the taking of evidence through a commissioner. Although the obtaining of evidence by a com-
missioner constitutes, like the other two aforesaid methods, passive judicial assistance, it has a 
considerable drawback: the trial court is not able to see and hear the foreign witness, but its 
perception of the witness’ testimony is reduced to the relevant transcript. 
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In order to raise the efficiency of cross-border taking of evidence in South Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, the convention should reduce the involvement of the requested 
state in relation to the execution of a relevant request to an absolute minimum. As a conse-
quence, the transmission and examination of a request should merely involve the trial court and 
the court in the requested state in whose jurisdiction the foreign witness is resident, but no cen-
tral body with approving authority. The communication between the trial court and the request-
ed court should be as swift as possible, preferably by email or fax. The convention should 
moreover stipulate the mandatory use of a model form. Such form not only facilitates the issue 
of a request by the trial court and its examination by the requested court, but also limits the risk 
of a request being rejected due to formal or substantive defects. In order to maximise the effec-
tiveness of the convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, 
the reasons based on which the requested court is allowed to decline a request for the taking of 
evidence should be confined to what is strictly necessary. Consequently, a request should only 
be refused if it does not fall within the scope of the convention, or within the functions of the 
judiciary, or if it does not comply with the formal and substantive requirements as laid down in 
the convention. The requested court, however, should not be permitted to reject a request based 
on public policy reasons. 
Since all the recommended methods of taking evidence constitute passive judicial assistance, it 
is the trial court, or a commissioner, and not the requested court that will be in charge of the 
examination of the witness. The requested court should, if at all, be allowed only to lay down 
conditions with which the trial court and the commissioner have to comply when taking the 
evidence, or to assign an individual who supervises the examination of the foreign witness. 
When taking the foreign evidence, the trial court and the commissioner should apply the law of 
the requesting state. This should hold particularly true for the privileges the witness may in-
voke. In case the witness refuses to give evidence, the convention between South Africa, Bot-
swana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda should allow the trial court and the commissioner to ap-
ply to the requested court for measures of compulsion. The requested court should be under the 
obligation to use the coercive measures in the same way as if the examination of the witness 
takes place in a domestic procedure.  
The granting of a request to take foreign evidence emanating from the requesting state should 
generally not give rise to a claim for reimbursement of any charges of the requested state. This 
should hold particularly true for any costs associated with the receipt and examination of a re-
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quest, the conduct of supervisory activities, or the use of measures of compulsion towards re-
calcitrant witnesses.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The outcome of any court case hinges largely on the extent to which the relevant material facts 
underlying the lawsuit can be proven. While from the perspective of the plaintiff, the ability to 
prove the respective facts determines the success or failure of his claim, the trial court is eager 
to obtain proof of all the said facts, in order to get at the truth of the claim and make a correct 
judgment. Where evidence, which is necessary to prove the relevant material facts, is located 
outside the state of the trial court, the process of taking evidence is, from the perspective of the 
said court, no longer a purely domestic matter, but has an international impact. This thesis in-
vestigates the extent to which cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters 
in relation to Switzerland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda is allowed. 
The rules that have to be taken into account in this regard are threefold: first, public interna-
tional law governing the relation between states; second, the law of the state where the civil 
proceedings, for which the foreign evidence is to be obtained, are pending; and third, the law of 
the state where the foreign evidence is located. This Chapter summarises the major conclusions 
reached in this thesis. 
Based on the public international law concept of sovereignty, a state is not allowed to perform 
an act of state on the territory of another state, unless the latter gives its permission. The extent 
to which a trial court, litigants, their counsel, or any other individual are allowed to collect evi-
dence in a state other than that of the said court therefore depends on whether the foreign state 
regards the evidence-taking as a judicial act or not. In civil litigation pending in civil-law coun-
tries, the taking of evidence is under the control of the court and thus is considered as an act of 
state, irrespective of whether it is performed by a member of the trial court, or by a private in-
dividual, and whether compulsion is applied or not. In Switzerland, a civil-law country, the 
taking of evidence on Swiss soil for the benefit of civil proceedings pending abroad constitutes 
a criminal offence. By contrast, in countries following the common-law tradition, such as 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia,
1
 Nigeria, and Uganda, the collection of evidence is entrust-
ed to the parties. As a result, these countries regard the taking of evidence as a private act, pro-
vided no measures of compulsion are used.  
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 See in this regard Chapter 2 para. IV.B.2.a). 
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Where a state seeks means of proof located in a foreign state and the latter regards evidence-
taking as interference with its sovereignty, the relevant evidence may be obtained through in-
ternational judicial assistance. Such assistance is either granted based on an international treaty 
on cross-border taking of evidence, or based on “courtoisie internationale”. In the case of an 
international agreement, the requested state is under a public international law obligation to 
render judicial assistance, while in the second case, no such obligation exists. 
The three classical methods for obtaining foreign evidence in civil and commercial matters by 
means of international judicial assistance are the taking of evidence by a letter of request, 
through a commissioner, and by a diplomatic officer or consular agent. The first method quali-
fies as active judicial assistance where the competent authority of the requested state takes the 
evidence based on its own rules and transmits the results to the requesting state. By contrast, 
the second and third method constitute passive judicial assistance. Here, it is a commissioner 
appointed by the trial court, or a diplomatic officer or consular agent representing the request-
ing state who takes the evidence on foreign territory in accordance with the rules of the re-
questing state. Trial courts usually prefer to obtain foreign evidence through a commissioner, 
as the taking of evidence is governed by their own rules and may not, as in the case of the col-
lection of evidence by a diplomatic officer or consular agent, be limited to nationals of the re-
questing state. In comparison to the foreign authority, which may apply compulsion in its ju-
risdiction when executing a letter of request, a commissioner, diplomatic officer or consular 
agent is not allowed to use any coercive measures on foreign territory, as such compulsion 
would interfere with foreign sovereignty. 
From the perspective of trial courts, the gathering of foreign evidence through international ju-
dicial assistance is often a burdensome and time-consuming process. The said courts are often 
eager to transfer the evidence originally located in a foreign state to their own jurisdiction. By 
this so-called “transfer of foreign evidence”, the evidence is no longer taken on foreign territo-
ry, but in the jurisdiction of the trial court. From the court’s viewpoint, the taking of the trans-
ferred evidence is thus a purely domestic matter and no longer requires the assistance of the 
foreign state. Compared to the collection of evidence by means of international judicial assis-
tance, the advantages of a transfer of foreign evidence are, again from the trial court’s perspec-
tive, manifold: delays resulting from the involvement of foreign authorities can be avoided; the 
examination of evidence is governed by the rules of the trial court; and the evidence is not “fil-
tered” by any foreign authority, commissioner, diplomatic officer, or consular agent.  
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Although the trial court does not in the course of a transfer of foreign evidence become physi-
cally active on foreign territory, the effects of a request of the trial court for such transfer go 
beyond the national boundaries of the state of the said court. The question therefore arises as to 
whether and, if so, to what extent, a request for a transfer of foreign evidence is allowed under 
public international law. This question is controversial. It is submitted that the aforesaid re-
quest does not interfere with foreign sovereignty where it is aimed at foreign litigants, provided 
the trial court only applies direct compulsion which is limited to the state where it is located or 
to procedural consequences. With regard to foreign third parties, a request for a transfer of for-
eign evidence is allowed where such witnesses have the same nationality as the trial court and 
the measures of compulsion are direct and merely take effect in the state of the said court. It is 
moreover submitted that a request, wherein the trial court asks a foreign witness for his volun-
tary cooperation, does not infringe the sovereignty of the state where the witness is resident. 
Where a trial court wishes to bring foreign evidence into its jurisdiction without the assistance 
of the foreign state, it has several options: it may order a foreign witness to appear in court, to 
testify via videolink or telephone, to give evidence based on a questionnaire, or to submit doc-
uments or movable property. Where the specialised knowledge of an expert is required, a (civ-
il-law) court may appoint a domestic expert to make investigations abroad which are necessary 
for the preparation of the expert opinion. With the exception of a summons of a foreign witness 
to attend court, it is controversial whether the aforesaid methods constitute a true transfer of 
foreign evidence, or whether they do not rather qualify as a judicial act performed by the trial 
court on foreign territory. It is submitted that all of the abovementioned options are to be re-
garded as transfers of foreign evidence that do not require the assistance of the foreign state. In 
all cases, the trial court does not (physically) perform a judicial act on foreign territory. The 
activities of the witness in the foreign state merely constitute a preparatory measure, while the 
evidence-taking ultimately occurs in the jurisdiction of the trial court, as the examination of 
evidence is only concluded once the court has reviewed it. It is furthermore submitted that an 
order, wherein a trial court instructs a litigant to obtain the evidence of a foreign third party for 
the benefit of the civil proceedings pending before it, constitutes a transfer of foreign evidence. 
Also, it is submitted that the aforesaid activities of a witness domiciled in Switzerland in re-
sponse to a request for a transfer of foreign evidence of a court abroad constitute a criminal of-
fence under Swiss law. A third party, however, who procures evidence based on a request of a 
litigant, who in turn was ordered to obtain evidence from such a witness, does not commit a 
criminal offence. Where a foreign witness voluntarily furnishes evidence without being re-
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quested to do so by a trial court, foreign sovereignty is not infringed. This holds particularly 
true with regard to Swiss law, where a witness residing in Switzerland does not commit a crim-
inal offence when voluntarily submitting evidence to a court abroad. 
The question regarding the admissibility of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence under 
public international law is strictly to be separated from the question as to how such a request 
must be transmitted to the foreign witness. In countries sharing the civil-law tradition, the ser-
vice of process is seen as a judicial act which is reserved to their own authorities. From the per-
spective of such countries, judicial documents addressed to witnesses domiciled within their 
territory and emanating from abroad thus have to be forwarded through channels of interna-
tional judicial assistance. Whether the foregoing also applies to requests for a transfer of for-
eign evidence is controversial. While the traditional approach advocates the transmission of 
such a request via international judicial assistance, the author suggests that the trial court may 
directly send the request to the foreign witness by postal channels, provided such a request is, 
where necessary, accompanied by an official translation and the competent authority of the for-
eign state is notified about the transmission and the content of the request. Under Swiss law, 
the transmission of a request for a transfer of foreign evidence without the involvement of the 
competent Swiss authorities is regarded as a criminal offence, unless the respective judicial 
document has no legal effect on the witness domiciled in Switzerland. 
From the countries dealt with in this thesis, only Switzerland and South Africa are members of 
an international convention on evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters. Switzerland is 
a party to the Hague Evidence Convention, and to the Hague Procedure Convention, whereas 
South Africa only acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention. While the Hague Procedure 
Convention merely provides for evidence-taking via a letter of request, the Hague Evidence 
Convention stipulates three methods, namely by letter of request, through a commissioner, and 
via a diplomatic officer or consular agent. Under the Hague Evidence Convention, South Afri-
ca declared, unlike Switzerland, that it would only execute letters of request and applications 
for evidence-taking by commissioners.  
In relation to countries, which are not parties to the aforesaid conventions, Switzerland applies 
by analogy the provisions of the Hague Procedure Convention. Accordingly, Swiss authorities 
take evidence for the benefit of foreign civil proceedings based on a letter of request and in ac-
cordance with its own rules. Swiss law does not contain a specific rule on the conditions under 
which a litigant in civil proceedings pending in Switzerland may apply to the Swiss court for 
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obtaining evidence abroad. Once the Swiss court has given leave to a relevant application, it 
issues a letter of request to the foreign state which may then take the evidence based on its own 
rules. 
Where a trial court wishes to obtain evidence in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Uganda based on courtoisie internationale, the legal situation in the said countries is very 
similar. Judicial assistance is granted based on the Foreign Courts Evidence Act (South Africa, 
Namibia), the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act (Botswana, Uganda), the Rules of the High 
Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria), the Supreme Court Act (South Africa), or the 
High Court Act (Namibia).
2
 Under the said rules, the competent authorities of the aforesaid 
countries appoint a commissioner who takes the evidence in accordance with the rules of the 
court which nominated him. Under the South African Protection of Businesses Act and the 
Namibian Second General Law Amendment Act, the execution of a request for taking evidence 
in South Africa and Namibia emanating from a foreign state requires the authorisation of the 
relevant Minister. Where a litigant in civil proceedings pending before a high court of one of 
the aforesaid countries wishes to obtain evidence located abroad, he has to apply, based on the 
Rules of the High Court (South Africa, Botswana), the High Court Act (Namibia), the Rules of 
the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria), or the Civil Procedure Rules (Ugan-
da), to the respective high court for a so-called “commission de bene esse”. When granting 
such an application, the high court issues a letter of request to the requested state which may 
then render judicial assistance in accordance with its own law. 
The means of proof and the principles governing the procedure for the taking of evidence in 
civil proceedings before a high court of the African countries dealt with in this thesis are very 
similar. Evidence can be given by the testimony of a witness, and by the presentation of docu-
mentary evidence and real evidence. Every person is competent and compellable to give evi-
dence, provided he is able to understand the questions put to him and to give reasonable an-
swers, and he cannot invoke any privilege.
3
 As a general principle, witnesses give evidence 
viva voce on oath before the trial court. They are interrogated by the parties’ counsel and sub-
ject to the latter’s examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination. Where a liti-
gant wishes to use documents as evidence, which are in the possession or control of the oppos-
ing party, he may require the latter to make discovery on oath of all relevant documents 
                                                     
2
 South African and Namibian law provide for two different procedures for obtaining evidence in South Africa 
and Namibia, respectively. 
3
 A witness may, amongst other things, refuse to answer questions which tend to incriminate him, or which refer 
to spousal communications or correspondence with a legal adviser. 
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relating to the matter in dispute. With regard to documents controlled by a third party, the liti-
gant has to call him as witness. Nigerian and Ugandan law not only provide for the discovery 
of documents, but also for the discovery of facts. By way of so-called “interrogatories”, a party 
may request the opponent to answer questions relating to any matters in question prior to the 
hearing.  
In civil proceedings pending in Switzerland, evidence may be given by witness testimony, 
documentary evidence, inspection, expert opinion, written information, party testimony, and 
testimony given under oath. Each person, who is mentally and physically fit to give evidence in 
court, is a competent witness. A third party may, however, decline to testify at all,
4
 or may 
merely refuse to answer specific questions.
5
 Unlike third parties, litigants cannot refuse to enter 
the witness box at all, but may refuse to answer specific questions.
6
 Litigants and third parties 
testify viva voce before the trial court. Their questioning is conducted by the court, while a liti-
gant may only put questions to the opponent and non-party witnesses via the judge. As a gen-
eral principle, witnesses do not testify under oath, but are exhorted to tell the truth. Experts are 
appointed by the judge and are regarded as aides of the court. It is also the judge who instructs 
the expert and formulates the questions he has to address. By contrast, experts selected by the 
litigants are regarded as ordinary non-party witnesses. Where parties offered sufficiently speci-
fied documents as evidence in their pleadings, the court issues orders wherein litigants and 
third parties are instructed to submit the relevant documents to the court where they can be in-
spected by the litigants. 
Based on the above, the main differences between the means of proof and the procedure of tak-
ing evidence in civil proceedings in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria and Uganda, 
and those in Switzerland are evident. Swiss law distinguishes between the evidence given by 
litigants, third parties, and experts. Moreover, the reasons based on which a witness in proceed-
ings before a Swiss judge may refuse to testify are less limited than in the aforesaid African 
countries. Under Swiss law, the procurement of evidence is under the control of the court, 
while in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda, such process is dominated by 
                                                     
4
 This may, for instance, be the case, where the third party is married to a party, has children with a party, or is a 
direct relative or in-law of a party. 
5
 This may, amongst other things, be the case for questions which may expose the third party, his spouse, a di-
rect relative or in-law to the risk of penal investigation or civil liability. The same holds true where the third 
party is privy to a statutorily protected secret, such as a lawyer, doctor, clergyman, journalist, or public offi-
cial. 
6
 This may, for instance, apply to questions which may expose the litigant’s spouse or his direct relative or in-
law to the risk of penal investigation or civil liability, or which may conflict with a statutorily protected secret. 
With regard to the latter, see fn. 5 above. 
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the parties. This holds particularly true with regard to the examination of witnesses. According-
ly, Swiss law does not recognise the examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-
examination. The same holds true for pre-trial discovery. In civil proceedings pending in Swit-
zerland, a litigant is under no obligation to furnish the opposing party with documents which 
may help the latter to advance his own case or damage the case of his adversary, unless the op-
ponent proffered such documents as evidence in his pleadings. 
Since Switzerland’s neighbouring countries and its main trading partners, as well as the vast 
majority of the member states of the European Union, are either party to the Hague Evidence 
Convention or the Hague Procedure Convention, Switzerland is fairly well-positioned with re-
gard to cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. The same holds true, 
albeit to a lesser extent, for South Africa being a contracting state to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, as its neighbouring countries are not members of the said Convention. Not being a 
party to any international agreement on evidence-taking in civil and commercial matters, the 
situation is even less favourable for the remainder of the African countries, including Botswa-
na, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda.
7
 These shortcomings could be overcome by either acceding 
to the Hague Evidence Convention and/or negotiating bilateral treaties. In this context, it has to 
be kept in mind that, on the one hand, the Hague Evidence Convention constitutes a compro-
mise solution to accommodate the needs of the civil- and common-law systems regarding evi-
dence-taking in civil and commercial matters, and that, on the other, bilateral treaties merely 
regulate the relation between the two states involved. By contrast, the draft of a new conven-
tion between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda can be tailored to the par-
ticular needs of the said countries and would create a uniform legal area in evidence-taking in 
civil and commercial matters between these countries.  
Needless to say, the said convention between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and 
Uganda should be drafted with the aim of enhancing and expediting the cross-border taking of 
evidence in these countries to the greatest possible extent. The convention should thus limit the 
involvement of the requested state to the necessary minimum and should allow for direct 
communication between the trial court and the foreign court in whose jurisdiction the evidence 
is located. It should moreover provide for the correspondence between the said courts to be 
conducted by email or fax. The reasons based on which the requested state can decline to grant 
international judicial assistance should be limited to an absolute minimum and should, in par-
                                                     
7
 With the exception of the Seychelles, which acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention, and Egypt and Mo-
rocco which both are party to the Hague Procedure Convention. 
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ticular, exclude the refusal based on public policy reasons. The convention should stipulate the 
examination by videolink as a primary method for taking evidence which is conducted by the 
trial court in accordance with the rules of the requesting state. Where the foreign witness refus-
es to cooperate with the trial court, the latter should be allowed to apply to the competent for-
eign court for coercive measures and such court should be under the obligation to use compul-
sion in the same manner as in domestic proceedings. 
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